• Today's news
  • Reviews and deals
  • Climate change
  • 2024 election
  • Fall allergies
  • Health news
  • Mental health
  • Sexual health
  • Family health
  • So mini ways
  • Unapologetically
  • Buying guides

Entertainment

  • How to Watch
  • My Portfolio
  • Latest News
  • Stock Market
  • Biden Economy
  • Stocks: Most Actives
  • Stocks: Gainers
  • Stocks: Losers
  • Trending Tickers
  • World Indices
  • US Treasury Bonds Rates
  • Top Mutual Funds
  • Options: Highest Open Interest
  • Options: Highest Implied Volatility
  • Basic Materials
  • Communication Services
  • Consumer Cyclical
  • Consumer Defensive
  • Financial Services
  • Industrials
  • Real Estate
  • Stock Comparison
  • Advanced Chart
  • Currency Converter
  • Credit Cards
  • Balance Transfer Cards
  • Cash-back Cards
  • Rewards Cards
  • Travel Cards
  • Credit Card Offers
  • Best Free Checking
  • Student Loans
  • Personal Loans
  • Car insurance
  • Mortgage Refinancing
  • Mortgage Calculator
  • Morning Brief
  • Market Domination
  • Market Domination Overtime
  • Asking for a Trend
  • Opening Bid
  • Stocks in Translation
  • Lead This Way
  • Good Buy or Goodbye?
  • Financial Freestyle
  • Capitol Gains
  • Living Not So Fabulously
  • Fantasy football
  • Pro Pick 'Em
  • College Pick 'Em
  • Fantasy baseball
  • Fantasy hockey
  • Fantasy basketball
  • Download the app
  • Daily fantasy
  • Scores and schedules
  • GameChannel
  • World Baseball Classic
  • Premier League
  • CONCACAF League
  • Champions League
  • Motorsports
  • Horse racing
  • Newsletters

New on Yahoo

  • Privacy Dashboard

Yahoo Finance

The carlyle group inc (cg) q1 2024 earnings call transcript highlights: record margins and ....

FRE (Fee-Related Earnings): $266 million, up nearly 40% from Q1 last year.

FRE Margin: 47%, a record high and up from 35% in Q1 2023.

DE (Distributable Earnings): $431 million or $1.01 per share, the best quarterly result since 2022.

Assets Under Management: $425 billion, up 12% year-over-year.

Capital Raised: $5.3 billion in the quarter, on track for $40 billion annual target.

Management Fees: $516 million, increased by about 2% from the previous year.

Transaction and Advisory Revenues: $27 million, up over 60% from Q1 last year.

G&A Expenses: $80 million, lower compared to Q1 last year.

Net Accrued Carry: $2.2 billion, a key future earnings source.

Stock Repurchase: $150 million, reducing adjusted shares outstanding by 1%.

Warning! GuruFocus has detected 8 Warning Signs with CG.

Release Date: May 01, 2024

For the complete transcript of the earnings call, please refer to the full earnings call transcript .

Positive Points

The Carlyle Group Inc ( NASDAQ:CG ) reported a record quarterly FRE of $266 million, a near 40% increase over the first quarter of the previous year.

CG achieved a record FRE margin of 47%, significantly higher than the 35% in Q1 2023.

Assets under management grew to $425 billion, up 12% year-over-year.

CG successfully completed significant sales including McDonald's China and Neptune Energy, generating strong returns for LPs and performance revenues.

The company remains on track to meet its 2024 financial targets, including a targeted $40 billion of inflows.

Negative Points

The macroeconomic environment remains somewhat fragile, which could impact investment and market activities.

Management fees only saw a modest increase of about 2% compared to the previous year, indicating slower growth in this revenue stream.

The fundraising environment in Global Private Equity remains challenging, although there are some pockets of strength.

Net accrued carry balance of $2.2 billion declined relative to the last quarter due to fund realizations and a relatively lower level of appreciation in carry funds.

General and Administrative (G&A) expenses are expected to increase in the coming quarters, potentially impacting margins.

Q & A Highlights

Q : Could you discuss the trajectory of Fee-Related Earnings (FRE) for the remainder of 2024, particularly in relation to expenses and fee-related revenue? A : Harvey Schwartz, CEO, noted the record FRE of $266 million for the quarter, a 40% increase from the previous year, with a strong margin of 47%. He mentioned that the G&A expenses were unusually low due to seasonal factors and one-off items, expecting them to normalize in the coming quarters. Management fees met expectations with no surprises, and with $15 billion of pending fee-paying AUM, an acceleration in fee growth is anticipated throughout the year.

Q : What were the drivers behind the decline in private credit fee-paying AUM this quarter? A : John Redett, CFO, explained the slight decline as normal course runoff, emphasizing strong fundraising momentum across various products, particularly in secondaries and co-investment strategies. He expects an acceleration in growth in fee-paying AUM.

Q : Can you provide more details on the $15 billion of pending fee-paying AUM and the components contributing to achieving the $40 billion inflow target for the year? A : Harvey Schwartz highlighted the momentum across various segments, including Solutions, Wealth channel, and Credit. He stressed the importance of new wealth partnerships and upcoming product launches, indicating strong potential for meeting the annual targets.

Q : What is your outlook for share repurchases for the rest of the year? A : John Redett mentioned that $1.25 billion remains in the share repurchase authorization, with Carlyle actively buying back stock. He also discussed equity-based compensation, noting it was elevated due to grants to key investment team members, aligning their interests with shareholders.

Q : How are you thinking about the dividend moving forward, particularly in light of potential increases in the payout ratio? A : Harvey Schwartz indicated no immediate changes to the dividend, emphasizing flexibility in capital allocation to invest in the business and return value to shareholders. The focus remains on maintaining flexibility rather than adjusting the dividend.

Q : Could you comment on the increase in U.S. and European CLO default rates and your exposure to Altice in the global CLO business? A : John Redett reassured that the credit quality in Carlyle's CLO business remains strong, with default rates in the U.S. half the industry average and European rates also better than average. He expressed confidence in the long-term performance and management of the CLO portfolio.

This article first appeared on GuruFocus .

Advanced search

English (USA)

English (UK)

English (UK)

English (Canada)

English (Canada)

English (India)

English (India)

Deutsch (Deutschland)

Deutsch (Deutschland)

Deutsch (Österreich)

Deutsch (Österreich)

Deutsch (Schweiz)

Deutsch (Schweiz)

Español

Français (France)

Français (Suisse)

Français (Suisse)

Italiano

Nederlands (Nederland)

Nederlands (België)

Nederlands (België)

the carlyle group investor presentation

  • Top Capitalization
  • United States
  • North America
  • Middle East
  • Sector Research
  • Earnings Calendar
  • Equities Analysis
  • Most popular
  • NVIDIA CORPORATION
  • AMD (ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES)
  • MICROSOFT CORPORATION
  • THE EDINBURGH INVESTMENT TRUST PLC
  • SALESFORCE.COM, INC.
  • THYSSENKRUPP AG
  • DOLLAR GENERAL CORPORATION
  • Index Analysis
  • Indexes News
  • EURO STOXX 50
  • Currency Cross Rate
  • Currency Converter
  • Forex Analysis
  • Currencies News
  • Precious metals
  • Agriculture
  • Industrial Metals
  • Livestock and Cattle
  • CRUDE OIL (WTI)
  • CRUDE OIL (BRENT)

the carlyle group investor presentation

  • Yield Curve
  • Developed Nations
  • Emerging Countries
  • South America
  • Analyst Reco.
  • Capital Markets Transactions
  • New Contracts
  • Profit Warnings
  • Appointments
  • Press Releases
  • Security Transactions
  • Earnings reports
  • New markets
  • New products
  • Corporate strategies
  • Legal risks
  • Share buybacks
  • Mergers and acquisitions
  • Call Transcripts
  • Currency / Forex
  • Commodities
  • Cryptocurrencies
  • Interest Rates
  • Asset Management
  • Climate and ESG
  • Cybersecurity
  • Geopolitics
  • Central Banks
  • Private Equity
  • Business Leaders
  • All our articles
  • Most Read News
  • All Analysis
  • Satirical Cartoon
  • Today's Editorial
  • Crypto Recap
  • Behind the numbers
  • All our investments
  • Asia, Pacific
  • Virtual Portfolios
  • USA Portfolio
  • European Portfolio
  • Asian Portfolio
  • My previous session
  • My most visited
  • Yield stocks
  • Undervalued stocks
  • Growth stocks
  • Quality stocks
  • Momentum stocks
  • US Basketball
  • Circular economy
  • Serial buyers
  • Biotechnology
  • Unusual volumes
  • New Historical Highs
  • New Historical Lows
  • Top Fundamentals
  • Sales growth
  • Earnings Growth
  • Profitability
  • Rankings Valuation
  • Enterprise value
  • Top Consensus
  • Analyst Opinion
  • Target price
  • Estimates Revisions
  • Top ranking ESG
  • Environment
  • Visibility Ranking
  • Stock Screener Home
  • Quantum computing
  • Europe's family businesses
  • Oversold stocks
  • Overbought stocks
  • Close to resistance
  • Close to support
  • Accumulation Phases
  • Most volatile stocks
  • Top Investor Rating
  • Top Trading Rating
  • Top Dividends
  • Low valuations
  • All my stocks
  • Stock Screener
  • Stock Screener PRO
  • Portfolio Creator
  • Event Screener
  • Dynamic Chart
  • Economic Calendar
  • Our subscriptions
  • Our Stock Picks
  • Thematic Investment Lists

Stock CG

The Carlyle Group Inc.

Us14316j1088, investment management & fund operators.

Market Closed - Nasdaq 04:00:00 2024-08-30 pm EDT 5-day change 1st Jan Change
40.13 +0.12% -0.30% -1.38%
Aug. 30 MT
Aug. 30 MT
  • Carlyle : Investor Presentation, Q1 2021

Shareholder & Investor Presentation

Important Information

This presentation has been prepared by The Carlyle Group Inc. (together with its affiliates, "Carlyle") and may only be used for informational purposes only. This presentation may not be referenced, quoted or linked by website, in whole or in part except as agreed to in writing by Carlyle. All information presented herein is as of March 31, 2021 unless otherwise specified.

On January 1, 2020, we completed our conversion from a Delaware limited partnership named The Carlyle Group L.P. into a Delaware corporation named The Carlyle Group Inc. Unless the context suggests otherwise, references in this report to "Carlyle", the "Company", "we", "us", and "our" refer (i) prior to the consummation of the conversion, to The Carlyle Group L.P. and its consolidated subsidiaries and (ii) from and after the consummation of the conversion, to The Carlyle Group Inc. and its consolidated subsidiaries. References to our common stock in periods prior to the conversion refer to the common units of The Carlyle Group L.P. References to our dividends in periods prior to the conversion refer to the distributions of The Carlyle Group L.P.

This presentation provides an overview of Carlyle and is not intended to be taken by, and should not be taken by, any individual recipient as investment advice, a recommendation to buy, hold or sell any security, or an offer to sell or a solicitation of offers to purchase any security. An offer or solicitation for an investment in any investment fund managed or sponsored by Carlyle or its affiliates ("Fund") will occur only through an offering memorandum and related purchase documentation, and subject to the terms and conditions contained in such documents and in such Fund's operative agreements. The offering memorandum relating to any Fund contains additional information about the investment objective, terms and conditions of such Fund, tax information and risk disclosure that should be reviewed prior to making an investment decision regarding a Fund. This presentation is qualified in its entirety by such offering memorandum, which should be read completely before making any investment. An investment in a Fund would be speculative and would involve significant risks. Nothing in this presentation is intended to be taken by, and should not be taken by, any individual recipient as investment advice, a recommendation to buy, hold or sell any security, or an offer to sell or a solicitation of offers to purchase any security.

Although the information presented in this presentation has been obtained from sources that Carlyle believes to be reliable, Carlyle makes no representations as to its accuracy, validity, timeliness or completeness for any purpose. The information set forth herein does not purport to be complete and Carlyle is not responsible for errors and/or omissions with respect to the information contained herein. Unless otherwise expressly stated herein any analysis or outlook relating to the matters discussed herein express Carlyle's views only as of February 16, 2021.

Statements contained in this presentation that are not historical facts are based on current expectations, estimates, projections, opinions and/or beliefs of Carlyle. Such statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors, and undue reliance should not be placed thereon. Certain information contained in this presentation constitutes "forward-looking statements," which can be identified by the use of forward-looking terminology such as "may," "will," "should," "seek," "expect," "anticipate," "forecast," "project," "estimate," "intend," "continue," "target," or "believe" or the negatives thereof or other variations thereon or comparable terminology. Statements related to projected Distributable Earnings ("DE"), Fee Related Earnings ("FRE"), and fundraising for future periods could be impacted by the level of investment performance, our ability to fundraise and the fees we can charge on such commitments, the pace and scale of capital deployment which may not be consistent with historical levels, the pace and success of exit activity, changes in regulations and laws (including tax laws), our ability to scale existing businesses and wind-down underperforming businesses, our ability to manage expenses and retain key personnel, our ability to manage stock dilution and our ability to charge and retain transaction fees. Even if we were to achieve our goals, there is no guarantee that such fundraising will translate into increased earnings and margins. There can be no assurance that Carlyle's strategic goals will ultimately be realized or if realized, that they will have the effect of accelerating our growth or earnings. All projections assume benign market conditions. These statements are subject to risks, uncertainties and assumptions, including those listed in this disclaimer and described under the section entitled "Risk Factors" in our Annual Report on Form 10 ‐ K for the year ended December 31, 2020 as filed with the SEC on February 11, 2021 (the "Annual Report"), as such factors may be updated from time to time in our periodic filings with the SEC, which are accessible on the SEC's website at www.sec.gov. These factors should not be construed as exhaustive and should be read in conjunction with the other cautionary statements that are included in this presentation and in our filings with the SEC. The fund return information reflected in this presentation is not indicative of the performance of The Carlyle Group Inc. and is also not necessarily indicative of the future performance of any particular fund. There can be no assurance that any of Carlyle's funds or its other existing and future funds will achieve similar returns. See "Risk Factors - Risks Related to Our Business Operations - The historical returns attributable to our funds, including those presented in this report, should not be considered as indicative of the future results of our funds or of our future results or of any returns expected on an investment in our common units" in the Annual Report. As used throughout this document, and unless otherwise indicated, "Gross IRR" represents the annualized internal rate of return for the period indicated on limited partner invested capital based on contributions, distributions and unrealized value before management fees, expenses and carried interest, which will reduce returns and, in the aggregate are substantial. "Net IRR" represents the annualized internal rate of return for the period indicated on limited partner invested capital based on contributions, distributions and unrealized value after management fees, expenses and carried interest (but not taxes borne by investors). "Gross MOIC" represents total fair value, before management fees, expenses and carried interest, divided by cumulative invested capital. An investment is considered realized when the investment fund has completely exited, and ceases to own an interest in, the investment. An investment is considered partially realized when the total proceeds received in respect of such investment, including dividends, interest or other distributions and/or return of capital represents at least 85% of invested capital and such investment is not yet fully realized. In considering investment performance information contained in this presentation, prospective investors should bear in mind that past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results and there can be no assurance that Carlyle or any Fund will achieve comparable results. Actual realized value of currently unrealized investments will depend on, among other factors, future operating results, the value of the assets and market conditions at the time of disposition, any related transaction costs and the timing and manner of sale, all of which may differ from the assumptions and circumstances on which the current unrealized valuations are based. Accordingly, the actual realized values of unrealized investments may differ materially from the values indicated herein. Unless otherwise specified, LTM, or last twelve months refers to the period of Q2 2020 through Q1 2021, and the prior rolling 12-month period refers to the period Q2 2019 to Q1 2020.

This presentation includes comparisons of certain private equity indices to various indexes including certain MSCI indexes (MSCI) and the S&P 500 and other indexes. The private equity indices do not represent the performance of any Fund or family of Funds. Recipients should not infer that any Fund is top quartile. There are significant differences between the types of securities and assets typically acquired by U.S. and global buyout funds, the investments covered by the MSCI, S&P 500 and other indexes. Specifically, U,S. and global buyout funds typically make investments in securities and other assets that have a greater degree of risk and volatility, and less liquidity, than those securities included in these indexes and companies included in the indexes are not subject to certain of the management fees, carried interest or expenses to which investors in U.S. and global buyout funds are typically subject. Comparisons between private equity funds, Carlyle sponsored funds, the MSCI, S&P 500 and other indexes are included for informational purposes only. The private equity returns do not represent the performance of any Fund or family of Funds. Recipients should not infer that any Fund is top quartile.

Detailed information about Carlyle's management fees and performance revenues is available in Carlyle's public filings. Please note that certain metrics and projections contained in this Presentation include the Legacy Energy Funds and funds advised by NGP Energy Capital Management. Please note that the Legacy Energy Funds (as defined in Carlyle's public filings), are managed with Riverstone Holdings LLC and its affiliates. Affiliates of both Carlyle and Riverstone act as investment advisers to each of the Legacy Energy Funds. Currently, Carlyle is only entitled to carried interest and management fees in certain funds advised by NGP Energy Capital Management. The NGP Energy Capital Management funds which solely earn management fees are referred to herein as "NGP predecessor funds."

For purposes of the non-financial operating and statistical data included in this presentation, including the aggregation of our non-U.S. dollar denominated investment funds, foreign currencies have been converted to U.S. dollars at the spot rate as of the last trading day of the reporting period when presenting period end balances, and the average rate for the period has been utilized when presenting activity during such period. With respect to capital commitments raised in foreign currencies, the conversion to U.S. dollars is based on the exchange rate as of the date of closing of such capital commitment.

This presentation includes certain Non-GAAP financial measures, Distributable Earnings ("DE") and Distributable EBITDA. These Non-GAAP financial measures should be considered only as supplemental to, and not as superior to, financial measures prepared in accordance with GAAP. Please refer to the Appendix of this presentation for a reconciliation of the non-GAAP financial measures included in this presentation to the most directly comparable financial measured prepared in accordance with GAAP. Please see Carlyle's public filings for the definition of "carry funds," "Fee-earning assets under management" or "Fee-earning AUM," (FEAUM), and "Assets under management" or "AUM."

The Carlyle Group Overview

  • Carlyle is a leading global investment firm focused on private capital investment management, one of the fastest growth areas of financial services with more than 1,800 employees across 29 offices on 5 continents
  • Carlyle manages $260 billion in Assets Under Management, an increase of 20% over the past year, across three business segments - Global Private Equity, Global Credit & Investment Solutions
  • Carlyle generated $520 million in Fee Related Earnings in the LTM, accounting for 65% of Distributable Earnings
  • $3.2 billion in net accrued performance revenue on our balance sheet underpins the opportunity for growing realized performance revenue over the next several years
  • Carlyle generated $802 million in Distributable Earnings over the past twelve months, or $2.15 per common share after tax
  • At our February 2021 Investor Day, we laid out a path to deliver at least $1.6 billion in Distributable Earnings by 2024 through growth in Fee Related Earnings, Performance Revenue and Investment Income

Note: Data as of March 31, 2021. Please see the "Important Information" slide for more information about the use of and reliance on projections.

We Are A Leading

Global Investment Firm

INVESTMENT SOLUTIONS $64 BN

GLOBAL

Primary

Secondaries

PRIVATE EQUITY

$260 BN

Co-investments

$137 BN

Corporate Private Equity

Real Estate

TOTAL AUM

GLOBAL CREDIT

Natural Resources

$59 BN

Liquid Credit

Illiquid Credit

Real Assets Credit

Note: Data as of March 31, 2021.

We Have Delivered Strong Financial Performance Over the Past 12 Months

FEERECORDRELATEDF E

RELATEDEARNINGSEARNINGS

320% FRE Margin 1

As of March 31, 2021.

CARRY FUND

RECORD NET ACCRUED

APPRECIATION

PERFORMANCE REVENUE

34%

$3.2 BN

BUILDING REALIZED

ROBUST

PROCEEDS MOMENTUM

FUNDRAISING

$22.9 BN

$27.7 BN

Attachments

  • Original document

The Carlyle Group LP published this content on 04 May 2021 and is solely responsible for the information contained therein. Distributed by Public , unedited and unaltered, on 05 May 2021 13:28:01 UTC .

Latest news about The Carlyle Group Inc.

MT
MT
RE
RE
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
CI
MT

Chart The Carlyle Group Inc.

Chart The Carlyle Group Inc.

Company Profile

Logo The Carlyle Group Inc.

Income Statement and Estimates

Analysis / opinion.

Weekly market update:  Nvidia's Grand (Re-)Entrance

Weekly market update: Nvidia's Grand (Re-)Entrance

August 23, 2024 at 05:06 pm EDT

INTERVIEW - David Rubenstein, Carlyle: US recession not certain

INTERVIEW - David Rubenstein, Carlyle:  US recession not certain

Analysts' Consensus

Quarterly revenue - rate of surprise.

  • Stock Market
  • News The Carlyle Group Inc.

Carlyle Secured Lending: Recent Pullback, Merger And Discount To NAV Makes Them A Buy (Rating Upgrade)

The Dividend Collectuh profile picture

  • Carlyle Secured Lending is a promising BDC, benefiting from a merger with Carlyle Secured Lending III, enhancing their liquidity and scale.
  • Despite a miss on their top & bottom lines, dividend coverage was strong and improved leverage, positioning CGBD well for future growth.
  • They currently trade at a slight discount to NAV with the recent pullback of 8%, making CGBD a buy currently.
  • Risks include rising non-accruals which increase quarter-over-quarter, but the merger should provide relief, making CGBD a strong investment moving forward.

A business people standing on the US/Australian dollar sign on the floor made with light and shadow

Introduction

Carlyle Secured Lending ( NASDAQ: CGBD ) is a business development company that has been one of my favorite smaller cap BDCs for a while. The stock has performed well in a high-interest rate environment, but their portfolio companies have faced some headwinds recently.

Additionally, they recently announced a merger with Carlyle Secured Lending III that is expected to provide benefits such as increased liquidity, size and scale for the company moving forward. With the share price experiencing an 8% pullback in the past month, I think Carlyle Secured Lending is worth buying at its current price.

Previous Hold Rating

I last covered Carlyle Secured Lending this past June, assigning the stock a hold rating due to the company's valuation. However, their share price has seen a pullback like others in the sector. A likely result of declining interest rates already priced in. Since then, CGBD is down nearly 7% while the S&P is up slightly above 3%.

slide

Seeking Alpha

During the company's Q1 earnings, the BDC managed to beat on their bottom line by $0.02 with net investment income of $0.54. Total investment income declined from the prior quarter by roughly $600,000 coming in at $62 million.

Their NAV also saw an $0.08 increase to $17.07. Their dividend coverage was also strong at 115%. This was even higher than peers Blackstone Secured Lending ( BXSL ) and Ares Capital's ( ARCC ) 113% and 114% respectively.

Disappointing Quarter

CGBD reported their second quarter earnings earlier this month, with a miss on both its top and bottom lines. The quarter was a not so great one for the BDC in my opinion with net investment income declining to $0.51, missing analysts' estimates by $0.01.

This was a 5.5% decline from $0.54 in Q1. Total investment income also experienced a decline from the previous quarter's $60.2 million to $58.3 million. The company's financials dropped as a result of their portfolio's fair value declining 2.8% during the quarter to $1.73 billion.

Year-over-year, their portfolio value also declined from $1.90 billion. But the good news is the company announced a merger on August 5th with Carlyle Secured Lending III.

The merger is expected to increase the company's liquidity and scale, giving the BDC better access to capital. This is expected to close during the first quarter of 2025 and increase net assets to $2.5 billion. With the announcement, this puts CGBD in a favorable position to better navigate a declining interest rate environment.

Dividend Coverage

As mentioned in my previous thesis, I like the fact that the BDC operates similarly to an internally managed BDC with its shareholder friendly dividend payouts. During the quarter, dividend coverage remained strong even with the decline on their bottom line. This stood at 109% in comparison to 115% in the previous quarter. Base dividend coverage was significantly higher at 128%.

This was in comparison to base dividend coverage of 133% for Fidus Investment Corp ( FDUS ). Their non-base dividend coverage was 100%. For Carlyle Secured Lending, the merger should add to the company's bottom line and is expected to reduce costs, translating to NII growth for the BDC going forward.

slide

Author chart

One metric I would've liked to see from the company is a reduction in its fees when they announced the merger, similar to Golub Capital BDC ( GBDC ) who lowered its base management fee from 1.375% to 1.0% following the merger with Golub Capital BDC III.

Furthermore, management expects this to provide $0.13 accretion to their bottom line on an annualized basis. This is a possibility for CGBD's management to announce later in the year, but honestly don't see it happening. But if so, this would likely benefit shareholders, especially with anticipated lower interest rates in the foreseeable future.

NAV & Balance Sheet

Carlyle Secured Lending also saw a drop in NAV from the previous quarter. This stood at $16.95, down $0.12 from March as a result of unrealized depreciation.

However, it is still up slightly from $16.78 from the year prior. But with the merger, this should also be accretive to the BDC's NAV as well. Golub Capital BDC's merger was accretive to their NAV following the completion. This was up 1.3% from March.

One thing that did see improvement during the quarter was the CGBD's leverage. Statutory leverage was 1.1x, while net financial leverage was just 0.9x. These were 1.13x and 0.95x respectively in the previous quarter. Aside from $190 million worth of debt maturing at the end of this year, CGBD's debt is well-staggered, with none due until 2028.

slide

CGBD investor presentation

They also extended the maturity date and reinvestment period of their 2015-IN debt by four years and reduced the debt cost by more than 20 basis points. So, from a balance sheet standpoint, Carlyle Secured Lending is in a good position to take advantage of an uptick in investment activity, likely in the coming months.

At the time of writing, CGBD is trading at a slight discount to its NAV at a price of $16.65, giving them a P/NAV ratio of 0.98x. In my opinion, due the merger likely being accretive to earnings going forward, and their quality, I think the BDC is worth buying at current levels.

Additionally, at least 2 rate cuts are already priced in the market in my opinion, so unless something drastic happens, I don't foresee a huge drop in share price. For comparison purposes, here's how Carlyle Secured Lending stacks up in terms of valuation to some of their peers:

Golub Capital BDC: 0.99x

Fidus Investment Corp: 1.02x

Monroe Capital Corp ( MRCC ): 0.84x

Ares capital ( ARCC ): 1.07x

Although the current discount is not low as their 3-year average of 13.24%, with the merger improving their size, liquidity, and scale, I think a smaller discount is justified investor's buying at the current price. Moreover, if you're looking to start a sizable position, you may want to consider waiting for a few rate cuts to happen as I anticipate the BDC could see a further drop in the next 6–12 months.

Risks & Conclusion

One risk investing here is CGBD did see a rise in non-accruals during the quarter. But management stated during earnings they expect this to drop back below 1% in the upcoming quarter. During Q2, non-accruals rose to 2.8% at cost and 1.8% at fair value as the lender added two additional companies to non-accrual status.

These were only 0.2% at cost and fair value during the previous quarter. But as previously mentioned, the merger should provide some relief going forward. And unless the economy experiences a sudden downturn, I expect these to improve over the coming quarters. But with a weakening economy, a potential further rise in non-accruals is something potential investors and shareholders should keep a close eye on.

With the merger expected to close in Q1 2025, this will increase Carlyle Secured Lending's size and scale, positioning the BDC more favorably moving forward. Additionally, this should be accretive to their financials as management expects cost savings of $2.5 million annually.

So, for potential investors and current shareholders, CGBD looks to position themselves as one of the major players in the sector with net assets anticipated to be $2.5 billion at close of the transaction. As a result of this along with their current discount to NAV, I am upgrading Carlyle Secured Lending to a buy.

the carlyle group investor presentation

This article was written by

The Dividend Collectuh profile picture

Contributing analyst to the iREIT+Hoya Capital investment group. The Dividend Collectuh is not a registered investment professional nor financial advisor and these articles should not be taken as financial advice. This is for educational purposes only and I encourage everyone to do their own due diligence. I'm a Navy veteran who enjoys dividend investing in quality blue-chip stocks, BDC's, and REITs. I am a buy-and-hold investor who prefers quality over quantity and plans to supplement his retirement income and live off dividends in the next 5-7 years. I aspire to reach and help the hard working, lower and middle class workers build investment portfolios of high quality, dividend-paying companies. I also hope to give investors a new perspective to help them reach financial independence.

Analyst’s Disclosure: I/we have a beneficial long position in the shares of ARCC, BXSL either through stock ownership, options, or other derivatives. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Seeking Alpha's Disclosure: Past performance is no guarantee of future results. No recommendation or advice is being given as to whether any investment is suitable for a particular investor. Any views or opinions expressed above may not reflect those of Seeking Alpha as a whole. Seeking Alpha is not a licensed securities dealer, broker or US investment adviser or investment bank. Our analysts are third party authors that include both professional investors and individual investors who may not be licensed or certified by any institute or regulatory body.

Recommended For You

About cgbd ticker.

SymbolLast Price% Chg

More on CGBD

Related stocks.

SymbolLast Price% Chg
CGBD--

Trending Analysis

Trending news.

the carlyle group investor presentation

Shareholders LP Login

News Release

The carlyle group names andrei terekhov and joshua larson managing directors and co-heads of new russia investment team.

London - Global private equity firm The Carlyle Group announced today that Joshua Larson and Andrei Terekhov have joined as Managing Directors and will co-head Carlyle’s new Russia investment team based in Moscow.

David M. Rubenstein, Carlyle co-founder and Managing Director, said, “We see great opportunity in Russia. Establishing a team of seasoned investment professionals from Russia enables Carlyle to leverage its global resources as we explore and make investments in this massive market. I am pleased to welcome Joshua and Andrei to the Carlyle global family. They have proven themselves in this market and are a solid foundation on which to grow.”

“Carlyle’s superb global brand and its disciplined investment process will serve us well in Russia. As the Russian buyout market matures Carlyle will be in the vanguard, demonstrating the value of private equity. I look forward to starting and growing this important new endeavour and working with Carlyle’s global investment team,” said Mr Terekhov.

“This is an exciting time for Carlyle to be focusing on Russia. The ongoing political and economic reforms combined with strong economic growth will provide us with a wide range of opportunities to add value to growing companies. This is a great organization and I look forward to working with Carlyle’s global network of professionals as we explore opportunities throughout Russia,” said Mr Larson.

Carlyle’s Russia investment team will focus primarily on opportunities in the consumer, media, energy, services and manufacturing sectors.

Joshua Larson , Managing Director and Co-Head of Carlyle Russia, was formerly head of Morgan Stanley’s Russian operations in Moscow. While at Morgan Stanley Mr. Larson led the development of relationships with a number of major Russian corporates in the oil & gas, natural resources and consumer sectors, as well as the execution of a number of major transactions, including the Russian government’s US$775 mm sale of LUKOIL shares and LUKOIL’s listing on the London Stock Exchange. Previous to Morgan Stanley Mr Larson was at Goldman Sachs where he was jointly responsible for the development of its Russian business.

Between 1994 and 1997, Mr Larson was with Banque Paribas in Moscow, responsible for the development of its Russian investment banking business, and Credit Suisse First Boston’s investment banking division in Moscow, where he worked with a number of Russian and international corporates on capital markets and M&Amp;A transactions.

Mr Larson also worked at Sun Group in Moscow, where he worked on Sun’s acquisition and management of brewing assets in Russia.

Joshua, 38, and a U.S. citizen, is a graduate of the University of Texas at Austin with a Bachelor's degree in Russian. In 1992 he earned his Master’s degree in International Affairs from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. He also completed the certificate program at the Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

Andrei Terekhov , Managing Director and Co-Head of Carlyle Russia, was formerly a senior partner of Baring Vostok Capital Partners, one of Russia’s leading private equity firms, which he co-founded in 1997. He established and managed the firm’s Ukrainian operations and led a number of private equity investment projects in Russia. He led the creation of SladKo confectionery group and was a board member of Golden Telecom Ukraine, Rogan Brewery (Kharkov) and the Rosinter restaurant group.

Prior to his work in private equity, Mr Terekhov worked as a project manager with the consulting firm Central Europe Trust (UK), where he executed projects for such clients as Kraft Jacobs Suchard, CPC/Best Foods and the EBRD. He also served for four years in the Soviet Army, including two years in Angola.

Mr Terekhov, 38, was born in Northern Kazakhstan. He earned his BA with honors from Kiev State University as an interpreter of English, German and Portuguese. In 1996, as an Edmund Muskie Scholar, he completed the MBA program at the University of Minnesota with a concentration in finance and marketing. In 2001, Andrei completed the Advanced Management Program at Harvard Business School.

  • Contributors

Misalignment Under the Radar: Stealth Dual-Class Stock

the carlyle group investor presentation

James Crowe is the Research Manager at the Council of Institutional Investors. This post is based on a research article by the Council of Institutional Investors Research and Education Fund.

Executive Summary

Traditional dual-class or multi-class stock structures have received significant attention from market participants because of the disconnect they create between voting rights and economic ownership, thereby insulating company insiders from accountability to the company’s owners. However, it is important for investors to understand that companies can deliver substantially similar entrenchment mechanisms without creating multiple classes of common stock or adopting widely understood anti-takeover devices such as poison pills. In fact, there may be an incentive for insiders to achieve the same control enhancing outcomes without adopting a traditional dual-class structure. By doing so, they may receive the private benefits of outsized decision-making power without receiving the negative attention and stock price discount accompanying dual-class stock. This paper reviews nine examples of arrangements that could constitute “stealth dual class”: identity-based voting power, side agreements with favored shareholders, stock pyramiding/cross-ownership, umbrella partnerships and C corporations (UpCs), employees granting irrevocable proxy voting rights transferred from employees to insiders, golden shares, situational super-class issuances, non-equity votes and vote caps.

Introduction

Dual-class stock structures raise concerns for many investors because of the misalignment they cause between equity ownership and corporate control, and the associated long-term underperformance compared to companies without these structures. [1] In a 2023 paper, we analyzed total stock market returns for companies with both a dual-class structure and a classified board, finding that total returns for these companies underperformed benchmark stock indices. [2]

The essential feature of dual-class structures is disproportionate voting rights compared to economic ownership, violating the “one share, one vote” principle. “Dual-class stock” has traditionally referred to companies with two classes of common shares, a high-vote class and a low-vote class, with the high-vote class being owned by primarily or exclusively by insiders such as founders. However, any corporate governance structure that results in disproportionate voting rights compared to economic ownership raises similar concerns as traditional dual-class structures, regardless of the exact mechanism or design that gives rise to the disproportionate control. Empirical evidence suggests that institutional investors consider voting rights in their investment decisions and invest less money in companies with dual-class structures, controlling for other determinants, and that institutional investors increase their investment in the same companies when they collapse the dual-class structure into one share class. [3]

With attention on dual-class structures from investors, index providers and proxy advisors, there may be an incentive for company insiders to accomplish the same disproportionate influence without adopting a traditional dual-class structure. By taking this approach, they may receive the private benefits of outsized decision-making power without receiving the negative attention and stock price discount accompanying dual-class stock. For example, one company’s prospectus includes among its risk factors that “the dual class structure of our common stock may prevent the inclusion of our Class A common stock in such indices [such as the S&P 500], may cause stockholder advisory firms to publish negative commentary about our corporate governance practices or otherwise seek to cause us to change our capital structure and may result in large institutional investors not purchasing shares of our Class A common stock.” [4]

In 2019, after a prominent index provider’s since-reversed decision to exclude dual-class entrants going forward from certain core indices, the Carlyle Group announced that it was converting from a dual-class company to a single-class company. While the announcement touts that the “[n]ew one-share/one-vote structure will deliver industry-leading governance rights to all shareholders,” it also highlights how changing its stock structure would increase its attractiveness “to a broader group of passive and active investors through potential inclusion into indices and benchmarks utilized by more than $7 trillion of industry assets.” [5]

In addition to cases where public companies may choose alternative arrangements to adopt dualclass stock to avoid the discounting and exclusion that might accompany a traditional dual-class structure, private equity investors may seek alternatives to dual-class because they have different strategies and incentives than founders. Empirical evidence suggests that private equity investors would prefer contractual rights through shareholder agreements rather than owning dual-class stock. [6] This is likely because of private equity investors’ typical plan to exit their investment to redeploy capital elsewhere rather than holding on to the stock in the long-term. One paper concludes that at least 35% of companies that are dual-class in function do not have the traditional design of at least two classes of shares, one with disproportionate voting rights compared to economic ownership, but instead accomplish dual-class outcomes through other approaches. [7]

An alternative view of “stealth dual class” structures is that they represent the legally valid and legitimate exercise of private ordering, allowing companies and investors to tailor their corporate governance structures to the context and needs of a particular company. In this view, customization may foster innovation, and any potential dangers are constrained by market discipline. [8] Others have responded to this view by arguing that stealth dual-class structures violate corporate governance norms of standardization, transparency and accountability and are inappropriate for corporations. [9]

This paper reviews nine potential categories of “stealth” dual-class structures. [10]

Stealth Dual-Class Categories

Identity-based voting.

Instead of creating multiple share classes with different voting rights, companies can assign different voting rights based on the identity of the owner of those shares. This was reaffirmed for companies incorporated in Delaware in Colon v. Bumble, Inc. , [11] where the Delaware Court of Chancery found that a company’s charter can modify the standard requirements for voting rights provided by Delaware law. In the case of Bumble, shares have one vote each, unless they are held by a “principal stockholder”—in that case, the shares have ten votes each. The “principal stockholders” are anyone who was a party to another specific publicly disclosed stockholder agreement, other than the company itself. This approach also allows insiders to freely buy and sell their shares on the public market rather than needing to hold on to a separate class of stock with superior voting rights.

A more well-known application of identify-based voting is tenure-based voting rights, also known as time-phased voting. Shares with such rights entitle the holder to superior voting rights after they are continuously held for a certain period of time. On its face, this may seem to support longer-term investment, but empirical evidence does not support that conclusion. For example, France adopted a tenure-voting system as the default, requiring a supermajority of shareholders to override the default. The average holding period among tenure-voting firms and one-share-one-vote firms is not significantly different before and after the system was implemented. [12] , [13]

Tenure-based voting rights tend to grant outsized rights to insiders, especially for companies with significant family ownership. In addition to the French companies mentioned above, below are some examples from U.S. companies.

Examples. A 2017 review of U.S. companies found only five current examples of tenure-based voting in the U.S. public markets: Aflac, Carlisle Companies, J.M. Smucker Company, Quaker Chemical Corporation and Synovus Financial Corporation. [14] Of these companies, our review of 2024 proxy statements identified only Aflac as still having tenure-based voting.

Side Agreements

Side agreements between companies and particular shareholders, such as founders or early investors, are generally adopted while a company is private, before its initial public offering. They are not subject to the same disclosure requirements as documents like the company’s charter or bylaws, but shape important features of the company’s governance and include such documents as voting agreements, stock purchase agreements and investors’ rights agreements. [15]

While state law sets certain defaults, most of these default provisions of governance may be modified by companies. As noted by Bainbridge (2006), “Under the Delaware Code […] shareholder voting rights are essentially limited to the election of directors and approval of charter or bylaw amendments, mergers, sales of substantially all of the corporation’s assets, and voluntary dissolution.” [16]

Rauterberg (2021) notes that corporate law justifies the board of directors’ authority over corporate affairs by virtue of the fact that the board is elected by shareholders, but then permits that default to be modified by contract, which is pervasive in private companies. [17] In some ways, these board-nomination rights give certain insider shareholders even greater control than they would have in traditional dual-class companies because they have the right to designate certain members of the board. A company insider who owns high-vote shares but holds no more than 50% of the voting power would not alone have enough power to control any seats on the board.

Contractual rights to nominate or appoint members of the board effectively guarantee insiders seats on the board, even if they own just a minority stake.

To be sure, not all shareholder agreements deliver control to the contracting shareholder, and in many cases shareholder agreements can facilitate long-term shareholder value. A shareholder agreement that secures one or two board seats for representatives of early investors with “skin in the game” and special skills to offer at a pivotal time in the company’s growth is a very different arrangement from a shareholder agreement like the arrangement at issue in Moelis , which became the subject of intense litigation and legislation in 2024. The contracting party, founder Ken Moelis, used the agreement to assert veto power over a broad range of board powers, to the extent that the board’s oversight function had become pro forma. Investors are charged with determining for themselves which shareholder agreements cross the threshold into “stealth dual class.”

In a review of schedule 13D filings from 1996 to 2018, Schoenfeld (2020) found than 24% of these companies with a 5% or greater ownership block had shareholder agreements. [18] A separate sample of 2,100 initial public offerings (IPOs) between 2000 and 2020 also found that 24% of firms went public with shareholder agreements that contained either the right to appoint members of the board of directors or with veto rights overt certain decisions, [19] a much higher prevalence than the number of companies that went public with a traditional dual-class stock structure. [20]

In comparison to dual-class stock structures, which usually seek to grant outsized voting power to founders, shareholder agreements may grant outsized power to others such as private equity investors. In Schoenfeld’s sample, board control is granted for an average of 33% ownership of the company, and for less than 10% ownership of the company in almost 25% of these agreements. Sen’s analysis of this sample suggests that the market is pricing not just whether a company has dual-class stock structures or shareholder agreements but is differentiating between whether those structures or agreements are for the benefit of private equity companies or for the benefit of founders. It finds that the market reacts negatively to the control by private equity firms. Interestingly, the analysis does not find that this discounting results from worse operating performance by companies because firms backed by private equity in this sample had better operating performance than those that did not.

Below are several examples of how the selection and organization of the board of directors may be modified by these agreements.

Example 1. Through shareholder agreements and a combination of partnerships and privately held groups, Jack Ma controls Alibaba despite owning less than 5% of the company. [21]

Example 2. “The Investment Agreements require us to elect or appoint a representative of the Gapstow fund, the Montlake funds and Mr. Hovde to the board of directors […]” Coastal Finance Corp.

Example 3. “[F]or so long as Thoma Bravo beneficially owns in the aggregate at least (i) 30% of our outstanding shares of common stock, Thoma Bravo will have the right to designate the chairman of our board of directors and of each committee of our board of directors as well as nominate a majority of our board of directors.” Dynatrace, Inc.

While traditional dual-class stock includes concerns about the entrenchment of insiders such as the CEO, shareholder agreements can accomplish the same outcome on a more direct basis by limiting the removal of board members, the CEO and other key executives.

Example 4. Sotera Health Company has a provision requiring a supermajority board vote for “any termination of the chief executive officer or designation of a new chief executive officer” if certain insider shareholders hold a certain percentage of common stock.

Example 5. Rackspace Tech., Inc. has an agreement requiring the consent of certain insider shareholders who own at least 33% for “hiring or terminating our Chief Executive Officer or our Chief Financial Officer.”

Example 6. PlayAGS, Inc. has an agreement requiring approval of an insider shareholder for “a termination of the chief executive officer or designation of a new chief executive officer.”

Such agreements may also provide specific veto rights over other shareholders, even at lower levels of ownership.

Example 7. Gatos Silver, Inc. provides veto rights regarding mergers, consolidation or sale of all or substantially all of their assets, or incurrence of more than $100 million of indebtedness and the issuance of more than $100 million of equity securities to certain insiders as long as they own at least 35% of outstanding shares.

Example 8. Livent Corporation’s 2018 prospectus provides an insider with veto rights over disposing of assets, issuing equity, acquiring another company, incurring debt, and settling litigation.

Example 9. AXA Equitable Holdings, Inc.’s 2018 prospectus provides an insider veto rights, including over acquisitions, any issuance of stock or debt, forming a new committee of the board, and amending the certificate of incorporation or bylaws.

Example 10. Noodles & Company’s 2013 prospectus provides that “[t]he rights of holders of Class A common stock and Class B common stock are identical, except that our Class B common stock does not vote on the election or removal of directors […]”

Creative shareholder agreements used in connection with non-voting stock may also not be subject to reporting obligations that would otherwise apply:

Example 11. Atreca, Inc’s 2019 prospectus notes that “[b]ecause our Class B common stock is generally non-voting, stockholders who own more than 10% of our common stock overall but 10% or less of our Class A common stock will not be required to report changes in their ownership from transactions in our Class B common stock pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or the Exchange Act, and would not be subject to the short-swing profit provisions of Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act. In addition, acquisitions of Class B common stock would not be subject to notification pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, as amended.”

Side agreements can be all-encompassing and not limited to just one or two board seats. One day before the company’s shares started trading publicly, Ken Moelis, Moelis & Co. and affiliates of Moelis & Co. entered into a stockholder agreement that required prior written consent from Ken Moelis for 18 categories of actions that the board might take. As noted by the Delaware Court of Chancery in West Palm Beach Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Moelis & Co. , “[t]he pre-approval requirements encompass virtually everything the Board can do.” [22] In addition, Ken Moelis retained control over the composition of the board.

Amendments to the Delaware Code specifically allowing such stockholder agreements were passed by the legislature and signed into law by the Delaware Governor [23] in July of 2024 in response to the Chancery Court‘s decision. With these amendments, shareholder agreements may become more common and may encourage even more creative structures that could mimic dualclass structures and make it difficult for investors to easily ascertain how much of the company is controlled by minority owners wielding significantly more influence than their economic ownership would otherwise provide.

Stock Pyramiding/Cross-Ownership

In a stock pyramid, ownership is vertically separated from economic interests. More common in Asia and in Europe than the United States, control is maintained through nested ownership of companies that ultimately own the operating company.

An example of this arrangement is a three-company design where one party owns 50% of a parent company owning 50% of a subsidiary that owns 50% of the operating company. While the parent company has majority control over the operating company (as the determinative vote at each level), the party with these holdings only owns 12.5% of the total cashflow rights. [24]

Crossholdings are mathematically more complex but accomplish disproportionate control by horizontal holdings, usually by more than one shareholder acting together, such as a family. [25] Crossholdings obfuscate the concentrated control that these parties have over these companies.

Two examples include the Hong Kong Li Ka-shing group and Sweden’s ABB. [26] The Li Kashing family operates through the Cheung Kong public company, the fifth largest company in Hong Kong. The Li-Ka-shing family holds a 35% interest in this company. Cheung Kong, in turn, has a 44% interest in its main operating company, Hutcheson Wampoa. Hutcheson Wampoa owns Cavendish International, which is the holding company for Hong Kong Electric. Hutchison Whampoa and Cheung Kong Holdings are among the largest companies in Hong Kong.

ABB, the fourth most valuable company in Sweden, is controlled by the Wallenberg family through a pyramid of companies. Incentive, the 17th most valuable company in Sweden, owns 24.3% of capital and has 32.8% of the votes in ABB. The Wallenberg Group owns 32.8% of the capital but has 43.1% of the votes in Incentive. Corporate Ownership Around the World, published in the Journal of Finance (1999) reported that the family can buy 20% of the voting power in ABB at a cost of only 4.46% of the total capital due to cross-ownership.

Umbrella partnerships and C corporations (Up-Cs)

An “Umbrella partnership and C corporation” or “Up-C” structure is a partnership owned by a C corporation, in which the corporation is the parent entity and thus an “umbrella” over the partnership it owns. Insiders own units of the partnership, which are often convertible to publicly traded shares. However, because of the partnership structure, members of the partnership have significant cash flow advantages over those holding shares of the corporation. While Up-C structures have been touted primarily for their tax benefits, disclosure of how the insiders’ partnership is more economically valuable has been less transparent. [27] , [28] , [29] The prevalence of Up-C structures has increased in recent years, representing 1% of initial public offerings (IPOs) prior to 2004, but 8% of IPOs in recent years.

Three of these advantages to insiders over other shareholders are in cash distributions, payment of expenses and tax receivable agreements. When the partnership makes a cash distribution, the partners automatically receive cash, but other shareholders receive cash distributions only when a dividend is declared by the publicly traded corporation. If the corporation does not declare a dividend, company insiders also disproportionately benefit. This is because the insiders effectively own of a portion of the accumulated cash at the corporation level even after receiving the initial cash distribution as an owner of the partnership., since their partnership units are often convertible to shares of the corporation.

Similarly, operating expenses are frequently reimbursed by the corporation to the partnership, meaning that insiders received disproportionate value because operating expenses, which would otherwise reduce their total returns, are transferred from the insiders to the public shareholders.

Finally, while Up-C structures confer tax advantages, companies frequently redirect the value of these tax advantages from public shareholders to company insiders through tax receivable agreements. Under these agreements, the corporation pays the partnership for the value of the tax advantages created by the Up-C structure, reallocating the economic value of the tax benefits from public shareholders to company insiders. Because the tax receivables agreement are separate contractual agreements and not a right inherent in ownership of partnership units, insiders can assert that the partnership units and the publicly traded shares are economically equivalent because the disproportionate value is driven by the contractual agreement and not a feature of the partnership units themselves.

Examples of disclosure of these features can be found below:

Example 1. “Our organizational structure, including the [tax receivable agreement], confers certain benefits upon the Continuing LLC Owners that will not benefit the holders of our Class A common stock to the same extent that it will benefit the Continuing LLC Owners.” [30]

Example 2. “We intend, as its managing member, to cause SSE Holdings to make cash distributions to the owners of LLC Interests in an amount sufficient to (i) fund all or part of their tax obligations in respect of taxable income allocated to them and (ii) cover our operating expenses, including payments under the Tax Receivable Agreement.” [31]

Empirical evidence suggests that while Up-C deals increase IPO valuations, they harm public shareholders and underperform relative to traditional IPOs. [32]

Irrevocable proxy voting rights transferred from employees to insiders

Shareholders generally have a right to vote and to assign this right to others. In the context of employees, this is concerning because employers could require assignment of rights to the employer as a condition of employees receiving certain stock awards or being hired. This takes away the employees’ rights as shareholders, and using company funds to grant compensation that may be motivated by a desire to exercise disproportionate control rather than to recruit and retain employees.

As an example, the Carlyle Group notes in a presentation explaining its 2019 move away from dual-class stock that “[s]enior employees, representing approximately 60% of current total outstanding units, will generally assign their voting rights for up to five years to our existing General Partner and that entity will exercise those votes as a block.” [33]

Golden shares

Issued by a company or a government, golden shares are shares that come with certain veto rights and that are frequently associated with government control of a company, but which may be tradeable. Golden shares might come with the right to block mergers or as a veto over any action that shareholders collectively can make. Golden shares may be used to prevent outcomes that might otherwise be in the best interest of shareholders for goals other than long-term shareholder value. Golden shares often grant broad discretion to the holder to exercise their veto rights for any reason or no reason.

In addition to the risk that countries’ leaders may veto strategically in ways that are not in the best interest of shareholders, golden shares may also discourage merger offers because of the additional uncertainty. The European Court of Justice has ruled that golden shares are unlawful when they “impede the free flow of capital” but not that they are unlawful in and of themselves. [34]

Examples of situations in which golden shares played a part include the proposed merger between Boeing and Brazilian company Embraer, [35] and the acquisition of Britoil by British Petroleum in 1987. [36] As a result of the Brazilian government’s golden share in Embraer, Boeing and Embraer entered into a complex joint venture including the transfer of intellectual property from Embraer to a separate entity in order to avoid the downsides of Brazilian government’s golden share, potentially at a higher cost. In the case of Britoil, the golden share may have discouraged acquisition offers due to the additional uncertainty that the government’s veto power provided, especially given the risk that the veto power might be used for political purposes rather than in the best interest of shareholders broadly.

China has also worked since 2015 to acquire golden shares with “special management rights” in companies like Alibaba and Tencent. [37] A 2017 paper even advocated for the introduction of the “golden shares” in bank regulation. [38]

Situational super-class issuances

Boards may also be empowered to issue extra stock in certain situations, often provided for in their charter. While small- and mid-cap companies may be using these to achieve a quorum, such issuances raise concern about diluting shareholder voting rights. [39] While technical uses that are intended to meet quorum without diluting voting rights may be an understandable solution in some cases, further research should explore cause of the quorum nonattainment and potential solutions that do not involve the issuance of new stock solely to solve quorum issues.

Non-equity votes

The board may be empowered to issue stock or non-stock certificates and may use this power to accomplish purposes far beyond meeting quorum. For example, Spotify’s articles of incorporation allow the board of directors to issue up to one billion, four-hundred million “beneficiary certificates […] in its absolute discretion.” [40] Although these certificates are not shares and are not entitled to cash flow rights, they do carry one vote each—the same as a share of common stock. This has allowed Spotify to recreate the unequal voting structure of a dualclass company but with only one class of stock.

In addition to seeking to increase the voting rights of insiders, the same outcome can be accomplished by reducing or capping the voting rights of non-insiders. These vote caps may also be intended as anti-takeover devices.

Example 1. McCormick & Company limits the amount of influence one common stock shareholder can have to 10% of all outstanding stock. The charter also provides that McCormick has the right to redeem any or all shares of Common Stock owned by a person owning more than 10% off all outstanding stock unless such person acquires more than 90% of the outstanding shares of each class of their common stock. [41]

Example 2. The United Parcel Service, Inc. certificate of incorporation limits voting such that, with certain exceptions, if a shareholder has more than 25% of the total voting power, each vote beyond that threshold is valued at 1/100th of a regular vote. [42]

Example 3. Magellan Petroleum Corporation provided one vote per shareholder no matter how many shares they held. This approach did not survive Magellan’s merger with Tellurian Inc. [43]

Mechanisms used to create a wedge between voting rights and economic ownership have expanded far beyond traditional dual-class stock structures and encompass at least eight different approaches that may be of interest to investors, regulators, and market participants. These approaches raise concerns that are similar to those raised by traditional dual-class stock, such as blocking mergers or replacement of the CEO when the majority of shareholders on a one-shareone-vote basis desire that outcome. Both accomplish similar outcomes in different ways, but stealth dual-class stock is less transparent and understandable to investors.

Recent legal developments also raise the possibility that stealth dual-class stock could become more common, which underscores the importance of understanding the prevalence, design, and impact of these structures. Depending on how they are designed, these mechanisms can result in severe misalignments between ownership and control.

1 As noted in the 2023 publication in note 2, for a broader review of dual-class structures, see Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel’s The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock , Virginia Law Review (2017), CII Summaries of Key Academic Literature on Multi-Class Structures and Firm Value , and The Life-Cycle of Dual Class Firm Valuation , European Corporate Governance Institute (2022) by Martijn Cremers, Beni Lauterbach, and Anete Pajuste. (go back)

2 Dual-Class Structures & Classified Boards: Evidence from 2018-2023 by the Council of Institutional Investors Research and Education Fund. (go back)

3 Do Voting Rights Affect Institutional Investment Decisions? Evidence from Dual-Class Firms , Financial Management (2008) by Kai Li, Hernán Ortiz-Molina, and Xinlei Zhao and Large Shareholder Diversification, Corporate Risk Taking, and the Benefits of Changing to Differential Voting Rights , Journal of Banking & Finance (2012) by Scott Bauguess, Myron Slovin, and Marie Sushka. (go back)

4 See this filing: SEC Filing | StepStone Group Inc. (2019). This example, among the others listed in this section, were identified by Gladriel Shobe & Jarrod Shobe in The Dual-Class Spectrum , Yale Journal on Regulation (2022) and reproduced here from that paper except where otherwise noted. (go back)

5 See The Carlyle Group Announces Conversion to Full C-Corporation Reports Second Quarter 2019 Financial Results . (go back)

6 Ria Sen, Private Equity, Private Ordering, and the Stealth Dual Class, unpublished manuscript. (go back)

7 Gladriel Shobe & Jarrod Shobe in The Dual-Class Spectrum , Yale Journal on Regulation (2022). That paper concludes that stealth dual-class companies make up approximately 35% of all dual-class companies, a figure which includes Up-C structures and the granting of disproportionate control of the board to insiders. (go back)

8 Barry Baysinger & Henry Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, Journal of Law and Economics (1985). (go back)

9 Jill Fisch, Stealth Governance: Shareholder Agreements and Private Ordering , Washington University Law Review (2022). (go back)

10 Lucian Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, and George Triantis termed these “controlling-minority structures” in Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights , published in Concentrated Corporate Ownership (Randall K. Morck, editor), University of Chicago Press (2000). (go back)

11 Colon v. Bumble, Inc. , Delaware Court of Chancery (2023). (go back)

12 Loyalty Shares with Tenure Voting: Does the Default Rule Matter? Evidence from the Loi Florange Experiment , Journal of Law and Economics (2020) by Marco Becht, Yuliya Kamisarenka, and Anete Pajuste. (go back)

13 The Capital Market Consequences of Tenure-Based Voting Rights: Evidence from the Florange Act , Management Science (2022) by Thomas Bourveau, Francois Brochet, and Alexandre Garel. Compare to Encouraging long-term shareholders: The effects of loyalty shares with double voting rights , Finance (2024) by François Belot, Edith Ginglinger, and Laura Starks. (go back)

14 David Berger, Steven Solomon, and Aaron Benjamin, Tenure Voting and the U.S. Public Company , Business Lawyer (2017) reacting to Lynne Dallas and Jordan Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting , Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (2015). (go back)

15 Barry Baysinger & Henry Butler, supra note 8. Companies may be required to disclose shareholder agreements under different provisions of the federal securities laws or state securities laws. (go back)

16 Stephen Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights , UCLA Law Review (2006). (go back)

17 Gabriel Rauterberg, The Separation of Voting and Control: The Role of Contract in Corporate Governance , University of Michigan Law and Economics Research Paper No. 20-031 (2021), p. 4. (“Statutory corporate law confers authority over corporate affairs on the board of directors and justifies that authority through the board’s election by shareholders. That statutory system makes the election of the board a function of shareholder voting power […] Shareholders, however, can alter these defaults by contract, and in private firms, do so widely.”). (go back)

18 Jordan Shoenfeld, Contracts Between Firms and Shareholders , Journal of Accounting Research (2020). (go back)

19 Examples include veto rights over acquiring or disposing of assets or entering into joint ventures with a value in excess of $5 million; incurring capital expenditures in any fiscal year in excess of 10% over the amount of capital expenditures provided for in the annual budget; incurring indebtedness for borrowed money; initiating any liquidation, dissolution, bankruptcy or other insolvency proceeding involving any of our subsidiaries; making any material change in the nature of the business conducted by the company or subsidiaries; terminating the employment of the Chief Executive Officer or Chief Financial Officer or hiring a new Chief Executive Officer or Chief Financial Officer; and changing the size or composition of the board of directors. (go back)

20 Sen, supra note 6. (go back)

21 For a full description of how Jack Ma controls Alibaba, see Jesse M. Fried and Ehud Kamar, Alibaba: A Case Study of Synthetic Control , Harvard Business Law Review (2021). (go back)

22 See West Palm Beach Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Moelis & Co . (go back)

23 See An Act to Amend Title 8 of the Delaware Code Relating to the General Corporation Law . (go back)

24 As discussed by Lucian Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, and George Triantis, supra note 10, this is 50%×50%×50%=(50%)³=0.503=0.125=12.5%. (go back)

25 For a mathematical derivation of how cross-ownership structures lead to disproportionate cashflows rights and economic ownership, see pages 299-300 of Lucian Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, and George Triantis, supra note 10. (go back)

26 These examples are from Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World , the Journal of Finance (1999). (go back)

27 This information in this section generally derived from The Dual-Class Spectrum , Yale Journal on Regulation, (2022) by Gladriel Shobe & Jarrod Shobe and The Substance over Form Doctrine and the Up-C , Virginia Tax Review (2018) by Gladriel Shobe. (go back)

28 There are other risks that may be underestimated by investors. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has not opined on the tax treatment of Up-C structures, so Up-C owners currently get the best of both worlds: the Securities and Exchange Commission applies a form over substance approach, while the IRS applies a substance over form approach. However, if the IRS were to make an unfavorable determination on the tax treatment, this could materially impact after-tax performance. (go back)

29 While the exact description of the tax advantage is beyond the scope of this paper, there is a tax step-up because of a pre-IPO § 754 election under the Internal Revenue Code, which reduces tax liability for the corporation. (go back)

30 Evo Payments, Inc. 2018 Prospectus 424B4 (sec.gov) . (go back)

31 Shake Shack Inc. 2015 prospectus S hake Shack Inc. (Form: S-1/A) . (go back)

32 Innovations in IPO Deal Structure: Do Up-C IPOs Harm Post-IPO Shareholders? , Management Science (2022) by Mary Billings, Kevin Hsueh, Gladriel Shobe & Melissa Western. (go back)

33 See Conversion to a C-Corporation by the Carlyle Group (2019). (go back)

34 See P ortugal Telecom ‘golden shares’ ruled illegal , Financial Times. (go back)

35 See Fool’s Gold? Constitution, Sovereignty and the Golden Share in Embraer-Boeing Case , The Journal of Applied Business and Economics (2021) by Fábio Sampaio Mascarenhas. (go back)

36 British Government to Yield Its ‘Golden Share’ of Britoil – The New York Times . (go back)

37 China moves to take ‘golden shares’ in Alibaba and Tencent units (ft.com) . (go back)

38 Bank Governance and Systemic Stability: The ‘Golden Share’ Approach , Alabama Law Review, (2017) by Saule Omarova. (go back)

39 Companies Implementing ‘Super-Voting Preferred Stock’ as Stockholder Meeting Solution , Cooley Law Firm (2023). (go back)

40 See Spotify’s articles of incorporation: Articles of Incorporation. (go back)

41 See McCormick & Co 2023 Annual Report. (go back)

42 See UPS Certificate of Incorporation. (go back)

43 Delaware Court of Chancery, supra note 11, page 16. (go back)

Post a Comment

Your email is never published nor shared. Required fields are marked *

You may use these HTML tags and attributes: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <cite> <code> <del datetime=""> <em> <i> <q cite=""> <s> <strike> <strong>

Supported By:

the carlyle group investor presentation

Subscribe or Follow

Program on corporate governance advisory board.

  • William Ackman
  • Peter Atkins
  • Kerry E. Berchem
  • Richard Brand
  • Daniel Burch
  • Arthur B. Crozier
  • Renata J. Ferrari
  • John Finley
  • Carolyn Frantz
  • Andrew Freedman
  • Byron Georgiou
  • Joseph Hall
  • Jason M. Halper
  • David Millstone
  • Theodore Mirvis
  • Maria Moats
  • Erika Moore
  • Morton Pierce
  • Philip Richter
  • Elina Tetelbaum
  • Marc Trevino
  • Steven J. Williams
  • Daniel Wolf

HLS Faculty & Senior Fellows

  • Lucian Bebchuk
  • Robert Clark
  • John Coates
  • Stephen M. Davis
  • Allen Ferrell
  • Jesse Fried
  • Oliver Hart
  • Howell Jackson
  • Kobi Kastiel
  • Reinier Kraakman
  • Mark Ramseyer
  • Robert Sitkoff
  • Holger Spamann
  • Leo E. Strine, Jr.
  • Guhan Subramanian
  • Roberto Tallarita

the carlyle group investor presentation

Print this article

Carlyle Appoints UK Investor Relations, Fund-Raising Head

Rachel Walsh

15 October 2008

Leonard Tsomik has been appointed as managing director responsible for investor relations and fundraising at The Carlyle Group’s UK base in London .

Prior to joining US-headquartered Carlyle, the private global investment firm, Mr Tsomik was the head of private banking for Russia with JP Morgan in London , where he initiated the private bank's coverage of the Russian market. In that role, he reported to Felipe Godard, head of offshore private banking at JP Morgan Europe.

From 2001 to 2004, Mr Tsomik was with Uralsib Financial Corporation in Moscow , first as a director of corporate finance and then as a managing director of private equity. Prior to that, Mr Tsomik spent ten years in M&A, corporate finance and private equity working in New York and Moscow .

  • Today's news
  • Reviews and deals
  • Climate change
  • 2024 election
  • Newsletters
  • Fall allergies
  • Health news
  • Mental health
  • Sexual health
  • Family health
  • So mini ways
  • Unapologetically
  • Buying guides
  • Labor Day sales

Entertainment

  • How to Watch
  • My watchlist
  • Stock market
  • Biden economy
  • Personal finance
  • Stocks: most active
  • Stocks: gainers
  • Stocks: losers
  • Trending tickers
  • World indices
  • US Treasury bonds
  • Top mutual funds
  • Highest open interest
  • Highest implied volatility
  • Currency converter
  • Basic materials
  • Communication services
  • Consumer cyclical
  • Consumer defensive
  • Financial services
  • Industrials
  • Real estate
  • Mutual funds
  • Credit cards
  • Balance transfer cards
  • Cash back cards
  • Rewards cards
  • Travel cards
  • Online checking
  • High-yield savings
  • Money market
  • Home equity loan
  • Personal loans
  • Student loans
  • Options pit
  • Fantasy football
  • Pro Pick 'Em
  • College Pick 'Em
  • Fantasy baseball
  • Fantasy hockey
  • Fantasy basketball
  • Download the app
  • Daily fantasy
  • Scores and schedules
  • GameChannel
  • World Baseball Classic
  • Premier League
  • CONCACAF League
  • Champions League
  • Motorsports
  • Horse racing

New on Yahoo

  • Privacy Dashboard

Will Bryan Kohberger Moscow murder trial move? ‘Most difficult decision’ in judge’s career

The judge handling the capital murder case of Bryan Kohberger, who is accused of killing four University of Idaho students, held back from making a decision on where the trial should take place after a full day of arguments and expert testimony.

“I would say this is probably, professionally, the most difficult decision I’ve ever had to make,” said Judge John Judge, who is overseeing the case in the 2nd Judicial District in Latah County.

Kohberger, a former Washington State University graduate student, is scheduled for his trial to start in June 2025 in Moscow. Judge heard arguments Thursday from prosecutors and Kohberger’s defense as to whether the trial should remain in the city where the crime occurred.

Kohberger, 29, attended Thursday’s hearing in a black suit with a light blue button-down shirt. He faces four first-degree murder charges in the November 2022 stabbing deaths of the U of I students at an off-campus home in Moscow. The four victims were Kaylee Goncalves and Madison Mogen, both 21, and Xana Kernodle and Ethan Chapin, both 20.

Just before concluding the nearly six-hour hearing, Judge said he would hold off on issuing a decision in court. Both the defense and prosecution demonstrated “really solid positions,” Judge noted.

“I’ll do my best. It’s a challenge,” Judge said. “That’s probably all I should say at this point. But I listened carefully all day, and I thought there were some really important things to think about (from) both sides.”

Led by attorney Anne Taylor, Kohberger’s defense seeks to move his murder trial to the courthouse in Boise, about 300 miles south of Moscow. Idaho’s capital city, situated in the state’s largest county, gives Kohberger his best shot at an unbiased jury pool following a deluge of prejudicial media coverage against her client , she said.

“Mr. Kohberger has a constitutional right to fair trial by an impartial jury, and to guarantee that this court must change venue,” Taylor told the court Thursday. “Your Honor has to look at the content of the media and know that there hasn’t been positive stories about Bryan Kohberger. It’s negative stories.”

Latah County has become “utterly corrupted,” which has created a “ mob mentality within the community,” Kohberger’s defense argued in court filings leading up to Thursday’s in-person showdown on the venue change issue. Results from a phone survey about the high-profile case conducted by hired trial consultant prove it must be moved elsewhere, Taylor said.

The defense was backed at the hearing by testimony from four expert witnesses who specialize in jury selection, media analysis, surveying and personal bias through the lens of social psychology. They all came to the same conclusion: The impacts from news reports and social media about the case make Moscow an unsuitable location for Kohberger’s trial.

“It’s continuous, it’s every day: social media, books have been written, prime time television shows have happened in this case,” Taylor said. “It just doesn’t stop, and you know that this is prejudicial coverage.”

Victim’s family prefers trial stay in Moscow

Prosecutors oppose moving Kohberger’s trial out of Moscow. They countered Thursday that Kohberger’s defense had not met the burden required by Idaho law to justify a venue change for trial. Their expert survey data fell within the margin of error and showed that an impartial jury was just as likely to be found in Moscow as it was in Boise, where the defense prefers the trial be held, said Ingrid Batey, special assistant in the Idaho Attorney General’s Office and prosecutor on the case.

“The pervasive media coverage across the entire state has simply created some complications and difficulties. Those are not unique to Latah County,” Batey said. “The more productive conversation to have is, how can we craft questionnaires that will ask jurors factual questions that help us identify sources of bias?”

Prosecutors intend to seek a death sentence for Kohberger if he is convicted. Any possible challenges to the death penalty are scheduled for a court hearing in early November.

But to land on 18 qualified people — 12 jurors and six alternates — the court could just as easily call an expanded jury pool of 1,800 residents of Latah County rather than move the trial all the way south to the Ada County Courthouse in Boise, she said.

“The question is, which community is the most likely to give Mr. Kohberger a fair trial?” Batey argued. “We believe those can be dealt with through other measures short of venue change.”

The decision is left to Judge. Should he choose to grant the defense’s request to move the trial, he would stay with the case unless he opts to withdraw on account of the venue change, under Idaho criminal rules .

The parents and brother of Kaylee Goncalves attended Thursday’s hearing and have previously stated their desire for the trial to remain in Moscow. They live about 100 miles north of Moscow in Rathdrum, located in Kootenai County.

“It was a long day, but we hope that he keeps it here or says Kootenai County,” Kristi Goncalves, her mother, told the Idaho Statesman in an interview following the hearing. “We’d be good with that.”

Their family would still plan to attend the hearing, even if Judge chooses to move the trial as far as away as Boise,her father, Steve Goncalves, told the Statesman. But they are joined by some of the other victims’ families in their preference to keep the trial in Moscow, he said, though he declined to identify which ones.

“They also feel that the community that was insulted should have a say in who’s held accountable,” Steve Goncalves said. “But moving it to Boise doesn’t benefit anyone.”

Kohberger hearing paused over social media concerns

Earlier in the day, Judge abruptly paused the hearing on the trial’s potential change of venue after an expert witness for the defense in a presentation showed content from social media in court.

Bryan Edelman, founder of California-based jury consultancy Trial Innovations , showed Facebook posts in the courtroom during his testimony. Edelman searched “Moscow murders” on the platform and shared a screen recording of him scrolling through the results.

“You can see the extent of content that’s out there from groups that are just talking about this case and sharing information and discussing what they think happens, and videos and posts, which may include anything from influencers and podcasters to sharing traditional news stories through local newspapers or television stories,” Edelman said.

A number of Facebook groups, posts and videos appeared on screen, many of which used sensationalized language or speculated about case details.

Judge then stopped Edelman and paused the hearing, which was live-streamed to the public through YouTube.

“I don’t think we need to advertise all these, honestly,” Judge said. “We’ve been trying to protect from this kind of stuff. I’m aware of it, I don’t look at it, I don’t read it.”

Kohberger’s lead public defender asked for a break to discuss the situation privately. After a 30-minute in-chamber meeting between the two sides, the hearing resumed. A deal was brokered to continue, but not broadcast. The private court presentation became about 25 minutes of the hearing that considered prejudicial materials to Kohberger and could further spoil the local jury pool if disseminated to the public.

“It’s kind of a compromise,” Judge said. “We thought there were certain things that maybe we don’t want to send out to the public. I don’t necessarily know what it all is, but I need to look at it and see it.”

IMAGES

  1. Carlyle Group (CG) Investor Presentation

    the carlyle group investor presentation

  2. The Carlyle Group L.P. (CG) Investor Presentation

    the carlyle group investor presentation

  3. The Carlyle Group L.P. (CG) Investor Presentation

    the carlyle group investor presentation

  4. The Carlyle Group (CG) Investor Presentation

    the carlyle group investor presentation

  5. Carlyle Group

    the carlyle group investor presentation

  6. Carlyle Group: Private Equity Firm With Significant Strength (NASDAQ:CG

    the carlyle group investor presentation

COMMENTS

  1. Events & Presentations

    Carlyle - Investor Relations. Analyst Coverage; Tax Information; Dividend History; ... Data Provided by Refinitiv. Minimum 15 minutes delayed. Events & Presentations. Events & Presentations Upcoming Events ... Archived Events Carlyle Group Second Quarter 2024 Earnings Call . Aug 05, 2024 8:30 AM EDT Listen to Webcast. View Earning Release 1 ...

  2. PUBLIC INVESTORS

    CURRENT INVESTOR PRESENTATION. Latest Earnings Release. Latest 10-K/10-Q. Upcoming Events. Carlyle Group Key Metrics ... Effective January 1, 2020, we completed our conversion from a Delaware limited partnership named The Carlyle Group L.P. into a Delaware corporation named The Carlyle Group Inc. Unless the context suggests otherwise ...

  3. The Carlyle Group Investor Presentation

    Breadth of Fundraising Resources and Capabilities Drive New Investor Relationships. More than 1,700 fund investors from 78 countries. More than 275 new fund investors over past 3 years have committed $6.7 billion. 62% of fund investor capital is invested across six or more carry funds, up from 50% in 2006. Diverse Source of Capital Commitments.

  4. Carlyle Investor Presentation, June 2022

    The Investor Relations website contains information about The Carlyle Group's business for stockholders, potential investors, and financial analysts.

  5. Earnings Releases

    Carlyle Group Second Quarter 2024 Earnings Call. Carlyle Reports Second Quarter 2024 Financial Results. 1.9 MB. Financial Data Supplement PDF. 480.4 KB. Financial Data Supplement Excel. 133.5 KB. Q2 2024 Transcript. 282.8 KB.

  6. Annual Report 2021

    The performance we delivered in 2021 gives us the resources to invest and build the firm to accelerate our growth even further. We are investing strategically to compound our momentum organically and inorganically. Over $2.2 billion in pre-tax DE generated last year helped grow our balance sheet cash to $2.5 billion as of December 31, 2021.

  7. Carlyle Announces Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2021 Financial Results

    Washington, DC and New York, NY - February 3, 2022 - Global investment firm The Carlyle Group Inc. (NASDAQ: CG) today reported its unaudited results for the fourth quarter and full year ended December 31, 2021.The full detailed presentation of Carlyle's fourth quarter and full year 2021 results can be viewed on the investor relations section of our website at ir.carlyle.com.

  8. Carlyle Presents Strategic Plan to Accelerate Platform and Earnings

    Targets $1.6+ billion in Distributable Earnings and $130+ billion in new LP commitments by 2024. Washington, DC, February 23, 2021 - Global investment firm The Carlyle Group Inc. (NASDAQ: CG) will announce today a multi-year strategic plan to accelerate growth and deliver enhanced shareholder value over the next four years.. During the investor day event, Chief Executive Officer Kewsong Lee ...

  9. Carlyle to Announce Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2022 Financial Results

    New York and Washington - The Carlyle Group Inc. (NASDAQ: CG) announced today that it will release financial results for the fourth quarter and full year 2022 on Tuesday, February 7, 2023, and host a conference call at 8:30 a.m. EST.The conference call will be available via public webcast from the Events & Presentations section of ir.carlyle.com and a replay will also be available after the ...

  10. Carlyle to Announce First Quarter 2022 Financial Results and Host

    New York and Washington - The Carlyle Group Inc. (NASDAQ: CG) announced today that it will release financial results for the first quarter of 2022 on Thursday, April 28, 2022, and host a conference call at 8:30 a.m. EDT. The conference call will be available via public webcast from the Events & Presentations section of ir.carlyle.com and a replay will also be available after the call's ...

  11. PDF Global Private Equity

    This presentation has been forward‐looking prepared by The Carlyle Group Inc. (together with its affiliates, "Carlyle") and may only be used for informational purposes. All information contained herein is presented as of December 31, 2020, unless otherwise specifically noted. Unless otherwise expressly stated herein any analysis or ...

  12. The Carlyle Group Inc (CG) Q1 2024 Earnings Call Transcript Highlights

    The Carlyle Group Inc reported a record quarterly FRE of $266 million, a near 40% increase over the first quarter of the previous year. CG achieved a record FRE margin of 47%, significantly higher ...

  13. Document

    I remain confident that Carlyle is well-positioned to deliver for our investors and shareholders as we build on our momentum and take action to align the firm for growth." U.S. GAAP results for Q3 2023 included income (loss) before provision for income taxes of $0.2 billion and net income (loss) per common share of $0.22 on a diluted basis.

  14. Carlyle : View Investor Day Presentation

    Carlyle : View Investor Day Presentation. February 23, 2021 at 08:52 am EST. INVESTOR DAY 2021. Accelerating Growth. FEBRUARY 23, 2021. 1. IMPORTANT INFORMATION. This presentation has been prepared by The Carlyle Group Inc. (together with its affiliates, "Carlyle") and may only be used for informational purposes.

  15. The Carlyle Group Inc. (CG) Stock Earnings Call Transcripts

    The Carlyle Group (CG) Investor Presentation - Slideshow SA Transcripts Fri, Nov. 20, 2020 ManTech International Corporation (MANT) CEO Kevin Phillips on Q3 2020 Results - Earnings Call Transcript

  16. 2021 Carlyle Investor Day Presentation

    2021 Carlyle Investor Day presentation - Free ebook download as PDF File (.pdf), Text File (.txt) or read book online for free. This document provides an introduction and important disclaimers for an investor day presentation by The Carlyle Group on February 23, 2021. It notes that the presentation contains forward-looking statements and discusses risks and uncertainties.

  17. The Carlyle Group Inc. (CG) Q1 2024 Earnings Call Transcript

    The Carlyle Group Inc. (NASDAQ:CG) Q1 2024 Results Conference Call May 1, 2024 8:30 AM ETCompany Participants. Daniel Harris - Head of IR Harvey Schwartz - CEO John Redett - CFO. Conference Call ...

  18. Investor Dashboard

    CGBD and CSL III Merger Investor Presentation 393.2 KB. News Releases. ... In addition, we are able to leverage the broad resources of The Carlyle Group to enhance the sourcing and evaluation of potential investment opportunities. We have elected to be regulated as a business development company, (a "BDC"), under the Investment Company Act of ...

  19. The Carlyle Group hiring Analyst, Product Specialist Job in London

    Carlyle seeks to hire a Product Specialist in our Global Private Equity Investor Relations Group, based in London. ... Preparation of presentations/content for investor meetings and events including conferences; ... The Carlyle Group (NASDAQ: CG) is a global investment firm with $425 billion of assets under management and more than half of the ...

  20. Carlyle : Investor Presentation, Q1 2021

    Carlyle : Investor Presentation, Q1 2021. May 05, 2021 at 09:29 am EDT. Shareholder & Investor Presentation. May 2021. 1. Important Information. This presentation has been prepared by The Carlyle Group Inc. (together with its affiliates, "Carlyle") and may only be used for informational purposes only. This presentation may not be referenced ...

  21. Log in

    Enter search text or select an advanced option, and click Search. For better results wrap your search query in quotation marks.

  22. Carlyle Secured Lending: Recent Pullback, Merger And Discount To NAV

    CGBD investor presentation They also extended the maturity date and reinvestment period of their 2015-IN debt by four years and reduced the debt cost by more than 20 basis points.

  23. The Carlyle Group Names Andrei Terekhov and Joshua Larson Managing

    London - Global private equity firm The Carlyle Group announced today that Joshua Larson and Andrei Terekhov have joined as Managing Directors and will co-head Carlyle's new Russia investment team based in Moscow. David M. Rubenstein, Carlyle co-founder and Managing Director, said, "We see great opportunity in Russia. Establishing a team of seasoned investment professionals from Russia ...

  24. Carlyle Appoints UK Investor Relations, Fund-Raising Head

    Leonard Tsomik has been appointed as managing director responsible for investor relations and fundraising at The Carlyle Group's UK base in London. Prior to joining US-headquartered Carlyle, the private global investment firm, Mr Tsomik was the head of private banking for Russia with JP Morgan in London, where he initiated the private bank's ...

  25. Misalignment Under the Radar: Stealth Dual-Class Stock

    As an example, the Carlyle Group notes in a presentation explaining its 2019 move away from dual-class stock that "[s]enior employees, representing approximately 60% of current total outstanding units, will generally assign their voting rights for up to five years to our existing General Partner and that entity will exercise those votes as a ...

  26. Carlyle Appoints UK Investor Relations, Fund-Raising Head

    Print this article. Carlyle Appoints UK Investor Relations, Fund-Raising Head. Rachel Walsh. 15 October 2008. Leonard Tsomik has been appointed as managing director responsible for investor relations and fundraising at The Carlyle Group's UK base in London. Prior to joining US-headquartered Carlyle, the private global investment firm, Mr Tsomik was the head of private banking for Russia with ...

  27. Judge halts Bryan Kohberger hearing in Moscow after defense shows

    This is a breaking news story. Check back to idahostatesman.com for updates. To sign up for breaking news alerts, click here. The judge overseeing the Bryan Kohberger case abruptly paused a hearing on the capital murder trial's potential change of venue Thursday after an expert witness for the defense in a presentation showed content from social media in court.