case study of earthquake

Nepal Earthquake Case Studies

About the Project

On April 25, 2015, Nepal and its people experienced a 7.8 magnitude earthquake. On May 12, another major earthquake of 7.2 magnitude hit the country. In practice, his means that millions of Nepalis have lived and died under the weight of falling buildings, landslides, floods, hunger, and homelessness brought about by massive seismic shifts across the Himalayan belt. Most will refer to this as an earthquake, singular. But this is no singular disaster. The country has experienced more than 300 seismic events since April 25, 2015, and nearly 9000 people died as a direct result of the two most major earthquakes.

For most of Nepal’s approximately 30 million people, living uncertainty is old hat. Consider the legacies of civil war (1996-2006) followed by a decade of political instability and current struggles to write a viable constitution. But the spring of 2015 has cracked open new forms of vulnerability for most Nepalis. These quakes have caused enormous destruction to the nation’s rich cultural heritage, in the Kathmandu Valley and beyond. The countryside has experienced vast devastation. More than half a million homes have been destroyed or are precariously habitable. This equates to about 2.5 million internally displaced. More than 3,500 schools have been destroyed and nearly as many health posts. There has been widespread damage to highways and road networks; glacial lakes are in danger of bursting; landslides are a constant threat, and have continued to wipe out settlements; many hydroelectric dams have been damaged; water borne illness and other public health challenges loom as monsoon has arrived. Even so, Nepalis are showing incredible resilience, creativity, and deep commitments to helping each other through this suffering.

This project – in the context of ANTH 55: Anthropology of Global Health – explores the human impacts of these disasters by asking students to engage in collective research and writing of case studies focused on specific areas of inquiry related to the earthquake.

The assumption of this project is not that students will become “experts” either on Nepal or on the health effects of earthquakes, but that they will amass sufficient knowledge about their area of inquiry so that they can contribute to an effort to expand knowledge and understanding of this event to others, and expand in the process their own conceptualization of what “global health” is, where and how it occurs, and how it links to many other aspects of human life.

• Share full article

Advertisement

How Haiti Was Devastated by Two Natural Disasters in Three Days

By Tim Wallace Ashley Wu and Jugal K. Patel Aug. 18, 2021

Aug. 14 Epicenter

of earthquake

Aug. 16 Storm path of Grace

A magnitude-7.2 earthquake struck Haiti Saturday morning, killing more than 1,900 and leaving thousands injured and displaced from their homes. As people in the affected regions in the country’s southwest worked to recover with scarce res ources , a severe storm — Grace, then a tropical depression — drenched Haiti in heavy rain on Monday, bringing with it flash floods and the threat of mudslides , which could further delay recovery.

Area affected by earthquake

and storm in Haiti

Lower population

Damage reported

Petit-Trou-de-

Anse-à-Veau

Aug. 16, 8 p.m.

Storm batters Haiti

Aug. 17, 2 a.m.

Path of Tropical

Storm Grace

Aug. 16, 2 p.m.

Very strong shaking

Strong shaking

Moderate shaking

Light shaking

Path of Grace,

now a tropical storm

Although some light shaking from the earthquake could be felt as far as Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, 80 miles from the epicenter, major damage was concentrated in the country’s Nippes, Sud, and Grand’Anse departments. When the shaking subsided, vast swaths of Haiti had ever so slightly moved. The map below shows displaced areas in Haiti, evidence of where the earth shifted after the earthquake.

Petit-Trou-

Epicenter of

magnitude-7.2

How much the ground

sank or rose

1 foot or more

A number of homes and school buildings were damaged in Les Cayes, a seaport community about 20 miles from the earthquake’s epicenter. Local hospitals were quickly overwhelmed , and a very limited number of doctors and surgeons worked through the night to triage victims. Temporary operating rooms near the main airport in Les Cayes were erected, as people tried to evacuate their loved ones to Port-au-Prince for emergency care.

Even before the quake, living conditions had been unstable for many Haitians as the pandemic added to severe poverty, gang violence and political trauma — the still-unsolved July 7 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse .

The earthquake also destroyed several churches that have served as sources of aid and stability to surrounding communities, especially to those that receive little support from the government.

Among the collapsed buildings in Les Cayes was Hôtel Le Manguier, where rescue teams continued to dig through the rubble and remove debris in the days after the earthquake hit.

Hôtel Le Manguier in Les Cayes

Jan. 24, 2020

Aug. 15, 2021

People in Les Cayes who lost their homes spent Monday night sheltering under plastic sheets in makeshift camps or fleeing flooded refugee camps as the storm passed through.

Jérémie, the capital city of the Grand’Anse department in Haiti, also suffered severe damage. Just five years ago, Jérémie was hit by Hurricane Matthew , which destroyed a wave of development that had brought hotels, cell phone service and new roads to the previously isolated region. Saturday’s earthquake caused destruction that overwhelmed the city’s main hospital and triggered a landslide that cut off access to the road leading to the city.

Like in Les Cayes, several churches in Jérémie were damaged, including the St. Louis King of France Cathedral, a landmark place of worship in the area that had also been damaged by Hurricane Matthew.

St. Louis King of France Cathedral in Jérémie

Aug. 14, 2020

Petit-Trou-De-Nippes

In Petit-Trou-De-Nippes, just five miles from the earthquake’s epicenter, phone lines were down in the area with no news immediately available. Landslides in nearby cities were recorded, according to the National Human Rights Defense Network, leaving parts of the Nippes department accessible only by motorcycle or sea.

Because of an editing error, an earlier version of this article misspelled the given name of the Haitian president who was assassinated last month. He was Jovenel Moïse, not Juvenel.

Learning from Megadisasters: A Decade of Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake

March 11, 2021 Tokyo, Japan

Authors: Shoko Takemoto,  Naho Shibuya, and Keiko Sakoda

Today marks the ten-year anniversary of the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE), a mega-disaster that marked Japan and the world with its unprecedented scale of destruction. This feature story commemorates the disaster by reflecting on what it has taught us over the past decade in regards to infrastructure resilience, risk identification, reduction, and preparedness, and disaster risk finance.  Since GEJE, the World Bank in partnership with the Government of Japan, especially through the Japan-World Bank Program on Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Management in Developing Countries has been working with Japanese and global partners to understand impact, response, and recovery from this megadisaster to identify larger lessons for disaster risk management (DRM).

Among the numerous lessons learned over the past decade of GEJE reconstruction and analysis, we highlight three common themes that have emerged repeatedly through the examples of good practices gathered across various sectors.  First is the importance of planning. Even though disasters will always be unexpected, if not unprecedented, planning for disasters has benefits both before and after they occur. Second is that resilience is strengthened when it is shared .  After a decade since GEJE, to strengthen the resilience of infrastructure, preparedness, and finance for the next disaster, throughout Japan national and local governments, infrastructure developers and operators, businesses and industries, communities and households are building back better systems by prearranging mechanisms for risk reduction, response and continuity through collaboration and mutual support.  Third is that resilience is an iterative process .  Many adaptations were made to the policy and regulatory frameworks after the GEJE. Many past disasters show that resilience is an interactive process that needs to be adjusted and sustained over time, especially before a disaster strikes.

As the world is increasingly tested to respond and rebuild from unexpected impacts of extreme weather events and the COVID-19 pandemic, we highlight some of these efforts that may have relevance for countries around the world seeking to improve their preparedness for disaster events.

Introduction: The Triple Disaster, Response and Recovery

On March 11th, 2011 a Magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck off the northeast coast of Japan, near the Tohoku region. The force of the earthquake sent a tsunami rushing towards the Tohoku coastline, a black wall of water which wiped away entire towns and villages. Sea walls were overrun. 20,000 lives were lost. The scale of destruction to housing, infrastructure, industry and agriculture was extreme in Fukushima, Iwate, and Miyagi prefectures. In addition to the hundreds of thousands who lost their homes, the earthquake and tsunami contributed to an accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, requiring additional mass evacuations. The impacts not only shook Japan’s society and economy as a whole, but also had ripple effects in global supply chains. In the 21st century, a disaster of this scale is a global phenomenon.

The severity and complexity of the cascading disasters was not anticipated. The events during and following the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) showed just how ruinous and complex a low-probability, high-impact disaster can be. However, although the impacts of the triple-disaster were devastating, Japan’s legacy of DRM likely reduced losses. Japan’s structural investments in warning systems and infrastructure were effective in many cases, and preparedness training helped many act and evacuate quickly. The large spatial impact of the disaster, and the region’s largely rural and elderly population, posed additional challenges for response and recovery.

Ten years after the megadisaster, the region is beginning to return to a sense of normalcy, even if many places look quite different. After years in rapidly-implemented temporary prefabricated housing, most people have moved into permanent homes, including 30,000 new units of public housing . Damaged infrastructure has been also restored or is nearing completion in the region, including rail lines, roads, and seawalls.

In 2014, three years after GEJE, The World Bank published Learning from Megadisasters: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake . Edited by Federica Ranghieri and Mikio Ishiwatari , the volume brought together dozens of experts ranging from seismic engineers to urban planners, who analyzed what happened on March 11, 2011 and the following days, months, and years; compiling lessons for other countries in 36 comprehensive Knowledge Notes . This extensive research effort identified a number of key learnings in multiple sectors, and emphasized the importance of both structural and non-structural measures, as well as identifying effective strategies both pre- and post-disaster. The report highlighted four central lessons after this intensive study of the GEJE disaster, response, and initial recovery:

1) A holistic, rather than single-sector approach to DRM improves preparedness for complex disasters; 2) Investing in prevention is important, but is not a substitute for preparedness; 3) Each disaster is an opportunity to learn and adapt; 4) Effective DRM requires bringing together diverse stakeholders, including various levels of government, community and nonprofit actors, and the private sector.

Although these lessons are learned specifically from the GEJE, the report also focuses on learnings with broader applicability.

Over recent years, the Japan-World Bank Program on Mainstreaming DRM in Developing Countries has furthered the work of the Learning from Megadisasters report, continuing to gather, analyze and share the knowledge and lessons learned from GEJE, together with past disaster experiences, to enhance the resilience of next generation development investments around the world. Ten years on from the GEJE, we take a moment to revisit the lessons gathered, and reflect on how they may continue to be relevant in the next decade, in a world faced with both seismic disasters and other emergent hazards such as pandemics and climate change.

Through synthesizing a decade of research on the GEJE and accumulation of the lessons from the past disaster experience, this story highlights three key strategies which recurred across many of the cases we studied. They are:

1) the importance of planning for disasters before they strike, 2) DRM cannot be addressed by either the public or private sector alone but enabled only when it is shared among many stakeholders , 3) institutionalize the culture of continuous enhancement of the resilience .

For example, business continuity plans, or BCPs, can help both public and private organizations minimize damages and disruptions . BCPs are documents prepared in advance which provide guidance on how to respond to a disruption and resume the delivery of products and services. Additionally, the creation of pre-arranged agreements among independent public and/or private organizations can help share essential responsibilities and information both before and after a disaster . This might include agreements with private firms to repair public infrastructures, among private firms to share the costs of mitigation infrastructure, or among municipalities to share rapid response teams and other resources. These three approaches recur throughout the more specific lessons and strategies identified in the following section, which is organized along the three areas of disaster risk management: resilient infrastructure; risk identification, reduction and preparednes s ; and disaster risk finance and insurance.

Lessons from the Megadisaster

Resilient Infrastructure

The GEJE had severe impacts on critical ‘lifelines’—infrastructures and facilities that provide essential services such as transportation, communication, sanitation, education, and medical care. Impacts of megadisasters include not only damages to assets (direct impacts), but also disruptions of key services, and the resulting social and economic effects (indirect impacts). For example, the GEJE caused a water supply disruption for up to 500,000 people in Sendai city, as well as completely submerging the city’s water treatment plant. [i] Lack of access to water and sanitation had a ripple effect on public health and other emergency services, impacting response and recovery. Smart investment in infrastructure resilience can help minimize both direct and indirect impacts, reducing lifeline disruptions. The 2019 report Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity found through a global study that every dollar invested in the resilience of lifelines had a $4 benefit in the long run.

In the case of water infrastructure , the World Bank report Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services: The Case of Japan documents how Sendai City learned from the disaster to improve the resilience of these infrastructures. [ii] Steps included retrofitting existing systems with seismic resilience upgrades, enhancing business continuity planning for sanitation systems, and creating a geographic information system (GIS)-based asset management system that allows for quick identification and repair of damaged pipes and other assets. During the GEJE, damages and disruptions to water delivery services were minimized through existing programs, including mutual aid agreements with other water supply utility operators. Through these agreements, the Sendai City Waterworks Bureau received support from more than 60 water utilities to provide emergency water supplies. Policies which promote structural resilience strategies were also essential to preserving water and sanitation services. After the 1995 Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake (GHAE), Japanese utilities invested in earthquake resistant piping in water supply and sanitation systems. The commonly used earthquake-resistant ductile iron pipe (ERDIP) has not shown any damage from major earthquakes including the 2011 GEJE and the 2016 Kumamoto earthquake. [iii] Changes were also made to internal policies after the GEJE based on the challenges faced, such as decentralizing emergency decision-making and providing training for local communities to set up emergency water supplies without utility workers with the goal of speeding up recovery efforts. [iv]

Redundancy is another structural strategy that contributed to resilience during and after GEJE. In Sendai City, redundancy and seismic reinforcement in water supply infrastructure allowed the utility to continue to operate pipelines that were not physically damaged in the earthquake. [v] The Lifelines report describes how in the context of telecommunications infrastructure , the redundancy created through a diversity of routes in Japan’s submarine internet cable system  limited disruptions to national connectivity during the megadisaster. [vi] However, the report emphasizes that redundancy must be calibrated to the needs and resources of a particular context. For private firms, redundancy and backups for critical infrastructure can be achieved through collaboration; after the GEJE, firms are increasingly collaborating to defray the costs of these investments. [vii]

The GEJE also illustrated the importance of planning for transportation resilience . A Japan Case Study Report on Road Geohazard Risk Management shows the role that both national policy and public-private agreements can play. In response to the GEJE, Japan’s central disaster legislation, the DCBA (Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act) was amended in 2012, with particular focus on the need to reopen roads for emergency response. Quick road repairs were made possible after the GEJE in part due to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT)’s emergency action plans, the swift action of the rapid response agency Technical Emergency Control Force (TEC-FORCE), and prearranged agreements with private construction companies for emergency recovery work. [viii] During the GEJE, roads were used as evacuation sites and were shown effective in controlling the spread of floods. After the disaster, public-private partnerships (PPPs) were also made to accommodate the use of expressway embankments as tsunami evacuation sites. As research on Resilient Infrastructure PPPs highlights, clear definitions of roles and responsibilities are essential to effective arrangements between the government and private companies. In Japan, lessons from the GEJE and other earthquakes have led to a refinement of disaster definitions, such as numerical standards for triggering force majeure provisions of infrastructure PPP contracts. In Sendai City, clarifying the post-disaster responsibilities of public and private actors across various sectors sped up the response process. [ix] This experience was built upon after the disaster, when Miyagi prefecture conferred operation of the Sendai International Airport   to a private consortium through a concession scheme which included refined force majeure definitions. In the context of a hazard-prone region, the agreement clearly defines disaster-related roles and responsibilities as well as relevant triggering events. [x]

Partnerships for creating backup systems that have value in non-disaster times have also proved effective in the aftermath of the GEJE. As described in Resilient Industries in Japan , Toyota’s automotive plant in Ohira village, Miyagi Prefecture lost power for two weeks following GEJE. To avoid such losses in the future, companies in the industrial park sought to secure energy during power outages and shortages by building the F-Grid, their own mini-grid system with a comprehensive energy management system. The F-Grid project is a collaboration of 10 companies and organizations in the Ohira Industrial Park. As a system used exclusively for backup energy would be costly, the system is also used to improve energy efficiency in the park during normal times. The project was supported by funding from Japan’s “Smart Communities'' program. [xi] In 2016, F-grid achieved a 24 percent increase in energy efficiency and a 31 percent reduction in carbon dioxide emissions compared to similarly sized parks. [xii]

Schools are also critical infrastructures, for their education and community roles, and also because they are commonly used as evacuation centers. Japan has updated seismic resilience standards for schools over time, integrating measures against different risks and vulnerabilities revealed after each disaster, as documented in the report Making Schools Resilient at Scale . After the 2011 GEJE, there was very little earthquake-related damage; rather, most damage was caused by the tsunami. However, in some cases damages to nonstructural elements like suspending ceilings in school gymnasiums limited the possibility of using these spaces after the disaster. After the disaster, a major update was made to the policies on the safety of nonstructural elements in schools, given the need for higher resilience standards for their function as post-disaster evacuation centers [xiii] .

Similarly, for building regulations , standards and professional training modules were updated taking the lessons learned from GEJE. The Converting Disaster Experience into a Safer Built Environment: The Case of Japan report highlights that, legal framework like, The Building Standard Law/Seismic Retrofitting Promotion Law, was amended further enhance the structural resilience of the built environment, including strengthening structural integrity, improving the efficiency of design review process, as well as mandating seismic diagnosis of large public buildings. Since the establishment of the legal and regulatory framework for building safety in early 1900, Japan continued incremental effort to create enabling environment for owners, designers, builders and building officials to make the built environment safer together.

Cultural heritage also plays an important role in creating healthy communities, and the loss or damage of these items can scar the cohesion and identity of a community. The report Resilient Cultural Heritage: Learning from the Japanese Experience shows how the GEJE highlighted the importance of investing in the resilience of cultural properties, such as through restoration budgets and response teams, which enabled the relocation of at-risk items and restoration of properties during and after the GEJE. After the megadisaster, the volunteer organization Shiryō-Net was formed to help rescue and preserve heritage properties, and this network has now spread across Japan. [xiv] Engaging both volunteer and government organizations in heritage preservation can allow for a more wide-ranging response. Cultural properties can play a role in healing communities wrought by disasters: in Ishinomaki City, the restoration of a historic storehouse served as a symbol of reconstruction [xv] , while elsewhere repair of cultural heritage sites and the celebration of cultural festivals served a stimulant for recovery. [xvi] Cultural heritage also played a preventative role during and after the disaster by embedding the experience of prior disasters in the built environment. Stone monuments which marked the extent of historic tsunamis served as guides for some residents, who fled uphill past the stones and escaped the dangerous waters. [xvii] This suggests a potential role for cultural heritage in instructing future generations about historic hazards.

These examples of lessons from the GEJE highlight how investing in resilient infrastructure is essential, but must also be done smartly, with emphasis on planning, design, and maintenance. Focusing on both minimizing disaster impacts and putting processes in place to facilitate speedy infrastructure restoration can reduce both direct and indirect impacts of megadisasters.  Over the decade since GEJE, many examples and experiences on how to better invest in resilient infrastructure, plan for service continuity and quick response, and catalyze strategic partnerships across diverse groups are emerging from Japan.

Risk Identification, Reduction, and Preparedness

Ten years after the GEJE, a number of lessons have emerged as important in identifying, reducing, and preparing for disaster risks. Given the unprecedented nature of the GEJE, it is important to be prepared for both known and uncertain risks. Information and communication technology (ICT) can play a role in improving risk identification and making evidence-based decisions for disaster risk reduction and preparedness. Communicating these risks to communities, in a way people can take appropriate mitigation action, is a key . These processes also need to be inclusive , involving diverse stakeholders--including women, elders , and the private sector--that need to be engaged and empowered to understand, reduce, and prepare for disasters. Finally, resilience is never complete . Rather, as the adaptations made by Japan after the GEJE and many past disasters show, resilience is a continuous process that needs to be adjusted and sustained over time, especially in times before a disaster strikes.

Although DRM is central in Japan, the scale of the 2011 triple disaster dramatically exceeded expectations. After the GEJE, as Chapter 32 of Learning From Megadisasters highlights, the potential of low-probability, high-impact events led Japan to focus on both structural and nonstructural disaster risk management measures. [xviii] Mitigation and preparedness strategies can be designed to be effective for both predicted and uncertain risks. Planning for a multihazard context, rather than only individual hazards, can help countries act quickly even when the unimaginable occurs. Identifying, preparing for, and reducing disaster risks all play a role in this process.

The GEJE highlighted the important role ICT can play in both understanding risk and making evidence-based decisions for risk identification, reduction, and preparedness. As documented in the World Bank report Information and Communication Technology for Disaster Risk Management in Japan , at the time of the GEJE, Japan had implemented various ICT systems for disaster response and recovery, and the disaster tested the effectiveness of these systems. During the GEJE, Japan’s “Earthquake Early Warning System” (EEWS) issued a series of warnings. Through the detection of initial seismic waves, EEWS can provide a warning of a few seconds or minutes, allowing quick action by individuals and organizations. Japan Railways’ “Urgent Earthquake Detection and Alarm System” (UrEDAS) automatically activated emergency brakes of 27 Shinkansen train lines , successfully bringing all trains to a safe stop. After the disaster, Japan expanded emergency alert delivery systems. [xix]

The World Bank’s study on Preparedness Maps shows how seismic preparedness maps are used in Japan to communicate location specific primary and secondary hazards from earthquakes, promoting preparedness at the community and household level. Preparedness maps are regularly updated after disaster events, and since 2011 Japan has promoted risk reduction activities to prepare for the projected maximum likely tsunami [xx] .

Effective engagement of various stakeholders is also important to preparedness mapping and other disaster preparedness activities. This means engaging and empowering diverse groups including women, the elderly, children, and the private sector. Elders are a particularly important demographic in the context of the GEJE, as the report Elders Leading the Way to Resilience illustrates. Tohoku is an aging region, and two-thirds of lives lost from the GEJE were over 60 years old. Research shows that building trust and social ties can reduce disaster impacts- after GEJE, a study found that communities with high social capital lost fewer residents to the tsunami. [xxi] Following the megadisaster, elders in Ofunato formed the Ibasho Cafe, a community space for strengthening social capital among older people. The World Bank has explored the potential of the Ibasho model for other contexts , highlighting how fueling social capital and engaging elders in strengthening their community can have benefits for both normal times and improve resilience when a disaster does strike.

Conducting simulation drills regularly provide another way of engaging stakeholders in preparedness. As described in Learning from Disaster Simulation Drills in Japan , [xxii] after the 1995 GHAE the first Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework was developed as a guide for the execution of a comprehensive system of disaster response drills and establishing links between various disaster management agencies. The Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework is updated annually by the Central Disaster Management Council. The GEJE led to new and improved drill protocols in the impacted region and in Japan as a whole. For example, the 35th Joint Disaster simulation Drill was held in the Tokyo metropolitan region in 2015 to respond to issues identified during the GEJE, such as improving mutual support systems among residents, governments, and organizations; verifying disaster management plans; and improving disaster response capabilities of government agencies. In addition to regularly scheduled disaster simulation drills, GEJE memorial events are held in Japan annually to memorialize victims and keep disaster preparedness in the public consciousness.

Business continuity planning (BCP) is another key strategy that shows how ongoing attention to resilience is also essential for both public and private sector organizations. As Resilient Industries in Japan demonstrates, after the GEJE, BCPs helped firms reduce disaster losses and recover quickly, benefiting employees, supply chains, and the economy at large. BCP is supported by many national policies in Japan, and after the GEJE, firms that had BCPs in place had reduced impacts on their financial soundness compared to firms that did not. [xxiii] The GEJE also led to the update and refinement of BCPs across Japan. Akemi industrial park in Aichi prefecture, began business continuity planning at the scale of the industrial park three years before the GEJE. After the GEJE, the park revised their plan, expanding focus on the safety of workers. National policies in Japan promote the development of BCPs, including the 2013 Basic Act for National Resilience, which was developed after the GEJE and emphasizes resilience as a shared goal across multiple sectors. [xxiv] Japan also supports BCP development for public sector organizations including subnational governments and infrastructure operators. By 2019, all of Japan’s prefectural governments, and nearly 90% of municipal governments had developed BCPs. [xxv] The role of financial institutions in incentivizing BCPs is further addressed in the following section.

The ongoing nature of these preparedness actions highlights that resilience is a continuous process. Risk management strategies must be adapted and sustained over time, especially during times without disasters. This principle is central to Japan’s disaster resilience policies. In late 2011, based on a report documenting the GEJE from the Expert Committee on Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster Management, Japan amended the DCBA (Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act) to enhance its multi-hazard countermeasures, adding a chapter on tsunami countermeasures. [xxvi]

Disaster Risk Finance and Insurance

Disasters can have a large financial impact, not only in the areas where they strike, but also at the large scale of supply chains and national economy. For example, the GEJE led to the shutdown of nuclear power plants across Japan, resulting in a 50% decrease in energy production and causing national supply disruptions. The GEJE has illustrated the importance of disaster risk finance and insurance (DRFI) such as understanding and clarifying contingent liabilities and allocating contingency budgets, putting in place financial protection measures for critical lifeline infrastructure assets and services, and developing mechanisms for vulnerable businesses and households to quickly access financial support. DRFI mechanisms can help people, firms, and critical infrastructure avoid or minimize disruptions, continue operations, and recover quickly after a disaster.

Pre-arranged agreements, including public-private partnerships, are key strategies for the financial protection of critical infrastructure. The report Financial Protection of Critical Infrastructure Services (forthcoming) [xxvii] shows how pre-arranged agreements between the public sector and private sector for post-disaster response can facilitate rapid infrastructure recovery after disasters, reducing the direct and indirect impacts of infrastructure disruptions, including economic impacts. GEJE caused devastating impacts to the transportation network across Japan. Approximately 2,300 km of expressways were closed, representing 65 percent of expressways managed by NEXCO East Japan , resulting in major supply chain disruptions [xxviii] .  However, with the activation of pre-arranged agreements between governments and local construction companies for road clearance and recovery work, allowing damaged major motorways to be repaired within one week of the earthquake. This quick response allowed critical access for other emergency services to further relief and recovery operations.

The GEJE illustrated the importance of clearly defining post-disaster financial roles and responsibilities among public and private actors in order to restore critical infrastructure rapidly . World Bank research on Catastrophe Insurance Programs for Public Assets highlights how the Japan Railway Construction, Transport and Technology Agency  (JRTT) uses insurance to reduce the contingent liabilities of critical infrastructure to ease impacts to government budgets in the event of a megadisaster. Advance agreements between the government, infrastructure owners and operators, and insurance companies clearly outline how financial responsibilities will be shared in the event of a disaster. In the event of a megadisaster like GEJE, the government pays a large share of recovery costs, which enables the Shinkansen bullet train service to be restored more rapidly. [xxix]

The Resilient Industries in Japan   report highlights how diverse and comprehensive disaster risk financing methods are also important to promoting a resilient industry sector . After the GEJE, 90% of bankruptcies linked to the disaster were due to indirect impacts such as supply chain disruptions. This means that industries located elsewhere are also vulnerable: a study found that six years after GEJE, a greater proportion of bankruptcy declarations were located in Tokyo than Tohoku. [xxx] Further, firms without disaster risk financing in place had much higher increases in debt levels than firms with preexisting risk financing mechanisms in place. [xxxi] Disaster risk financing can play a role pre-disaster, through mechanisms such as low-interest loans, guarantees, insurance, or grants which incentivize the creation of BCPs and other mitigation and preparedness measures.  When a disaster strikes, financial mechanisms that support impacted businesses, especially small or medium enterprises and women-owned businesses, can help promote equitable recovery and help businesses survive. For financial institutions, simply keeping banks open after a major disaster can support response and recovery. After the GEJE, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) and local banks leveraged pre-arranged agreements to maintain liquidity, opening the first weekend after the disaster to help minimize economic disruptions. [xxxii] These strategies highlight the important role of finance in considering economic needs before a disaster strikes, and having systems in place to act quickly to limit both economic and infrastructure service impacts of disasters.

Looking to the Future

Ten years after the GEJE, these lessons in the realms of resilient infrastructure, risk identification, reduction and preparedness, and DRFI are significant not only for parts of the world preparing for tsunamis and other seismic hazards, but also for many of the other types of hazards faced around the globe in 2021. In Japan, many of the lessons of the GEJE are being applied to the projected Nankai Trough and Tokyo Inland earthquakes, for example through modelling risks and mapping evacuation routes, implementing scenario planning exercises and evacuation drills , or even prearranging a post-disaster reconstruction vision and plans. These resilience measures are taken not only individually but also through innovative partnerships for collaboration across regions, sectors, and organizations including public-private agreements to share resources and expertise in the event of a major disaster.

The ten-year anniversary of the GEJE finds the world in the midst of the multiple emergencies of the global COVID-19 pandemic, environmental and technological hazards, and climate change. Beyond seismic hazards, the global pandemic has highlighted, for example, the risks of supply chain disruption due to biological emergencies. Climate change is also increasing hazard exposure in Japan and around the globe. Climate change is a growing concern for its potential to contribute to hydrometeorological hazards such as flooding and hurricanes, and for its potential to play a role in secondary or cascading hazards such as fire. In the era of climate change, disasters will increasingly be ‘unprecedented’, and so GEJE offers important lessons on preparing for low-probability high-impact disasters and planning under uncertain conditions in general.

Over the last decade, the World Bank has drawn upon the GEJE megadisaster experience to learn how to better prepare for and recover from low-probability high-impact disasters. While we have identified a number of diverse strategies here, ranging from technological and structural innovations to improving the engagement of diverse stakeholders, three themes recur throughout infrastructure resilience, risk preparedness, and disaster finance. First, planning in advance for how organizations will prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters is essential, i.e. through the creation of BCPs by both public and private organizations. Second, pre-arranged agreements amongst organizations for sharing resources, knowledge, and financing in order to mitigate, prepare, respond and recover together from disasters and other unforeseen events are highly beneficial. Third, only with continuous reflection, learning and update on what worked and what didn’t work after each disasters can develop the adaptive capacities needed to manage ever increasing and unexpected risks. Preparedness is an incremental and interactive process.

These lessons from the GEJE on the importance of BCPs and pre-arranged agreements both emphasize larger principles that can be brought to bear in the context of emergent climate and public health crises. Both involve planning for the potential of disaster before it strikes. BCPs and pre-arranged agreements are both made under blue-sky conditions, which allow frameworks to be put in place for advanced mitigation and preparedness, and rapid post-disaster response and recovery. While it is impossible to know exactly what future crises a locale will face, these processes often have benefits that make places and organizations better able to act in the face of unlikely or unpredicted events. The lessons above regarding BCPs and pre-arranged agreements also highlight that neither the government nor the private sector alone have all the tools to prepare for and respond to disasters. Rather, the GEJE shows the importance of both public and private organizations adopting BCPs, and the value of creating pre-arranged agreements among and across public and private groups. By making disaster preparedness a key consideration for all organizations, and bringing diverse stakeholders together to make plans for when a crisis strikes, these strengthened networks and planning capacities have the potential to bear benefits not only in an emergency but in the everyday operations of organizations and countries.

Back to Top

Additional Resources

Program Overview

• Japan-World Bank Program on Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Management in Developing Countries

Reports and Case Studies Featuring Lessons from GEJE

• Learning from Megadisasters: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake  (PDF)
• Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity  (PDF)
• Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services: The Case of Japan  (PDF)
• Japan Case Study Report on Road Geohazard Risk Management  (PDF)
• Resilient Infrastructure PPPs  (PDF)
• Making Schools Resilient at Scale  (PDF)
• Converting Disaster Experience into a Safer Built Environment: The Case of Japan  (PDF)
• Resilient Cultural Heritage: Learning from the Japanese Experience  (PDF)
• Information and Communication Technology for Disaster Risk Management in Japan
• Resilient Industries in Japan : Lessons Learned in Japan on Enhancing Competitiveness in the Face of Disasters by Natural Hazards (PDF)
• Preparedness Maps for Community Resilience: Earthquakes. Experience from Japan  (PDF)
• Elders Leading the Way to Resilience  (PDF)
• Ibasho: Strengthening community-driven preparedness and resilience in Philippines and Nepal by leveraging Japanese expertise and experience  (PDF)
• Learning from Disaster Simulation Drills in Japan  (PDF)
• Catastrophe Insurance Programs for Public Assets  (PDF)
• PPP contract clauses unveiled: the World Bank’s 2017 Guidance on PPP Contractual Provisions
• Learning from Japan: PPPs for infrastructure resilience

Audiovisual Resources on GEJE and its Reconstruction Processes in English

• NHK documentary: 3/11-The Tsunami: The First 3 Days
• NHK: 342 Stories of Resilience and Remembrance
• Densho Road 3.11: Journey to Experience the Lessons from the Disaster - Tohoku, Japan
• Sendai City: Disaster-Resilient and Environmentally-Friendly City
• Sendai City: Eastern Coastal Area Today, 2019 Fall

[i]   Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services  report, p.63

[ii]   Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services  report, p.63

[iii]   Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services  report, p.8

[iv]   Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services  report, p.71

[v]   Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services  report, p.63

[vi]   Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity  report, p.115

[vii] Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity  report, p.133

[viii]   Japan Case Study Report on Road Geohazard Risk Management  report, p.30

[ix]   Resilient Infrastructure PPPs  report, p.8-9

[x]   Resilient Infrastructure PPPs  report, p.39-40

[xi]   Resilient Industries in Japan  report, p.153.

[xii]   Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity  report, p. 132

[xiii]   Making Schools Resilient at Scale  report, p.24

[xiv]   Resilient Cultural Heritage  report, p.62

[xv]   Learning from Megadisasters  report, p.326

[xvi]   Resilient Cultural Heritage  report, p.69

[xvii]   Learning from Megadisasters  report, p.100

[xviii] Learning from Megadisasters  report, p.297.

[xix]  J-ALERT, Japan’s nationwide early warning system, had 46% implementation at GEJE, and in communities where it was implemented earthquake early warnings were successfully received. Following GEJE, GOJ invested heavily in J-ALERT adoption (JPY 14B), bearing 50% of implementation costs. In 2013 GOJ spent JPY 773M to implement J-ALERT in municipalities that could not afford the expense. In 2014 MIC heavily promoted the L-ALERT system (formerly “Public Information Commons”), achieving 100% adoption across municipalities. Since GEJE, Japan has updated the EEWS to include a hybrid method of earthquake prediction, improving the accuracy of predictions and warnings.

[xx]  Related resources: NHK, “#1 TSUNAMI BOSAI: Science that Can Save Your Life”  https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/ondemand/video/3004665/  ; NHK “BOSAI: Be Prepared - Hazard Maps”  https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/ondemand/video/2084002/

[xxi]  Aldrich, Daniel P., and Yasuyuki Sawada. "The physical and social determinants of mortality in the 3.11 tsunami." Social Science & Medicine 124 (2015): 66-75.

[xxii]   Learning from Disaster Simulation Drills in Japan  Report, p. 14

[xxiii]  Matsushita and Hideshima. 2014. “Influence over Financial Statement of Listed Manufacturing Companies by the GEJE, the Effect of BCP and Risk Financing.” [In Japanese.] Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineering 70 (1): 33–43.  https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jscejsp/70/1/70_33/_pdf/-char/ja .

[xxiv]   Resilient Industries in Japan  report, p. 56

[xxv]  MIC (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications). 2019. “Survey Results of Business Continuity Plan Development Status in Local Governments.” [In Japanese.] Press release, MIC, Tokyo.  https://www.fdma.go.jp/pressrelease/houdou/items/011226bcphoudou.pdf .

[xxvi]   Japan Case Study Report on Road Geohazard Risk Management  report, p.17.

[xxvii]  The World Bank. 2021. “Financial Protection of Critical Infrastructure Services.” Technical Report – Contribution to 2020 APEC Finance Ministers Meeting.

[xxviii]   Resilient Industries in Japan  report, p. 119

[xxix]  Tokio Marine Holdings, Inc. 2019. “The Role of Insurance Industry to Strengthen Resilience of Infrastructure—Experience in Japan.” APEC seminar on Disaster Risk Finance.

[xxx]  TDB (Teikoku DataBank). 2018. “Trends in Bankruptcies 6 Years after the Great East Japan Earthquake.” [In Japanese.] TDB, Tokyo.  https://www.tdb.co.jp/report/watching/press/pdf/p170301.pdf .

[xxxi]  Matsushita and Hideshima. 2014. “Influence over Financial Statement of Listed Manufacturing Companies by the GEJE, the Effect of BCP and Risk Financing.” [In Japanese.] Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineering 70 (1): 33–43.  https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jscejsp/70/1/70_33/_pdf/-char/ja .

[xxxii]   Resilient Industries in Japan  report, p. 145

Bhuj Earthquake India 2001 – A Complete Study

Bhuj earthquake india.

Gujarat : Disaster on a day of celebration : 51st Republic Day on January 26, 2001

• 7.9 on the Richter scale.
• 8.46 AM January 26th 2001
• 20,800 dead

Basic Facts

• Earthquake: 8:46am on January 26, 2001
• Epicenter: Near Bhuj in Gujarat, India
• Magnitude: 7.9 on the Richter Scale

Geologic Setting

• Indian Plate Sub ducting beneath Eurasian Plate
• Continental Drift
• Convergent Boundary

Specifics of 2001 Quake

Compression Stress between region’s faults

Depth: 16km

Probable Fault: Kachchh Mainland

Fault Type: Reverse Dip-Slip (Thrust Fault)

The earthquake’s epicentre was 20km from Bhuj. A city with a population of 140,000 in 2001. The city is in the region known as the Kutch region. The effects of the earthquake were also felt on the north side of the Pakistan border, in Pakistan 18 people were killed.

Tectonic systems

The earthquake was caused at the convergent plate boundary between the Indian plate and the Eurasian plate boundary. These pushed together and caused the earthquake. However as Bhuj is in an intraplate zone, the earthquake was not expected, this is one of the reasons so many buildings were destroyed – because people did not build to earthquake resistant standards in an area earthquakes were not thought to occur. In addition the Gujarat earthquake is an excellent example of liquefaction, causing buildings to ‘sink’ into the ground which gains a consistency of a liquid due to the frequency of the earthquake.

India : Vulnerability to earthquakes

• 56% of the total area of the Indian Republic is vulnerable to seismic activity .
• 12% of the area comes under Zone V (A&N Islands, Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, J&K, N.E.States, Uttaranchal)
• 18% area in Zone IV (Bihar, Delhi, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, J&K, Lakshadweep, Maharashtra, Punjab, Sikkim, Uttaranchal, W. Bengal)
• 26% area in Zone III (Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Kerala, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttaranchal, W. Bengal)
• Gujarat: an advanced state on the west coast of India.
• On 26 January 2001, an earthquake struck the Kutch district of Gujarat at 8.46 am.
• Epicentre 20 km North East of Bhuj, the headquarter of Kutch.
• The Indian Meteorological Department estimated the intensity of the earthquake at 6.9 Richter. According to the US Geological Survey, the intensity of the quake was 7.7 Richter.
• The quake was the worst in India in the last 180 years.

What earthquakes do

• Casualties: loss of life and injury.
• Loss of housing.
• Damage to infrastructure.
• Disruption of transport and communications.
• Breakdown of social order.
• Loss of industrial output.
• Loss of business.
• Disruption of marketing systems.
• The earthquake devastated Kutch. Practically all buildings and structures of Kutch were brought down.
• Ahmedabad, Rajkot, Jamnagar, Surendaranagar and Patan were heavily damaged.
• Nearly 19,000 people died. Kutch alone reported more than 17,000 deaths.
• 1.66 lakh people were injured. Most were handicapped for the rest of their lives.
• The dead included 7,065 children (0-14 years) and 9,110 women.
• There were 348 orphans and 826 widows.

Loss classification

Deaths and injuries: demographics and labour markets

Effects on assets and GDP

Effects on fiscal accounts

Financial markets

Disaster loss

• Initial estimate Rs. 200 billion.
• Came down to Rs. 144 billion.
• No inventory of buildings
• Non-engineered buildings
• Land and buildings
• Stocks and flows
• Reconstruction costs (Rs. 106 billion) and loss estimates (Rs. 99 billion) are different
• Public good considerations

Human Impact: Tertiary effects

• Affected 15.9 million people out of 37.8 in the region (in areas such as Bhuj, Bhachau, Anjar, Ganhidham, Rapar)
• High demand for food, water, and medical care for survivors
• Humanitarian intervention by groups such as Oxfam: focused on Immediate response and then rehabilitation
• Of survivors, many require persistent medical attention
• Region continues to require assistance long after quake has subsided
• International aid vital to recovery

Social Impacts

• 80% of water and food sources were destroyed.
• The obvious social impacts are that around 20,000 people were killed and near 200,000 were injured.
• However at the same time, looting and violence occurred following the quake, and this affected many people too.
• On the other hand, the earthquake resulted in millions of USD in aid, which has since allowed the Bhuj region to rebuild itself and then grow in a way it wouldn’t have done otherwise.
• The final major social effect was that around 400,000 Indian homes were destroyed resulting in around 2 million people being made homeless immediately following the quake.

Social security and insurance

• Ex gratia payment: death relief and monetary benefits to the injured
• Major and minor injuries
•  Cash doles
• Government insurance fund
• Group insurance schemes
• Claim ratio

Demographics and labour market

• Geographic pattern of ground motion, spatial array of population and properties at risk, and their risk vulnerabilities.
• Low population density was a saving grace.
• Extra fatalities among women
• Effect on dependency ratio
• Farming and textiles

Economic  Impacts

• Total damage estimated at around $7 billion. However $18 billion of aid was invested in the Bhuj area.
• Over 15km of tarmac road networks were completely destroyed.
• In the economic capital of the Gujarat region, Ahmedabad, 58 multi storey buildings were destroyed, these buildings contained many of the businesses which were generating the wealth of the region.
• Many schools were destroyed and the literacy rate of the Gujarat region is now the lowest outside southern India.

Impact on GDP

• Applying ICOR
• Rs. 99 billion – deduct a third as loss of current value added.
• Get GDP loss as Rs. 23 billion
• Adjust for heterogeneous capital, excess capacity, loss Rs. 20 billion.
• Reconstruction efforts.
• Likely to have been Rs. 15 billion.

Fiscal accounts

• Differentiate among different taxes: sales tax, stamp duties and registration fees, motor vehicle tax, electricity duty, entertainment tax, profession tax, state excise and other taxes. Shortfall of Rs. 9 billion of which about Rs. 6 billion unconnected with earthquake.
• Earthquake related other flows.
• Expenditure:Rs. 8 billion on relief. Rs. 87 billion on rehabilitation.

Impact on Revenue Continue Reading

Comments are closed.

Privacy Overview

• Español (Spanish)
• Français (French)
• Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian)
• Brasil (Portuguese)
• हिंदी (Hindi)

A wake-up jolt? Assam’s 6.4 quake exposes its vulnerabilities

• A 6.4 magnitude earthquake, measured on the Richter scale, rocked Assam in the early hours of April 28 this year. Two people died of shock and there was a lot of damage to property. There were at least 20 aftershocks.
• Soil liquefaction, when water seeps from the ground, was seen in places near the epicentre, near Dhekiajuli in the Sonitpur district.
• Scientists point that anthropogenic factors could contribute to earthquake triggers, although of smaller magnitude.
• More stringent monitoring of construction activities to ensure that the seismic code of safety is followed and awareness among people, are ways to mitigate the rising vulnerability of Assam as it lies in the highest seismic hazard zone.

When a strong, 6.4 magnitude earthquake shook Assam on April 28 this year, there was panic and mayhem. The earth cracked near the epicentre in the Sonitpur district, and so did walls and ceilings of people’s houses scores of miles in the radius; buildings swayed “like betel nut trees in the wind”, a hill broke down, and water seeped out of paddy fields. Already under the siege of the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, the earthquake — and the multiple aftershocks through the day — unleashed fear. Two people died of shock and there were several reports of considerable damage to houses and buildings. It also exposed, once again, the vulnerability of Assam to seismic activity and how anthropogenic activities could be further contributing to it.

Assam, and the entire northeast India, is categorised under seismic zone 5 , which means it’s extremely prone to high-intensity earthquakes. On April 28, the 6.4 magnitude earthquake measured on the Richter scale, was followed by 20 aftershocks of different magnitudes through the day, according to Gyanendra Dev Tripathi, CEO of Assam State Disaster Management Authority (ASDMA). Six aftershocks, of magnitude 3.2 to 4.7, occurred within hours of the main tremor. The National Centre for Seismology (NCS) has in fact continued to record seismic activity of magnitude 2.6-2.7 in the region on the eighth day of the main tremor.

The main tremor, said the NCS, occurred near the Kopili Fault, close to the Himalayan Frontal Thrust (HFT) which is a seismically very active area “associated with collisional tectonics where Indian plane sub-ducts beneath the Eurasian Plate”. A fault , according to the United States Geological Survey (USGS) “is a fracture or zone of fractures between two blocks of rocks. Faults allow the blocks to move relative to each other.” The Kopili fault is a 300 km northwest-southeast trending fault from the Bhutan Himalaya to the Burmese arc.

Earthquakes and Assam’s vulnerability

Earthquakes are not uncommon in Assam, with the NCS saying that the region has seen several moderate to high-intensity earthquakes. One of the worst among them was the great Assam-Tibet earthquake in 1950 which measured 8.6 magnitude on the Richter scale. Approximately 4,800 people were killed as a result, and there were several landslides that blocked the tributaries of the Brahmaputra and changed the topography of the region. The 1869 Cachar earthquake, measuring 7.4 magnitude, was another major seismic activity to hit the region.

Experts have said that recent seismicity discovered along the Kopili fault had led to speculations that it is one of the most seismically active faults of the region. A large portion of the Kopili fault region, said scientist Nilutpal Bora, and its neighbouring areas are characterised by alluvial soil that has a higher potential of trapping seismic waves and therefore making it one of the most earthquake-prone zones in northeast India.

“Assam, being located in the highest seismic zone, is perpetually challenged by the possibility of occurrence of earthquakes as an expression of release of accumulated tectonic stress,” Chandan Mahanta, professor in the department of civil engineering, Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Guwahati, told Mongabay-India. Continuous tectonic stress keeps building up along the fault lines, he said, and the 6.4 magnitude tremor was a release of such accumulated stress.

One thing leads to the other

High-intensity tremors aside, the region is vulnerable to seismic activity of different magnitude and intensity. This, said Mahanta, could be a contributing factor to erosion, since “seismic activity can disturb earth material properties, like strength and cohesion, and slope instability adds to this”.

Images of a portion of a hill breaking and falling into a river in the Udalguri district following the 6.4 magnitude tremor showcased to the rest of the world the intensity of the quake. The 1950 quake had led to many landslides and Mahanta said that apart from the major quakes mentioned, “many landslides are seismologically induced”. This means that seismic activity has a role to play in adding sediment load to the Brahmaputra river. “Landslides in upper Brahmaputra are known to add high sediment load to the river,” Mahanta said.

This is significant because a high sediment load on the Brahmaputra is known to cause recurrent floods since the river bed rises and the width of the river increases. Dredging of the river, the Assam government has long said, is a solution to this problem, allocating huge amounts of funds to this end. In 2017, union minister of transport, Nitin Gadkari, had announced Rs 250 crores for dredging the Brahmaputra. Experts, however, opine that dredging the entire river is neither a feasible nor a permanent solution since the silt makes its way back after being removed.

When water guzzled out of the earth

This April’s tremor also led to a seemingly ‘strange’ event: of water springing out of paddy fields, close to the epicentre, near Dhekiajuli, in Assam. A video of this was shared on social media by the present state chief minister Himanta Biswa Sarma. Scientists call this phenomenon, soil liquefaction. By definition, it means when saturated or partially saturated soil substantially loses strength and stiffness in response to applied stress, like the shake of an earthquake.

And in this case, Vineet Gahalaut, chief scientist, CSIR-National Geophysical Research Institute, said it was nothing out of the ordinary particularly because “it is common in places with shallow water table”.

“In 2017, the Manu earthquake in Tripura caused soil liquefaction till Bangladesh. And its magnitude was 5.7 on the Richter scale,” Gahalaut said.

Anthropogenic factors at play?

What should be considered more importantly, is the possibility of anthropogenic factors impacting seismic activity. “Whether anthropogenic factors can cause an earthquake of this magnitude (6.4) is difficult to establish. But there have been few cases in the US, where seismic monitoring is good, where it has been seen that anthropogenic factors may have caused small magnitude earthquake and seismic activity,” Gahalaut told Mongabay-India.

As an example, he said, excessive mining, geothermal pumps, construction of dams, and injecting water under high pressure in oil reserves to crack the area in order to release fluid and oil may “trigger” seismic activity. A research paper , ‘ Influence of anthropogenic groundwater unloading in Indo-Gangetic plains on the April 25, 2015 Mw 7.8 Nepal Earthquake ’—of which Gahalaut is a co-author—talks along similar lines.  “Tectonic process and anthropogenic factors are two very different things, but like the last straw on the camel’s back, when the pressure is already high and in a critical position, human activity can trigger an earthquake,” Gahalaut said.

Mitigating vulnerabilities

For northeast India and for Assam which is in the highest probability zone in terms of earthquake hazard, the vulnerability quotient is high and increasing. “Construction on hills, mushrooming high-rises increase the vulnerability factor,” Tripathi of ASDMA told Mongabay-India, “The way to mitigate this vulnerability is to ensure all construction follow the seismic code of safety and making people aware of safety measures,” he said.

Whether every building in Assam and in particular Guwahati — “especially the new ones,” said an expert — is following the code, however, is questionable.

“There is no strong supervisory mechanism or regulatory policy to ensure that this code is followed in all construction,” Tripathi said.

Mahanta suggests that “high-resolution, micro zonation-based planning and building design following the correct seismic code” is the key to building safety which is crucial in a place like Assam. A 2007 seismic microzonation atlas of Guwahati region is a case in point.

Interestingly, the tremor also brought into limelight the good-old, single-storeyed ‘Assam-type’ houses which were built with indigenous material and were more capable of resisting earthquakes. Fast disappearing from urban areas, the jolt has revved up nostalgia on social media and has spurred conversations around the restoration of such ancestral houses.

Banner image: Seismic activity has a role to play in adding sediment load to the Brahmaputra river. Photo by VINOYBLOG/Wikimedia Commons.

Special series

Wetland champions.

• [Commentary] Wetland champions: Promise from the grassroots
• The story of Jakkur lake sets an example for inclusive rejuvenation projects
• Welcome to Tsomgo lake: Please don’t litter
• Managing waste to save the wetlands of Himachal Pradesh

Environment And Health

• Hopscotch to heat watch: How climate change is impacting summer play
• What’s killing the buzz? A look into urban fumigation
• Air pollution deaths spotlight need for health-based air quality standards
• As cities become megacities, their lanes are losing green cover

Almost Famous Species

• Himalayan pikas wait for weather cues to make winter plans
• [Video] Fading ties with Mumbai’s mudskippers
• Indus river dolphins in troubled waters
• Biologists turn content creators to teach Indians about native biodiversity, ethically

• A blooming tale of transformation
• [Video] Flowers of worship sow seeds of sustainability
• Rising above the waters with musk melon
• Saving India’s wild ‘unicorns’ 

India's Iconic Landscapes

• [Book review] Chronicle of an ‘Ecocide’ Foretold
• [Explainer] How does habitat fragmentation impact India’s biodiversity hotspots?
• Unchecked shrimp farming transforms land use in the Sundarbans
• [Commentary] Complexities of freshwater availability and tourism growth in Lakshadweep

Beyond Protected Areas

• Mugger crocodiles may be physiologically stressed in disturbed habitats
• Land use changes and roads disrupt genetic connectivity of herbivores in central India

Conserving Agro-biodiversity

• [Commentary] Green Credit Rules: Death by trees?
• High temperatures lead to decline in coconut production, spiked prices
• Kashmiri willow steps up to the crease and swings for recognition
• Rising temperatures alter insect-crop interactions and impact agricultural productivity

Just Transitions

• Coal mining degraded 35% of native land cover in India’s central coal belt
• Slow progress hinders Bihar’s solar street light initiative
• Uttar Pradesh to fast-track biofuel production with the right blend of ethanol and biogas
• [Interview] “This is in honour of adivasis fighting for their land, water, forest,” says Goldman Prize winner Alok Shukla

Case Study: Earthquakes ( SL IB Geography )

Revision note.

Geography Lead

Case Study: Nepal

• Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of under $1000 in 2015
• Located between China and India, Nepal is a landlocked country
• In 2015, 80% of the population lived in rural, often remote, communities
• In April 2015 at 11.26 a.m., Nepal was struck by an earthquake of magnitude 7.8
• The epicentre was 80km northwest of Kathmandu in the Gorka district
• The focus was shallow at only 15km beneath the surface
• Over 300 aftershocks followed the main earthquake

Location of the Nepal earthquake

• Nepal is located on a collision boundary between the Indian and Eurasian plates
• Approximately 9000 deaths  
• Over 20,000 people injured
• Electricity and water supplies cut
• 7000 schools and 1000 health facilities damaged or destroyed
• Almost 3.5 million people made homeless
• Offices, shops and factories destroyed, meaning people unable to make a living
• UNESCO world heritage sites destroyed, as well as many temples
• A loss of tourist income, which Nepal is reliant on
• Avalanches on Mount Everest and in the Langtang Valley
• Landslides, which blocked roads and rivers
• Damages estimated at between $7 and $10 billion; about 35% of the GDP

Immediate responses

• There were donations of money and aid from around the world totalling $3 billion, including $3.3 million from China and $51 million from the UK 
• Temporary shelters
• Search and rescue teams
• Medical staff
• 90% of the Nepalese army were mobilised 
• Tent cities were set up in Kathmandu for those made homeless
• A GIS crisis-mapping tool was used to co-ordinate the response
• A $3 million grant was provided by the Asian Development Bank for emergency relief

Long-term responses

• Landslides were cleared and roads repaired to restore access to remote rural communities
• Schools were rebuilt
• Earthquake drills were introduced to provide people with education about what to do in the event of an earthquake
• Stricter building codes were introduced with more enforcement
• $200 million was provided by the Asian Development Bank for rebuilding
• A new government task force was set up to plan for future earthquake events 

Factors affecting vulnerability

• Communication and education about the risks of earthquakes are limited
• In the event of a hazard these areas are difficult to reach 
• The city of Kathmandu is densely populated, so more people are affected
• Buildings are often built using low-quality materials and are usually not earthquake-resistant
• Nepal is a mountainous area, which increases the risk of landslides and avalanches
• There is a lack of education regarding the risks of earthquakes 

Case Study: New Zealand

• New Zealand is one of the wealthiest countries in the world, with a Gross Domestic Product of US$40,058 in 2016
• It is located to the south-east of Australia
• On 14th November 2016, it was struck by a magnitude 7.8 earthquake
• The epicentre was 15km north-east of Culverden and 60km south-west of Kaikōura
• The focus was shallow, only 15km below the surface
• By the 17th November, there had been over 2000 aftershocks

Location of the New Zealand earthquake

• New Zealand is located on a destructive boundary between the Indian-Australian and Pacific plates
• Two deaths 
• Over 50 people injured
• Temporary homelessness of 60 people
• Over 2000 buildings were damaged or destroyed, including some in the capital city, Wellington
• Power, water and telecommunication cut off to Kaikōura and surrounding communities
• Destruction of 390km of road and railway
• Kaikōura and surrounding communities were completely cut off for 16 days
• Kaikōura's harbour was affected by the uplift, meaning boats could not leave or enter the harbour
• Disruption of the coastal breeding areas for dolphins, seals and sea birds
• A tsunami followed the earthquake, reaching up to 6.9 metres in Goose Bay
• Insurance costs reached $2.27 billion
• The cost to the government reached almost $3.5 billion
• National Crisis Management Centre activated 
• Tsunami warnings were issued for coastal areas via sirens, texts and social media
• Local states of emergency declared
• Helicopters and ships provided emergency supplies and evacuated vulnerable people 
• Search and rescue teams dispatched 
• Improvements to the tsunami warning procedure 
• Road routes were repaired between one month and one year after the event
• The main rail route reopened after two months but full repair took over a year
• Improvements to the building regulations made to assess existing buildings for earthquake resistance
• Kaikōura's harbour was rebuilt; taking over a year to complete
• Planning and preparation for earthquake events
• Education about what to do during and after an earthquake event
• Emergency services are well-trained and equipped
• People at risk were rapidly evacuated from the affected areas
• Building quality and materials are of a high standard, reducing the risk of collapse
• As a HIC, New Zealand can afford the repairs and rebuilding, reducing recovery time
• A tsunami warning system gives people time to evacuate from areas at risk

You've read 0 of your 10 free revision notes

Get unlimited access.

to absolutely everything:

• Downloadable PDFs
• Unlimited Revision Notes
• Topic Questions
• Past Papers
• Model Answers
• Videos (Maths and Science)

Join the 100,000 + Students that ❤️ Save My Exams

the (exam) results speak for themselves:

Did this page help you?

Author: Bridgette

After graduating with a degree in Geography, Bridgette completed a PGCE over 25 years ago. She later gained an MA Learning, Technology and Education from the University of Nottingham focussing on online learning. At a time when the study of geography has never been more important, Bridgette is passionate about creating content which supports students in achieving their potential in geography and builds their confidence.

Harnessing Operational Systems Engineering to Support Peacebuilding: Report of a Workshop by the National Academy of Engineering and United States Institute of Peace Roundtable on Technology, Science, and Peacebuilding (2013)

Chapter: 6 case study: post-earthquake recovery in haiti.

6 Case Study: Post-Earthquake Recovery in Haiti

T he earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010, resulted in 222,570 deaths, 300,572 people injured, and approximately 2.3 million people displaced ( Figure 6-1 ). 1 The earthquake damaged or destroyed 60 percent of government buildings and caused major disruptions in communication systems. More than two years later, in August 2012, it was estimated that approximately 369,000 displaced people remained in 541 camps.

In response to the earthquake, concerned global citizens used Web 2.0 technologies to create an online, interactive map that harnessed short message service (SMS) to locate disaster victims, coordinate relief supplies, and guide search-and-rescue teams. The Haiti Crisis Map was built using the Ushahidi platform, an open source mapping system developed during the December 2007 Kenyan elections as a means for laypersons to use SMS and e-mail to record and report post-election violence. The map made use of the collective, local intelligence of Haitian SMS, e-mails, blogs, and Facebook and Twitter posts to continually display and update the status of trapped persons, medical emergencies, food supplies, water, and shelter.

But verification of the validity of these reports or the responses by NGOs and disaster relief workers was limited. This lack of validation points to the

____________

1 The introduction to this chapter is drawn from a background paper prepared for the workshop by Ryan Shelby, Christine Mirzayan Science & Technology Policy Fellow and J. Herbert Hollomon Fellow at the National Academy of Engineering.

FIGURE 6-1 On January 12, 2010, an earthquake struck near Port-au-Prince in Haiti. SOURCE: CIA World Factbook.

need for a decision support system to rapidly identify inaccurate information, detect early warning signs of conflict or disease outbreak, and maintain the security of information and the privacy of people reporting it.

In October 2010 a lightning-fast and virulent outbreak of cholera swept through the earthquake-ravaged country, killing more than 7,000 Haitians and sickening more than 530,000 despite the presence of the large number of NGOs. In response, the Haitian government established the National Sentinel Site Surveillance (NSSS) system at 51 sites to help decision makers allocate resources and identify effective public health interventions. It also established the Internally Displaced Persons Surveillance System (IDPSS) to facilitate the monitoring of communicable diseases identified in temporary clinics serving displaced people.

It is not known whether the hundreds of NGOs operating in Haiti are integrated into these systems, nor whether there is a common disease surveillance system among the NGOs. Reports indicate that medical responses have been delayed by communication difficulties among NGO partners and by limitations of IDPSS data due to lack of reliable information about the population in camps.

Finally, gender-based violence has been a continuing problem since the earthquake. In a 2011 survey of “households” in four camps near Port-au-Prince, 14 percent of respondents reported that one or more members of their household had been victimized by either rape or unwanted touching or both since the earthquake. More than 10,000 people were sexually assaulted in the six weeks after the earthquake, and over the next three months 24 percent of all arrests by the Haitian National Police involved sexual violence.

There is no systematic collection or management of data on gender-based violence in Haiti, so it is difficult to quantify the occurrence of such violence. Under the dictatorships of François and Jean-Claude Duvalier, gender-based violence was commonly used as a tool of repression. A 2006 report found that approximately 35,000 females and an additional 13,000 restaveks , children working as unpaid domestic servants, experienced sexual assault between February 2004 and December 2005.

PERSISTENT CHALLENGES

Robert Perito, director of the USIP Security Sector Governance Center, provided a detailed and vivid view of the situation in Haiti. The tent camps in Port-au-Prince are an example of what he called the “Haiti Syndrome,” characterized by chronic disease, poverty, and insecurity exacerbated by a crisis. The January 2010 earthquake not only destroyed 190,000 housing units but was followed by a number of aftershocks that caused people to move out of whatever structures were still standing and into any open space available. Golf courses, public parks, even highway medians filled with tents.

Three years later, more than 500 tent camps remain in the Port-au-Prince area. These camps pose serious hardships for those still living in them, with no electricity, no sewers, no roads, and no amenities, according to Perito. However, he pointed out that before the earthquake some 300,000–400,000 people lived in the slum at the center of Port-au-Prince, Cité Soleil, which the Economist at the time described as “having little if any electricity, no sewers, no shops, no form of employment and no police.” People came to Cité Soleil from the countryside, and when the agricultural sector in Haiti failed during the 1990s they came in large numbers.

After the earthquake, the international community flooded into Haiti and, among other things, created tent camps that, ironically, were a major improvement in living standards for the residents of Cité Soleil. The camps had new tents, free food, bottled water, and in many cases world-class medical care thanks to the legions of doctors who flew to Haiti. The quality of life

in the camps during the first year was such that it actually encouraged people who lived in or were displaced to the countryside to come live in them.

Residents of the camps who had resources could either rebuild their homes or find new places to rent and move on. Others were resettled to locations far from the city where there are no jobs and few amenities. In many cases, however, people left their names on the camp registers in the hope that they would be resettled in a better house or receive some other benefit. Many of those who remain in the camps are what Perito called “a residual hard-core population” who do not have the resources to rent elsewhere and have not been able to participate in a resettlement program.

A comprehensive government-led effort is needed to resettle the city’s homeless, Perito said. But it would require urban planning and resolution of the problem of missing land registration titles. No more than 15 percent of the land in Haiti is registered, and resettlement efforts have been hampered by the fact that nobody knows who owns the land. If someone clears a piece of land, squatters often arrive. If someone builds on a piece of land, people often show up with forged documents claiming they own the land.

The current government program is to clear six areas in the capital city, mostly former parks and open spaces. To provide people with an incentive to leave the camps, the government has been offering to pay their rent for a year. The government also has been sending armed forces to clear the camps. But with few provisions for resettlement, people forced out of camps often just move to other camps.

Further complicating the post-earthquake recovery is the cholera epidemic, which began a year after the earthquake. Cholera was not seen in Haiti until 2011, and it appears to have arrived with a group of UN peacekeeping troops from Nepal, although the United Nations has not admitted responsibility for introducing the disease into the country. Controlling the spread of cholera has been hampered by Haiti’s lack of basic infrastructure. Cities have no water systems or sewer systems; Haitians use streams and other untreated water sources for their drinking water, for bathing, for laundry, and for other bodily functions, often in the same place. Tent camp populations are especially vulnerable because of a lack of clean water, adequate latrines, and medical care. Cholera is a waterborne disease, and spreads during the heavy rains of the hurricane season.

The response of the international community to the cholera outbreak has been inadequate, Perito said. The International Organization for Migration announced that it had distributed 10,000 cholera kits, which contain

rehydration salts, Aquatabs, ® and chlorine, in 31 camps. But with more than 500 camps in Haiti, the vast majority has not received the kits. The international community also has been building temporary clinics, distributing soap and bottled water and treating cases that come to their facilities. But these are short-term responses that do not address the basic problems of people living in the camps.

According to Perito, Haiti needs a comprehensive plan for health care delivery in both urban and rural areas. But because of a lack of jobs, education, and health care, people continue to leave the countryside and move into the camps around Port-au-Prince.

Finally, Perito looked at the problem of gender-based violence. Many women living in the camps are alone, having lost their families. The camps offer no privacy or physical protection, and the police presence is minimal if it exists at all. Historically, the slums of Port-au-Prince have been a locale for crimes, gangs, kidnapping, and random violence. In 2007 the UN military cracked down on the gangs, arresting their leaders and putting members in prison, but some 800 of these criminals escaped when prison guards abandoned their posts at the time of the earthquake. Most of them remain at large, living in the camps, where they have resumed their activities.

The international community’s response to gender-based violence in Haiti has been inconsistent. Efforts have focused on making the camps safer, counseling women on how to avoid attacks, caring for rape victims, improving lighting, and increasing camp patrols. All of these are useful and help in the short term, Perito said, but they do not solve the basic problem of living in a tent in the camps.

Haiti’s homelessness, illness, and gender-based violence result from a failure of governance and a lack of international coordination, Perito concluded. After the earthquake, the international community pledged almost $10 billion, and an interim Haitian reconstruction commission was formed. But then Haiti went through another convulsion of political violence, and the elections in November 2010 were disputed. A president finally emerged in March 2011, but there has been a continuing standoff between the president and the parliament. Faced with this uncertainty, international donors stepped back. As a result, the camps remain a problem, many institutions have pulled out, and donor fatigue is setting in. A long-term systematic solution will require planning, government buy-in, capacity building, international community coordination, and the creation of a development or reconstruction narrative.

BREAKOUT GROUP DISCUSSION

This breakout group selected as its objective to develop a method to understand the underlying reasons why the camps exist. That is, why does homelessness exist in Haiti? First, said breakout group reporter James Willis Jr., vice president of SPEC Innovations, the group identified several illustrative root causes of homelessness: weak governance and predatory elites as fundamental drivers, together with limited ownership opportunities and an inadequate supply of housing, caused in part by the destruction of buildings by earthquakes and hurricanes. The group did not pretend to have exhausted its analysis of the root causes of homelessness, but it agreed that with adequate information, such analysis could support actionable insights. The discussants also emphasized the importance of a holistic approach rather than separating analyses into silos.

To build the knowledge necessary for a full analysis, the breakout group suggested using a variety of technical approaches, including qualitative exploratory methods, case studies, simulations, and prototypes. For example, using prototyping to build out a knowledge base would require the construction of small group of houses in a particular location to assess costs and infrastructure needs. The group asserted that the use of such techniques would also require multidisciplinary expertise both during the planning and operational phases to enable application of systems engineering, modeling, and other integrated approaches.

Among the challenges to successfully addressing homelessness would be to gain buy-in from the elites that dominate Haiti. Whatever strategy were developed, it would need to benefit the homeless, the population of Haiti as a whole, and the elites. For example, the group wondered whether there is a way to redistribute land through a Homestead Act that could achieve widespread acceptance. They worried that land redistribution has great potential for violence—perhaps even greater than the violence now occurring in camps—but that without resolution of land tenure and ownership issues, there would be little incentive to dismantle these camps. Perito reported that many Haitians have a strong entrepreneurial spirit. Pride of ownership is part of this spirit. An emphasis on land ownership could also build on successful development programs that are already under way in Haiti.

As part of its consideration of method, the working group looked at what metrics might be needed to measure success. Of particular concern was the issue of data and of long-term access to those data. The working group thought that potential metrics might include available funding, sustainable economic growth, fewer people in camps, a reduction in disease, and

an increase in home ownership. The data needed to populate these metrics could be derived from information on NGO activities, lists of ongoing projects, and compilations of building activity.

The proposed analysis of homelessness could reveal latent capacity in the slums to address the problem. At the same time, though, it could also make more explicit the needs of the people living in the camps and their vulnerability (especially women and children subject to gender violence). With a better understanding of Haitians’ own goals and priorities, programming can be designed to ensure buy-in to changes in land ownership.

The breakout group concluded that the lack of infrastructure and effective governance in Haiti must be addressed to achieve sustainable outcomes in national and international efforts to overcome the persistent challenges in the wake of the 2010 earthquake.

This page intentionally left blank.

Operational systems engineering is a methodology that identifies the important components of a complex system, analyzes the relationships among those components, and creates models of the system to explore its behavior and possible ways of changing that behavior. In this way it offers quantitative and qualitative techniques to support the design, analysis, and governance of systems of diverse scale and complexity for the delivery of products or services. Many peacebuilding interventions function essentially as the provision of services in response to demands elicited from societies in crisis. At its core, operational systems engineering attempts to understand and manage the supply of services and product in response to such demands.

Harnessing Operational Systems Engineering to Support Peacebuilding is the summary of a workshop convened in November 2012 by the Roundtable on Science, Technology, and Peacebuilding of the National Academy of Engineering and the United States Institute of Peace to explore the question "When can operational systems engineering, appropriately applied, be a useful tool for improving the elicitation of need, the design, the implementation, and the effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions?" The workshop convened experts in conflict prevention, conflict management, postconflict stabilization, and reconstruction along with experts in various fields of operational systems engineering to identify what additional types of nonnumerical systems methods might be available for application to peacebuilding.

READ FREE ONLINE

Welcome to OpenBook!

You're looking at OpenBook, NAP.edu's online reading room since 1999. Based on feedback from you, our users, we've made some improvements that make it easier than ever to read thousands of publications on our website.

Do you want to take a quick tour of the OpenBook's features?

Show this book's table of contents , where you can jump to any chapter by name.

...or use these buttons to go back to the previous chapter or skip to the next one.

Jump up to the previous page or down to the next one. Also, you can type in a page number and press Enter to go directly to that page in the book.

Switch between the Original Pages , where you can read the report as it appeared in print, and Text Pages for the web version, where you can highlight and search the text.

To search the entire text of this book, type in your search term here and press Enter .

Share a link to this book page on your preferred social network or via email.

View our suggested citation for this chapter.

Ready to take your reading offline? Click here to buy this book in print or download it as a free PDF, if available.

Get Email Updates

Do you enjoy reading reports from the Academies online for free ? Sign up for email notifications and we'll let you know about new publications in your areas of interest when they're released.

Information

• Author Services

Initiatives

You are accessing a machine-readable page. In order to be human-readable, please install an RSS reader.

All articles published by MDPI are made immediately available worldwide under an open access license. No special permission is required to reuse all or part of the article published by MDPI, including figures and tables. For articles published under an open access Creative Common CC BY license, any part of the article may be reused without permission provided that the original article is clearly cited. For more information, please refer to https://www.mdpi.com/openaccess .

Feature papers represent the most advanced research with significant potential for high impact in the field. A Feature Paper should be a substantial original Article that involves several techniques or approaches, provides an outlook for future research directions and describes possible research applications.

Feature papers are submitted upon individual invitation or recommendation by the scientific editors and must receive positive feedback from the reviewers.

Editor’s Choice articles are based on recommendations by the scientific editors of MDPI journals from around the world. Editors select a small number of articles recently published in the journal that they believe will be particularly interesting to readers, or important in the respective research area. The aim is to provide a snapshot of some of the most exciting work published in the various research areas of the journal.

Original Submission Date Received: .

• Active Journals
• Find a Journal
• Proceedings Series
• For Authors
• For Reviewers
• For Editors
• For Librarians
• For Publishers
• For Societies
• For Conference Organizers
• Open Access Policy
• Institutional Open Access Program
• Special Issues Guidelines
• Editorial Process
• Research and Publication Ethics
• Article Processing Charges
• Testimonials
• Preprints.org
• SciProfiles
• Encyclopedia

Article Menu

• Subscribe SciFeed
• Recommended Articles
• Google Scholar
• on Google Scholar
• Table of Contents

Find support for a specific problem in the support section of our website.

Please let us know what you think of our products and services.

Visit our dedicated information section to learn more about MDPI.

JSmol Viewer

Nepal government’s emergency response to the 2015 earthquake: a case study.

1. Introduction

2. literature review, 2.1. emergency response after an earthquake, 2.2. disaster risk reduction, 2.3. disaster risk governance, 2.4. national system for disaster management, 3. methodology.

• Central Question:
• Based on your experience, what were the guidelines and policies the government followed to respond to the 2015 earthquake?
• Based on your experience, who was effectively involved in the emergency response? (Refers to government institutions.)
• Based on your experience, why did institutions respond in that way? Were they effective? Please elaborate.
• Based on your experience, how did the coordination mechanisms within the government ministry and departments work? What was the coordination like between the civil administration and the security forces? Please elaborate.
• During the immediate emergency response, what were the information-generating and sharing mechanisms that allowed the security forces and civil administrators to best respond to the disaster? Please elaborate.
• Based on your experience, what were the weaknesses and challenges you faced during the emergency response operation? Please elaborate.
• Based on your experience, what were the strengths of the Nepal government in coping with the large-scale disaster response?

3.1. Selection of Participants

3.2. data collection and analysis, 3.3. details of participants, 4. response structure and timeline, 4.1. government institutional arrangement for disaster management, 4.2. national disaster response framework 2013, 4.3. timeline of the 2015 earthquake, 5.1. policy and guidelines.

Without the National Disaster Response Framework 2013, we could have gone haywire in responding. Thank god the framework was there at least.

5.2. Coordination Mechanism (Refer to Table 3 and Figure 3 and Figure 4 )

Firstly, we do not have a clear policy and guidelines describing the detailed roles and responsibilities to address disaster situation. Second, we do not have adequate knowledge, experience and resources. Third, we lack coordination within our government ministries and departments.

At NEOC, the information that we usually received was from District Disaster Relief Committee, Nepal Police and Armed Police Force. Thus, we did not get much information from the Nepal Army, and since the Army took over the leadership on the ground, they were coordinating more from the military headquarter.

5.3. Strengths

Those hospitals, which conducted drills earlier, were able to activate the emergency operations more quickly as opposed to those that had written plans but never rehearsed.

The security forces are an organized and disciplined force amongst all. Thus, the deployment of these forces was highly effective in comparison to others. Since they follow a unitary command system, all the troops can be mobilized with one single order.

Our soldiers’ own families were victims, but they could not go home because they were deployed with us. As a commander, I know their feelings, but we have to follow the orders.

5.4. Weaknesses

In our old existing institutional setup, a Village Development Committee Secretary is a responsible government representative to coordinate reliefs at the village level. During the time of disaster and since long, the country did not have enough Village Development Committee Secretaries. How can you coordinate activities to the village when there are no representatives? Another constraint is monetary as it requires money to send or assign someone to visit the village. For that, we do not have a separate budget.

Local level elections 14 have not been held for more than two decades. If we had local representatives like Village Development Committee Chairman and their team such as Ward Chairman, Ward members, and Ward secretaries at the village, the district, and central administration ( PDDP 2002 ) will have a clearer picture of the local problems.

Assume that we have an emergency flood situation, and that we needed to evacuate the villagers from a certain area. As our process, we will call the District Disaster Relief Committee (DDRC) meeting at District Administration Office. The DDRC committee members would then agree and decide on evacuating the people. However, at that point, our security officials will state that before their deployment, they are required to take the final permission from their respective headquarters. Therefore, in such cases, though we already decide for executing a plan at DDRC, it will not go into immediate execution and that can also create delays.

The responsible district officials like Chief District Officers and Local Development Officers should have adequate knowledge in the field of disaster management. For example, the work procedures under disaster scenarios and knowledge of available policies and guidelines.

In a district office, Chief District Officer is responsible for numerous tasks. For instance, head various committees, sign all the issued citizenship cards, and passports, and resolve the complex public-private disputes. Besides, the Chief District Officer also take on coordination works from monitoring and evaluation of the programs to entertaining the inbound guests. Chief District Officer is a single person and how do you think they will perform given the responsibility of disaster management on top?

Forget about big equipment and technology, we did not even have concrete drilling machines and sufficient generators. We used our bare hands. The international SAR teams were well equipped. We had never seen those types of machinery, we learned much by seeing them.

Initially, the collected relief materials were distributed haphazardly in the district without any monitoring system as we also lacked experience and the time was ticking. The early relief materials did not go thru one door policy as instructed by the central authority. It was not possible for us at the District Disaster Relief Committee to immediately apply the system without experience, which demanded a slow process to pass through bureaucratic and administrative steps.

While hospitals had their own internal emergency preparedness plan, there existed no communication and coordination system amongst hospitals. If we had an inter-hospital communication and coordination system, we could have worked more efficiently. For instance, prompt referrals to appropriate hospitals.

We did everything from our side to treat the victims and exhausted all our resources. But not a single authority visited us to ask how we were doing and if we needed any help.

Private hospitals and nursing homes in Kathmandu could not give the services like public hospitals because they do not have sufficient human resource. Most of them usually outsource more than 80 percent of their core medical staff, and they have only a few full time in-house medical doctors.

Private hospitals were not sure how much the government would reimburse. Despite the confusions, Vayodha and Alka Hospital did provide services to the inbound victims, but due to the chaotic influx, they could not keep the records as to how many they treated. The government later offered around USD 5000 to compensate which was less than they had actually spent.

Upon receiving the international medical team, we required more helping hands. Thus, we announced through FM 18 Radio asking for volunteers having knowledge in Public Health. In response, hundreds of public health students, teachers and youth from Kathmandu showed up the next day. However, we could not use them as we had no plan to manage large numbers of volunteers.

First, the air traffic controllers at Tribhuvan International Airport struggled to control the foreign military air crafts. No one knew who should control them at the airport. The Americans, Indians and Chinese flew in their own way. Nobody had time to explain to them the runway layouts, crossing procedures, the points where they could and could not go. Second, when big aircraft like the Hercules arrived at Tribhuvan International Airport, they had no appropriate forklifts to offload them. Consequently, it occupied space in the crowded airport which then delayed other aircraft en route. Third, the airport did not have proper storage facilities.

I was annoyed by our media, their negative news on the Government’s response was not helpful. They should not vent negativity at the time of national crisis, which will only help to increase public anger. It not only made difficult to coordinate the necessary response but also created misunderstanding amongst the public and the international community.

6. Discussion

It is by default the duty of security forces to take care after rescue and relief operations as they are trained forces.

We arrived at Tribhuvan International Airport two weeks after the 25 April 2015 earthquake and cleared the immigration normally with no complaints. Throughout our time in Nepal, we were welcomed and supported by the people. There was no interference by government or security personnel. I think the government was eager to be as helpful as possible toward relief teams come to help.

Nepal saved Nepal, and the Nepalese can be justly proud of their ability to respond and recover. They can be equally satisfied knowing that the international community wanted to—and was allowed to—assist ( CFE-DMHA 2016 ).

Coordination between civilian and military actors is essential during an emergency response. The increasing number and scale of humanitarian emergencies, in both natural disaster and conflict settings, has led to more situations where military forces and civilian relief agencies are operating in the same environment.

7. Conclusions

Author contributions, acknowledgments, conflicts of interest.

• Adhikari, Mina, Douglas Paton, David Johnston, Raj Prasanna, and Samuel T. McColl. 2018. Modelling Predictors of Earthquake Hazard Preparedness in Nepal. Procedia Engineering 212: 910–17. [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ]
• Alexander, David. 2007. ‘From Rubble to Monument’ Revisited: Modernized Perspectives on Recovery from Disaster. In Post-Disaster Reconstruction: Meeting Stakeholder Interests . Firenze: Firenze University Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Alexander, David. 2015. Disaster and Emergency Planning for Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Natural Hazard Science , 1–31. [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ]
• Asokan, G. Vaithinathan, and Asokan Vanitha. 2017. Disaster Response under One Health in the Aftermath of Nepal Earthquake, 2015. Journal of Epidemiology and Global Health 7: 91–96. [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ] [ PubMed ]
• Bailey, Kenneth D. 1994. Methods of Social Research . New York: The Free Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Bakkour, Darine, Geoffroy Enjolras, Jean Claude Thouret, Robert Kast, Estuning Tyas Wulan Mei, and Budi Prihatminingtyas. 2015. The Adaptive Governance of Natural Disaster Systems: Insights from the 2010 Mount Merapi Eruption in Indonesia. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 13: 167–88. [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ]
• Barbour, Rosaline. 2008. Introducing Qualitative Research: A Student Guide to the Craft of Doing Qualitative Research . Newcastle upon Tyne: Sage. [ Google Scholar ]
• Bisri, Mizan Bustanul Fuady, and Shohei Beniya. 2016. Analyzing the National Disaster Response Framework and Inter- Organizational Network of the 2015 Nepal/Gorkha Earthquake. Procedia Engineering 159: 19–26. [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ]
• Brown, Daniel, Stephen Platt, and John Bevington. 2010. Disaster Recovery Indicators: Guidelines for Monitoring and Evaluation . Cambridge: Cambridge University Centre for Risk in the Built Environment (CURBE), Available online: http://www.carltd.com/sites/carwebsite/files/CAR Brown Disaster recovery Indicators.pdf (accessed on 9 April 2018).
• CFE-DMHA. 2015. Emerging Challenges to Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Response. Liaison: A Journal of Civil-Military Disaster Management and Humanitarian Relief Collaborations 7: 1–64. [ Google Scholar ]
• CFE-DMHA. 2016. Anatomy of a NGO Response Lessons from the Logistics Cluster. Liaison: A Journal of Civil-Military Disaster Management and Humanitarian Relief Collaborations 8: 1–58. [ Google Scholar ]
• Chen, Hao, Quancai Xie, Biao Feng, Jinlong Liu, Yong Huang, and Hongfu Chen. 2017. Seismic Performance to Emergency Centers, Communication and Hospital Facilities Subjected to Nepal Earthquakes, 2015. Journal of Earthquake Engineering . [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ]
• Coburn, Andrew, and Robin Spence. 2002. Earthquake Protection . West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. [ Google Scholar ]
• Contreras, Diana. 2016. Fuzzy Boundaries Between Post-Disaster Phases: The Case of L’Aquila, Italy. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science 7: 277–92. [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ]
• Cook, Alistair D. B., Maxim Shrestha, and Zin Bo. 2016a. International Response to 2015 Nepal Earthquake Lessons and Observations . NTS Report. Singapore: NTS. [ Google Scholar ]
• Cook, Alistair D. B., Maxim Shrestha, and Zin Bo Htet. 2016b. The 2015 Nepal Earthquake: Implications for Future International Relief . RSIS Policy Brief. Singapore: RSIS. [ Google Scholar ]
• Creswell, John W. 2013. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches , 3rd ed. Newcastle upon Tyne: Sage. [ Google Scholar ]
• Du, Feizhou, Jialing Wu, Jin Fan, Rui Jiang, Ming Gu, Xiaowu He, Zhiming Wang, and Ci He. 2016. Injuries Sustained By Earthquake Relief Workers: A Retrospective Analysis of 207 Relief Workers during Nepal Earthquake. Scandinavian Journal of Trauma, Resuscitation and Emergency Medicine 24: 1–6. [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ] [ PubMed ]
• Etinay, Nuha, Charles Egbu, and Virginia Murray. 2018. Building Urban Resilience for Disaster Risk Management and Disaster for Risk Reduction. Procedia Engineering 212: 575–82. [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ]
• FEMA. 1998. The Four Phases of Emergency Management. US Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Available online: https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/downloads/is10_unit3.doc (accessed on 14 May 2018).
• FEMA. 1999. The Role of the Media in Emergency Management, 1–8. Available online: https://training.fema.gov/hiedu/docs/hazdem/session 20--media.doc (accessed on 21 November 2017).
• Fitzgerald, Gerard, Apil Gurung, and Bharat Raj Poudel. 2015. How the Media Struggled In Nepal’s Earthquake Rescue. The Conversation . Available online: http://theconversation.com/how-the-media-struggled-in-nepals-earthquake-rescue-40970 (accessed on 13 February 2016).
• Fraser, Barbara, and Fabián Carvallo-Vargas. 2017. Emergency Response After Mexico’s Earthquakes. The Lancet 390: 1575. [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ]
• Gaire, Surya, Rafael Castro Delgado, and Pedro Arcos González. 2015. Disaster Risk Profile and Existing Legal Framework of Nepal: Floods and Landslides. Risk Management and Healthcare Policy 8: 139–49. [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ] [ PubMed ]
• Garge, Ramanand N., Huong Ha, and Susie Khoo. 2015. Disaster Risk Management and the Role of the Armed Forces: Critical Analysis of Reactive Disaster Management in India. In Strategic Disaster Risk Management in Asia . Edited by Huong Ha, R. Lalitha S. Fernando and Amir Mahmood. New Delhi: Springer, pp. 49–67. [ Google Scholar ]
• Gautam, P. K. 2013. Role of the Indian Military in Disasters ; Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Available online: https://idsa.in/idsacomments/RoleoftheIndianMilitaryinDisasters_pkgautam_050713 (accessed on 9 February 2018).
• Ghimire, Purushottam. 2015. Nepal: Experience, Gaps and Needs in Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation Planning and Financing. Available online: https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Gap%20and%20needs%20in%20DRR%20planning%20and%20financing%20in%20Nepal.pdf (accessed on 4 January 2016).
• GoN. 2017. Nepal Disaster Report, 2017 ‘The Road to Sendai’—Draft. Available online: http://drrportal.gov.np/uploads/document/1144.pdf (accessed on 12 March 2018).
• GoN, and WHO. 2004. Guidelines on Non-Structural Safety in Health Facilities. Available online: http://apps.searo.who.int/PDS_DOCS/B0610.pdf?ua=1 (accessed on 31 July 2018).
• GoN MoHA. 2013. National Disaster Response Framework (NDRF) . Kathmandu: GoN MoHA. [ Google Scholar ]
• GoN MoHA. 2015. Nepal Earthquake 2072: Situation Update as of 11th May . Kathmandu: GoN MoHA. [ Google Scholar ]
• GoN MoHA. 2017. Disaster Risk Reduction in Nepal: Status, Achievements, Challenges and Ways Forward. In National Position Paper for the Global Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction 22–26 May 2017, Cancun, Mexico ; pp. 1–9. Available online: http://drrportal.gov.np/uploads/document/892.pdf (accessed on 14 March 2018).
• GoN MoHA, and DPNet-Nepal. 2013. Nepal Disaster Report 2013: Focus on Prticipation and Inclusion . Kathmandu: Government of Nepal (GoN), Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) and Disaster Preparedness Network-Nepal (DPNet-Nepal), Available online: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Nepal Disaster Report 2013.pdf (accessed on 6 February 2018).
• GoN MoHA, and DPNet-Nepal. 2015. Nepal Disaster Report 2015 . Kathmandu: The Government of Nepal (GoN)—Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) and Disaster Preparedness Network-Nepal (DPNet-Nepal). [ Google Scholar ]
• GoN MoHA, MoFALD. 2014. Bipaat Byawasthapan Digdarshan 2071 . Kathmandu: Government of Nepal (GoN), UNDP. [ Google Scholar ]
• GoN NA. 2015. Part 2: Operation ‘Sankatmochan’. Available online: https://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/upload/publications/special/english_part2.pdf (accessed on 26 January 2016).
• GoN NPC. 2015. Nepal Earthquake 2015: Post Disaster Needs Assessment . Kathmandu: GoN NPC. [ Google Scholar ]
• Hall, M. L., A. C. K. Lee, C. Cartwright, S. Maharatta, J. Karki, and P. Simkhada. 2017. The 2015 Nepal Earthquake Disaster: Lessons Learned One Year On. Public Health 145: 39–44. [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ] [ PubMed ]
• Harvey, Paul. 2010. The Role of National Governments in International Humanitarian Response. Available online: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_1363.pdf (accessed on 9 January 2018).
• Holguín-Veras, José, Eiichi Taniguchi, Miguel Jaller, Felipe Aros-Vera, Frederico Ferreira, and Russell G. Thompson. 2014. The Tohoku Disasters: Chief Lessons Concerning the Post Disaster Humanitarian Logistics Response and Policy Implications. Transportation Research Part A 69: 86–104. [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ]
• IIGR. 2014. IIGR ‘s Leo Bosner Speaks at Two Disaster Conferences in Japan. International Institute of Global Resilience (IIGR). Available online: http://aboutiigr.org/iigr-s-leo-bosner-speaks-two-disaster-conferences-japan/ (accessed on 16 February 2016).
• Jones, Samantha, Katie J. Oven, Bernard Manyena, and Komal Aryal. 2014. Governance Struggles and Policy Processes in Disaster Risk Reduction: A Case Study from Nepal. Geoforum 57: 78–90. [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ]
• Kates, Robert W., and David Pijawka. 1977. From Rubble to Monument: The Pace of Reconstruction. Reconstruction Following Disaster 1: 1–23. [ Google Scholar ]
• Khazai, Bijan, Johannes Anhorn, and Christopher G. Burton. 2018. Resilience Performance Scorecard: Measuring Urban Disaster Resilience at Multiple Levels of Geography With Case Study Application to Lalitpur, Nepal. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 31: 604–16. [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ]
• Koirala, Pradip Kumar. 2014. Disaster Management Institution and System in Nepal . Kobe: Asian Disaster Reduction Center. [ Google Scholar ]
• Manandhar, Mohan Das, George Varughese, Arnold M. Howitt, and Erica Kelly. 2017. Disaster Preparedness and Response during Political Transition in Nepal: Assessing Civil and Military Roles in The Aftermath of the 2015 Earthquakes . San Francisco: The Asia Foundation. [ Google Scholar ]
• Metcalfe, Victoria, Simone Haysom, and Stuart Gordon. 2012. Trends and Challenges in Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination: A Review of the Literature. HPG Working Paper. Overseas Development Institute (ODI). Available online: https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/05-12 Literature Review - Trends and challenges in humanitarian civil-military coordination.pdf. (accessed on 1 August 2018).
• Miles, Matthew B, and A Michael Huberman. 1994. An Expanded Sourcebook: Qualitative Data Analysis , 2nd ed. Newcastle upon Tyne: Sage. [ Google Scholar ]
• NRRC Secretariat. 2012. The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium. Available online: https://odihpn.org/magazine/the-nepal-risk-reduction-consortium/ (accessed on 5 January 2016).
• Pathak, S., and M. M. Ahmad. 2018. Role of Government in Flood Disaster Recovery for SMEs In Pathumthani Province, Thailand. Natural Hazards , 1–10. [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ]
• Paul, Bimal Kanti, Bidhan Acharya, and Kabita Ghimire. 2017. Effectiveness of Earthquakes Relief Efforts in Nepal: Opinions of the Survivors. Natural Hazards 85: 1169–88. [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ]
• PDDP. 2002. Nepal Administrative/Political Structure. Available online: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/nepal_adminlevels_explained.pdf (accessed on 31 July 2018).
• Pokharel, Neetu, and Som Niroula. 2015. Earthquake Relief in Nepal Could Be Better If Civil Society’s Hands Weren’t Tied. Voices . Available online: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/earthquake-relief-nepal-could-be-better-if-civil-society-s-hands-weren-t-tied (accessed on 31 July 2018).
• Pradhan, Tika R. 2017. House Endorses Disaster Risk Management Bill: To Replace Law on Natural Calamities Enacted in 1982. Available online: http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2017-09-26/house-endorses-disaster-risk-management-bill.html (accessed on 1 December 2017).
• Rajan, S. Ravi. 2002. Disaster, Development and Governance: Reflections on the ‘Lessons’ of Bhopal. Environmental Values 11: 369–94. [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ]
• RI DEM. 2008. Definition of Emergency Response. Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (RI DEM). Available online: http://www.dem.ri.gov/topics/erp/1_2.pdf (accessed on 31 July 2018).
• Sheppard, Phillip S., and Michel D. Landry. 2016. Lessons from the 2015 Earthquake(s) in Nepal: Implication for Rehabilitation. Disability and Rehabilitation 38: 910–13. [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ] [ PubMed ]
• Shivananda, H., and Pradeep Kumar Gautam. 2005. Reassessing India’s Disaster Management Preparedness and the Role of the Indian Armed Forces. Journal of Defence Studies 6: 102–13. Available online: https://idsa.in/system/files/jds_6_1_Shivanandah.Gautam.pdf (accessed on 31 July 2018).
• SiAS. 2016. Post-Earthquake Disaster Governance in Nepal: Reflections from Practice and Policy . Kathmandu: Southasia Institute of Advanced Studies. [ Google Scholar ]
• Subba, Naresh. 2015. Nepal Earthquake 2015 Nepalese Army Experience and Lessons Learnt . Kathmandu: MoHA, UNDP, NASC. [ Google Scholar ]
• Taylor, Glyn, Krishna Vatsa, Mahendra Gurung, and Elisabeth Couture. 2013. Review of the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC). Available online: https://www.preparecenter.org/sites/default/files/nrrcreviewfinalreport_22082013.pdf (accessed on 14 January 2018).
• Thapa, Manish. 2016. Out of Barracks: Civil-Military Relations in Disaster Management—A Case Study of Nepalese Army’s Humanitarian Response during 2015 Earthquake in Nepal Manish. United Nations Mandated Univerity of Peace (UPEACE) , 1–12. [ Google Scholar ]
• Thiel, Sandra Van. 2014. Research Methods in Public Administration and Public Management: An Introduction . London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. [ Google Scholar ]
• Tufford, Lea, and Peter Newman. 2010. Bracketing in Qualitative Research. Qualitative Social Work 11: 80–96. [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ]
• Tuladhar, Gangalal, Ryuichi Yatabe, Ranjan Kumar Dahal, and Netra Prakash Bhandary. 2015. Disaster Risk Reduction Knowledge of Local People in Nepal. Geoenvironmental Disasters 2: 1–12. [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ]
• UNISDR. 2017. UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction. Available online: https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology (accessed on 31 July 2018).
• Von Einsiedel, Sebastian, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan. 2012. Nepal in Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Wendelbo, Morten, Federica La China, Hannes Dekeyser, Leonardo Taccetti, Sebastiano Mori, Varun Aggarwal, Omar Alam, Ambra Savoldi, and Robert Zielonka. 2016. The Crisis Response to the Nepal Earthquake: Lessons Learned. Available online: http://www.eias.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/The-Crisis-Response-to-the-Nepal-Earthquake-_-Lessons-Learned-colour-1.pdf (accessed on 5 April 2018).
• White, Stacey. 2015. A Critical Disconnect: The Role of SAARC in Building the DRM Capacities of South Asian Countries. Brookings Institution . May 5. Available online: https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-critical-disconnect-the-role-of-saarc-in-building-the-disaster-risk-management-capacities-of-south-asian-countries/ (accessed on 5 April 2018).
• Whittaker, Joshua, Blythe Mclennan, and John Handmer. 2015. A Review of Informal Volunteerism in Emergencies and Disasters: Definition, Opportunities and Challenges. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 13: 358–68. [ Google Scholar ] [ CrossRef ]

Click here to enlarge figure

Share and Cite

Shrestha, B.; Pathranarakul, P. Nepal Government’s Emergency Response to the 2015 Earthquake: A Case Study. Soc. Sci. 2018 , 7 , 127. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci7080127

Shrestha B, Pathranarakul P. Nepal Government’s Emergency Response to the 2015 Earthquake: A Case Study. Social Sciences . 2018; 7(8):127. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci7080127

Shrestha, Bahul, and Pairote Pathranarakul. 2018. "Nepal Government’s Emergency Response to the 2015 Earthquake: A Case Study" Social Sciences 7, no. 8: 127. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci7080127

Article Metrics

Article access statistics, further information, mdpi initiatives, follow mdpi.

Subscribe to receive issue release notifications and newsletters from MDPI journals

Advertisement

Post-earthquake damage classification and assessment: case study of the residential buildings after the M w  = 5 earthquake in Mila city, Northeast Algeria on August 7, 2020

• Original Article
• Published: 21 November 2022
• Volume 21 , pages 849–891, ( 2023 )

Cite this article

• Hamidatou Mouloud 1 ,
• Amar Chaker 2 ,
• Hallal Nassim 1 ,
• Saad Lebdioui 3 ,
• Hugo Rodrigues 4 &
• Matthew R. Agius 5  

4649 Accesses

13 Citations

2 Altmetric

Explore all metrics

On August 7th, 2020, a magnitude Mw  = 5.0 earthquake shook 5 km north of Mila city center, northeast of Algeria, causing substantial damage directly to structures, and indirectly from induced impacts of landslides and rock falls, ultimately disrupt to everyday civilian life. Given the recent significant seismic occurrences in the region, a detailed and comprehensive examination and assessment of post-earthquake damage is critical to Algeria. This is primarily because masonry, concrete, and colonial-era structures are sensitive to horizontal motions caused by seismic waves, and because masonry and concrete structures constitute a substantial portion of today’s Algeria's build environment. We present a post-earthquake investigation of the Mila earthquake, starting from the earthquake source, and a catalogue of buildings type, damage categorization, and failure patterns of residential structures in Mila's historic old town, where colonial-era brick buildings prevail. We find that structures that represent notable architectural achievements were severely damaged as a result of the earthquake. Data acquired during the immediate post-earthquake analysis was also evaluated and discussed. The graphical representations of the damages are detailed and complemented by photos. This seismic event has shown the fragility of Algeria's building stock, which must be addressed properly in future years. This study reports on an overall estimate of residential buildings in Mila's lower city, as well as an evaluation of the seismic vulnerability of three neighborhood towns (El-Kherba, Grareme-Gouga, and Azzeba). A generic database for graphical surveys and geometric research was developed and implemented making it possible to evaluate the shear strength on-site. The broad observations, collated data, and consequences were then loaded into the 3Muri structural verification program. Nonlinear static analysis was conducted to analyze probable failure paths and compare the real damage to the software results.

Similar content being viewed by others

Geological Structural Analysis Applied to Archaeoseismology

Seismic response of rc buildings during the mw 6.0 august 24, 2016 central italy earthquake: the amatrice case study, damage classification and derivation of damage probability matrices from l’aquila (2009) post-earthquake survey data.

Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.

1 Introduction

A seismic event is a rare natural occurrence that may induce enormous costs and consequences for structures, the environment, human life, and society. On August 7, 2020, at 06:15:37 UTC, an earthquake of a moderate magnitude Mw  = 5.0 (Boulahia, 2022 ) and intensity VI on the European Macroseismic scale EMS-98 struck the Mila metropolitan region (Eurocode 8 2004a , b ). It was followed at 08:12:43 UTC by the strongest aftershock earthquake, with a magnitude Mw  = 4.8 (Boulahia, 2022 ), and intensity of V. The primary earthquake destroyed a substantial number of structures in three areas (El-Kherba, Grareme-Gouga, and Azzeba), including both residential and public buildings. The vast majority of structures built following Algeria's earthquake code (RPA, Règulement Para-sismique Algerien 2003 ) were either undamaged or only minimally impacted by other correlated hazards, like landslides. However, most of the city (upper and lower areas) was severely affected since structures were constructed without earthquake design concerns and on unstable soils, besides, an important part of the construction was built without official approval. The destruction of buildings is considerable; over 1040 structures were affected, many of which were seriously destroyed (Fig.  1 ). At the end of the year, another moderate earthquake ( Mw  = 5.2) struck Northeast Algeria, with Skikda as the epicenter, about 60 km from Mila. The seismic event triggered minor secondary impacts to already damaged constructions.

Illustration of typical structure damage following the Mila earthquake

Seismic vulnerability assessment for past earthquake in Northeast Algeria has been relatively newly initiated, starting on 1992 by Farsi and Belazougui ( 1992 ). The current work consists of regional and local studies, mainly based on seismic vulnerability assessments by (Bechtoula and Ousalem 2005 ; Laouami et al. 2006 ; Harbi et al. 2007a , 2007b ; Belazougui 2008 ; Hellel et al. 2010 ; Meslem et al. 2012 ; Mehani et al. 2013 ; Boukri et al. 2013 ; Remki and Benouar 2014 ; Hamidatou et al. 2017 ; Chimouni et al. 2018 ; Allali et al. 2018 ; Hichem et al. 2019 ; Akkouche 2019 ; Amari et al. 2020 ). We know that the first major hazard that threatens the Mila region is landslide, in this case several studies have assessed landslides’ risk as well as earthquake-triggered landslides’ risk in the region (Marmi et al. 2008 ; Atmania et al. 2010 ; Guemache et al. 2010 ; Semmane et al. 2012 ; Merghadi et al. 2018 ; Benfedda et al. 2021 ; Tebbouche et al. 2022 ; Smail et al. 2022 ; Bounemeur et al. 2022 ; Medhat et al. 2022 ).

Algeria has a vast number of modern constructions made of reinforced concrete (RC), masonry, and colonial 19th and 20th-century style buildings. Assuming that most of the ostensibly "strategic" projects of cultural and historical value are constructed of masonry, this suggests that old masonry constructions must be evaluated and repaired according to the highest standards (Atalić et al. 2019 ; Ortega et al. 2019 ; Rodríguez et al. 2019 ; Stepinac et al. 2020 ; ARES 2021 ). Pushover analysis, also known as nonlinear static evaluation, is crucial and is suggested as a reference technique in Eurocode 8–3 for such cases. Even though the engineering community has made significant advances in comprehending seismic occurrences and their consequences, there are still many unknowns and uncertainties. Earthquake engineering requires a better description of seismic motions and new robust tools for analyzing buildings and assessing seismic hazards and risks. In the previous several decades, structural standards have been carefully researched, developed, and improved to the point that they now allow for designing new types of structures while preventing major damage to human life. It is also necessary to have the ability to evaluate the response of structures to earthquake ground shaking. The seismic risk of existing masonry constructions is difficult to assess and necessitates specialized technical knowledge (Lourenco and Karanikoloudis 2019 ). Post-earthquake condition evaluation may be described as the process of determining the safety and usability of a structure following a seismic event. Many factors influence structural seismic performance, including the number of floors, roof shape, age of construction, building materials, the geometry of the structure, stiffness, strength, ductility properties, soil conditions, and seismic event characteristics. Information from multiple disciplines, such as tectonics, geophysics, seismology, geology, and civil engineering including geotechnical and structural engineering, mathematics, or applied statistics, is required.

Afterward the earthquake, the first to respond to a catastrophe were civil engineers who led and coordinated the entire organization of building assessment and construction damage analysis. Several similar post-earthquake assessment procedures are used internationally (Yavari et al. 2010 ; Marshall et al. 2013 ; Didier et al. 2017 ). In the first week after Mila earthquake, a large number of constructions were examined, with a rapid post-earthquake assessment. The most endangered buildings in the city’s center were the ones under cultural heritage protection. The aim of a rapid assessment of structures is to determine the degree of damage to buildings concerning the protection of life and property, that is, to determine if the structures are usable, temporarily unusable or unusable. Emerging technological advances allow the usage of artificial intelligence in the post-earthquake assessment process in the form of machine learning methods for more efficient and precise results (Bialas et al. 2016 ; Zhang et al. 2018 ; Kim et al. 2020 ; Natio et al. 2020 ; Stepinac and Gasparuvic 2020 ).

Mila is a rural area separated into three zones: Zone A, Zone B, and Zone C (Fig.  2 ). Mila's most ancient architectural districts are found in Zone A, which is defined by packed blocks of structure masonry, brick, or a mix of materials. The majority of structures are made out of solid longitudinal and transverse walls, brick ceiling vaults, or timber ceiling beams with reinforced concrete roofs. Some schools, commercial structures, residential and government structures, cultural institutions, and monuments are located in Zone A, and are either components of a historical city structure or stand as lone landmark buildings. The earthquake-caused landslides severely damaged 10% of the structures in Zone A. Zone B is made up of a wide range of urban designs and includes a high number of structures. The landslide zone triggered by the seismic event is Zone C, and some buildings in this area have been significantly damaged. The seismic event occurred throughout the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown and caused a critical interruption to the social restrictions adapted at that time. The research focuses on the post-earthquake investigation, damage categorization, and failure patterns of masonry residential projects in the Mila region. We present primary data acquired by onsite inspections and provide an updated and broader insight to the seismic hazard of the Mila region. We also run 3D modelling to better understand the response of building in similar conditions.

Protected areas A, B, and C, as well as the region of the analysis within the Mila (yellow dashed line)

In fact, the main shock triggered many large landslides, of which, the traces are traceable and the impact on individual houses is significant. The most important one was observed in the El Kherba region (Zone C in Fig.  2 ), a catastrophic one which caused damage to residential structures. A substantial number of structures and infrastructures in the landslide's neighbourhood has been severely damaged. According to this study in post-earthquake categorization, about 10% of structures were damaged in zone A, 15% in zone B, and 61% in zone C. Exhibiting the important effect of the major earthquake-triggered landslide in zone C.

According to Benfedda et al. ( 2021 ), six landslide zones have been identified using InSAR analysis of two Sentinel-1A images, taken before and after the August 7 event main shock. The landslides were located along a 22 km long and 6.5 km wide corridor oriented NE-SW. Furthermore, Medhat et al. ( 2022 ) detected tow landslide zone in far-separated regions, Kherba city and Grarem Gouga city using the 2D decomposition MT-InSAR approach to detect the deformation velocity before the landslide activity, retrieving displacement velocity rates up to ~ 50 mm/year. Two regions were located at 12 km apart, indicating slow motion rather than fast movement along the damaged area. In addition, Halla et al. ( 2022 under publication) three large landslides have been observed within 13 km radius. The three landslides are located South, Southwest and Southeast. The most important one is that of the El-Kherba district: the Western extension of Mila city. The second landslide is located just near the epicenter within a radius of 5 km, East of Grrarem-Gouga village. The last landslide is the least important. It is located in the Azzeba village, situated Southeast of Mila city.

A thorough and more thorough post-earthquake damage assessment is required in light of the recent devastating earthquakes in Algeria. This is particularly crucial for Algeria since the bulk of the country's buildings are made of masonry, which makes them extremely sensitive to earthquake-induced horizontal movements. An exhaustive assessment of a residential structure in Mila's lower town is given in this paper. Geometric surveys and visual inspections were both part of a comprehensive program that was developed and executed. This earthquake brought to light Mila's vulnerable building stock, which has to be mitigated as effectively as possible going forward. To minimize earthquake losses, determining the characteristics of susceptibility and evaluating the seismic performance of existing structures are crucial (Endo et al. 2017 ; Casapulla et al. 2018 ; Ortega et al. 2018 ; Valente and Milani 2019 ; Hichem et al. 2019 ; Grillanda et al. 2020 ).

2 Historical seismicity and the seismic sequence in Mila

2.1 seismicity in algeria's northeast.

Many seismic events have shaken Algeria's Northeast in the past. The strongest earthquakes were the tsunamigenic earthquakes that struck the city of Jijel (previously Djidjelli) on 21 and 22 August 1856, with an intensity of X on the EMS scale, and affected Djidjelli and the nearby region (Harbi et al. 2011 ). According to ancient sources, the earthquake generated a tsunami and caused extensive damage in the city, with more than 30 people killed and many collapsed structures. Figure  3 is a map of major earthquakes in northern Algeria with their surface magnitudes Ms . Only a few significant earthquakes have happened in Algeria's northeastern region in more than a century. As a result, public awareness and readiness were at an all-time low. Though authorities and scientists have warned for years about the repercussions of a catastrophic earthquake and about the importance of planning for a swift response after an earthquake (vulnerability assessment, rescue and care of people, damage assessments, etc.…), preparedness actions have been limited (Atalić et al. 2019 ; Stepinac et al. 2020 ).

Strong earthquakes in Algeria's Northeast and surrounding regions in the previous century from 1900 to 2021, the red square indicates the Mila region (Hamidatou et al. 2017 , 2019 , 2021 )

Mila is located in the NW of the Constantine basin, which, with its tectonic configuration, is the key cause of earthquakes in the zone (Durand 1969 ; Raoult 1974 ; Vila 1980 ; Coiffait 1992 ). The 1985 Constantine earthquake (Ms = 6.0, Ousadou et al. 2012 ), the worst seismic event registered in the area, triggered substantial damage in the city and was felt in the Mila area. According to historical records, the earthquake produced extensive damage to constructions (108 structures were damaged) and caused two fatalities and injured 10 inhabitants (Bounif et al. 1987 ). The 1985 earthquake was a watershed moment in Northeast Algeria’s development and city planning. However, since strong seismic events occur across relatively extended time periods, the lessons of the past are easily forgotten. Even though 50 percent of the North Algerian region is vulnerable to severe seismic shaking, and 70% of the population lives in this region, the public’s risk awareness is low.

2.2 The seismic sequence in Mila on July–August 2020

In the period including July and August 2020, the Mila region witnessed a seismic sequence that was marked mainly by the appearance of three important shocks. Recently, Benfedda et al. ( 2021 ) studied the main events of the July–August 2020 Mila seismic sequence, including, respectively, the events on July 17 at 08:12 UTC (Mw 4.6), August 7 at 06:15 UTC (Mw 4.8) and at 11:13 UTC (Mw 4.4). More recently, Boulahia ( 2022 ) examined the first shock of July 17, 2020 at 08:12 UTC of Mw 4.8, located 1 km North of Sidi Merouane (near Grarem-Gouga area), a second shock on the August 7, 2020, at 06:15:37 UTC, where he stated a Mw magnitude of 5.0, and a third shock at 11:13:27 UTC of a Mw 4.5 (Boulahia 2022 ). The main shock (the second one) had an intensity of VI according to the EMS-98 scale, it also triggered a spectacular landslide in the El Kherba region. This landslide caused significant damage to individual buildings (Fig.  4 ).

Preliminary Earthquake Intensity Map (left) from the earthquake of August 7, 2020, at 6:15:37 (UTC) compared with predicted peak ground accelerations (right) for a return period of 475 years (Hamidatou et al. 2021 ), the red square indicates the Mila region

Benfedda et al. ( 2021 ) performed a waveform inversion of the accelerograms to calculate the seismic moment, moment magnitude, and focal mechanisms of the three main seismic events:

The July 17th, 2020, Mo = 1.019E + 16 Nm, Mw = 4.6, h = 5 km.

The August 7th main shock, Mo = 1.794E + 16 Nm, Mw = 4.8, h = 8 km.

The August 7th aftershock, Mo = 4.653E + 15 Nm, Mw = 4.4, h = 12 km.

They determined focal mechanisms generated a pure strike-slip solution for the three events with nodal plans oriented NE-SW and NE-SW and a pressure axis oriented N-S.

In addition Boulahia ( 2022 ) used an Empirical Green’s Function (EGF) method to derive the Relative Source Time Functions (RSTF’s) and high-resolution relocation to active structures and analyzed the spatiotemporal behavior and mechanics of the sequence. They managed to separate the initial seismic cloud into two densely concentrated spatial clusters of strongly correlated events, and were able to detect components of directivity toward the southeast for the shock (Mw 4.8) and directivity toward the northeast for the mainshock (Mw 5.0).

The July 17th, 2020, Mo = 2.14 × 1016 N.m, Mw = 4.8.

The August 7th main shock, Mo = 3.14 × 1016 N.m, Mw = 5.0.

The August 7th aftershock, Mo = 0.67 × 1016 Nm, Mw = 4.5.

They relocate over 981 events from the sequence, with structures matching moment tensor solutions and focal mechanisms indicating predominantly right- and left-lateral strike-slip ruptures. The results reveal orthogonal conjugate structures—one trending ~ N65W and dipping 80°SW, and one trending ~ N28E, 70°NW-dipping fault plane. The earthquakes evolved in two phases, with a spatiotemporal migration of epicenters from the NW–SE fault plane to the NE-SW fault at a rate consistent with pore fluid diffusion (Boulahia 2022 ).

Furthermore, Benfedda et al. ( 2021 ) recorded the peak ground accelerations (PGAs) of the three major events in Mila by the local network. The Beni-Haroun station recorded the maximum accelerations for all events. The Beni-Haroun huge dam reservoir is just a few meters away from the BHAR station, which is situated in a free field and on hard rock on the NW side. The high values of ground motion of these relatively small earthquakes are explained by the near field and shallow depth of the seismic events. Hard rock often records such high acceleration values quite near to the hypocenters (Laouami and Slimani 2018 ).

The earthquake's epicenter was located at latitude 6.28 N and longitude 36.54E. The epicenter was located around 13 km Southwest of Mila center, in the Hamala area, at a depth of 7 km. The strongest aftershock occurred at 8:12:43 UTC, with an Mw magnitude of 4.8 (Boulahia 2022 ) and EMS-98 intensity V. The epicenter of this aftershock was about 10 km Southwest of Mila's center, at a depth of 10 km. On the same day, five aftershocks with Mw magnitudes larger than 3.0 and EMS-98 intensity V were observed. Following that, the city of Mila and its surroundings have been hit by a series of mild and medium aftershock earthquakes (Fig.  5 ).

Earthquakes with a magnitude more than 2.0 ( Mw ) occurred in Mila between August 7 and October 30, 2020

Even though the seismic event was of moderate magnitude, it caused a large amount of measurable damage. Seismic risk assessment in urban areas and building vulnerability are usually misread, therefore the majority of community media (and a section of the technical community) have consistently reported on the disparity between the magnitude of the earthquake and the degree of damage. Assuming that a thorough and complete seismic risk assessment for the city of Mila has not been conducted, such reporting is not unusual. Given that the PGA for the historic core of Mila, which was the subject of prior studies, was about 0.19 g, and that most of the structures are quite vulnerable, widespread damage should have been predicted (Hamidatou and Sbrtai 2016 , 2017 ; Hamidatou et al. 2019 ; 2021 ). The primary earthquake destroyed a substantial number of old urban structures, including residential buildings, administrative offices, colleges, and public institutions.

3 Procedure for immediate response and post-earthquake evaluation

The seismic event in Mila occurred during the strong restrictions imposed following the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, which imposed extra constraints on rescuer and researcher operations. Immediately following the earthquake, a multidisciplinary post-seismic disaster management team visited the Mila City Crisis Management Agency to examine the damaged state of the constructions and the possibility of their continued use in a timely manner. The Civil Protection Center was activated, and researchers, specialists, and experts from research centers and universities, as well as the CRAAG, were hired to organize work related to field condition assessment, installation of the seismic network and Global Positioning Systems (GPS), geological and geophysical field missions, rapid engineering assessment training, and the organization and development of an information system for dealing with disasters. All activities were conducted in partnership with the Ministry of the Interior's Civil Protection Directorate and the City of Mila's Civil Protection Authority.

Based on Italian results, a prototype technique for post-earthquake damage and useability study was proposed (Baggio et al. 2007 ) and EMS-98 (EMS 1998 ), because knowledge of seismic occurrences in northern Algeria is low, vigilance for such events and immediate actions was also poor. Until now, data on the number of structures, floor layouts, cross-sections, building materials, or function at the time of the earthquake were not available. The post-earthquake damage analysis includes a quick visual evaluation of each structural system, an indication of the degree of damage, and the categorization of the structure into each of six sections:

CN1 (dark red color): Not feasible due to external hazards—The construction is dangerous due to the likelihood of major portions of a nearby structure collapsing. It is advised not to remain in such facilities given the considerable number of aftershocks.

CN2 (red color): Unusable owing to damage—The structure is dangerous due to substantial structural damage, collapse, and failure. The structure has reached the limit of its loadbearing capability and ductility and cannot be utilized in any way. That does not always mean that the building must be destroyed.

PCN1 (dark yellow color): Possibly unusable—Full assessment required—The structure has a fair extent of the damage but no risk of collapse. The loadbearing capacity has been partly reduced. A shorter visit to the structure is conceivable, and a structural engineer should provide suggestions for future repair work.

PCN2 (yellow color): Temporarily unusable- Emergency rehabilitation measures required—The structure has some damage with no probability of collapse, but cannot be utilized owing to the possibility of failure of some structural components. The structural engineer is aware of emergency response methods and must give instructions to users. The structure, or a portion of it, is inoperable until the safeguards are put in place. Provisional usability may apply to elements of the structure (components) only.

CU1 (dark green color): Usable without limitations—There is no damage or only minor damage that does not jeopardize the structure's load-bearing ability and usage.

CU2 (green color): Consider Protective Measures.—Except for some elements where there is an immediate risk to a portion of the structure, the structure can be used. The building evaluator can grant authorization for sthe risk to be removed and advise the occupants to impose temporary residential limitations on specific portions of the structure. The structure can be used freely after the risk has been removed.

After Day 1, Class CU2 was used in the procedure because non-structural components of the structures were damaged and may endanger passers-by and members of the public. It was essential to eliminate these components as quickly and efficiently as possible. The structure was safe to use once the non-structural damaged components were removed.

The building typologies, structural damage, and failure patterns caused by the earthquake or landslide in the Mila city center area are depicted and discussed in the following sections. The brick structures that make up a considerable proportion of the city center and the surrounding area are given special attention. This study focuses on the typical damage and disaster to residential structures. Significant advancement has recently been achieved in understanding the seismic behavior of masonry buildings and analysis during seismic occurrences (Binda et al. 2000 ; Ortega et al. 2017 ; Vlachakis et al. 2020 ). It is hoped that the current data will positively contribute to further development in this field.

4 Typology of constructions in Mila

Mila's buildings typically consist of roughly 91,000 residential constructions and 5,000 non-residential constructions, according to the Algeria Population and Housing Census 2008, provided by the National Office of Statistics of Algeria. More than 20% of the construction stock is over 40 years old. The use of traditional materials and building techniques, like masonry and timber, is a defining feature of such older Mila structures. Most of the people in Mila province, particularly in the cities, work and reside in colonial constructions, especially in Mila's city core.

Throughout the city's and the surrounding areas’ history, numerous types of structures have been constructed depending on the advancement of construction technology, understanding of soil qualities, and urban planning, including urban protection measures and the demand for building areas. Knowing when a set of buildings were built provides a reasonable estimate of their seismic strength following the 1985 Constantine earthquake. Most of the structures in Mila's old city center are concrete and masonry constructions with timber floors and roofs. A single-story typical height varied from 2.5 to 3.7 m.

They followed RPA norms from 1996 to 2003, and after 2003, they followed RPA regulations (RPA 2003 ). As a result, many structures were built without any proper lateral force resisting system before any seismic regulations were implemented. In terms of floor systems, timber in older houses and reinforced concrete in later constructions are the most common options. Timber floors are more flexible than rigid concrete slabs. Because the connections between walls and floors are typically weak, this makes walls more susceptible to potential out-of-plane failure mechanisms.

New structures with four or more stories have been built in the city throughout the previous two decades. They were designed to withstand earthquakes. A mix of historic individual structures and new apartment towers distinguishes the urban area. Most single-family houses in Mila's immediate vicinity are one- or two-story brick structures. Contained masonry with reinforced concrete floor constructions is more recent than unreinforced stone masonry constructions with wood or reinforced concrete floors. About 17 percent of dwelling units in Mila were built before the first seismic code was enacted (1982), Fifteen percent of housing units were designed following the first seismic code (1962–1996), and 29% were built using the enhanced seismic code (Table 1 ). The RPA 2003 code was used to design housing units built after 2003.

Mila's historical city compound is a conservation area under the Act on Culture and Heritage Conservation and Maintenance. Zone A and Zone B are the two zones that make up the region (Fig.  6 ). The oldest and most architecturally key areas of Mila are in Zone A, which is the subject of this study. Both locations, however, have architectural and historic landmarks and are characterized by densely packed blocks of constructions using stone brick or a mix of materials. Many schools, businesses, residential and government structures, social organizations, and mosques are in Zone A and are conserved as part of a historical city structure or as separate historical sites, although they are not the subject of this research. Zone B contains the remaining parts of Mila's historic urban complex. It contains a wide range of urban forms as well as a considerable number of historically significant structures.

Heritage-protected zones in Mila (Zone A, Zone B, and Zone C). The yellow dashed line indicates the study's observation area

Once most of the buildings are constructed as part of bigger blocks, their sides are frequently the width of a leaf. The same building strategy was utilized even when the structures were built inside the blocks, i.e., as freestanding units, and these freestanding structures were severely damaged.

The inadequate connections between walls and floors are also observed, and since the floor structure is primarily wooden, the structures lack the so-called box-type behaviour. Timber flooring prevails despite the presence of multiple composite wooden concrete compound buildings. Because group of unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings are prone to damage from seismic excitations (Palazai et al. 2022 ), the damage was observed in a large number of structures following the Mila earthquake. The typical roof structure is a king or queen post truss; however, there are many distinct types of integrated timber roof constructions (Fig.  7 ). Due to rehabilitation work, a concrete slab beneath the roof systems can be found in a limited number of structures. Even though tie rods have been used for many years over the world, they were not widely used in Mila. Timber-reinforced masonry was used in very few examples in the ancient city core. After 1980, numerous new concrete constructions were put within the old downtown's existing building blocks, a trend that still exists today. These structures were either unaffected by the earthquake or suffered only minor non-structural damage. Newer buildings, on the other hand, tended to have more stories and less interstory height than older buildings, which clearly influenced the seismic response of neighboring structures (Fig.  8 ).

Typical residential structure (schematic representation)

Insertion of new concrete constructions "within" existing blocks during the building process and at the end

The lack of maintenance was identified as a key factor in the condition of structures following the earthquake. Because many structures were poorly or never maintained, the masonry strength deteriorated with time, the connection between the masonry and the walls was degraded, and the seismic performance of such buildings worsened. Water infiltration damaged the characteristics of both masonry and wood elements in numerous cases.

5 Case study: Sidi Ghanem Mosque

We studied the Sidi Ghanem Mosque, a building located in historical Mila city (Figs.  9 and 10 ). The Sidi Ghanem Mosque is the oldest mosque in Africa. Mila was once a Roman settlement. The Umayyad Arab forces arrived in 675 CE, about 59 AH. Under the direction of Abu al-Muhajir Dinar, they seized the city. That same year, it appears, the order was made to clear a site adjacent to a Christian Basilica and to build a mosque. The basilica had an abundance of building materials, stones, and columns that could be reused. The mosque, on the other hand, did not mirror the familiar Roman basilica or the Roman city street architecture, but it had an important meaning. Its 62 m-high minaret, for example, was constructed with 365 steps, representing the number of days in the year. The mosque of Abu al-Muhajir in Mila does not have a marked orientation. Here's a blueprint for the structure. It began as a mosque, but was later turned into a workshop and, finally, a hospital.

North façade view of the Sidi Ghanem Mosque

South façade view of the Sidi Ghanem Mosque

The Roman basilica was demolished to make way for the mosque to be rebuilt. The main construction is made of reclaimed materials from the old town. The reuse of Roman columns and marquees allowed the mosque to have more robust construction. The other materials used were full-size bricks made on-site. There are visible elements of a second-story building that the French-built to house the soldiers.

The state of disrepair of the Sidi Ghanem Mosque was worsened by the Mila earthquake. The study of the monument’s restoration, which began in 2019, focused in its first phase on "the state of the sites and emergency measures," in light of which emergency work was undertaken.

According to the Algerian seismic hazard map (Hamidatou and Sbartai 2017 ; Hamidatou et al. 2019 , 2021 ), for a return time of 475 years, the peak ground acceleration at the building site is 0.197 g. The building serves as an educational-cultural institution. Prior to the earthquake, the structure's state in terms of vertical loads was adequate and well maintained.

6 Residential building damage and common failure patterns

The earthquake severely damaged key architectural achievements and shattered Mila's historically identifiable city center. The vast majority of structures were constructed after the first mandated earthquake rules (i.e., during the 1980s) withstood the earthquake unscathed or with only minor damage. However, many structures in the historic district (Upper and Lower Town) were severely damaged. It is estimated that about 10% of the entire building stock was damaged in Zone A and more than 15% in Zone B—a total of 540 damaged buildings. However, in Zone C, 61% of the buildings were damaged, with a total of 743 building, i.e., more than the total of the damaged structures in Zones A and B gathered, exhibiting the substantial effect of the major earthquake-triggered landslide in zone C. (Table 2 ).

According to the previously mentioned post-earthquake categorization (red or N, yellow or PN, green or U), of 136 damaged structures in zone A, 97 were green-tagged, 35 were yellow-tagged, and 4 were red-tagged, whereas in zone B, of 404 damage structure, 342 were green-tagged, 55 were yellow-tagged, and 7 were red-tagged. However, in Zone C, among the 743 damaged buildings, 515 were green-tagged, 137 were yellow-tagged, and 91 were red-tagged. In Fig.  11 , the residential structures with usability tags are depicted on a map of the historical city center, whereas Fig.  12 depicts a typical building block. In this block, 17 buildings were green-tagged (13 percent of all damaged buildings), 20 (17 percent) were yellow-tagged, and 3 (4 percent) were red-tagged.

A detail of Mila city's building usability rating

Post-earthquake damage assessment for one typical block of buildings

The historic downtown is made up of blocks of aggregated buildings, a damage map for each one has been prepared (Fig.  13 ). The goal was to gather information on the risk of individual blocks as well as a prospective seismic vulnerability assessment for certain sections of Mila. Although it was assumed that blocks further away from the epicenter would be less damaged, the map in Fig.  13 reveals a significant spread and random outcomes.

Average damage index for each block of buildings

According to our post-earthquake assessment analysis, each individual building in the block was assigned a number on the map. CU1 buildings were assigned an index of 0.5, CU2 buildings were assigned an index of 1, PCN1 and PCN2 buildings were assigned an index of 3, and CN1 and CN2 buildings were assigned an index of 5.

Ni: Number of structures in each calculation mesh assigned to a damage category.

Based on the information received; these figures are enough for a basic indicator of damage or average index can be computed for the entire block. For the block depicted in Fig.  12 , the damage index is computed as a weighted average depending on the number of individual structures, as \(\left[ {{12} \times 0,{5}\left( {{\text{CU1}}} \right) + {25} \times {1}\left( {{\text{CU2}}} \right) + {4}0 \times {3}\left( {{\text{PCN1}} + {\text{PCN2}}} \right) + {9} \times {5}\left( {{\text{CN1 }} + {\text{ CN2}}} \right)} \right]/{86} = {196}/{86} = {2},{28}\) .

It should be emphasized that the damage information should be viewed with caution because the criteria of various engineers were often subjective and deviated from the evaluation guidelines.

The choice to consider PN1 and PN2 designations, as well as N1 and N2 with the same damage index is also justified. Although the results may not provide an entirely accurate image of the damage in the city, they do provide a reasonable indication of which areas are most vulnerable to earthquakes. The immediate post-earthquake evaluation revealed unique structural damage typologies. Non-structural components such as chimneys and ornamental elements on facades were found to be losing their structural resistance and stability on every structure in the city center. These factors resulted in further damage to the building exterior or structural damage to nearby structures, as well as water intrusion inside the premises. Secondly, the loss of structural strength and stability of structural components jeopardized the structural integrity of entire structures. Gable walls, masonry columns, portions of walls between or under windows, vaults, ceilings, and stairs are the most frequently encountered damaged elements. Some of these features also harmed roof systems, which frequently became unstable because of the collapse of individual load-bearing walls underneath them.

Individual buildings, particularly those within the blocks of buildings, suffered significant damage and had uncertain structural resistance and stability. Table 3 shows the prevalence of observed masonry structure damages and load-deformation in Mila. The structural damage observed is discussed in the following section with graphical interpretations and images of the affected buildings. There are examples of in-plane, out-of-plane, and mixed damage or failure mechanisms.

6.1 Structural damage

Masonry is a well-known heterogeneous, composite material with low tensile strength and significant self-weight, making it difficult to sustain earthquake-induced stresses. Learning from past occurrences can help us design better new structures and make post-earthquake evaluations easier. The Mila earthquake caused damage to clay brick masonry constructions similar to those observed in Japan and Italy (Penna et al. 2014 ; Binda et al. 2000 ; De Luca et al. 2018 ) and Turkey after recent earthquakes (Karimzadeh et al. 2018 ; 2020 ). Most of the residential structures in Mila's old town were constructed with URM. To prevent masonry failure, proper detailing and strengthening should be employed. However, this was not always the case in older structures. Even though “zero mechanism” was frequently mentioned in many post-earthquake evaluations in African nations (i.e., the disintegration of the material) (Indirli et al. 2013 ), due to the construction type, i.e., solid brick structure, this mechanism was not detected during the Mila earthquake. The partial collapse or overturning of gable walls was one of the most typical failure types in Mila's residential structures. Gable walls are often just 9 cm thick. In addition to the attic gable walls, the parapet walls were frequently damaged, but to a lesser extent. The preceding part depicted the roof type, and it was observed that the connections between the timber framework and the walls were frequently insufficient or non-existent. Roof rafters and ridge beams frequently collide with gable walls, causing substantial damage and failure due to their weight and magnified accelerations at the gable's height. The same thing happens with the mezzanine wood structure (which rests on the longitudinal walls) and sidewalls—the wall and horizontal parts are not or are very poorly attached. Figure  14 depicts damage examples from the most prevalent gable wall collapses.

In-plane and out-of plane damage

Many buildings have an architectural design that includes protrusions for entrances or other floor plan irregularities. Cracks frequently emerge at the junction of orthogonal load-bearing walls in these areas; torsion ensues, which can compromise the building's overall stability. Because building entrances with stairs are widespread in these locations, the staircases and related load-bearing walls are frequently damaged. Figure  15 depicts one example.

Plan irregularities caused damage to the connecting components

6.2 Non-structural damages

The Mila earthquake caused the most damage to non-structural elements. Partition walls are typically composed of 9 cm-thick masonry but can be as thin as 3.7 cm without plaster. The degree of damage to partition walls ranges from minor plaster damage to severe collapse and failure (Fig.  16 ). Non-structural walls are sometimes built on the shorter side of the brick (shiner) and are likely to be destroyed after an earthquake. Although damage to partition walls may not result in a permanent reduction in structural strength and stability, it can nonetheless represent a risk to the building's performance and peoples’ safety. Many buildings in Mila have such walls that are exceedingly high and long. This makes them comparatively thin, and their collapse can endanger people. The massive damage to partition walls reflects a major economic loss as well. Certain institutions with huge floor areas have partition walls that have sustained so much damage that cost–benefit assessments have shown that repairing them is not profitable. The building approach was to stack partition walls on top of one other, transferring no load to the slab. If the first-floor wall is destroyed or lost, the weight of the second floor (and higher levels) will be transmitted to the first-floor slab.

Damage to partition walls

Conversion of non-residential spaces to residential spaces is a common adjustment to building spaces (such as basements, attics, or service rooms). Partition walls were frequently eliminated during such renovations, undesired intrusions in load-bearing walls are also common. It is often assumed that if a steel beam is installed on top of the opening to replace the load-bearing wall, nothing will happen to the structure. Elements of the roof structure are frequently removed when transforming an attic into a living area since they interfere with the intended usage (Fig.  17 ). Roof structures have been extensively modified during the conversion of attics to residential use. Timber tie components were frequently cut to install a door (Fig.  17 ), creating significant alterations to the roof structure's basic structural system.

An example of an attic conversion for residential use

Stairs in residential structures are often positioned in the center of the floor layout, with various residential units on either side. Stairs are not necessarily non-structural features, but in the case of brick structures in Mila, they are not critical for seismic force resistance. Stairs can be monolithic at times, although they are usually fixed to the walls on one side and supported by steel profiles on the other. Many stairs lack a supporting beam and are not monolithic, as seen in Fig.  18 (right). Staircase walls are often thicker and part of a rigid core. The most typical staircase damage is the separation of individual stairs, the falling of plaster (sometimes as thick as 3 cm), and the separation of the stairs from the walls (Fig.  18 ).

Typical stairwell damage

Many staircases were built cantilevered into the wall, resulting in substantial step separations during the earthquake. Finally, in older structures, elevator shafts served as partition walls and were frequently damaged (Fig.  19 ).

Typical elevator shaft damage

7 Methodology

7.1 assessment procedure.

A quick, preliminary assessment of the continued useability including all structures affected in the earthquake is the first step in a thorough post-seismic building evaluation (Stepinac et al. 2017 ; Uroš et al. 2020 ). The information thus collected may also be used to evaluate old infrastructure and build a modeling and simulation model. The following studies employed similar technologies (Dall’Asta et al. 2019 ; Betti et al. 2021 ). When required, detailed assessment and available Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) assessment methods are preferred (Stepinac et al. 2020 ). With consideration of the safety of civil engineers in the field, a quick initial survey is carried out as quickly and efficiently as possible following the earthquake. In Algeria, this type of evaluation entailed a quick visual inspection of each load-bearing structural component and an assessment of the level of damage, and the assignment of the building into one of six potential categories (Fig.  20 ):

CU1 Unrestricted use possible (Dark Green label),

CU2 Useful with suggestions (Green label),

PCN1 Unusable for the time being, a thorough examination is essential (Dark Yellow label),

PCN2 temporarily ineffective (Yellow label),

CN1 Due to extraneous influences, it is no longer usable (Dark Red label), and

CN2 Due to damage, it is no longer useable (Red label).

Six categories, each with a unique label

7.2 Detailed assessment results

On August 8, 2020, within the first 24 h after the earthquake, a rapid evaluation of the case study building was conducted. Following a quick thorough observation of load-bearing structural components, the building was deemed temporally uninhabitable (Dark Yellow label), with a suggestion for a further assessment (PCN1). The preliminary assessment's main findings are as follows:

On all levels, there is apparent damage in the form of cracks in the wall coverings, arches (Fig.  21 a), vaults, and ceilings (Fig.  21 b);

Plaster separation and localized damage;

Structural components (walls, columns, and arches) have minor damage;

First floor cracks: wall, lintel ( a ), and ceiling ( b )

In the eastern part of the structure, diagonal cracks are apparent on load-bearing walls.

The second floor and attic had slight damage, but the eastern (Fig.  22 a, b) and central staircase wings received the most serious damage (Fig.  23 a, b). The structure should be used with caution in areas where there is a risk of plaster collapsing, according to the instructions. Furthermore, while the eastern and western stairs can be used with a limited number of people, the central staircase cannot be used until a comprehensive assessment has been conducted.

Exterior a and internal b cracks on the eastern stairwell

Exterior a and internal b diagonal cracks on the central staircase

The buildings under consideration are in the range of peak ground acceleration of 0.199 g, according to current structural engineering standards shown by RPA ( 2003 ), and governmental codes—which means the expected earthquake intensity is X on the EMS-98 scale for a return period of 475 years. Furthermore, a seismic hazard map for the Mila region was developed according to RPA 2003 criteria based on the latest findings from research conducted by CRAAG in collaboration with the University of Skikda (Hamidatou et al. 2017 ). The soil in the immediate area of the evaluated structure falls into the category of soil type C, according to the specified seismic hazard study (2017–2019).

The damage observations are depicted on the building’s floor plans (Figs.  24 and 25 ). The building was evaluated from the air using an unmanned aerial vehicle, and no damage to the primary load-bearing structure or the roof structure was found. Also examined were decorative crosses, figurines, and reliefs. The 3D model of the building was created using photogrammetric photographs for digital preservation reasons.

Damage pattern and shear strength-testing locations on the building's ground floor

Damage pattern and shear strength-testing locations on the first level of the structure

After a detailed assessment of the structure, the following damages were discovered: cracks in wall hangings, vaults, and ceiling, and separation and local degradation of plaster on the bottom floor. Due to lateral motions during the earthquake, cracks in the barrel vaults are frequently parallel to the supporting joints. The cracks are caused by tensile strains that run perpendicular to the supporting joint. If such fissures develop deeply enough, they can induce hinge formation and, as a result, loss of stability. However, the defects found in the studied structure are superficial and mostly concentrated in the plaster. Minor local damage occurred to the structural elements (walls, columns, and arches). Diagonal fractures on load-bearing walls may be seen in the center core of the structure, where the main stairway is located, and in the eastern part of the building. These fissures can also be noticed on the building's north side. All the floors show visible damage, such as cracks and crumbling plaster on the walls. Minor local damage to the first-floor walls, as well as cracks on the partition walls and ceiling connectors, may be seen.

The east wing's ground and first floors were severely damaged. The cracks that developed spread along the entire wall of the wing's south front. It is unfavorable that the fissures are connected and proceed to the transversely interconnected walls and lintels. The little contribution of a torsional reaction of the structure, where the boundary elements are the most strained and collapse might induce such fractures. In addition, that component of the structure is connected to the adjacent structure. Although this can have a favorable impact in general, in the case of the east wing walls, such a boundary condition might produce extra forces. The walls may fail if they are not well connected to the diaphragms. The wall is not in danger of collapsing because there has been no out-of-plane displacement, but it should be strengthened as soon as possible to prevent further damage. Except for the main staircase, the entire structure is available for use. Depending on the probable future, a static and dynamic analysis of the structure's current condition must be done. Irrespective of how much the entire structure would be repaired, the primary staircase, as well as every other wall with cracks along their length, need to be renovated and repaired. Prior to that, preliminary research on the masonry's characteristics and other essential data for the design and analysis must be performed.

7.3 Numerical modeling

The 3Muri software is used to generate a 3D numerical model of the evaluated building. Because of its computational efficiency and excellent accuracy, the macro-element technique is used (Mouyiannou et al. 2014 ).

Its simulation adaptability (including properties of the different elements, realistic floor stiffnesses, strengthening, and many other features) makes it extremely helpful in a location where the great bulk of building stock is brick. This research was based on relevant case analyses in the 3Muri program (Lamego et al. 2017 ; Malcata et al. 2020 ).

The equivalent-frame technique, which employs non-linear beam elements, is used by the macro-element approach. The three categories of macro-elements are piers, spandrels, and stiff nodes (or non-linear beam elements). The piers and spandrels, which are connected by rigid nodes, are the focal points of all deformation. Figure  26 depicts an analogous frame model constructed from these aforementioned macro-elements.

3Muri 3D model and a 3D comparable framework

Non-linear static pushover analysis (Fajfar and Fischinger 1998 ; Cerovecki et al. 2018 ) verifies the limit load ratio employed in numerical solution and provides more comprehensive information on relevant components, failure causes, and the building's overall performance. The pushover study is conducted with constant dynamic loading and monotonically increasing lateral stiffness. Two alternative horizontal load distributions along the building's elevation are investigated in the pushover research. The horizontal load is proportionate to the mass of the building in the first distribution, which also has a high degree of similarity. The horizontal loads are transferred according to the structure's mode pattern in the second distribution first vibration mode form as established by elastic analysis (Figs.  27 and 28 ). Such horizontal forces are imposed in the model at the position of the masses, i.e., at each floor level in the center of the masses. Furthermore, incidental irregularity is carefully considered to account for uncertainty in the determination of the building’s center of mass. For both the x (longitudinal) and y (transversal) directions, 3% of the structure's height perpendicular to the seismic load direction is considered on each side.

Pushover in the y-direction with a mode shape associated with a period of T = 0.26 s

Pushover mode shape in the x-direction, associated with a period T = 0.13 s

In a 3D model, floors are considered as horizontally stiff diaphragms, which is realistic due to the true in-plane rigidity of the horizontal floor elements. In software, rigid diaphragms' in-plane rigidity is limitless, and the mass of the real slab is considered. The roof is removed from the load-bearing structure in the seismic analysis since it has no substantial effect on the structure's reaction and does not contribute to the building's overall resistance. Although it did not meet the criteria, its significance to the model in the form of force was not disregarded.

The numerical model's average values of material parameters (Table 4 ) are based on an analysis of relevant literature (Ghiassi et al. 2019 ; EC06 2021 ) as well as on-site testing. Knowledge level 2 (normal knowledge) can be characterized in terms of experimental in situ testing and extensive study of the structure. The confidence factor was set at 1.2 based on the attained knowledge level.

According to the study in (EC06 2021 ), the building is characterized as normal in height but irregular in floor design, necessitating 3D modeling. The structure is designated as a torsional stiff system. First, static analysis is carried out according to EC06 ( 2021 ) followed by dynamic analysis.

Because seismic resilience is crucial given the consequences of a catastrophe, the pedagogical facility is designated as having relevance class II. As a result, the significance factor is I = 1.2. For two limit states, three PGA values are employed.

The capacity curve represented the ratio of shear force at the structure's base to control node displacement resulting from the seismic analysis. The control node was chosen to be close to the center of mass and is positioned on the building's top story. Figure  29 displays the capacity curves generated from all investigations. Figures  30 and 31 show bi-linearized pushover curves in the x and y axes, respectively. The y-axis shows total base shear in kN, while the x-axis shows control node displacement in mm.

Pushover curves for the x (blue) and y (red) axes

The most relevant pushover curve for the x-direction

The most relevant pushover curve for the y-direction

Figures  32 and 33 show the damaged condition until the last stage of the pushover curves in the x and y-axis, with yellow indicating shear damage and red indicating bending damage.

Damage at maximum displacement capacity for x-direction pushover. Yellow: shear damage, red: bending damage

Damage at maximum displacement capacity for y-direction pushover. Yellow: shear damage, red: bending damage

The structure's capacity is assessed after the structure's response, and inspections are carried out in line with the fundamental standards pertaining to the status of extensive damage, as defined by limit states. Table 5 shows the parameters for similar SDOF systems from Figs.  32 and 33 . These characteristics are determined through bilinearization by employing the associated energy concept that is used to calculate target movement.

The ratio α of the building's limit capacity acceleration to the reference peak ground acceleration on type A ground is also presented in Table 6 . For all limit states, the parameter is provided. An issue emerges with historic masonry structures, which are frequently unable to be strengthened to the extent required to meet today's seismic-resistant construction requirements.

A study of the walls out-of-plane bending must then be performed. This explains the earthquake activity that occurs perpendicular to the walls. The investigation is carried out for the limited situation that is on the verge of collapsing. Acceleration for a 475-year return period is used. If a wall's MRd/MEd ratio is greater than or equal to 1.0, it is considered to have passed the out-of-plane bending test. In Fig.  34 , the walls that failed the examination are shown in red.

Out-of-plane bending findings. Red: bending damage

In the global study, the 3Muri software also does not take the out-of-plane loss of stability into account. It is believed that appropriate connections are created across walls and diaphragms. Out-of-plane local processes are thus avoided, allowing the global in-plane response of the structure to be studied (Lagomarsino et al. 2013 ). Therefore, the resistance to consolidation is put to the test in a specific program unit; specific elements of a single wall are tested, as well as the interaction of parts of many distinct walls that can generate various local mechanisms when combined. A local mechanism is seen in Fig.  35 , with the mechanical component.

Example of a local mechanism

Local mechanisms are arbitrarily established based on the geometry of the building, common failure mechanisms, and seismic damage. Local mechanisms commonly emerge because of faulty wall and wall-to-floor structural connections. The linear kinematic analysis method is applied. There are three phases to defining a local mechanism. To begin, a kinematic block is a stiff wall element that is sensitive to movement or tilting in relation to another block or the whole of the wall. The initial conditions are then found, and the load is finally calculated. Several of the local progressive collapse of the apparent building, as well as its resistance to the types of failure shown, are listed below (Fig.  36 and Table 7 ). The ratio of the response spectrum of mechanical activation to the response spectrum of earthquake excitation is represented by the α parameter.

The local mechanisms LM1 (east wing), LM2 (right wing), and LM3 (left wing) are represented in the diagram (central wing)

8 Discussion and conclusions

Based on case studies from recent seismic events in Japan and Italy, (Da Porto et al. 2013 ; Lucibello et al. 2013 ; Formisano 2017 ; Formisano and Marzo 2017 ; Boschi et al. 2018 ; Chieffo and Formisano 2019 ; Malcata et al. 2020 ), the structure under study was assessed to determine its earthquake resilience. The Mila, Algeria’s recent earthquake damaged the structure. The building was not built according to seismic design principles. However, the repair and retrofit improved the structure's condition. Transverse walls are added, and old timber beams are replaced with reinforced concrete flooring. Such stiff diaphragms provide a good connection between all walls and, as a result, improved the seismic behavior of the structure. Therefore, enhancing the rigidity of conventional timber flooring in ancient brick buildings is frequently one of the first seismic retrofitting procedures. On the other hand, a recent study shows that replacing traditional hardwood floors with rigid diaphragms, such as RC flooring, improves energy efficiency. Cracks on the edges of the two materials, or, in the worst-case scenario, disintegration, and collapse of the masonry walls, might be the consequence. This strategy, however, is effective for earthquakes of expected smaller magnitudes, such as those in Mila, and serves to reinforce the existing structure against horizontal actions.

We described the damage to Mila's historic downtown following the earthquake on August 7, 2020. Despite previous calls from the scientific and technical communities, the earthquake demonstrated and verified that awareness, vulnerability mitigation, and readiness are critical to preventing catastrophic seismic consequences and enabling timely action after an earthquake. Although of low magnitude, the Mila earthquake inflicted major damage and economic loss, as well as exposed many weaknesses in the built heritage that people, decision-makers, and the professional and scientific community will have to address for many years to come. The earthquake severely destroyed older masonry structures built before seismic standards were enforced.

The information obtained during the rapid post-earthquake assessment was analyzed and discussed. Damages are graphically shown and illustrated by images. This report examines preliminary data from the database that was enhanced by field engineers. Forms for rapid post-earthquake building evaluation were developed shortly after the 1980 earthquake, and similar forms were used after subsequent earthquakes such as the Tipaza and Zemmouri earthquakes. The findings of the rapid evaluations must be calibrated and reconciled with the extensive reviews provided by the new Act for the rehabilitation of Mila city. In the impacted region, 1044 structures have been identified as severely damaged and will be submitted to further inspections.

3 Muri and an analogous frame approach were used to analyze the existing unconfined masonry structure. Because of its multiple advantages, non-linear static (pushover) seismic analysis is used instead of linear seismic analysis. For the 100, 225, and 475-year return periods, limit state checks were performed. In terms of the structure's existing wall distribution, the results are consistent with the expected behavior. The construction becomes less stiff and has higher displacements in the y direction. Furthermore, the structure's capacity is reduced in the y-direction. There is also some irregularity between the centers of stiffness and mass, which causes torsion to have a minor but unfavorable influence on the overall behavior of the structure. The middle stairwell's walls, as well as the west side of the structure’s cross walls, are crucial elements. Out-of-plane bending failure of walls was also investigated. Using linear kinematics, the causes of failure mode were also examined. The actual damage was compared to the damage calculated using the 3Muri software's non-linear static seismic analysis. From the examination of the structure's behavior during an earthquake, it is evident that strengthening is necessary to improve the structure's seismic performance. An earthquake's damage must be repaired to avoid future damage and threat to the structure's overall strength and stability.

The main results of the investigated area of the city are that the damaged structures are typically older and were built before seismic regulations were implemented. The building materials have degraded over time. Furthermore, the structures are typically under-maintained and, in many cases, designed as seismically deficient. Local (rather than global) in-plane and out-of-plane mechanisms were the most typical failure modes. Significant damage has been found in secondary and/or ornamental building components. Buildings collapsing all at once were extremely infrequent. Aside from concerns with the existing susceptible building stock built prior to seismic regulations, the amount of damage was compounded owing to unlawful conversion of ground levels for commercial activity. There appears to be a widespread lack of understanding and perception of seismic danger in the population, as well as a lack of preventative information dissemination aimed at boosting awareness.

As a result of the several devastating earthquakes that have struck Algeria, the ability to 'build back better’ is much valued. This involves using sustainable resources and producing new ideas (Funari et al. 2020 , 2021 ; Stepinac et al. 2020 ) should be implemented, and energy efficiency should be ensured (Milovanovic and Bagaric 2020 ; Valluzzi et al. 2021 ). Buildings made of masonry can be strengthened using a variety of techniques (Ortega et al. 2017 ; Kouris and Triantafillou 2018 ; Skejic et al. 2020 ). Due to their compatibility and reversibility, materials like FRP (Fiber-Reinforced Polymers) and TRM (Textile-Reinforced Mortars) can be used.

Data availability

All data generated or analyzed during this study are included in this article.

Akkouche K, Hannachi NE, Hamizi M et al. (2019) Knowledge-based system for damage assessment after earthquake: Algerian buildings case. Asian J Civ Eng 20:769–784. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42107-019-00143-z

Article   Google Scholar  

Allali SA, Abed M, Mebarki A (2018) Post-earthquake assessment of buildings damage using fuzzy logic. Eng Struct 166:117–127. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.engstruct.2018.03.055

Amari K, Abdessemed F, Cheikh Zouaoui M, Uva G (2020) Seismic vulnerability of masonry lighthouses: a study of the bengut lighthouse, Dellys, Boumerdès, Algeria. Buildings 10:247. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings10120247

ARES (2021) Project first Workshop. Available online: www.grad.hr/ares (Accessed on 15 Feb 2021)

Atalić J, Šavor Novak M, Uroš M (2019) Seismic risk for Croatia: overview of research activities and present assessments with guidelines for the future. Građevinar 71(10):923–947

Google Scholar  

Athmania D, Benaissa A, Hammadi A, Bouassida M (2010) Clay and marl formation susceptibility in Mila Province. Algeria Geotech Geol Eng 28(6):805–813. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10706-010-9341-5

Baggio C, Bernardini A, Colozza R, Corazza L, Bella M, Di Pasquale G, Dolce M, Goretti A, Martinelli A, Orsini G et al. (2007) Field manual for post-earthquake damage and safety assessment and short-term countermeasures (AeDES), JRC Sci, Thechnical Reports. 1–100

Bechtoula H, Ousalem H (2005) The 21 May 2003 Zemmouri (Algeria) earthquake: damages and disaster responses. J Adv Concr Technol 3(1):161–174

Belazougui M (2008) Boumerdes Algeria earthquake of May 21, 2003: damage analysis and behavior of beam-column reinforced concrete structures. In: proceedings of the 14th world conference on earthquake engineering, Beijing, Paper 14_01–1006

Benfedda A, Serkhane A, Bouhadad Y, Slimani A, Abbouda M, Bourenane H (2021) The main events of the July-August 2020 Mila (NE Algeria) seismic sequence and the triggered landslides. Arab J Geosci 14:1894. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12517-021-08301-x

Betti M, Bonora V, Galano L, Pellis E, Tucci G, Vignoli A (2021) An integrated geometric and material survey for the conservation of heritage masonry structures. Heritage 4:35

Bialas J, Oommen T, Rebbapragada U, Levin E (2016) Object-based classification of earthquake damage from high-resolution optical imagery using machine learning. J Appl Remote Sens 10(03):036025

Binda L, Saisi A, Tiraboschi C (2000) Investigation procedures for the diagnosis of historic masonries. Constr Build Mater 14(4):199–233. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0950-0618(00)00018-0

Boschi S, Borghini A, Pintucchi B, Bento R, Milani G (2018) Seismic vulnerability of historic masonry buildings: a case study in the center of Lucca. Procedia Struct Integr 11:169–176

Boukri M, Farsi MN, Mebarki A, Belazougui M (2013) Development of an integrated approach for Algerian building seismic damage assessment. Struct Eng Mech 47(4):471–493. https://doi.org/10.12989/SEM.2013.47.4.471

Boulahia O (2022) Identification, characterization and interaction of seismic sources: Implication on sequences of seismic events of the period 2010–2021 in the North-East of Algeria Doctoral thesis at Sétif University. http://dspace.univ-setif.dz:8888/jspui/handle/123456789/3956

Bounemeur N, Benzaid R, Kherrouba H et al. (2022) Landslides in Mila town (northeast Algeria): causes and consequences. Arab J Geosci 15:753. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12517-022-09959-7

Bounif MA, Haessler H, Meghraoui M (1987) The Constantine earthquake of October 27, 1985: surface ruptures and aftershock study. Earth Planet Sci Lett 85:451–460

Casapulla C, Argiento LU, Maione A (2018) Seismic safety assessment of a masonry building according to Italian Guidelines on cultural heritage: simplified mechanical-based approach and pushover analysis. Bull Earthq Eng 16:2809–2837

Cerovecki A, Kraus I, Moric D (2018) N2 building design method. Gradjevinar 70:509–518

Chieffo N, Formisano A (2019) Comparative seismic assessment methods for masonry building aggregates: a case study. Front Built Environ 5:123

Chimouni R, Harbi A, Boughacha MS, Hamidatou M, Kherchouche R, Sebaï A (2018) The 1790 Oran earthquake, a seismic event in times of conflict along the Algerian coast: a critical review from western and local source materials. Seismol Res Lett 89(6):2392–2403. https://doi.org/10.1785/0220180175

Coiffait PE (1992) A post-nappe basin in its structural framework: The example of the Constantine basin (North-East Algeria). Dessertation, University of Nancy

Da Porto F, Munari M, Prota A, Modena C (2013) Analysis and repair of clustered buildings: case study of a block in the historic city center of L’Aquila (Central Italy). Constr Build Mater 38:1221–1237

Dall’Asta A, Leoni G, Meschini A, Petrucci E, Zona A (2019) Integrated approach for seismic vulnerability analysis of historic massive defensive structures. J Cult Herit 35:86–98

De Luca FGED, Woods C, Galasso D, D’Ayala RC (2018) In filled building performance against the evidence of the 2016 EEFIT Central Italy post-earthquake reconnaissance mission: empirical fragilities and comparison with the FAST method. Bull Earthq Eng 16(7):2943–2969. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10518-017-0289-1

Didier M, Baumberger S, Tobler R, Esposito S, Ghosh S, Stojadinovic B (2017) Improving post-earthquake building safety evaluation using the 2015 Gorkha, Nepal, Earthquake rapid visual damage assessment data. Earthq Spectra 33:415–438

Durand DM (1969) Focus on the structure of the Northeast of the BERBERIE. Bull Serv Carte Geol Agerie NS 39:89–131

EMS (1998) Comision Sismologica Europea, Escala Macro Sísmica Europea EMS 98(15)

Endo Y, Pelà L, Roca P (2017) Review of different pushover analysis methods applied to masonry buildings and comparison with nonlinear dynamic analysis. J Earthq Eng 21:1234–1255

Eurocode 6 (2021) Design of masonry structures—Part 1–1: general rules for reinforced and unreinforced masonry structures. Available online: https://www.phd.eng.br/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/en.1996.1.1.2005.pdf

Eurocode 8 (2004a): Design of structures for earthquake resistance—Part 1: general rules, seismic actions and rules for buildings. EN 1998–1: European Committee for Standardization, Brussels. https://www.phd.eng.br/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/en.1998.1.2004a.pdf

Eurocode 8 (2004b) Design of structures for earthquake resistance—Part 3: assessment and retrofitting of buildings. Available online: https://www.phd.eng.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/en.1998.3.2005.pdf

Fajfar P, Fischinger M (1998) N2—a method for non-linear seismic analysis of regular buildings. In: proceedings of the 9th world conference in earthquake engineering, Tokyo-Kyoto, Japan, 2–9 August 1998, pp 111–116

Farsi MN, Belazougui M (1992) The Mont Chenoua (Algeria) earthquake of October 29th 1989; damage assessement and distribution", Proceedings of the 10th world conference on earthquake engineering, Madrid, Spain

Formisano A (2017) Theoretical and numerical seismic analysis of masonry building aggregates: case studies in San Pio Delle Camere (L’Aquila, Italy). J Earthq Eng 21:227–245

Formisano A, Marzo A (2017) Simplified and refined methods for seismic vulnerability assessment and retrofitting of an Italian cultural heritage masonry building. Comput Struct 180:13–26

Funari MF, Mehrotra A, Lourenço PB (2021) A tool for the rapid seismic assessment of historic masonry structures based on limit analysis optimisation and rocking dynamics. Appl Sci 11:942

Funari MF, Spadea S, Lonetti P, Fabbrocino F, Luciano R (2020) Visual programming for structural assessment of out-of-plane mechanisms in historic masonry structures. J Build Eng 31:101425

Ghiassi B, Vermelfoort AT, Lourenço PB (2019) Masonry Mechanical Properties. In: Numerical modeling of masonry and historical structures. Woodhead Publishing, pp 239–261

Grillanda N, Valente M, Milani G, Chiozzi A, Tralli A (2020) Advanced numerical strategies for seismic assessment of historical masonry aggregates. Eng Struct 212:110441

Guemache MA, Machane D, Beldjoudi H, Gharbi S, Djadia L, Benahmed S, Ymmel H (2010) On a damaging earthquake-induced landslide in the Algerian Alps: the March 20, 2006 Laâlam landslide (Babors chain, northeast Algeria), triggered by the Kherrata earthquake (Mw = 5 3). Nat Hazards 54(2):273–288. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-009-9467-z

Halla N, Hamidatou M, Hamai L, Atmane L, Yelles chaouche A (2022) Earthquake induced landslide in Milla region: the August 07, 2020 (El-Kherba, Grarem-Gouga and Azzeba) landslides Northeast Algeria, triggered by the Mila earthquake (Mw = 5). In process for publication, Naturals hazards journal

Hamidatou M, Mohammedi Y, Hallal N, Yelles-Chaouche A, Lebdioui S, Thallak I, Stromeyer D, Khemici O (2021) Reply to the comment on the paper “seismic hazard analysis of surface level, using topographic condition in Northeast of Algeria” by Mohamed Hamdache and José A. Pelàez. Pure Appl Geophys 178:305–312. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00024-020-02644-4

Hamidatou M, Mohammedi Y, Yelles-Chaouche A, Thallak I, Stromeyer D, Lebdioui S, Cotton F, Hallal N, Khemici O (2019) Seismic hazard analysis of surface level, using topographic condition in the Northeast of Algeria. Pure Appl Geophys 178(3):823–846. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00024-019-023104

Hamidatou M, Sbartai B (2016) Deterministic assessment of seismic risk in Constantine city, Northeast Algeria. Nat Hazards 86(2):441–464. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-016-2693-2

Hamidatou M, Sbartai B (2017) Probabilistic seismic hazard assessment in the Constantine region, Northeast of Algeria. Arab J Geosci 10(6):1–20. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12517017-2876-5

Harbi A, Maouche S, Ousadou F, Rouchiche Y, Yelles-Chaouche A, Merahi M, Heddar A, Nouar O, Kherroubi A, Beldjoudi H, Ayadi A, Benouar D (2007) Macroseismic study of the Zemmouri earthquake of 21 May 2003 (Mw 6.8, Algeria). Earthq Spectra 23(2):315–332

Harbi A, Maouche S, Vaccari F, Aoudia A, Oussadou F, Panza GF, Benouar D (2007b) Seismicity, seismic input and site effects in the Sahel-Algiers Region (North Algeria). Soil Dyn Earth Eng 27(5):427–447

Harbi A, Meghraoui M, Maouche S (2011) The Djidjelli (Algeria) earthquakes of 21 and 22 August 1856 (I0 VIII, IX) and related tsunami effects Revisited. J Seismol 15:105–129. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10950-010-9212-9

Hellel M, Chatelain JL, Guillier B, Machane D, Ben Salem R, Oubaiche E, Haddoum H (2010) Heavier damages without site effects and site effects with lighter damages: Boumerdes City (Algeria) after the May 2003 earthquake. Seismol Res Lett 81(1):37–43. https://doi.org/10.1785/gssrl.81.1.37

Hichem N, Ahmed M, Mohamed A (2019) Post-quake structural damage evaluation by neural networks: theory and calibration. Eur J Environ Civ Eng 23:710–727. https://doi.org/10.1080/19648189.2017.1304277

Indirli MS, Kouris LA, Formisano L, Borg RP, Mazzolani FM (2013) Seismic damage assessment of unreinforced masonry structures after the abruzzo 2009 earthquake: the case study of the historical centers of L’Aquila and castelvecchio subequo. Int J Architect Herit 7(5):536–578. https://doi.org/10.1080/15583058.2011.654050

Karimzadeh S, Askan A, Erberik MA, Yakut A (2018) Seismic damage assessment based on regional synthetic ground motion dataset: a case study for Erzincan, Turkey. Nat Hazards 92(3):1371–1397

Karimzadeh S, Kadas K, Askan A, Erberik MA, Yakut A (2020) Derivation of analytical fragility curves using SDOF models of masonry structures in Erzincan (Turkey). Earthq Struct 18(2):249–261

Kim T, Song J, Kwon OS (2020) Pre- and post-earthquake regional loss assessment using deep learning. Earthq Eng Struct Dyn 49:657–678

Kouris LAS, Triantafillou TC (2018) State-of-the-art on strengthening of masonry structures with textile reinforced mortar (TRM). Constr Build Mater 188:1221–1233

Lagomarsino S, Penna A, Galasco A, Cattari S (2013) TREMURI program: an equivalent frame model for the nonlinear seismic analysis of masonry buildings. Eng Struct 56:1787–1799

Lamego P, Lourenço PB, Sousa ML, Marques R (2017) Seismic vulnerability and risk analysis of the old building stock at urban scale: application to a neighbourhood in Lisbon. Bull Earthq Eng 15:2901–2937

Laouami N, Slimani A, Larbes S (2018) Ground motion prediction equations for Algeria and surrounding region using site classification based H/V spectral ratio. Bull Earthq Eng 16(7):2653–2684. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10518-018-0310-3

Laouami N, Slimani N, Bouhadad Y, Chatelain JL, Nour A (2006) Evidence for fault-related directionality and localized site effects from strong motion recordings of the 2003 Boumerdes (Algeria) earthquake: consequences on damage distribution and the Algerian Seismic Code. Soil Dyn Earth Eng 26:991–1003. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.soildyn.2006.03.006

Lourenco P, Karanikoloudis G (2019) Seismic behavior and assessment of masonry heritage structures. Needs in engineering judgement and education. RILEM Tech Lett 3:114–120

Lucibello G, Brandonisio G, Mele E, De Luca A (2013) Seismic damage and performance of Palazzo Centi after L’Aquila earthquake: a paradigmatic case study of effectiveness of mechanical steel ties. Eng Fail Anal 34:407–430

Malcata M, Ponte M, Tiberti S, Bento R, Milani G (2020) Failure analysis of a Portuguese cultural heritage masterpiece: Bonet building in Sintra. Eng Fail Anal 115:104636

Marmi R, Kacimi M, Boularak M (2008) Landslides in the Mila region (North-Eastern Algeria): impact on infrastructure. Revista De Geomorphologie 10:51–56

Marshall JD, Jaiswal K, Gould N, Turner F, Lizundia B, Barnes JC (2013) Post-earthquake building safety inspection: lessons from the canterbury, New Zealand, earthquakes. Earthq Spectra 29:1091–1107

Medhat NI, Yamamoto M-Y, Tolomei C, Harbi A, Maouche S (2022) Multi-temporal InSAR analysis to monitor landslides using the small baseline subset (SBAS) approach in the Mila Basin, Algeria, Terra Nova published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1111/ter.12591

Mehani Y, Bechtoula H, Kibboua A, Naili M (2013) Assessment of seismic fragility curves for existing RC buildings in Algiers after the 2003 Boumerdes earthquake. Struct Eng Mech 46(6):791–808. https://doi.org/10.12989/SEM.2013.46.6.791

Merghadi A, Abderrahmane B, Tien Bui D (2018) Landslide susceptibility assessment at Mila Basin (Algeria): a comparative assessment of prediction capability of advanced machine learning methods. ISPRS Int J Geo Inf 7(7):268. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijgi7070268

Meslem A, Yamazaki F, Maruyama Y, Benouar D, Kibboua A, Mehani Y (2012) The effects of building characteristics and site conditions on the damage distribution in Boumerdès after the 2003 Algeria earthquake. Earthq Spectra 28(1):185–216. https://doi.org/10.1193/1.3675581

Milovanovic B, Bagaric M (2020) How to achieve nearly zero-energy buildings standard. Gradjevinar 72:703–720

Mouyiannou A, Rota M, Penna A, Magenes M (2014) Identification of suitable limit states from nonlinear dynamic analyses of masonry structures. J Earthq Eng 18:231–263

Naito S, Tomozawa H, Mori Y, Nagata T, Monma N, Nakamura H, Fujiwara H, Shoji G (2020) Building-damage detection method based on machine learning utilizing aerial photographs of the Kumamoto earthquake. Earthq Spectra 36:1166–1187

Ortega J, Vasconcelos G, Rodrigues H, Correia M (2018) Assessment of the influence of horizontal diaphragms on the seismic performance of vernacular buildings. Bull Earthq Eng 16:3871–3904

Ortega J, Vasconcelos G, Rodrigues H, Correia M, Ferreira TM, Vicente R (2019) Use of post-earthquake damage data to calibrate, validate and compare two seismic vulnerability assessment methods for vernacular architecture. Int J Disaster Risk Reduct 39:101242

Ortega J, Vasconcelos G, Rodrigues H, Correia M, Lourenço PB (2017) Traditional earthquake resistant techniques for vernacular architecture and local seismic cultures: a literature review. J Cult Herit 27:181–196. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.culher.02.015

Ousadou F, Dorbath L, Dorbath C, Bounif MA, Benhallou H (2012) The Constantine (Algeria) seismic sequence of 27 October 1985: a new rupture model from aftershock relocation, focal mechanisms, and stress tensors. J Seismol 17(2):207–222

Palazzi NC, Barrientos M, Sandoval C de la Llera JC (2022) Seismic Vulnerability Assessment of the Yungay's Historic Urban Center in Santiago, Chile. J Earthq Eng 1–28

Penna AP, Morandi M, Rota CF, Manzini F, Da Porto G (2014) Magenes, Performance of masonry buildings during the Emilia 2012 earthquake. Bull Earthq Eng 12(5):2255–2273. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10518-013-9496-6

Raoult JF (1974) Geology of the Center of the numidic chain (North Constantinois, Algeria). Thesis Paris Mem Soc Geol 121: 63

Remki M, Benouar D (2014) Damage potential and vulnerability functions of strategic buildings in the city of Algiers. KSCE J Civ Eng 18:1726–1734. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12205-014-0184-0

Rodríguez AS, Rodríguez BR, Rodríguez MS, Sánchez PA (2019) 9-Laser scanning and its applications to damage detection and monitoring in masonry structures. In: Ghiassi B, Lourenço PB (eds) Woodhead Publishing Series in Civil and Structural Engineering, Long-term Performance and Durability of Masonry Structures, Woodhead Publishing, pp 265–285

RPA (2003) Algerian Earthquake Rules 1999. Version 2003. National Center of Applied Research in Earthquake Engineering (CGS)

Semmane F, Abacha I, Yelles-Chaouche AK et al. (2012) The earthquake swarm of December 2007 in the Mila region of northeastern Algeria. Nat Hazards 64:1855–1871. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-012-0338-7

Skejic D, Lukacevic I, Curkovic I, Cudina I (2020) Application of steel in refurbishment of earthquake-prone buildings. Gradjevinar 72:955–966

Smail T, Abed M, Mebarki A, Lazecky M (2022) Earthquake-induced landslide monitoring and survey by means of InSAR. Nat Hazards Earth Syst Sci 22:1609–1625. https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-22-1609-2022

Stepinac M, Gašparovic M (2020) A review of emerging technologies for an assessment of safety and seismic vulnerability and damage detection of existing masonry structures. Appl Sci 10:5060

Stepinac M, Kisicek T, Renic T, Hafner I, Bedon C (2020) Methods for the assessment of critical properties in existing masonry structures under seismic loads-The ARES project. Appl Sci 10(5):1576. https://doi.org/10.3390/app10051576

Stepinac M, Rajcic V, Barbalic J (2017) Inspection and condition assessment of existing timber structures. Gradjevinar 69:861–873

Tebbouche MY, Ait Benamar D, Hassan HM et al. (2022) Characterization of El Kherba landslide triggered by the August 07, 2020, Mw = 4.9 Mila earthquake (Algeria) ambient noise analysis. Environ Earth Sci 81:46. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12665-022-10172-8

Uroš M, Šavor Novak M, Atalc J, Sigmund Z, Banicek M, Demšic M, Hak S (2020) Post-earthquake damage assessment of buildings–procedure for conducting building inspections. Gradjevinar 72:1089–1115

Valente M, Milani G (2019) Damage assessment and collapse investigation of three historical masonry palaces under seismic actions. Eng Fail Anal 98:10–37

Valluzzi MR, Salvalaggio M, Croatto G, Dorigatti G, Turrini U (2021) Nested buildings: an innovative strategy for the integrated seismic and energy retrofit of existing masonry buildings with CLT panels. Sustainability 13:1188

Vila JM (1980) Geological map at 1/50.000. Dissertation, University of Paris VI

Vlachakis G, Vlachaki E, Lourenço PB (2020) Learning from failure: damage and failure of masonry structures, after the 2017 lesvos earthquake (Greece). Eng Fail Anal 117:104803. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.engfailanal

Yavari S, Chang SE, Elwood KJ (2010) Modeling post-earthquake functionality of regional health care facilities. Earthq Spectra 26:869–892

Zhang Y, Burton HV, Sun H, Shokrabadi M (2018) A machine-learning framework for assessing post-earthquake structural safety. Struct Saf 72:1–16

Download references

This paper did not receive any funding.

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

Research Center in Astronomy, Astrophysics and Geophysics, BP 63, 16340, Bouzaréah, Algiers, Algeria

Hamidatou Mouloud & Hallal Nassim

The Engineering Mechanics Institute, American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, USA

Amar Chaker

Faculty of Technology, University of August 20, 1955-Skikda, P. O. Box 26, 21000, Skikda, Algeria

Saad Lebdioui

Civil Engineering Department, University of Aveiro, Campus Universitário de Santiago, RISCO, 3810-193, Aveiro, Portugal

Hugo Rodrigues

Dipartiment tal-Ġeoxjenza, Fakultà tax-Xjenza, L-Università ta’ Malta, Msida, Malta

Matthew R. Agius

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Hamidatou Mouloud .

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest.

The authors declare no conflict of interest. The funders had no role in the design of the study; in the collection, analyses, or interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript, or in the decision to publish the results.

Additional information

Publisher's note.

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Mouloud, H., Chaker, A., Nassim, H. et al. Post-earthquake damage classification and assessment: case study of the residential buildings after the M w  = 5 earthquake in Mila city, Northeast Algeria on August 7, 2020. Bull Earthquake Eng 21 , 849–891 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10518-022-01568-9

Download citation

Received : 28 June 2022

Accepted : 09 November 2022

Published : 21 November 2022

Issue Date : January 2023

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s10518-022-01568-9

Share this article

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Vulnerability
• Residential building
• Classification
• Post-earthquake
• Find a journal
• Publish with us
• Track your research

• 0 Shopping Cart

Japan Earthquake 2011

Japan earthquake 2011 case study.

An earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter Scale struck off Japan’s northeast coast, about 250 miles (400km) from Tokyo at a depth of 20 miles.

The magnitude 9.0 earthquake happened at 2:46 pm (local time) on Friday, March 11, 2011.

The earthquake occurred 250 miles off the North East Coast of Japan’s main island Honshu.

Japan 2011 Earthquake map

Japan is located on the eastern edge of the Eurasian Plate. The Eurasian plate, which is continental, is subducted by the Pacific Plate, an oceanic plate forming a subduction zone to the east of Japan. This type of plate margin is known as a destructive plate margin . The process of subduction is not smooth. Friction causes the Pacific Plate to stick. Pressure builds and is released as an earthquake.

Friction has built up over time, and when released, this caused a massive ‘megathrust’ earthquake.

The amount of energy released in this single earthquake was 600 million times the energy of the Hiroshima nuclear bomb.

Scientists drilled into the subduction zone soon after the earthquake and discovered a thin, slippery clay layer lining the fault. The researchers think this clay layer allowed the two plates to slide an incredible distance, some 164 feet (50 metres), facilitating the enormous earthquake and tsunami .

2011 Japan Earthquake Map

The earthquake occurred at a relatively shallow depth of 20 miles below the surface of the Pacific Ocean. This, combined with the high magnitude, caused a tsunami (find out more about how a tsunami is formed on the BBC website).

Areas affected by the 2011 Japanese earthquake.

What were the primary effects of the 2011 Japan earthquake?

Impacts on people

Death and injury – Some 15,894 people died, and 26,152 people were injured. 130,927 people were displaced, and 2,562 remain missing.

Damage – 332,395 buildings, 2,126 roads, 56 bridges and 26 railways were destroyed or damaged. 300 hospitals were damaged, and 11 were destroyed.

Blackouts – Over 4.4 million households were left without electricity in North-East Japan.

Transport – Japan’s transport network suffered huge disruptions.

Impacts on the environment

Landfall – some coastal areas experienced land subsidence as the earthquake dropped the beachfront in some places by more than 50 cm.

Land movement – due to tectonic shift, the quake moved parts of North East Japan 2.4 m closer to North America.

Plate shifts – It has been estimated by geologists that the Pacific plate has slipped westwards by between 20 and 40 m.

Seabed shift – The seabed near the epicentre shifted by 24 m, and the seabed off the coast of the Miyagi province has moved by 3 m.

Earth axis moves – The earthquake moved the earth’s axis between 10 and 25 cm, shortening the day by 1.8 microseconds.

Liquefaction occurred in many of the parts of Tokyo built on reclaimed land. 1,046 buildings were damaged

What were the secondary effects of the 2011 Japan earthquake?

Economy – The earthquake was the most expensive natural disaster in history, with an economic cost of US$235 billion.

Tsunami –  Waves up to 40 m in high devastated entire coastal areas and resulted in the loss of thousands of lives. This caused a lot of damage and pollution up to 6 miles inland. The tsunami warnings in coastal areas were only followed by 58% who headed for higher ground. The wave hit 49% of those not following the warning.

Nuclear power – Seven reactors at the Fukushima nuclear power station experienced a meltdown. Levels of radiation were over eight times the normal levels.

Transport –  Rural areas remained isolated for a long time because the tsunami destroyed major roads and local trains and buses. Sections of the Tohoku Expressway were damaged. Railway lines were damaged, and some trains were derailed. 

Aftermath – The ‘Japan move forward committee’ thought that young adults and teenagers could help rebuild parts of Japan devastated by the earthquake.

Coastal changes – The tsunami was able to travel further inland due to a 250-mile stretch of coastline dropping by 0.6 m.

What were the immediate responses to the Japan 2011 earthquake?

• The Japan Meteorological Agency issued tsunami warnings three minutes after the earthquake.
• Scientists had been able to predict where the tsunami would hit after the earthquake using modelling and forecasting technology so that responses could be directed to the appropriate areas.
• Rescue workers and around 100,000 members of the Japan Self-Defence Force were dispatched to help with search and rescue operations within hours of the tsunami hitting the coast.
• Although many search and rescue teams focused on recovering bodies washing up on shore following the tsunami, some people were rescued from under the rubble with the help of sniffer dogs.
• The government declared a 20 km evacuation zone around the Fukushima nuclear power plant to reduce the threat of radiation exposure to local residents.
• Japan received international help from the US military, and search and rescue teams were sent from New Zealand, India, South Korea, China and Australia.
• Access to the affected areas was restricted because many were covered in debris and mud following the tsunami, so it was difficult to provide immediate support in some areas.
• Hundreds of thousands of people who had lost their homes were evacuated to temporary shelters in schools and other public buildings or relocated to other areas.
• Many evacuees came from the exclusion zone surrounding the Fukushima nuclear power plant. After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdown, those in the area had their radiation levels checked, and their health monitored to ensure they did not receive dangerous exposure to radiation. Many evacuated from the area around the nuclear power plant were given iodine tablets to reduce the risk of radiation poisoning.

What were the long-term responses to the Japan 2011 earthquake?

• In April 2011, one month after the event occurred, the central government established the Reconstruction Policy Council to develop a national recovery and reconstruction outlook for tsunami-resilient communities. The Japanese government has approved a budget of 23 trillion yen (approximately £190 billion) to be spent over ten years. Central to the New Growth Strategy is creating a ‘Special Zones for Reconstruction’ system. These aim to provide incentives to attract investment, both in terms of business and reconstruction, into the Tohoku region.
• Also, the central government decided on a coastal protection policy, such as seawalls and breakwaters which would be designed to ensure their performance to a potential tsunami level of up to the approximately 150-year recurrence interval.
• In December 2011, the central government enacted the ‘Act on the Development of Tsunami-resilient Communities’. According to the principle that ‘Human life is most important, this law promotes the development of tsunami-resistant communities based on the concept of multiple defences, which combines infrastructure development and other measures targeting the largest class tsunami.
• Japan’s economic growth after the Second World War was the world’s envy. However, over the last 20 years, the economy has stagnated and been in and out of recession. The 11 March earthquake wiped 5–10% off the value of Japanese stock markets, and there has been global concern over Japan’s ability to recover from the disaster. The priority for Japan’s long-term response is to rebuild the infrastructure in the affected regions and restore and improve the economy’s health as a whole.
• By the 24th of March 2011, 375 km of the Tohoku Expressway (which links the region to Tokyo) was repaired and reopened.
• The runway at Sendai Airport had been badly damaged. However, it was restored and reusable by the 29th of March due to a joint effort by the Japanese Defence Force and the US Army.
• Other important areas of reconstruction include the energy, water supply and telecommunications infrastructure. As of November 2011, 96% of the electricity supply had been restored, 98% of the water supply and 99% of the landline network.

Why do people live in high-risk areas in Japan?

There are several reasons why people live in areas of Japan at risk of tectonic hazards:

• They have lived there all their lives, are close to family and friends and have an attachment to the area.
• The northeast has fertile farmland and rich fishing waters.
• There are good services, schools and hospitals.
• 75% of Japan is mountainous and flat land is mainly found in coastal areas, which puts pressure on living space.
• They are confident about their safety due to the protective measures that have been taken, such as the construction of tsunami walls.

Japan’s worst previous earthquake was of 8.3 magnitude and killed 143,000 people in Kanto in 1923. A magnitude 7.2 quake in Kobe killed 6,400 people in 1995 .

Premium Resources

Please support internet geography.

If you've found the resources on this page useful please consider making a secure donation via PayPal to support the development of the site. The site is self-funded and your support is really appreciated.

Related Topics

Use the images below to explore related GeoTopics.

Previous Topic Page

Topic home, next topic page, share this:.

• Click to share on Twitter (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Pinterest (Opens in new window)
• Click to email a link to a friend (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on WhatsApp (Opens in new window)
• Click to print (Opens in new window)

If you've found the resources on this site useful please consider making a secure donation via PayPal to support the development of the site. The site is self-funded and your support is really appreciated.

Search Internet Geography

Latest Blog Entries

Pin It on Pinterest

• Click to share
• Print Friendly

• International
• Education Jobs
• Schools directory
• Resources Education Jobs Schools directory News Search

GCSE Geography - Earthquakes & Volcanoes

Subject: Geography

Age range: 14-16

Resource type: Assessment and revision

Last updated

14 August 2024

• Share through email
• Share through twitter
• Share through linkedin
• Share through facebook
• Share through pinterest

Uplift your geography performance with our GCSE Geography - Earthquakes & Volcanoes revision guide! This interactive and comprehensive tool is crafted to make your study sessions more productive. It includes 12 meticulously designed slides and follows the IGCSE Cambridge syllabus while being flexible enough for any exam board. Whatever your goal, this guide provides all the essentials you need to unlock your full potential. Let us know how it improved your exam prep by sharing your feedback in a review!

• 1 PDF document with no access or editorial restrictions
• Covers the specification point 2.1 from the official Cambridge IGCSE Geography 0460 syllabus
• Definitions aligned with official mark schemes to ensure full marks
• Annotated diagrams to convey clear messages 2 Case studies included:
• Earthquake & Tsunami(Japan)
• A Volcano(Mount Soufriere)

This guide delves into the following topics:

• Tectonics & The Earth
• Plate Boundaries
• Features & Types of Volcanoes
• Hazards & Opportunities From Volcanoes
• Earthquakes

For a detailed preview of the document’s contents, please refer to the second image. For cheaper prices and free sample guides check out our website revisionguru.uk and give us a follow on instagram @revision.guru for a free revision guide

Tes paid licence How can I reuse this?

Your rating is required to reflect your happiness.

It's good to leave some feedback.

Something went wrong, please try again later.

This resource hasn't been reviewed yet

To ensure quality for our reviews, only customers who have purchased this resource can review it

Report this resource to let us know if it violates our terms and conditions. Our customer service team will review your report and will be in touch.

Not quite what you were looking for? Search by keyword to find the right resource:

Thank you for visiting nature.com. You are using a browser version with limited support for CSS. To obtain the best experience, we recommend you use a more up to date browser (or turn off compatibility mode in Internet Explorer). In the meantime, to ensure continued support, we are displaying the site without styles and JavaScript.

• View all journals
• Explore content
• About the journal
• Publish with us
• Sign up for alerts
• 18 August 2024

These labs have prepared for a big earthquake — will it be enough?

• Anna Ikarashi

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

A powerful earthquake can do heavy damage to university properties. Credit: Yuki Sato/Kyodo News via AP/Alamy

Earlier this month, Japan’s Meteorological Agency issued its first-ever ‘megaquake’ alert, advising that the risk of a large earthquake along the Pacific coast was higher than usual. The warning came after an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.1 on 8 August.

The agency lifted the warning a week later, after no major change in seismic activity was detected. But the alert was another reminder for scientists who live in Japan and other seismic zones of the constant threat that an earthquake could disrupt — or even destroy — their research. So how do they safeguard their laboratories? Nature spoke to seven researchers about their preparations and whether those are enough.

Securing equipment

When the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami hit in March 2011, Masahiro Terada, an organic chemist at Tohoku University in Sendai, found broken glass scattered across his lab, fume hoods weighing 400 kilograms metres away from their usual position and water from broken pipes flooding the space. The smell of organic solvents filled the lab and a fire had broken out in the reagent storage room. Terada lost ten years’ worth of synthesized compounds.

These days, Terada anchors large furniture and equipment directly to the concrete wall and stores reagents in cushioned mesh containers.

Each year, biochemist Hideki Tatsukawa is securing more and more of his lab’s equipment at Nagoya University in Japan, under the institute’s guidance. The university is located in a region that has a more than 70% likelihood of a severe earthquake in the next 30 years, according to the Japanese government. Tatsukawa anchors any equipment taller than one metre, such as refrigerators, with vertical bands to the floor to prevent them from toppling or jumping during a quake.

Tying down equipment is crucial for saving lives and preventing secondary disasters, such as broken gas pipes or exposed electrical wiring that could spark a fire, says Koji Fukuoka, a risk-management researcher formerly at Kyushu University in Fukuoka, Japan. Fires only take two minutes to reach the ceiling in most Japanese buildings, he says, so “removing potential causes of fire needs to be one of the top priorities in a lab setting”. Fukuoka recommends that labs have two evacuation routes in case one of them becomes compromised.

Damage to equipment during earthquakes can also result in considerable financial losses. During the 2011 quake, damage to research instruments cost Tohoku University 26.9 billion yen (US$180 million). In the wake of that earthquake, the university established a Disaster Management Promotion Office, which issues technical guidelines on how to secure equipment depending which floor of the building they are on. For instance, nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) spectroscopy instruments should be installed on the ground floor and on top of a base isolation stand, which isolates the equipment from the floor so that it moves independently of the shaking ground. NMR instruments can explode because the helium liquid they contain becomes a gas when the equipment is broken and might deplete rooms of oxygen.

“But, to our knowledge, these learnings haven’t been shared across universities systematically,” says Takeshi Sato, a disaster-prevention scientist at Tohoku University. Fukuoka also notes that, without expert advice and dissemination of knowledge, each lab’s precautions might not be enough in the event of very strong shaking.

Backing up samples

One of the main concerns for Kentaro Noma, a neurobiologist at Nagoya University, is losing the more than 600 unique strains of nematode worm ( Caenorhabditis elegans ) that he has produced over the course of his career so he could study the relationship between genetics and the ageing of neurons. “Losing the strains not only compromises my own work, but research reproducibility for the wider scientific community,” he says.

In addition to the stocks that Noma currently uses for his research, he maintains two backup collections: one in a freezer cooled to −80 °C kept in his lab and another stored in liquid nitrogen, also in the lab. The freezer has a backup power generator that runs on gasoline; the collection stored in liquid nitrogen serves as an extra safeguard in case of an extreme disaster, when there is no access to fuel. “It’s not perfect, but the liquid-nitrogen freezer buys us an extra 1–2 weeks to devise longer-term measures,” he says.

Tatsukawa, who studies the functions of proteins in model organisms, preserves genetically engineered lines of mice and medaka fish ( Oryzias latipes ) by extracting sperm, mixing the samples with a preservation solution and freezing them in liquid nitrogen. The cryogenically preserved samples can be thawed, and female animals can be artificially inseminated to restart the line.

Similar precautions are being taken by scientists at the University of California in the San Francisco Bay Area, which sits directly on top of the Hayward Fault. There is a more than 30% chance of an earthquake with a magnitude of 6.7 or higher occurring on the fault by 2043.

Dirk Hockemeyer, a cell biologist at the University of California, Berkeley, also cryogenically preserves his stem-cell lines in liquid nitrogen, a standard procedure in his field. He has more than 25,000 vials of cell lines produced by the 50 researchers that have worked in his lab over the past 10 years. As a preventative measure, Hockemeyer keeps duplicates of valuable cell lines in liquid nitrogen in different buildings in case one collapses.

Research animals

For scientists who work with animals, there are many factors to consider in earthquake preparation. In Japan, facilities with primates typically have two-tiered walls so that if one layer is destroyed, the other keeps the animals contained, says Ikuma Adachi, a primatologist at Kyoto University in Inuyama. Kyoto University’s Center for Human Evolution Modeling Research houses 11 chimpanzees ( Pan troglodytes ) and 800 macaques ( Macaca sp.). “Primates are very sensitive to changes in the environment and will become anxious during disasters,” he says. Securing water for them to drink and maintaining hygienic conditions for the animals to live in is also crucial, says Adachi.

“The best we can do is to prepare measures and protocols in advance so that it guides decision-making during emotionally challenging times,” he says.

doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-024-02622-z

Reprints and permissions

Related Articles

Geology’s biggest mystery: when did plate tectonics start to reshape Earth?

News Feature 14 AUG 24

Inner core backtracking by seismic waveform change reversals

Article 12 JUN 24

Fault-network geometry influences earthquake frictional behaviour

Article 05 JUN 24

What I learnt from running a coding bootcamp

Career Column 21 AUG 24

How a midwife became a neuroscientist to seek a cure for her son

Career Feature 20 AUG 24

Chatbots in science: What can ChatGPT do for you?

Career Column 14 AUG 24

Dinosaur-killing Chicxulub asteroid formed in Solar System’s outer reaches

News 15 AUG 24

Stonehenge’s enigmatic centre stone was hauled 800 kilometres from Scotland

News 14 AUG 24

Principal Investigator Positions at the Institute for Regenerative Biology and Medicine, CIMR

Regenerative Biology and Medicine, including but not limited to disease immunology, ageing, biochemistry of extracellular matrix...

Beijing, China

The Chinese Institutes for Medical Research (CIMR), Beijing

Principal Investigator Positions at the Institute for Molecular and Cellular Therapy, CIMR, Beijing

We're looking for outstanding scientists at all ranks interested in developing novel therapeutics in all disease areas.

2024 Recruitment notice Shenzhen Institute of Synthetic Biology: Shenzhen, China

The wide-ranging expertise drawing from technical, engineering or science professions...

Shenzhen,China

Shenzhen Institute of Synthetic Biology

Qiushi Chair Professor

Distinguished scholars with notable achievements and extensive international influence.

Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China

Zhejiang University

ZJU 100 Young Professor

Promising young scholars who can independently establish and develop a research direction.

Sign up for the Nature Briefing newsletter — what matters in science, free to your inbox daily.

Quick links

• Explore articles by subject
• Guide to authors
• Editorial policies