ICSID website available at:
Investor state | The law/convention on which the dispute was based | Plaintiff |
---|---|---|
Holland | Bilateral Investment Agreement between Egypt and the Netherlands 1996 | Future Pipe International Pipe manufacturing company |
United State | Bilateral Investment Agreement between Egypt and the United States 1986 | LP Egypt Holdings I Fund III Egypt OMLP Egypt Holdings The field of construction and construction |
USA | Bilateral Investment Agreement between Egypt and the United States 1986, and the Egyptian Investment Law No. 8 of 1997 | Champion Holding Company and others Cotton processing and trade |
Qatar | Bilateral Investment Agreement between Egypt and Qatar 1999 | Al Jazeera |
Spain | Bilateral Investment Agreement between Egypt and Spain 1992 | Cementos La Union S.A Aridos Jativa |
Spain | Bilateral Investment Agreement between Egypt and Spain 1992 | Unión Fenosa Gas, S.A Spain's Union Fenosa Gas Company Natural gas liquefaction |
USA/Germany | The bilateral investment agreement between Egypt and the United States 1986, and the bilateral agreement between Egypt and Germany 2005 | Ampal-American Israel Corporation and others Mining/exporting natural gas |
France | Bilateral Investment Agreement between Egypt and France 1974 | Veolia Propreté company Water and Sanitation |
Source: ICSID website available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/pages/casedetail
Political Methods of Dispute Settlement: https://guides.libraries.uc.edu/c.php?g=222418&p=1583660
Dr Walid Abdulrahim, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, https://sites.google.com/site/walidabdulrahim/home/my-studies-in-english/14-peaceful-settlement-of-disputes
Abdualla Mohamed Hamza, p. 14 .
Abdualla Mohamed Hamza, p. 14.
Brenton D. Soderstrum, Litigation v. Arbitration: Pros and Cons , www.bestlawyers.com/Content/Downloads/Articles/4379_1.pdf
Settlement of International Trade and Investment Disputes Gonzalo Biggs, Lawyer: www.camsantiago.cl/…/45_Articulo%20Cepal%20version%20Ingles
review the text of the Convention on the United Nations website available at: www.un.org
number of African States have signed the UNCITRAL Rules: Uganda, Egypt, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Algeria […] Other States See UNCITRAL Guide, Basic Facts on the United Nations Commission on Trade Law, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ( 2013 ), Vienna, January, pp. 39-42.
General Assembly Resolution 2205 (XXI) of 17 December 1966, fifth and ninth preamble considerations.
For more details about the signatory countries, see the ICSID website available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org
Institutional vs. 'ad hoc' arbitration, OUT-LAW GUIDE, 12 Aug 2011: www.pinsentmasons.com/out-law/guides/institutional-vs-ad-hoc-arbitration
Respini Beretta Piccoli and Fornara, Institutional vs. ad hoc arbitration: when and why?, GASI/ACC CONFERENCE 19/10/2017:
Sundra Rajoo, Institutional and Ad hoc Arbitrations: Advantages and Disadvantages: http://sundrarajoo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Institutional-and-Ad-hoc-Arbitrations-Advantages-Disadvantages-by-Sundra-Rajoo.pdf
Law No. 65 of 1971 regarding the investment of Arab capital and free zones, The Official Newspaper, No. 39, 30/9/1971, p. 529.
Text of Law No. 230 of 1989 for Investment, Official Gazette No. 29, 20/7/1989, p. 54.
ICSID website available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/16/2
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES WASHINGTON, D.C. IN THE PROCEEDING BETWEEN: WAGUIH ELIE GEORGE SlAG AND CLORINDA VECCHI (CLAIMANTS) AND THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT (RESPONDENT)(ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15) AWARD Members p. 1.
(ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15) (DECISION ON JURISDICTION) p. 6.
(ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15) (DECISION ON JURISDICTION) pp. 15-20.
(ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15), (DECISION ON JURISDICTION) pp. 22-31.
(ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15) AWARD Members pp. 23-24.
(ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15) AWARD Members pp. 115-127.
(ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15) AWARD Members pp. 170-175).
Al-Qalloubi , S.M. ( 2005 ), Arbitration Agreement, Arbitration Seminar in Works and Contracting Contracts , Arab Organization for Administrative Development , Sharjah , p. 58 .
Boczek , B.A. ( 2005a ), International Law: A Dictionary 356: Dictionaries of International Law, No. 2 , Scarecrow Press .
Boczek , B.A. ( 2005b ), International Law: A Dictionary 379: Dictionaries of International Law, No. 2 , Scarecrow Press .
El Hadad , H. ( 1996 ), The Contracts Concluded between the State and Foreign Individuals, Their Identity and the Applicable Law , Dar El Nahda Al Arabiya , Cairo , pp. 8 - 9 .
Hamza , A.M. ( 2017 ), “ Peaceful settlement of disputes, global journal of commerce and mangment prespective ”, Global Institute for Research and Education, (January-February, 2017) , p. 11 .
Kassem , T. ( 2015 ), “ The political character of Investor-State disputes ”, Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization , Vol. 42 , pp. 173 - 180 , available at: www.iiste.org , ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper) ISSN 2224-3259 .
Salacuse , J.W. ( 2007 ), “ Is there a better way? Alternative methods of treaty-based, investor-state dispute resolution ”, Fordham International Law Journal , Vol. 31 No. 1 , pp. 138 - 185 .
United Nations ( 1994 ), UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration , United Nations , New York, NY , pp. 2 - 6 .
United Nations ( 2011 ), General Assembly Resolution 65/22 of the Revised UNCITRAL Rules for 2010 , United Nations , New York, NY , pp. 2 - 7 .
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ( 2013 ), UNCITRAL Guide, Key Facts on the United Nations Commission on Trade Law , United Nations Commission on International Trade Law , Vienna , p. 1495 .
This work was funded by the “General Authority for Investment and Free Zones”.
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LEGAL EXPERTS INDIA
Law keeps changing and getting evolved with passage of time as the thinking of law makers, judicial officers’ changes and the situations change. What was good law once gets overruled by another law, but also there are various judgments which have withstood the test of time and the changed circumstances, One has thus to keep updated with not only the latest law but the law which is good law even today. Though the law is an ocean and there are innumerable judgments on every section of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, I have in this article tried to high light some of the important judgments under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, and related Acts in respect of issues which arise frequently in arbitral proceedings.
1. Indian Oil Corporation Vs. SPS Engineering Ltd.
(JT) 2011 (2) Supreme Court 553.
This judgment defines the jurisdiction of the Court and the Arbitrator by holding as to which forum has what powers. It has been held as under:-
“The issues (first category) which the Chief Justice/his designate will have to decide are:-
(a) Whether the party making the application has approached the appropriate High Court?
(b) Whether there is an arbitration agreement and whether the party who has applied under Section 11 of the Act, is a party to such an agreement?
Service of statutory notice to the respondent is mandatory for invoking the jurisdiction of the court for appointment of an arbitrator. If the notice is not shown to have been served, the petition is not maintainable.
The issues (second category) which the Chief Justice/his designate may choose to decide (or leave them to the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal) are:
(a) Whether the claim is a dead (long barred) claim or a live claim? (b)Whether the parties have concluded the contract/transaction by recording satisfaction of their mutual rights and obligation or by receiving the final payment without objection?
22.3. The issues (third category) which the Chief Justice/his designate should leave exclusively to the Arbitral Tribunal are:
(i) Whether a claim made falls within the arbitration clause (as for example, a matter which is reserved for final decision of a departmental authority and exempted or excluded from arbitration?
(ii) Merits or any claim involved in the arbitration”.
2. P.R. Shah Shares & Stock Brokers Vs. B.H.H. Securities Pvt. Ltd.
2012 (1) Supreme Court Cases 594.
This case deals with the scope of interference by the Courts and it has been held that a court does not sit in appeal over the award of an Arbitral Tribunal by reassessing or re-appreciating the evidence. An award can be challenged only under the grounds mentioned in Section 34 (2) of the Act. However if there is total lack of evidence, the award is liable to be set aside.
3. Food Corporation of India Vs. Shanti Cereals Pvt. Ltd.
2010 (10) Arbitration Law Reporter 296 (Delhi) (DB)
In this case also the High Court has held that the forum to raise factual pleas and contentions in an arbitration matter is only the arbitral tribunal. It is against the propriety of the legal regime, as well as mandate of law set out in Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 that the courts in objection (and more so in appeal under Section 37) should entertain the arguments that are purely factual in nature.
4. McDermott International Inc. Vs. Burn Standard Co. Ltd.
2006 (11) Supreme Court Cases 44
In this case various issues were involved and some of the important aspects are whether or not time was of the essence of the contract which would essentially be a question of the intention of the parties to be gathered from the terms of the contract and that even where the parties have expressly provided that time is of the essence of the contract such a stipulation will have to be read along with other provisions of the contract and such other provisions may, on construction of the contract, exclude the inference that the completion of the work by a particular date was intended to be fundamental The Court further held that the terms of the contract can be express or implied and the conduct of the parties and the correspondence exchanged would also be a relevant factor in the matter of construction of a contract. The construction of the contract agreement is within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators having regard to the wide nature, scope and ambit of the arbitration agreement and they cannot be said to have misdirected themselves in passing the award by taking into consideration the conduct of the parties. This however does not mean that the Arbitral Tribunal can interpret the terms which on the face of it appear to be erroneous. The interpretation by the tribunal has to be a plausible interpretation.
5. Delhi Development Authority Vs. Durga Chand
AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2609
Many a time a term in a contract is open to two interpretations like whether a glass is half full or half empty and whether a door is half closed or half open. It is in these circumstances that the Courts have ruled that if there be admissible two constructions of a document, one of which will give effect to all the clauses while the other will render one or more of them nugatory it is the former that should be adopted. It has been further held that assuming that two interpretations of it are reasonably possible, the principle to apply would be that the interpretation favouring the grantee as against the granter should be accepted. It has further been held by the courts that if two interpretations are possible, the courts will not interfere with the one adopted by the arbitrator.
6. Union of India Vs. D.N. Revri & Co.
AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2257
On the question of interpretation of a contract the Supreme Court held that “It must be remembered that a contract is a commercial document between the parties and it must be interpreted in such a manner as to give efficacy to the contract rather than to invalidate it. It would not be right while interpreting a contract entered into between two lay parties to apply strict rules of construction which are ordinarily applied to a conveyance and other formal documents. The meaning of such a contract must be gathered by adopting a common sense approach and it must not be allowed to be thwarted by a narrow pedantic and legalistic interpretation”.
7. In respect of giving reasons in an award the courts have held that an Arbitrator when called upon to give a reasoned Award is still not required to write a detailed judgment as the Judges do. It is sufficient if he has indicated his trend and given outline to indicate the basis on which he has arrived at such figure. But there must be reasons as to why and how the Arbitrator is awarding and /or rejecting a particular claim. Merely giving the facts and the conclusion is not enough. The reasons as to why and how the conclusion is arrived at must be given otherwise the award will be set aside being without reasons.
8. Many a times the Employer acts as the judge in its own cause which is contrary to the principles of natural justice and the Supreme Court in the case J.G. Engineers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India 2011 (5) Judgments Today, Supreme Court 380 has held that in fact the question whether the other party committed breach cannot be decided by the party alleging breach. A contract cannot provide that one party will be the arbiter to decide whether he committed breach. That question can only be decided by an adjudicatory forum, that is a Court or an Arbitral Tribunal. In State of Karnataka Vs. Shree Rameshwara Rice Mills 1987 (2) SCC 160 the Supreme Court held that adjudication upon the issue relating to a breach of condition of contract and adjudication of assessing damages arising out of the breach are two different and distinct concepts and the right to assess damages arising out of a breach would not include a right to adjudicate upon as to whether there was any breach at all. This Court held that one of the parties to an agreement cannot reserve to himself the power to adjudicate whether the other party has committed a breach.
The Court further held that the powers of the State under an agreement entered into by it with a private person providing for the assessment of damages for breach of conditions and recovery of the damages will stand confined only to those cases where the breach of conditions is admitted or it is not disputed.
9. On the issue of liquidated damages some of the principles culled out by the
Courts are as follows:-
i) Show cause notice must be issued before levy of L.D. ii) Right of hearing must be given to the other party.
iii) L.D. should not be levied mechanically upto the maximum amount without any basis and proper justification.
iv) The Employer must prove that it has suffered loss because of the alleged delay.
v) It must be proved that the other party has committed breach justifying levy of L.D.
vi) L.D. cannot be levied retrospectively. Judgments in this behalf are
10. NCT of Delhi Vs. R.K. Construction Co.
2003 (1) Arb. L.R.465 (Delhi)
Held. “. However, in the present case, the Arbitrator has held that the work was delayed due to lapses on the part of the petitioner. The petitioner issued the letter of levy of compensation on 8.6.2001, i.e. after a period of four years and nine months after the contract ceased to be operative. The petitioner did not issue any notice under Clause 2 during the contract period nor any explanation has been given for the same.”
“. However, before levying the compensation, no show cause notice was given to the respondent.” Levy of L.D. was held not tenable.
11. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Vs. Motorola India Pvt. Ltd.
AIR 2009 Supreme Court 357
Held. “Further, CGM Kerala Circle has already taken a decision as is evident from his letter dated 25 th of April, 2006, that the appellant was right in imposing liquidated damages and therefore, the question of such a person becoming an arbitrator does not arise as it would not satisfy the test of impartiality and independence as required under Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Moreover it would also defeat the notions laid down under the principles of natural justice wherein it has been recognized that a party cannot be a judge in his own cause.
The Supreme Court further held that the provision under clause 16.2 that quantification of the Liquidated Damages shall be final and cannot be challenged by the supplier Motorola is clearly in restraint of legal proceedings under Section
28 of the Indian Contract Act. So the provision to this effect has to be held bad.
12. Indian Oil Corporation Vs. Lloyds Steel Industries Ltd.
2007 (4) Arb. L.R. 84 (Delhi)
Held. “. Notwithstanding the above, the petitioner still wants damages to be recovered from the respondent on the specious plea that liquidated damages mentioned in the contract are predetermined damages and, therefore, in view of provisions of Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, the petitioner was entitled to these damages and it was not necessary for the petitioner to prove these damages. The legal position, as explained by the Supreme Court in ONGC Vs. Saw Pipes (supra) which has already been explained above, is not in doubt. However, it is only when there is a loss suffered and once that is proved, it is not for the arbitrator or the court to examine the actual extent of the loss suffered once there is a pre-estimation thereof. Moreover, the compensation, as stipulated in the contract, has to be reasonable. In a particular case where the defaulting party is able to demonstrate that delay/default has not resulted in any loss being suffered by the other party, then that party cannot claim the damages only because in the contract there is a stipulation regarding liquidated damages”. “ However, the stipulated sum has to be a genuine pre-estimate of damages likely to flow from the breach and is termed as „liquidated damages ‟ . If it is not genuine pre-estimate of the loss, but an amount intended to secure performance of the contract, if may be a penalty.” “ It is clear from the above that Section 74 does not confer a special benefit upon any party, like the petitioner in this case. In a particular case where there is a clause of liquidated damages the court will award to the party aggrieved only reasonable compensation which would not exceed an amount of liquidated damages stipulated in the contract. It would not, however, follow there from that even when no loss is suffered; the amount stipulated as liquidated damages is to be awarded. Such a clause, would operate when loss is suffered but it may normally be difficult to estimate the damages and, therefore, the genesis of providing such a clause is that the damages are pr-estimated. Thus, discretion of the court in the matter of reducing the amount of damages agreed upon is left unqualified by any specific limitation. The guiding principle is „reasonable
compensation ‟ . In order to see what would be the reasonable compensation in a given case, the court can adjudge the said compensation in that case. For this purpose, as held in Fateh Chand ‟ s case it is the duty of the court to award compensation according to settled principles. Settled principles warrant not to award a compensation where no loss is suffered, as one cannot compensate a person who has not suffered any loss or damage. There may be cases where the actual loss or damage is incapable of proof; facts may be so complicated that it may be difficult for the party to prove actual extent of the loss or damage. Section 74 exempts him from such responsibility and enables him to claim compensation in spite of his failure to prove the actual extent of the loss or damage, provided the basic requirement for award of „compensation ‟ viz. the fact that he has suffered some loss or damage is established. The proof of this basic requirement is not dispensed with by Section 74. That the party complaining of breach of contract and claiming compensation is entitled to succeed only on proof of „legal injury ‟ having been suffered by him in the sense of some loss or damage having been sustained on account of such breach, is clear from Section 73 and 74. Section 74 is only supplementary to Section 73, and it does not make any departure from the principle behind Section 73 in regard to this matter. Every case of compensation for breach of contract has to be dealt with on the basis of Section 73.”…… “In a case when the party complaining of breach of the contract has not suffered legal injury in the sense of sustaining loss or damage, there, is nothing to compensate him for; there is nothing to recompense, satisfy, or make amends. Therefore, he will not be entitled to compensation. If liquidated damages are awarded to the petitioner even when the petitioner has not suffered any loss, it would amount to „unjust enrichment ‟ which cannot be countenanced and has to be eschewed.”
13. B.W.L. vs. MTNL & Others
2000 (2) Arb.L.R. 190 Delhi
Held. “In order that clause 15 can be resorted to by the respondents to justify retention of any sums of money as liquidated damages, they would have to first prove, in terms of the opening words of clause 15.2 itself, that there was delay by the supplier in the performance of its obligations. None of clauses of the agreement clothe the respondents with the power to arrogate to this unilaterally arrive at the finding that delay has been caused by the petitioner. Therefore, even independent of Section 74 of the Contract Act and without reference to the decisions of the Apex Court interpreting this section; it is necessary that adjudication should take place on the question that who was responsible and liable for the delay.
14. DDA Vs. Construction & Design Services
165 (2009) Delhi Law Times 208
Held. “ On an overall consideration of the facts found, this Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff treated the condition, i.e. Clause 2 as a penal clause. The amount which can be recovered under the condition is based on exercise of discretion. Yet the order levying the compensation provides no clue what persuaded the decision maker to claim the maximum amount. This is the clearest indication that it was seen by the plaintiff as a penal clause, and operated as such.”
15. Indian Oil Corporation Vs. SPS Engineering Ltd.
In contracts the Employers normally retain the power to with hold the amounts due to the party on a specious plea that the Employer has some claim due to it from the other party. In the aforesaid case the Employer was trying to withhold awarded amount due to the contractor by raising a plea that they have a claim for damages against the contractor. The Court in this case held that the award amount due to the respondent under the award is an ascertained sum due, recoverable by executing the award as a decree. On the other hand the claim of the appellant for reimbursement of the extra cost for getting the work completed is a claim for damages which is yet to be adjudicated by an adjudicating forum. The appellant cannot therefore adjust the amount due by it under the award, against a mere claim for damages made by it against the respondent.
16. Pleadings form a very important aspect in any matter and care must be taken to ensure that the pleadings are very well drafted and contain complete factual aspects with brief description of the documents relied upon, the basis and the justification for the claim. No evidence can be led nor can any arguments be advanced in case a plea has not been raised. The Supreme Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Vs. Janmeja Singh 2002 (8) SCC 191 held that it is an established proposition that no evidence can be led on a plea not raised in the pleadings and no amount of evidence can cure the defect in the pleadings.
17. Bharat Construction Co. Ltd. Vs. Union of India
AIR 1954 Calcutta 606
Held: “The pleadings have got to be scanned with extreme rigour in cases under the Arbitration Act and no party can be allowed to raise a point, if he has not given sufficient notice of it, in his affidavits.”
18. On the issue of using personal knowledge the Supreme Court in the case P.R. Shah Shares & Stock Brokers Vs. B.H. Securities Pvt. Ltd. 2012 (1) SCC held that an Arbitral Tribunal cannot of course make use of its personal knowledge of the facts of the dispute, which is not a part of the record, to decide the dispute. But an Arbitral Tribunal can certainly use its expert or technical knowledge or the general knowledge about the particular trade in deciding a matter. In fact, that is why in many arbitrations, persons with technical knowledge, are appointed as they will be well versed with the practices and customs in the respective fields. In this case the Arbitrators referred to the market practice, which the court held cannot be considered as using some personal knowledge of facts of a transaction to decide the dispute.
19. Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. Vs. L.K. Ahuja
2004 (5) SCC 109
The Arbitrators must confine themselves within the four corners of the contract and the law and the Supreme Court in this case held that in cases where an arbitrator exceeds the terms of the agreement or passes an award in the absence of any evidence, which is apparent on the face of the award, the same could be set aside.
20. Many a time parties merely allege “fraud”. A bald allegation of fraud without any particulars or details cannot be looked into. The Supreme Court has held that while fraud unravels everything, and as a general proposition, the proposition is right, but fraud must necessarily be pleaded and proved See Gayatri Devi Vs. Sashi Pal Singh 2005 (5) SCC 521
21. Service of award is again an important aspect and it must be ensured that it is served on the “party” and not on the counsel. The court in the case Karamyogi Shelters Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Benarsi Krishna Committee 2010(3) Arb. L.R. 293 (Delhi) (DB) held that service of the award on the advocate of the party is not sufficient compliance with the statutory necessity postulated by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The Court further held that in view of Section 2(1)(h) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, there is no justifiable reason to depart from the precise definition of the word “party” which means a party to an arbitration agreement.
The word “Party” cannot take within its sweep an „agent ‟ of the party which is incompetent to take the requisite action envisaged under the statute.
22. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Vs. Haryana Telecom Ltd.
2010 (3) Arb. L.R. 460
In this case the award was sent to the Advocate and under certificate of posting which the court held not to be in compliance with the provisions of the Act meaning there by that the limitation for challenging the award will commence only from the time the award is sent to the “party” and not to its agent or counsel. As to what constitutes proper service of the award, the court has held as follows in the aforesaid case.
Held. “It seems to court that it is imperative that delivery/receipt of the arbitral award should be at the instance, responsibility and authority of the Arbitral Tribunal. In the case in hand, the arbitral award appears to have been dispatched under „certificate of posting ‟ and not recorded delivery, and that too to the advocate of the appellants. „UPC ‟ merely evidences the posting of a letter/envelop and not its service. In matters of moment, such as delivery/receipt of an arbitral award, the arbitral tribunal is duty bound to ensure that the award is actually delivered directly to the party concerned. It is court ‟ s fervent hope that the arbitrators and arbitral tribunals shall henceforward consider their judicial contract to have culminated only upon their being satisfied that each of the parties before them has actually been served with the arbitral award. If the recorded delivery is returned undelivered, the arbitral tribunal must dispatch it once again until it is served or there is sufficient reason to assume that it stands served.”
23. Claim for interest and award thereof is governed by Section 31 (7) of the Act. While interpreting this Section the Supreme Court in the case State of Haryana Vs. S.L. Arora & Company 2010 (3) C.G.L.J. 348 has held that compound interest is not payable as Section 31(7) makes no reference to payment of compound interest or payment of interest upon interest. Nor does it require the interest which accrues till the date of the award, to be treated as part of the principal from the date of award for calculating the post award interest. The use of the words in clause (b) of sub section (7) of Section 31 clearly indicate that the Section contemplates award of only simple interest and not compound interest or interest upon interest. „A sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award ‟ refers to the award of sums on the substantive claims and does not refer to interest awarded on the “sum directed to be paid by the award”. In the absence of any provision for interest upon interest in the contract, the Arbitral Tribunals do not have the power to award interest upon interest, or compound interest, either for the pre award period or for the post award period.
24. Sree Kamatchi Amman Constructions Vs. Divisional Railway Manager.
2010 (3) Arb. L.R. 442
In this case the Court held that Section 31(7) of the new Act by using the words “unless otherwise agreed by the parties” categorically clarifies that the arbitrator is bound by the terms of the contract insofar as the award of interest from the date of cause of action to date of award. Therefore, where the parties had agreed that no interest shall be payable, arbitral tribunal cannot award interest between the date when the cause of action arose to date of award.
25. The following judgments on the issue of claim for damages are illustrative of the principles for award of damages.
Narain Das R. Israni Vs. DDA 2005 (3) Arb. L.R. 455 (Delhi) This case dealt with the claim of damages for prolongation of contract. The Employer submitted that the agreement contained in clause being Clause 10(CC) under which the claimant had been compensated and, thus, this amount could not be awarded. The Court negatived the said plea by holding that Clause 10(CC) applies only for claims for damages in respect of increase in labour rates and material rates for period beyond the original stipulated time of the contract and that does not mean that no other kind of escalation can be granted. In respect of the items provided for in Clause 10(CC), the same would be governed by the said clause, but the other items would have to be considered on the principles of Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 as clause 10(CC) cannot take care of factors other than materials, labour and POL when there is inordinate delay on account of non fulfillment of contractual obligations by the Employer.
26. K.N. Sathyapalan Vs. State of Kerala
2007(13) SCC 43
Held “Ordinarily, the parties would be bound by the terms agreed upon in the contract, but in the event one of the parties to the contract is unable to fulfill its obligations under the contract which has a direct bearing on the work to be executed by the other party, the arbitrator is vested with the authority to compensate the second party for the extra costs incurred by him as a result of the failure of the first party to live up to its obligations.”
27. Anurodh Construction Vs. DDA
2005 (Suppl.) Arb.L.R. 258 ( Delhi )
Held “The damages are liable to be awarded once it is found that it is the respondent who is responsible for the delay and such damages can be awarded under Section 73 of the Contract Act. Use of Clause 10(CC) which is utilized in other contracts by DDA itself, can be said to be a good parameter and methodology to calculate such damages and the same cannot be faulted.”
28. Paragon Construction India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India.
2008(101) Delhi Recent Judgments 633.
Held: “ In view of these decisions, it is clear that the claimant ‟ s claim cannot be blocked out merely upon a reading of the said clause 10(CC) of the contract between the parties. As made clear in the award itself, the petitioner was claiming the amount under claim no.1 not upon an application of clause 10(CC) but dehors the same and by way of damages under Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. That being the case, I am of the view that the award is liable to be set aside in respect of the conclusion of the learned arbitrator with regard to claim no.1. However, the petitioner would have to establish, through evidence, the extent of damages it has suffered. This cannot be gone into by this court at this stage because no such material is available to this court. Consequently, the award in respect of the claim no.1 is set aside and the parties are directed to go in for arbitration afresh in respect of this claim. It shall be open to the parties to lead evidence with regard to this claim.”
29. The general trend is that the Employers do not grant the extension and/or make the payment unless the other party gives declarations about no further claim or such like a declaration. The Supreme Court has dealt with this aspect in the following cases.
Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. Annapurna Construction.
AIR 2003 Supreme Court 3660
Held. “Only because the respondent has accepted the final bill, the same would not mean that it was not entitled to raise any claim. It is not the case of the appellant that while accepting the final bill, the respondent had unequivocally stated that he would not raise any further claim. In absence of such a declaration, the respondent cannot be held to be estopped or precluded from raising any claim.”
30. Ambica Construction Co. Vs. Union of India
Judgments Today 2006 (10) SC 629
In this case, the following clause came up for interpretation before the Supreme
“43(2) Signing of “No claim” Certificate . The contractor shall not be entitled to make any claim whatsoever against the Railways under or by virtue of or arising out of this contract, nor shall the Railways entertain or consider any such claim, if made by the contractor, after he shall have signed a “No Claim” certificate in favour of the Railways, in such form as shall be required by the Railways, after the works are finally measured up. The contractor shall be debarred from disputing the correctness of the items covered by “No Claim Certificate” or demanding a reference to arbitration in respect thereof”.
The Supreme Court held as follows.
“ From the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and in particular from the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, it is apparent that unless a discharge certificate is given in advance, payment of bills are generally delayed. Although Clause 43(2) has been included in the General Conditions of Contract, the same is meant to be a safeguard as against frivolous claims after final measurement. Having regard to the decision in the case of
Reshmi Construction ‟ s (supra), it can no longer be said that
such a clause in the contract would be an absolute bar to a contractor raising claims which are genuine, even after the submission of such “No Claim Certificate.”
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Practical law uk help and information notes 5-205-6139 (approx. 5 pages), dispute resolution.
The year 2021 has seen some important case law developments in arbitration law in India. Highlights of 40 important decisions delivered by the Indian Courts on Arbitration law from June, 2021 to December, 2021 are as follows:
Whether an arbitration clause that allows the arbitration proceeding to be abandoned at the will of one party would be valid in law?
Tata Capital Finance Limited v. Shri Chand Construction and Apartment Pvt. Ltd. (Judgment dated 24.11.2021 in FAO(OS) 40/2020)
The High Court of Delhi held that an arbitration agreement that confers unequal power on one party to unilaterally abandon the arbitration proceedings, would be invalid in law, as such an agreement would lack ‘mutuality’, which is an essential feature of an arbitration agreement. The court further held that an arbitration agreement which provides for arbitration of the claims of one party and providing for a remedy of court or any other for a for the claim of the other party would also be invalid in law as the same would not only result in splitting of the claims and cause of action but also in the multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting decisions on the same cause of action.
Whether a party can file a writ petition against an order referring the parties to arbitration under Section 8 of the Act?
Arun Srivastava v. M/S Larsen & Toubro Ltd. (Judgment dated 09.11.2021 in CM(M) 1520/2018)
The High Court of Delhi held that a petition under Article 227 would not be maintainable against an order referring the parties to arbitration under Section 8. The court observed that no provision for appeal against an order allowing Section 8 application is there in the act, therefore, the legislative intent is clear in terms that if there is a valid arbitration agreement, the court must refer the parties to arbitration and all the issues related to existence and validity of the arbitration agreement must be raised before the tribunal.
Whether the embargo under Section 9(3) would apply to an application already ‘entertained’ by the court?
Arcelor Mittal Nipon Steel India Ltd. v. Essar Bulk Terminal Limited (Judgment dated 14.09.2021 in SLP(C) No. 13129/2021)
The Supreme Court held that the bar under Section 9(3) would be inoperative if the court has already entertained an application and taken it up for consideration. The purpose of Section 9(3) is not to turn back the clock and refer the already decided applications under Section 9(1) to the Tribunal for fresh consideration under Section 17.
What is the meaning that is to be ascribed to the term “constitution of the tribunal.”?
Quippo Infrastructure Ltd. v. A2z Infraservices Ltd. (Judgment dated 03.06.2021 in APO 29 of 2021)
The Calcutta High Court held that the constitution of the tribunal has to be given a wider interpretation so as to include assumption of jurisdiction by the arbitral tribunal after the arbitral proceedings have commenced in terms of Section 21 of the Arbitration Act, 1996.
Whether the court can determine the substantial issues while dealing with an application under Section 9 of the Act?
DLF Ltd. v. Leighton India Contractors Pvt. Ltd. (Judgment dated 22.07.2021 in FAO(OS) (COMM) 63/2020)
The High Court of Delhi held the scope of Section 9 of the Act is to merely preserve the subject matter of dispute till the arbitral tribunal is constituted and the same cannot be extended to directing specific performance of the contract itself. The Substantive questions and issues relating to illegality of action, entitlement, liability, damages, etc. have to be left for the Tribunal to adjudicate upon.
Whether the right of a party to appoint an arbitrator gets forfeited in case it fails to appoint an arbitrator prior to the filing of the petition u/s 11 of the Act?
Patil Rail Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd v. Ministry Of Railway (Judgment dated 22.07.2021 in ARB.P. 327/2021)
Relying on Datar Switchgears v. Tata Finance Ltd. , the Delhi High Court held that a party forfeits its right to make an appointment once the petition under section 11 is filed. Further, it held that the party cannot unilaterally make an appointment in view of the law laid down in Perkins Eastman .
Whether the right of a party to invoke arbitration can be restricted to a lesser period than provided under the limitation act?
Sagar Constructions v. Govt. (NCT) of Delhi (Judgment dated 06.10.2021 in ARB.P. 856/2021)
The High Court of Delhi held that a party cannot restrict the right of the other party to invoke arbitration to a lesser period than provided under the Arbitration Act. It held that the right of the party to invoke arbitration would be three years from the date when cause of action arises, the parties cannot circumscribe it to a lesser period through an agreement. The court relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. v. Sujir Ganesh Nayak to hold that an agreement that restrict the period of limitation would be void under Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act. The court held that the right of the party to invoke arbitration would be three years from the date when cause of action arises, the parties cannot circumscribe it to a lesser period through an agreement.
Whether the Court while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 11 can determine if the arbitration agreement correlate with the dispute?
DLF Home Developers Limited v. Rajapura Homes Private Limited (Judgment dated 22.09.2021 in ARBITRATION PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 16 OF 2020)
The Supreme Court widened the scope of examination of the arbitration agreement at the pre-arbitral stage to hold that the Courts while appointing an arbitrator must not act mechanically and relegate the parties to arbitration, but must examine the arbitration agreement to ensure that the arbitration agreement must correlate to the dispute at hand and the courts can decline the reference if there is no correlation. The court observed that it would not be usurping the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, but would only be streamlining the process of arbitration.
Avantha Holdings Limited v. CG Power and Industrial Solutions Limited (Judgment dated 06.12.2021 in ARB. P. 361/2020)
The High Court of Delhi declined to refer the parties to arbitration after coming to the conclusion that subject matter of the dispute is outside the scope of arbitration agreement. The Court relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Vidya Drolia to hold that limited scope of examination of arbitration agreement at pre-arbitral stage also includes an ex-facie view on the arbitrability of dispute and the court can decline to refer the parties to arbitration if it finds that the dispute does not correlate to the arbitration agreement.
Whether a party invoking arbitration can bifurcate its claims, choosing to refer some claims at one stage and others at a later stage?
Airone Charters Pvt. Ltd v. JetSetGo Aviation Services Pvt. Ltd. (Judgment dated 12.10.2021 in ARB.P. 245/2020)
The High Court of Delhi held that a party invoking arbitration cannot bifurcate its claims, choosing to refer some claims at one stage and others at a later stage. A party must specify in the notice invoking arbitration all existing disputes. However, if the arbitration agreement does not mandate that all the claims are to be made in one go, then the parties are not barred from raising them in different proceedings.
Whether the Pre-Arbitral steps are mandatory in nature?
Sanjay Iron and Steel Limited v. Steel Authority of India (Judgment dated 01.10.2021 in ARB.P. 408/2021)
The High Court of Delhi held that if the arbitration agreement mandates pre-arbitral conciliation, then the parties cannot circumvent the conciliation process and directly approach the court for appointment of an arbitrator. The parties must first make efforts to amicably resolve dispute through conciliation, and only after the efforts fail and no scope for conciliation remains, the court can directly appoint an arbitrator.
Whether the entire agreement between the parties to refer the dispute to arbitration will be void or non-existent in case the appointment mechanism is considered to be void?
Jyoti Sarup Mittal v. Executive Engineer, South Delhi Municipal Corporation (Judgment dated 12.07.2021 in ARB.P. 275/2021)
The High Court of Delhi held that the arbitration agreement will not become void or non-est, merely because the process of appointment of arbitrator enshrined under the agreement has become invalid. The court held that such appointment procedure is only ancillary to the agreement and could be severed from the rest of the valid agreement, without affecting the rest of the agreement.
Whether the court can draw an interference against a party that chooses not to appear before the court in a Section 11 petition and appoint an arbitrator?
Swastik Pipe Ltd. v. Shri Ram Autotech Pvt. Ltd . (Judgment dated 05.07.2021 in ARB.P. 241/2021)
The High Court of Delhi held that when the notice invoking arbitration made a categorical assertion that the arbitration agreement is valid and when both the notice invoking arbitration and the notice of the petition were duly served on the other party and it still choose to not appear before the court, the court can draw an interference that the other party has accepted the validity of the arbitration agreement.
Whether a party can approach the tribunal under a Special Statute in relation to an issue that has already raised before the arbitrator appointed by the High Court?
M.P. Housing and Infrastructure Development Board v. K.P. Dwivedi (Judgment dated 03.12.2021 in Civil Appeal No. 6768/2021)
The Supreme Court held that a party who participated in the arbitral proceedings and voluntarily raised an issue before the arbitrator appointed by the High Court, cannot re-agitate the same before a tribunal constituted under a special statute. The arbitral proceedings before the arbitrator appointed by the Court would not be non-est, after the participation of the parties without any demur or objection, the doctrine of ‘Issue Estoppel’ would apply and the party would be precluded from raising the same issue again.
Whether the panel of Arbitrators maintained by the Respondent will be hit by Section12 of the Act?
BCC Developers & Promoters Ltd. v. DMRC (Judgment dated 28.10.2021 in ARB.P. 813/2021)
Relying on the judgment in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification , the High Court of Delhi held that merely because the arbitrators on the panel are the ex-employees of one of the parties, it would not make them ineligible to be appointed as arbitrators to decide on the dispute. When the parties agreed on a procedure to appoint the arbitrators, the appointment shall be made in accordance with the agreed procedure only.
Whether the mandate of an officer of the department who is appointed as an Arbitrator owing to his designation, shall come to an end on his retirement?
Laxmi Continetal Construction Company v. State of Uttar Pradesh (Judgment date 20.09.2021 in Civil Appeal No. 6797/2008)
The Supreme Court held that once a person with specific designation has been appointed as the arbitrator, he would not incur disqualification on the retirement of his service, unless the agreement provides otherwise or he incurs disqualification under the Act.
Whether the award passed by an Emergency Arbitrator is an award within the meaning of Section 17 of the Act?
Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Retail Limited (Judgment dated 06.08.2021 in Civil Appeal 4492-97 of 2021)
The Supreme Court reiterated that party autonomy is an inherent feature of the Arbitration Act. The parties are at liberty to choose Institutional Rules to get their dispute resolved which also includes the power of the Emergency Arbitrator to grant interim reliefs to the parties. An order passed by the Emergency Arbitrator would be an order within the meaning of Section 17(1), enforceable under Section 17(2). Further, it held that there lies no appeal under Section 37 against an order of enforcement under Section 17(2).
Whether the Arbitral Tribunal could conduct a comprehensive examination of the terms of the contract while adjudicating an application for interim measures under Section 17 of the Act?
L&T Finance Limited v. Dm South India Hospitality Private Limited (Judgment dated 08.11.2021 in ARB. A. (COMM.) 14/2020)
The High Court of Delhi held that an arbitral tribunal while adjudicating on a Section 17 application for interim measures is not supposed to conduct a detailed examination of the terms of the contract. Doing so would amount to pre-trial determination of the issues and would be detrimental to the concept of a dispassionate arbitral process. The tribunal acts on equity and is required to keep in mind a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, while deciding an application for interim measures. It further held that the appellate court is not required to reassess the evidence and, would not interfere with the discretion of the tribunal unless, the reasoning of the tribunal is ex-facie perverse or patently illegal.
Whether the court can entertain a Section 17 application prior to the filing of the Statement of Claim?
Sanjay Arora v. Rajan Chadha (Judgment dated 05.10.2021 in ARB. A. (COMM.) 15/2020)
The High Court of Delhi held the arbitral tribunal is empowered to deal with a Section 17 application even before a Statement of Claims is filed. The objective of interim measures is to protect the sanctity of the arbitral process and to preserve the subject matter of the dispute. Therefore, the arbitral tribunal is empowered to decide on a Section 17 application before the filing of the Statement of Claims when any possibility of frustration of arbitral process is found to exist.
Whether the Rules of Arbitral Institution would determine the ‘Seat’ of the arbitral proceeding?
S.P. Singla Constructions Private Limited v. Construction and Design Services, Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam (Judgment dated 23.09.2021 in ARB.P. 450/2021)
The High Court of Delhi held that the rules of arbitration would not determine the seat of the arbitration. The seat would still be decided in accordance with the agreement between the parties. It further held that rules are procedural in nature and come into play only after the commencement of arbitration.
Whether the arbitrator could pass an award without taking the evidence of one of the parties on record?
Narinder Singh v. Union of India (Judgment dated 11.18.2021 in Civil Appeal 6734/2021)
The Supreme Court held that unnecessary hurry and haste by the arbitrator which results in the deprivation of a party’s right to produce evidence and cross-examine the witness of the other party, would result in violation of the principles of natural justice and Section 18, 24 and 25 of the Arbitration Act. Such an award would be set aside under Section 34(2)(a)(iii).
Whether a prior agreement of the parties would limit the power of the court to award cost?
Union of India v. Om Vajrakaya Construction Company (Judgment dated 20.12.2021 in O.M.P. (COMM) 299/2021)
The High Court of Delhi held that unlike the power of the tribunal to award interest, there is no fetter on its power to award costs within the meaning of Section 31A and any agreement of the parties prohibiting the awarding of cost would be inconsequential, unless the parties enter into an agreement after the disputes have arisen.
Whether the arbitrator could award interest, regardless of an agreement of the parties to contrary?
Union of India v. Manraj Enterprises (Judgment dated 18.11.2021 in CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6592 OF 2021)
The Supreme Court held that the Arbitral Tribunal cannot award interest if the parties have expressly prohibited the grant of any such interest. The arbitrator is a creature of the contract therefore, cannot act contrary to the terms of the contract in terms of Section 28 and 31(7) of the Act.
Whether the arbitrator is entitled to charge separate fees on the counter-claims?
NTPC Limited v. Afcons R.N. Shetty and Co.Pvt. Ltd Jv (Judgment dated 06.08.2021 in O.M.P. (T) (COMM.) 37/2021)
The High Court of Delhi held that the arbitrator is entitled to charge fees separately for claims and counter-claims. There is no requirement under the law to consolidate both the amounts in determining the ceiling price. On a conjoint reading of Section 31(8), 31A and 38(1) of the Act, it is amply clear that a separate fee is to be paid for claim and counter-claims.
Whether the Court can modify an award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act?
National Highway Authority of India v. M.Hakeem (Judgment dated 20.07.2021 in SLP (CIVIL) NO.13020 OF 2020)
The Supreme Court held that the court under Section 34 could only affirm or set aside the arbitral award, there is no power vested in the court to modify an award while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34. The court relied on the judgment in McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd, to observe that power under Section 34 does not extend to modifying Arbitral errors. The legislative intent of minimal interference is clear in terms of Section 34(4) which permits the court to adjourn the proceedings and give the arbitral tribunal a chance to eliminate the grounds for setting aside the award. Further, it held that modifying an award under Section 34 would amount to crossing the ‘ Lakshman Rekha’ .
Whether a Court under Section 34 application substitute its view with that of the arbitrator when both views are possible?
Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (Judgment dated 09.09.2021 in Civil Appeal No. 5628 of 2021)
The Supreme Court held that construction of the contract is within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal only, the court cannot substitute its view with that of the tribunal. Further it held that mere erroneous application of the law or contravention of substantive law by the tribunal would not fall within the rubric ‘Patent Illegality’ if the same does not go to the root of the matter. It is only when the view taken by the Tribunal is not even a possible view or the Tribunal goes beyond the terms of reference or delivers an award on an issue not submitted to it or ignores vital evidence or when the award is based on no evidence at all, the court would set aside the award under Section 34(2A). It further held that contravention of a statute not linked to the public policy or public interest, would not be a ground for setting aside an award under the head of ‘Public Policy’.
Whether the arbitrator could be made a party in a Section 34 application?
Kothari Industrial Corporation Ltd. v. M/S Southern Petrochemicals Industries (Judgment dated 29.09.2021 in OSA (CAD) No.83 of 2021)
The High Court of Madras imposed a cost of Rs. 1 Lakh on the appellants for unnecessarily impleading the arbitrator as a party under Section 34 petition. The court observed that it is absolutely pointless to make the arbitrator a party to a challenge petition, unless specific personal allegations are made which would merit an answer from the arbitrator.
Whether an agreement between the parties can make the 2015 Amendment to the Arbitration Act, 1996 apply retrospectively?
Ratnam Sudesh Iyer v. Jackie Kakubhai Shroff (Judgment dated 10.11.2021 in CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6112 OF 2021)
The Supreme Court held that a general phrase in a contract cannot override the legislative intent of an amendment to apply it prospectively. The court relied on the Judgment of the apex court in BCCI v. Kochi Cricket, Ssangyong v. NHAI and HCC v. UOI to reiterate that the 2015 Amendment Act would only apply to proceedings commenced after 23.10.2015. The mere inclusion of the words ‘or any amendment thereto’ in the agreement would not make the amendment to Section 34 of the Act apply to arbitral proceedings commenced before the amendment.
Whether the requirement to deposit 75% of the awarded amount as a pre-deposit is mandatory in terms of Section 19 of the MSMED Act?
Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority v. M/s Aska Equipments Ltd. (Judgment dated 08.10.2021 in CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6252/2021)
The Supreme Court reiterated that the deposit of 75% awarded amount is sine qua non for filing a Section 34 application. However, the appellate court if satisfied that such a deposit would cause undue hardship to the appellant, can allow the deposit to be made in instalments.
Whether the arbitrator can exercise its power ex debito justitiae to substitute the terms of the contract?
PSA Sical Terminals Pvt. Ltd v. The Board of Trustees of V.O. Chidambranar Port Trust Tuticorin (Judgment dated 28.07.2021 in CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3699-3700 OF 2018)
The Supreme Court held that the arbitral tribunal being a creature of the terms of reference, cannot exercise its powers ex debito justitiae. The tribunal cannot unilaterally modify the terms of the agreement and foist it on an unwilling party, a party cannot be made to perform something for which it never entered into a contract, doing so would amount to re-writing of the contract. The same would amount to breach of fundamental principles of justice and would shock the conscience of the court.
Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Deccan Chronicle Holdings Ltd. (Judgment dated 16.06.2021 in COMM ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO. 4466 OF 2020)
The High Court of Bombay held that the arbitrator has to decide the dispute in terms of the contract agreed between the parties, it cannot transgress the four corners of the contract and decide a dispute contrary to the terms agreed to between the parties.
When will the time be the essence of the contract?
Welspun Specialty Solutions Ltd. v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (Judgment dated 13.11.2021 in CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6834 OF 2021)
The Supreme Court held that merely having an explicit clause would not make the time as the essence of the contract. The same is to be determined from the reading of the complete contract as well as the immediate circumstances. An Extension of Time clause, dilutes the clause making time the essence of the contract. Moreover, granting numerous extensions without imposition of any damages would render such a clause entirely ineffective.
Whether the unilateral appointment of the arbitrator can be challenged for the first time in a Section 34 petition?
Kanodia Infratech Limited v. Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Limited (Judgment dated 08.11.2021 in O.M.P. (COMM) 297/2021)
The High Court of Delhi held that a party who has actively participated in the arbitral proceedings, cannot challenge the unilateral appointment of the arbitrator, for the first time under Section 34 petition. Failure of the party to raise the objection at the earliest possible opportunity under Section 11, 12(5), 14, 15 and 16 of the Act, would deprive him to challenge the appointment under Section 34 application.
Whether the Facilitation Council could pass an award without conducting the arbitral proceedings?
Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. The State of Rajasthan (Judgment dated 15.12.2021 in CIVIL APPEAL NO.2899 OF 2021)
The Supreme Court held that as per the provisions of the MSMED Act read with the Arbitration Act, the Facilitation Council, on the failure of the conciliation proceedings can only refer the parties to arbitration and not pass an award. The arbitration and facilitation cannot be clubbed together to pass an award. Such an order would be patently illegal and would not constitute an award within the meaning of the Arbitration Act.
Whether the Court would be bound by the principles of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while deciding an enforcement petition under Section 36 of the Arbitration Act, 1996?
Toyo Engineering Corporation v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited (Judgment dated 02.08.2021 in SLP (C) No. 11766-11767/2020)
The Supreme Court reiterated that while staying the enforcement of an award under Section 36(3), the court should only be considering the principles laid down under O. 41 R. 5 of the CPC and not swayed by the fact that large amount is to be paid by the government corporations.
Whether the Court could decree a claim in an appeal against an order under Section 34 of the Act?
Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. v. Ramesh Kumar and Co. (Judgment dated 13.11.2021 in Civil Appeal No 6832/2021 )
The Supreme Court held that the power of the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 37 against an order under Section 34 is different from that of the First Appellate Court in a Civil Suit. The court clarified that in arbitration appeal, the court is only required to determine the validity of the order under Section 34, it cannot go to the extent of decreeing a claim.
Whether the appellate court could re-assess the evidence in an appeal against an order under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1996?
Augmont Gold Pvt. Ltd. v. One97 Communication Limited (Judgment dated 27.09.2021 in ARB. A. (COMM) 30/2021)
The High Court of Delhi held that an order passed under Section 17 is discretionary in nature and subject to the final award, therefore, the court of appeal would not reassess the evidence to substitute its view with that of the tribunal. The court would not interfere with the order even if it finds that it had taken a different view, if it had considered the matter at the trial stage. The court would be justified only if the view taken by the tribunal is not even a possible view.
Whether a Foreign State can claim ‘Sovereign Immunity’ against the enforcement of an arbitral award?
KLA Const. Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. The Embassy of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Judgment dated 18.06.2021 in OMP (ENF) (COMM) 82/2019)
The High Court of Delhi held that a Foreign State cannot claim Sovereign immunity while dealing in commercial transactions as the State is not acting in the Sovereign capacity but as a ‘Commercial Entity’. Moreover, by having given consent to enter into a commercial transaction containing an arbitration agreement, the State has waived off its right to claim sovereign immunity against the enforcement of arbitral award.
Whether a party could raise a new ground of challenge in appeal under Section 37?
S tate Of Chhattisgarh v. M/s Sal Udyog Private Limited (Judgment dated 08.11.2021 in CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4353 OF 2010)
The Supreme Court held that a party is not barred from raising a new ground of challenge in appeal. The Court held that ground of ‘patent illegality’ is equally available under Section 37 of the Act and the same ground can be raised for the first time in appeal as well. There is nothing in the act which restrict the application of Section 34(2A) application to Section 34 petition only.
Whether the Arbitral Award would be binding on the non-signatory to the arbitration agreement?
Gemini Bay Transcription Pvt. Ltd. v. Integrated Sales Service Ltd. (Judgment dated 10.08.2021 in CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8343-8344 OF 2018)
Supreme Court held that a non-signatory who is acting as an alter-ego to the party signatory to the arbitration agreement, would be bound by the arbitral award. The court observed that the word ‘persons’ has been used under Section 46 rather than ‘parties. The objection as to award being not binding does not fit into the grounds enumerated under Section 48 of the act, which are to be interpreted narrowly for the reason that part II of the act has a pro-enforcement bias. The party enforcing the award is not bound to adduce evidence to prove that the non-signatory is a person who is claiming under a party or affected by alter ego doctrine, for the reason that requirement of Section 47 is only procedural in nature. Further, it held that ground of ‘patent illegality’ is not available to awards falling under part-II of the Act.
Here is the piece on 25 important judgments on Arbitration from January to May 2021.
The author is an Advocate and Registrar at the International Arbitration and Mediation Centre. He can be reached at [email protected] . The author would like to thank Ausaf Ayyub, a third-year law student at Faculty of Law, Jamia Millia Islamia for his assistance.
40 important Judgments on Arbitration from June to December 2021 Read article: https://t.co/vi1ov9Eje1 pic.twitter.com/IgNrJPoyWM — Bar & Bench (@barandbench) December 30, 2021
Bringing you the Best Analytical Legal News
by Vasanth Rajasekaran* and Harshvardhan Korada** Cite as: 2023 SCC OnLine Blog Exp 89
O ver recent years, the Indian courts have rendered various decisions aimed at reducing judicial intervention in the arbitral process and cultivating an arbitration-friendly atmosphere within India. The year 2023 was no exception, as it was marked by decisions that strengthened the arbitration jurisprudence in India. This article presents a concise overview of ten of the most noteworthy arbitration judgments delivered in the year 2023.
1. TATA Sons (P) Ltd. v. Siva Industries and Holdings Ltd. 1
Under the amended provisions of Section 29-A, Arbitral Tribunals in international commercial arbitrations are merely encouraged to complete the proceedings within twelve months after the conclusion of pleadings. Unlike domestic arbitrations, they are not obligated to adhere strictly to the specified time-limit.
The elimination of the mandatory time-frame for delivering an arbitral award in international commercial arbitrations does not bestow rights or obligations upon any party. As the amended provisions of Section 29-A are remedial in nature, they would be applicable to all ongoing/pending arbitral proceedings as of its effective date i.e. 30-8-2019.
Brief facts
In 2006, Tata Sons Private Limited (Tata Sons), along with Siva Industries and Holdings Limited (Siva Industries) and Tata Tele Services Limited (TTSL), entered into a share subscription agreement for the issuance/allotment of TTSL’s shares to Siva Industries.
Subsequently, in November 2008, Tata Sons, TTSL, and NTT Docomo Inc (Docomo) entered into another share subscription agreement, wherein Docomo sought to acquire a 26% shareholding in TTSL, comprising both fresh and secondary shares. Siva Industries was invited to participate in the sale of secondary shares to Docomo. Accordingly, on 3-3-2009, Docomo and Siva Industries executed a share purchase agreement, resulting in Docomo acquiring 20.740 million equity shares of TTSL from Siva Industries. The mutual understanding among Tata Sons, TTSL, and Docomo in relation to Docomo’s ownership of shares was documented in a shareholders agreement (SHA) dated 25-3-2009.
Following this, Tata Sons, TTSL, Siva Industries, and Mr C Sivasankaran, the promoter of Siva Industries (a resident of Seychelles), entered into an inter se agreement (inter se agreement). This agreement mandated Siva Industries and its promoter to purchase shares on a pro rata basis in the event Docomo exercised its sale option under the SHA.
Docomo initiated arbitration proceedings under the rules of the London Court for International Arbitration (LCIA) due to disputes with Tata Sons. The Arbitral Tribunal issued its award on 22-6-2016, directing Tata Sons to make payments to Docomo and acquire the shares of TTSL as per Docomo’s request.
Consequently, Tata Sons called upon Siva Industries and its promoter to make proportionate payments per the inter se agreement. Disputes arose between Tata Sons and Siva Industries, leading Tata Sons to invoke arbitration. The arbitrator, appointed by the Supreme Court, entered the reference on 14-2-2018. It was agreed that the mandate to render an award would run until 14-8-2019. In the interim, insolvency proceedings were initiated against Siva Industries, and a moratorium was imposed on 5-7-2019.
On 14-12-2019, Tata Sons filed a miscellaneous application before the Supreme Court, seeking an extension of the Arbitral Tribunal’s mandate once the moratorium on Siva Industries was lifted. Meanwhile, Section 29-A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) was amended, effective from 30-8-2019. Subsequently, on 3-6-2022, Siva Industries was released from the rigours of the corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP).
In light of these developments, Tata Sons filed an interlocutory application, contending that due to the amendments to Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act and the release of Siva Industries from the CIRP, the arbitral proceedings should be allowed to continue automatically.
The Supreme Court examined Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act as it stood pre and post-2019 Amendment. Following the 2019 Amendment, the Supreme Court observed that the addition of the phrase “in matters other than international commercial arbitration” in Section 29-A(1) was aimed at exempting international commercial arbitrations from the strict timeline outlined in Section 29-A for delivering arbitral awards.
Interpreting both the pre and post-2019 Amendment versions of Section 29-A, the Supreme Court concluded that after the amendment, in international commercial arbitrations, the arbitral tribunal is, at most, obligated to make an effort to issue the arbitral award within 12 months. Consequently, the 12-month time-frame is specifically applicable to domestic arbitrations and serves as a non-binding guideline for international commercial arbitrations.
Regarding the prospective or retrospective application of the Section 29-A Amendment, the Supreme Court stated that the removal of a mandatory time-limit for international commercial arbitration does not establish new rights or liabilities. Therefore, Section 29-A(1) should be applicable to all ongoing arbitral proceedings as of the effective date i.e. 30-8-2019.
In light of these considerations, the Supreme Court directed the sole arbitrator to provide suitable procedural directions for time extension while simultaneously ensuring a prompt conclusion of the arbitration process.
2. Alpine Housing Development Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Ashok S. Dhariwal 2
The pre-2019 amendment version of Section 34(2)( a ) is applicable to arbitration proceedings initiated and completed prior to the 2019 Amendment.
In extraordinary circumstances, if it is brought to the Court’s attention that issues crucial to the resolution of matters under Section 34(2)( a ) are not documented in the arbitral record, the party challenging the award based on the grounds specified in Section 34(2)( a ) may be granted permission to submit an affidavit as evidence. However, such permission will only be granted when absolutely essential.
The respondent had filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, contesting an ex parte arbitral award issued against him before the Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge in Bengaluru (Section 34 Court). In the course of the proceedings, the respondent sought approval from the Section 34 Court to present additional evidence but was denied this permission. Subsequently, the respondent filed a writ petition with the Karnataka High Court, seeking liberty to introduce additional evidence in the Section 34 court proceedings. On 1-9-2021, the Karnataka High Court granted permission to the respondent to submit additional documents.
Aggrieved with the decision of the Karnataka High Court, the appellant filed an appeal before the Supreme Court of India, contesting the order that permitted the respondent to submit additional documents as evidence in the Section 34 Court. The moot question before the Supreme Court revolved around whether a party could introduce supplementary documents as evidence during the Section 34 proceedings under the Arbitration Act.
The appellant asserted that the Karnataka High Court’s ruling ran against the fundamental objective of amending Section 34(2)( a ) of the Arbitration Act in 2019. Before the 2019 Amendment, Section 34(2) stipulated that “an arbitral award could be set aside by the court only if the ??( a ) the party making the application furnishes proof …”. The 2019 Amendment replaced the phrase “the party making the application furnishes proof” in Section 34(2)( a ) with “establishes on the basis of the record of the Arbitral Tribunal”.
According to the appellant, the primary intent of the 2019 Amendment was to expedite the resolution of arbitration proceedings and prevent unnecessary delays. The appellant argued that even when considering Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before the amendment, the respondent had challenged the arbitral award based on grounds specified in Section 34(2)( b ) of the Arbitration Act. Consequently, Section 34(2)( a ) of the Arbitration Act should not be applicable in this case. The appellant further contended that Parliament possesses the authority to establish distinct procedures for obtaining the same remedy.
The appellant stressed on the fact that the respondent deliberately refrained from participating in the arbitral proceedings, and therefore, he should not be allowed to gain an advantage from his own actions by introducing new evidence.
In contrast, the respondent argued that he had contested the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal, resulting in their non-participation and the subsequent issuance of an ex parte award. Additionally, the respondent withdrew from the proceedings and had also filed another application before the Arbitral Tribunal, alleging bias and excessive fees.
In the present case, the Supreme Court recognised that the arbitration proceedings were initiated, and the award was issued by the Arbitral Tribunal in 1998, predating the amendment of Section 34(2)( a ) by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019 . The Supreme Court held that, in this scenario, the pre-amendment version of Section 34(2)( a ) would be applicable because the 2019 Amendment brought about significant changes to the language of Section 34(2)( a ). Before the amendment, an arbitral award could be set aside if the party making the application “furnished proof” and the conditions outlined in both Sections 34(2)( a ) and ( b ) were satisfied. However, following the amendment, the phrase “furnishes proof” was replaced with “establishes on the basis of the record of the Arbitral Tribunal”.
Hence, the Supreme Court concluded that, for arbitration proceedings initiated and completed before the 2019 Amendment, the version of Section 34(2)( a ) in existence before the amendment to the Arbitration Act would be applicable. In arriving at this decision, the Supreme Court cited various cases, including Fiza Developers and Inter-Trade (P) Ltd. v. AMCI (India) (P) Ltd. 3 , Canara Nidhi Ltd. v. M. Shashikala 4 , and Emkay Global Financial Services Ltd. v. Girdhar Sondhi 5 .
The Supreme Court underscored that its previous rulings established the summary nature of applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, whereby an arbitral award could only be annulled based on the grounds specified in Sections 34(2)( a ) and ( b ). The Supreme Court noted that the overarching aim of the Arbitration Act and subsequent amendments has been to expedite the resolution of arbitral disputes. Typically, a request to set aside an arbitral award would not require anything beyond the materials presented to the arbitrator. However, if there are matters not covered in such records but are pertinent to the issues outlined in Section 34(2)( a ), these matters may be brought to the Court’s attention through affidavits filed by both parties. Cross-examination of individuals providing these affidavits should only be permitted when absolutely essential, as the truth can often be discerned by simply reading the affidavits of both parties.
In summary, the Supreme Court held that the High Court had not made an error in allowing the respondents to submit affidavits and additional evidence in the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
3. NTPC Ltd. v. SPML Infra Ltd. 6
The jurisdiction of the referral courts under Section 11(6) of the Act is highly restricted and encompasses two specific inquiries. The primary investigation involves determining the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement, including an examination of the parties involved and the applicant’s connection to the said agreement. The secondary investigation that may arise during the referral stage pertains to the non-arbitrability of the dispute.
NTPC Ltd. (NTPC) and SPML Infra Ltd. (SPML) entered into an agreement (agreement) for specific project works, wherein SPML provided performance and advanced bank guarantees totalling to INR 14,96,89,136 to secure NTPC. Upon project completion, NTPC issued a completion certificate, and in April 2019, communicated that the final payment would be released upon SPML’s issuance of a no‑demand certificate.
Upon SPML’s issuance of the no-demand certificate on 12-4-2019, NTPC released the final payment of INR 1,40,00,000. However, the bank guarantees were withheld due to ongoing disputes and liabilities concerning other projects in Bongaigaon, Barh, and Korba. NTPC officially notified SPML of this decision on 14-5-2019, leading SPML to object and claim INR 72,01,53,899 as recoverable liabilities from NTPC.
In an attempt to address disputes, on 12-6-2019, SPML requested the appointment of an adjudicator per the agreement’s dispute resolution mechanism. NTPC took no action, prompting SPML to file a writ petition in the Delhi High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Delhi High Court, in an interim order on 8-7-2019, directed NTPC not to invoke the bank guarantees and instructed SPML to maintain them.
While the writ petition was pending, the parties settled their disputes through a settlement agreement (settlement agreement). As per the settlement agreement, NTPC released the bank guarantees on 30-6-2020, and SPML withdrew the writ petition.
However, three weeks after the release of the bank guarantee and two months after the settlement agreement’s execution, SPML issued a letter of repudiation, alleging coercion and economic duress during the execution of the settlement agreement. Subsequently, SPML repudiated the settlement agreement and, on 10-10-2000, filed an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act with the Delhi High Court. In this application, SPML also asserted that NTPC had not appointed an arbitrator despite multiple requests, compelling SPML’s approach to the High Court.
The Supreme Court, in its judgment, thoroughly examined the pre and post-2015 Amendment legal framework that governs pre-referral jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court categorised cases at the pre-referral stage into three distinct groups:
( a ) cases necessitating the court’s direct determination on aspects such as evaluating the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement;
( b ) cases falling exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal;
( c ) cases where the court may opt to decide, especially those involving the determination of whether the parties had finalised the contract or transaction by mutually satisfying their rights and obligations or by making the final payment. This approach is commonly known as the “accord and satisfaction approach”.
2015 Amendment of the Arbitration Act
In response to the recommendations put forth in the 256th Law Commission Report, the 2015 Amendment introduced Section 11(6-A) with the specific goal of confining the courts’ role at the pre-referral stage to the determination of the existence of the arbitration agreement, “nothing more, nothing less”. However, in specific instances, some courts continued to apply the pre-2015 amendment “accord and satisfaction” approach. 7 Notably, in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn. 8 , the Supreme Court limited the scope of pre-referral jurisdiction under Section 11(6-A) to include a prima facie examination of ( i ) the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement; and ( ii ) the arbitrability of the dispute’s subject matter.
From this exploration of jurisprudence, the Supreme Court derived an “eye of the needle” approach, entailing a dual inquiry at the reference stage:
( a ) The primary inquiry is about the existence and the validity of an arbitration agreement, which also includes an inquiry as to the parties to the agreement and the applicant’s privity to the said agreement. These are matters which require a thorough examination by the referral court.
( b ) The secondary inquiry that may arise at the reference stage itself is with respect to the non-arbitrability of the dispute.
Upon the prima facie review of the facts, the Supreme Court deemed SPML’s claims to be an “afterthought”, and the allegations of economic duress and coercion were found to lack genuineness. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the application, characterising SPML’s claims and allegations as “patently frivolous and untenable” and “obviously devoid of merit and made in bad faith”.
In delivering this judgment, the Supreme Court underscored that supervisory courts should not act mechanically but instead have a “duty” to ensure that parties are not compelled to arbitrate disputes that are “demonstrably non-arbitrable”. Neglecting this duty would undermine the effectiveness of the arbitration process.
4. Interplay between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 , In re (N.N. Global III) 9
An unstamped or insufficiently stamped arbitration agreement is enforceable for the purpose of reference to arbitration.
In N.N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd . v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. ( N.N. Global I) 10 , a 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of the validity of an arbitration agreement within an unstamped or insufficiently stamped contract. In addressing this issue, the Supreme Court heavily relied on the principle of severability or separability, asserting that an arbitration agreement is considered a distinct and independent agreement, separate from the underlying contract. Consequently, when parties enter into a contract with an arbitration clause, they are essentially entering into two separate agreements: ( i ) the main contract defining the rights and obligations arising from the transaction; and ( ii ) the arbitration agreement establishing the commitment to resolve disputes through arbitration. Moreover, the Supreme Court invoked the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz, as outlined in Section 16(1) of the Arbitration Act. This doctrine affirms that the Arbitral Tribunal alone has the authority to decide on its jurisdiction, including objections related to the existence, validity, and scope of the arbitration agreement.
The Supreme Court, in N.N. Global I 11 , referred to the ruling in SBP & Co . v. Patel Engg. Ltd. 12 , pointing out that it was based on the pre-amendment version of Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. Following the introduction of sub-section (6-A) in Section 11, the referring Court only needed to examine the existence of the arbitration agreement, as clarified in Duro Felguera SA v. Gangavaram Port Ltd. 13 and Mayavati Trading (P) Ltd. v. Pradyuat Deb Burman 14 .
While delivering the judgment in N.N. Global I 15 , the Supreme Court differentiated its stance from SMS Tea Estates (P) Ltd. v. Chandmari Tea Co. (P) Ltd. 16 and Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. v. Coastal Marine Constructions and Engg. Ltd. 17 , affirming that the lack of stamp duty payment on the main contract would not invalidate the arbitration agreement. However, it expressed reservations about certain findings in Vidya Drolia 18 which aligned with the conclusion of Garware Wall Ropes 19 . Consequently, the matter was referred to a 5-Judge Bench for authoritative resolution.
In the subsequent case, N.N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. ( N.N. Global II) 20 , a 5-Judge Bench, through a majority decision, disagreed with the findings in N.N. Global I 21 regarding SMS Tea Estates 22 , contending that the argument suggesting non-stamping or inadequate stamping of the main contract would not invalidate the arbitration agreement lacked merit. The majority opinion in N.N. Global II 23 asserted that the arbitration agreement, as an independent and separate instrument, would still be subject to stamp duty, contradicting the foundational premise laid in N.N. Global I 24 .
Following the decisions in N.N. Global I 25 and N.N. Global II 26 , a 7-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India was called upon in N.N. Global III 27 to resolve the matter and the pressing issues that arose in the context of three statutes i.e. the Arbitration Act, the Stamp Act, 1899 (Stamp Act), and the Contract Act, 1872 (Contract Act).
In N.N. Global III 28 , the Supreme Court thoroughly examined various facets of arbitration law jurisprudence that were relevant for the determination of the issue at hand. These observations can be summarised as below:
( i ) Inadmissibility versus voidness: The admissibility of a document is a distinct and separate element as compared to its legality or enforceability under law. The void status of an agreement does not necessarily impact its admissibility, and conversely, a valid agreement may still be inadmissible as evidence. The voidness of an agreement pertains to its enforceability, whereas inadmissibility focuses on whether a court can consider or depend on the agreement as a piece of evidence during legal proceedings.
( ii ) Intent and purpose of the Stamp Act: The Stamp Act aims to generate revenue for the State and is not intended to arm litigants with the weapon of technicality to be used against opponents.
( iii ) Intent and purpose of the arbitration under the Arbitration Act: Arbitration is designed to achieve a prompt, efficient, and conclusive resolution of disputes arising between parties concerning their substantive obligations. 29 The modern needs of commerce and business efficiency have led to a shift where the authority of national courts is subordinated to the intentions of the parties and the competence of the Arbitral Tribunal. 30 Central to the jurisprudence of Indian arbitration law is the principle of arbitral autonomy. This principle empowers parties to an arbitration agreement to exercise their contractual freedom, conferring upon the Arbitral Tribunal the authority to adjudicate disputes that may emerge between them.
( iv ) Section 5 of the Arbitration Act: The primary objective of the Arbitration Act is to minimise the supervisory role of courts in the arbitration process. Section 5 of the Arbitration Act commences with the phrase “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force”. This broad language signifies the legislative intent to curtail judicial intervention during arbitration. 31 In the specific context of Section 5 of the Arbitration Act, it mandates that the provisions outlined in Part I of the Arbitration Act should be fully effective and operational, regardless of any other existing laws. The incorporation of non obstante clauses by the legislature serves to eliminate obstacles that might hinder the operation of the legislation. 32
( v ) Arbitration Act is a self-contained code : The Arbitration Act serves as a comprehensive and self-contained legal framework, encompassing various aspects such as the appointment of arbitrators, initiation of arbitration proceedings, issuance of awards including their execution, and the resolution of challenges to arbitral awards. 33 In instances where a self-contained code outlines a procedural method, the implication is that the application of a general legal procedure is implicitly excluded.
( vi ) Separability of the arbitration agreement: The principle of separability recognises the distinct nature of the arbitration agreement, ensuring its persistence even if the underlying contract is terminated, repudiated, or frustrated. This upholds the genuine intentions of the parties and maintains the integrity of arbitral proceedings, reinforcing the sanctity of the arbitration process.
( vii ) Doctrine of competence-competence : This doctrine implies that courts should abstain from considering challenges to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction until arbitrators have had the opportunity to address them. Section 16 of the Arbitration Act empowers the Arbitral Tribunal to determine issues pertaining to its jurisdiction while excluding courts from intervening during arbitral proceedings.
( viii ) Sections 8 and 11 of the Arbitration Act: The 2015 Amendment of the Arbitration Act establishes different criteria for judicial review under these sections. Section 8 focuses on the prima facie existence of a valid arbitration agreement, while Section 11 is limited to examining the mere existence of such an agreement. In Section 11(6-A) of the Arbitration Act, the phrase “examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement” is employed. The use of the term “examination” suggests that the legislature intends for the referral court to scrutinise or assess the interactions between the parties to determine the existence of an arbitration agreement. Importantly, the term “examination” does not imply a cumbersome or disputed inquiry.
( ix ) Arbitration Act’s silence on stamp duty: Although Parliament was aware of the provisions of the Stamp Act while enacting the Arbitration Act, the latter does not mandate stamping as a prerequisite for a valid arbitration agreement. Section 11(6-A) directs the Court to examine only the existence of the arbitration agreement, differing from Section 33(2) of the Stamp Act, which also mandates the examination of appropriate stamping.
Based on the above, the Supreme Court in N.N. Global III 34 held as below:
( i ) Agreements lacking proper stamping or with inadequate stamping are deemed inadmissible in evidence as per Section 35 of the Stamp Act. However, such agreements are not automatically void, void ab initio, or unenforceable.
( ii ) Non-stamping or insufficient stamping is a rectifiable/curable flaw.
( iii ) Challenges related to stamping do not fall within the purview of determinations under Section 8 or Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. The referral court should only assess the prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement.
( iv ) Objections regarding the stamping of the agreement fall under the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal.
( v ) The rulings in N.N. Global II 35 and in SMS Tea Estates 36 are overturned. To that extent, the content in paras 22 and 29 of Garware Wall Ropes 37 are also overruled.
5. Larsen Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Co. v. Union of India 38
A court acting under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is not empowered to modify an arbitral award and can only set aside the same in part or in whole.
Interest, once granted by the Arbitral Tribunal in an arbitral award, cannot be modified by a court acting under Section 34 or Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.
A dispute arose between the appellant and the respondent based on a contract related to certain works awarded in a tender. On 22-4-1997, the respondent initiated arbitration proceedings to address the disputes. The arbitral award, issued on 21-1-1999, mandated the respondent to pay 18% interest during the dispute’s pendency, along with future compound interest on specific claims. Aggrieved with the award, the respondent challenged it under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before the District Court (Section 34 Court). However, the Section 34 Court rejected the challenge, citing its inability to act as an appellate authority over the award.
In 2003, the respondent appealed the Section 34 Court’s decision. The Allahabad High Court (High Court) partially upheld the appeal, disagreeing with certain aspects of the arbitral award. It asserted that the INR 3 lakhs compensation for the non-issuance of tender documents and subsequent business disruption should not have been granted. Additionally, the High Court contended that the case was not governed by the Arbitration Act, 1940, and thus, the 18% interest rate was inapplicable. Regarding pendente lite interest, the High Court concluded that a mere prohibition on interest under the contract did not preclude pendente lite interest. Consequently, the High Court reduced the interest rate from 18% to 9% per annum, emphasising a lack of any basis for interfering with the arbitral award.
Aggrieved with the High Court’s decision, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of India. The moot question was whether the High Court erred in modifying the arbitral award, specifically in reducing the interest rate from 18% compound to 9% simple interest per annum.
The Supreme Court scrutinised Section 31(7)( b ) of the Arbitration Act, amended with effect from 23-10-2015. While citing a similar case in Shahi & Associates v. State of U.P. 39 , the Supreme Court observed that since the arbitration commenced in 1997, and the Arbitration Act took effect on 22-8-1996, the Arbitration Act was applicable to the present matter. In the pre-2015 Amendment provisions of Section 31(7), the statutory threshold for interest was set at 18% per annum in cases where the arbitral award did not specify a rate. The Supreme Court underscored that the High Court could not have intervened in the arbitrator’s determination of this interest rate, contrasting it with the previous regime where courts had the powers and authority to modify awards.
Citing various cases 40 to delineate the restricted scope of interference in arbitration awards the Supreme Court opined that this limited jurisdiction permitted interference solely on the grounds of patent illegality. The Supreme Court stressed that as long as an arbitrator reasonably interpreted a contract term, the arbitral award remained immune to being set aside.
In summary, the Supreme Court decided to overturn the contested judgment to the extent of the modified interest rate, reinstating the interest at 18% per annum as awarded by the arbitrator on 21-1-1999. Additionally, the Supreme Court directed the respondent to settle the outstanding dues within eight weeks.
6. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India 41
A dissenting/minority opinion rendered in an arbitral proceeding cannot be treated to be the award if the majority decision is set aside.
Disputes arose between the appellant contractor and the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) regarding a contract for construction works related to the Allahabad bypass project. The appellant contended that the measurement method involved assessing the entire cross-section of the embankment and calculating its volume using the average end area method. Conversely, the supervising engineer employed a different approach, dividing the cross-section into soil and pond ash areas to determine the embankment’s quantity. The appellant argued that this interpretation contradicted the technical specification clause in the contract, a stance opposed by NHAI. The dispute was submitted to arbitration.
Three technical experts served as arbitrators and issued a unanimous award on most issues, with a dissenting opinion on a few matters. The appellant raised objections against the unanimous and majority decisions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Initially, a Single Judge ruled that the Tribunal’s majority view on measurement aspects was reasonable and acceptable, warranting no interference. However, the Division Bench overturned this opinion, asserting that the majority view and award were based on an implausible interpretation of the contract.
Aggrieved with the Division Bench’s decision, the appellant sought recourse in the Supreme Court of India.
The Supreme Court emphasised that the arbitrators, who were technical experts, had a profound comprehension of the intricacies within the contract and possessed practical experience as engineers overseeing similar contracts. Consequently, the Supreme Court raised doubts about the necessity of a court’s intervention under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act when the prevailing consensus among these experts leaned strongly towards a unified measurement approach.
To support this understanding, the Supreme Court referred to the decision in Voestalpine Schienen GmbH v. DMRC Ltd. 42 , which underscored the significance of having expert individuals serve as arbitrators, particularly when addressing technical disputes within their specific expertise. The Supreme Court highlighted that Judges typically employ a corrective lens in their decision-making process, influenced by their training, predispositions, and background. However, when exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, this corrective lens was unavailable. Consequently, the Supreme Court suggested that courts should refrain from utilising primary contract interpretation as a means to facilitate a form of review explicitly prohibited by Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
The Supreme Court unequivocally asserted that the Division Bench’s exercise of appellate review, resulting in the reversal of the majority view of the Arbitral Tribunal was impermissible. This prohibition stemmed from the fact that the majority view of the arbitrators seemed reasonable, and the Supreme Court identified no compelling rationale to conclude otherwise. Additionally, the Supreme Court restated the well-established legal principle that awards incorporating reasoned interpretations of contractual terms should not be interfered with casually.
Moreover, the Supreme Court examined the significance of dissenting opinions in arbitration proceedings, particularly those involving multi-member tribunals. The Supreme Court supported the approach taken in Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Navigant Technologies (P) Ltd. 43 and referred to Russel on Arbitration while clarifying that a dissenting opinion is not inherently an award but can be admissible as evidence, particularly in procedural matters during challenges. Additionally, the Supreme Court cited Gary B. Born’s insights on international commercial arbitration, highlighting that a dissenting opinion is a crucial element of the process, enabling parties to present their case and comprehend the Tribunal’s decision.
The Supreme Court specified that a dissenting opinion cannot attain the status of an award if the majority award is set aside. Instead, it may provide valuable insights into procedural issues, which become crucial in contested hearings. Transforming a dissenting opinion into the Tribunal’s findings or treating it as an award in such cases was deemed inappropriate and improper. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and overturned the challenged judgment, upholding and reinstating the arbitral award that was the subject of the challenge.
7. Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India (P) Ltd. (Cox and Kings II) 44
In an application in Cox and Kings Ltd . v. SAP India (P) Ltd . ( Cox and Kings I) 45 under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) seeking the reference of disputes to arbitration, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India sought to examine the validity of the group of companies doctrine in the Indian context on the ground that it is premised more on economic efficiency rather than law. The Bench of three Judges doubted the correctness of the doctrine’s application in Indian courts.
The then Chief Justice of India N.V. Ramana criticised the approach taken by another three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Chloro Controls India (P) Ltd . v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc. 46 , which relied upon the phrase “claiming through or under” in Section 45 of the Arbitration Act to adopt the group of companies doctrine.
CJI Ramana observed that the doctrine was predominantly a result of economic concepts such as tight group structure and a single economic unit, which, in his view, could not be the sole basis for binding a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement. Accordingly, CJI Ramana referred the matter to a larger Bench seeking clarification on the following questions:
( i ) Could the phrase “claiming through or under” in Sections 8 and 11 of the Arbitration Act be interpreted to include the group of companies doctrine?
( ii ) Is the group of companies doctrine, as expounded by Chloro Controls 47 and subsequent judgments, valid in law?
In his concurring opinion, Justice Surya Kant in Cox and Kings I 48 observed that a catena of decisions which were rendered on the group of companies doctrine adopted a rigid and restrictive approach by placing undue emphasis on formal consent and opined that the doctrine had gained a firm footing in Indian arbitral jurisprudence. However, as per Kant, J., the Supreme Court had adopted inconsistent approaches while applying the doctrine in India. Accordingly, Kant, J., culled out the following moot points for determination by a larger Bench:
( i ) Should the group of companies doctrine be read into Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, or can it exist in Indian jurisprudence independent of any statutory provision?
( ii ) Whether the group of companies doctrine should continue to be invoked on the basis of the principle of “single economic reality”?
( iii ) Whether the group of companies doctrine should be construed as a means of interpreting implied consent or intent to arbitrate between the parties?
( iv ) Can the principles of alter ego and piercing the corporate veil alone justify pressing the group of companies doctrine into operation, even in the absence of implied consent?
Following the decision in Cox and Kings I 49 , a 5-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India was called upon in Cox and Kings II 50 to assess the validity of the group of companies doctrine and the jurisprudence surrounding the same in India. The doctrine essentially posits that an arbitration agreement made by one company within a group may extend to its non-signatory affiliates, provided the circumstances indicate a mutual intention to bind both signatories and non-signatories. The challenge presented to the Supreme Court was to determine whether the group of companies doctrine could be harmonised with established legal principles such as party autonomy, privity of contract, and separate corporate legal personality.
In Cox and Kings II 51 , it was observed that in contemporary commercial scenarios, it is typical for a company that has signed a contract containing an arbitration clause not to be the entity negotiating or fulfilling the underlying contractual obligations. In such instances, a strict emphasis on formal consent would exclude these non-signatories from the scope of the arbitration agreement, resulting in unwarranted multiplication of proceedings and the fragmentation of disputes. As per the Supreme Court 52 , multinational groups are increasingly adopting intricate corporate structures for the execution and delivery of complex commercial transactions, including construction contracts, concession contracts, licence agreements, long-term supply contracts, banking and financial transactions, and maritime contracts. These corporate structures may involve equity-based groups, joint ventures, and informal alliances. A multi-corporate structure provides flexibility for a group to implement commercially practical operational models, allowing different companies to participate at various stages of a single transaction. In this process, more often than not, individuals or entities not signatory to the underlying contract with the arbitration agreement are involved in negotiating, performing, or terminating the contract.
In view of the above analysis, the Supreme Court in Cox and Kings II 53 culled out the moot question that emerged: should non-signatories be excluded from arbitration proceedings, even if they were implicated in the dispute under arbitration? In view of the Supreme Court, it was only in response to this challenge, arbitration law jurisprudence evolved and embraced the group of companies doctrine, enabling or compelling a non-signatory party to be bound by an arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court also opined that in multi-party agreements, courts or Arbitral Tribunals must scrutinise the corporate structure to determine whether both signatory and non-signatory parties belong to the same group. This assessment is fact-specific and must adhere to the relevant principles of company law. Once the existence of the corporate group is confirmed, the next step involves determining whether there was a mutual intention among all parties to bind the non-signatory to the arbitration agreement.
The Supreme Court, upon extensively examining the judicial precedents and other relevant authorities, summarised its final verdict as below:
( i ) The definition of “parties” as per Section 2(1)( h ) in conjunction with Section 7 of the Arbitration Act encompasses both signatory and non-signatory parties.
( ii ) The actions of non-signatory parties may serve as an indication of their consent to be bound by the arbitration agreement.
( iii ) The stipulation of a written arbitration agreement under Section 7 does not preclude the possibility of binding non-signatory parties.
( iv ) Within the framework of the Arbitration Act, the term “party” holds a distinct and separate meaning from the concept of “persons claiming through or under” a party to the arbitration agreement.
( v ) The foundation for applying the group of companies doctrine is rooted in maintaining the corporate separateness of group companies while establishing the mutual intention of the parties to bind the non-signatory party to the arbitration agreement.
( vi ) The principle of alter ego or piercing the corporate veil cannot serve as the foundation for applying the group of companies doctrine.
( vii ) The group of companies doctrine possesses an independent standing as a legal principle, derived from a cohesive interpretation of Section 2(1)( h ) in conjunction with Section 7 of the Arbitration Act.
( viii ) To invoke the group of companies doctrine, courts or Arbitral Tribunals must consider all the cumulative factors outlined in ONGC Ltd . v. Discovery Enterprises (P) Ltd. 54 Consequently, the principle of a single economic unit cannot serve as the exclusive foundation for applying the group of companies doctrine.
( ix ) The expression “claiming through or under” in Sections 8 and 45 is intended to provide a derivative right; and it does not enable a non-signatory to become a party to the arbitration agreement. The expression “party” in Sections 2(1)( h ) and 7 is distinct from “persons claiming through or under them”.
( x ) The Supreme Court’s approach in Chloro Controls 55 , insofar as it links the group of companies doctrine to the phrase “claiming through or under”, is incorrect and contradicts established principles of contract law and corporate law.
( xi ) The retention of the group of companies doctrine in Indian arbitration jurisprudence is advisable, given its efficacy in discerning the parties’ intent in the context of intricate transactions involving numerous parties and agreements.
( xii ) During the referral stage, the Court referring the matter should leave it to the Arbitral Tribunal to determine whether the non-signatory is bound by the arbitration agreement.
8. Chennai Metro Rail Ltd. v. Transtonnelstroy Afcons (JV) 56
An Arbitral Tribunal will not become ineligible to act merely by attempting to revise the arbitral fee unilaterally.
An Arbitral Tribunal’s mandate cannot be terminated on grounds which are not listed in the Arbitration Act.
In the course of an arbitration between Chennai Metro Rail Limited (Chennai Metro) and Transtonnelstroy Afcons (JV) (Afcons), a member of the Arbitral Tribunal passed away and was consequently replaced in a reconstituted Arbitral Tribunal. Subsequently, during the proceedings, the arbitral tribunal unilaterally raised the per session fee from the initially agreed INR 1,00,000 to INR 2,00,000. Chennai Metro objected to this revision, but Afcons deposited the increased fee. Concerned that Afcons’ payment might result in biased treatment by the Arbitral Tribunal, Chennai Metro filed a Section 14 application under the Arbitration Act before the High Court seeking, among other things, the termination of the Arbitral Tribunal’s mandate. The High Court, however, dismissed the Section 14 application. Consequently, Chennai Metro filed the present petition before the Supreme Court.
Chennai Metro referred to the decision in ONGC Ltd. v. Afcons Gunanusa JV 57 , asserting that the Arbitral Tribunal’s unilateral fee revision goes against the principle of party autonomy in arbitration. According to Chennai Metro, parties involved in arbitration have the freedom to determine fees, and any changes should only occur with mutual agreement. The insistence on charging the revised fee, despite Chennai Metro’s objections, was deemed by it as a potential source of bias, raising concerns about impartiality throughout the proceedings.
On the other side, Afcons challenged the validity of the Section 14 application, drawing on HRD Corpn. v. GAIL 58 to argue that such applications are only admissible when the Arbitral Tribunal’s eligibility is contested based on Section 12(5) read in conjunction with the Seventh Schedule of the Act. Afcons contended that challenges related to doubts about the Arbitral Tribunal’s independence or impartiality should be initially addressed to the Tribunal itself, and not directly to the Court. If unsuccessful, these grounds could then be used to challenge the award under Section 13(5) read with Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. In support of their position, Afcons cited another judgment 59 , emphasising that establishing bias requires a significantly high threshold, necessitating a genuine likelihood of bias rather than mere suspicion.
The Supreme Court, upon scrutinising Sections 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the Arbitration Act, highlighted a deliberate omission of the term “bias” in favour of using expressions like “justifiable doubts about independence and impartiality” when referring to an Arbitral Tribunal.
The Supreme Court clarified that in situations where the grounds listed in the Seventh Schedule arise or are brought to one party’s attention, it is automatically sufficient for that party to terminate the Arbitral Tribunal’s mandate unless the objections are expressly waived by such party. Consequently, an aggrieved party has the option to directly challenge the Arbitral Tribunal’s mandate in court under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act. If a party raises doubts about the independence or impartiality of the Arbitral Tribunal based on grounds set out in the Fifth Schedule, the remedy available is to first apply to the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 13(2) of the Arbitration Act. If unsuccessful, the Arbitral Tribunal must proceed with the proceedings, and only after the award is rendered can the aggrieved party challenge it under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
Relying on the decision in ONGC Ltd. v. Afcons Gunanusa JV 60 , the Supreme Court affirmed that the Arbitral Tribunal’s fee could not be revised unless agreed upon by the parties. If there’s an objection, the Tribunal must revert to the agreed fee or decline to act. However, the Supreme Court emphasised that insistence on retaining the revised fee does not render the Arbitral Tribunal ineligible, and the mandate remains intact. Accordingly, Chennai Metro’s application was set aside, and the impugned order was upheld.
9. Lombardi Engg. Ltd. v. Uttarakhand Jal Vidyut Nigam Ltd. 61
A referral court can examine if the arbitration agreement is arbitrary and violates Article 14 while considering an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act.
On 25 October 2019, a Switzerland-based company Lombardi Engineering Ltd. (Lombardi), entered into an agreement (agreement) with Uttarakhand Project Development and Construction Corporation Limited (U PDCC ) for the provision of consultancy services linked to a hydro-electric project situated in Uttarakhand.
The aforementioned project, originally under the control of U PDCC , transitioned to the control of Uttarakhand Vidyut Nigam Limited (UVNL) via a tripartite agreement executed on 6-10-2020 (tripartite agreement). Through the tripartite agreement, the original agreement underwent novation, effectively transferring the responsibilities and commitments therein to UVNL, who succeeded U PDCC in this context.
The arbitration agreement between the parties provided, among other things, that ( i ) the party initiating arbitration must furnish a security deposit equivalent to 7% of the arbitration claim; and ( ii ) for claims amounting to INR 10 crores or less, a sole arbitrator, appointed by the Principal Secretary/Secretary (Irrigation), Government of Uttarakhand, would preside over the case.
As disputes arose between Lombardi and UVNL, Lombardi initiated the arbitration process by serving a notice to UVNL, invoking Clause 53 of the agreement and urging UVNL to designate an arbitrator. However, UVNL terminated the contract on 9-5-2022 citing alleged non-fulfilment of contractual obligations by Lombardi. Consequently, Lombardi approached the Supreme Court, seeking the appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act.
Lombardi argued primarily that UVNL’s exclusive authority to appoint an arbitrator was unenforceable and contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd. 62 , which established that a party with an interest in the dispute’s outcome should not have the power to appoint a sole arbitrator. Additionally, it was asserted that the precondition for predeposit was unjust, arbitrary, and violated Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.
In contrast, UVNL contended, among other points, that the contract’s security deposit was refundable to ensure that only valid and bona fide claims were made, preventing the project’s interruption due to frivolous claims. UVNL also argued that the arbitration agreement’s validity ought not to be tested against the rigours of Article 14 of the Constitution while deciding the application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act.
The Supreme Court rejected the claim that it could not assess the constitutionality of an arbitral clause while acting at the pre-reference stage under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act. The Supreme Court emphasised that all laws in India must align with the Constitution, the paramount source of law and the “grundnorm”. Following the Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, the Supreme Court outlined the three lawyers of the compliance hierarchy:
( i ) Constitution of India .
( ii ) Arbitration Act and any other Central/State law.
( iii ) The arbitration agreement based on Section 7 of the Arbitration Act.
In view of the above, the Supreme Court dismissed UVNL’s argument that Lombardi violated party autonomy by first agreeing to the pre-deposit clause and subsequently challenging its constitutionality.
The Supreme Court further ruled that the vague pre-deposit condition set out in the underlying arbitration agreement ( i ) violated Article 14 of the Constitution; and ( ii ) had no connection to preventing vexatious claims, contrary to UVNL’s assertion. In this regard, reliance was also placed upon the decision in ICOMM Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Board 63 to highlight that if a claim is really found frivolous or vexatious, the Arbitral Tribunal can award costs under Section 31-A of the Arbitration Act. Even otherwise, deterring a party to an arbitration agreement from invoking the alternative dispute resolution process by requiring the party to predeposit certain percentage of the claim amount would not only discourage arbitration but also clog the traditional court systems.
On the validity of the portion of the arbitration clause which permitted the Principal Secretary/Secretary (Irrigation), Government of Uttarakhand, to appoint an arbitrator, the Supreme Court held it was squarely covered by the Perkins Eastman 64 which holds that unilateral arbitrator appointment without the other party’s consent is non est.
10. Unibros v. All India Radio 65
An arbitral award for loss of profit without any substantial evidence is in conflict with public policy of India.
In the present case, the respondent granted the appellant a construction contract for the Delhi Doordarshan Bhawan, Mandi House. The project was initially set to commence on 12-4-1990 with a completion deadline of 11-4-1991. However, due to delays, the construction ultimately finished on 30-10-1994. Disputes arising from these delays led the parties to seek resolution through arbitration. The arbitrator determined that the appellant was entitled to compensation of INR 1,44,83,830, along with an 18% annual interest. This decision was based on the argument that the respondent was responsible for the project’s delay. Furthermore, the appellant was retained beyond the original 12-month contract period for an additional 3½ years, causing a loss in the appellant’s profit-earning capacity during this extended period. Aggrieved with the award, the respondent filed a challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
A Single Judge set aside the initial award, and the claims were sent back to the arbitrator for reconsideration and a fresh award. The arbitrator issued a second award on 15-7-2002, reaffirming the compensation for loss of profit and interest as per the first award. However, the respondents once again objected to the second award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
The Single Judge, in response to the objection, sided with the respondents, stating that the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence to substantiate the claimed loss of profit. The absence of records detailing the alleged utilisation of resources in the contract performance, such as manpower, materials, machinery, and overheads, raised doubts about the legitimacy of the asserted losses amounting to INR 2,00,00,000. In an appeal against the Single Judge’s decision, the Division Bench upheld the dismissal, holding that no evidence was presented to support the plea of loss of profit during the extended work period. Consequently, the arbitrator’s findings were deemed contrary to law more specifically the provisions of the Contract Act. Aggrieved by the decision of the Division Bench, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.
The central issue presented to the Supreme Court in the appeal was whether a claim for loss of profit could prevail solely on the basis of the delay being attributable to the employer. In this regard, the Supreme Court cited ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. 66 , asserting that the term “public policy of India” in Section 34 should be interpreted broadly and encompasses matters concerning public good and interest. The Supreme Court also referred to the decision in Associated Builders 67 holding that elements like compliance with fundamental legal principles, the need for a judicial approach, adherence to natural justice, Wednesbury test of unreasonableness, and patent illegality were a constituent element of the public policy of India.
Regarding the conflict with public policy, the Supreme Court concluded that the second award mirrored the flaws of the first. Despite the second award being phrased differently, the Supreme Court found no substantive changes and considered it an attempt to avoid mirroring the first award.
The Supreme Court asserted that any award attempting to override a binding judicial decision conflict with fundamental public policy and is unsustainable. Addressing the appellant’s loss of profit claim, the Supreme Court cited Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. v. L.K. Ahuja 68 , reaffirming the requirement for adequate evidence to support such claims. It emphasised that evidence must demonstrate viable opportunities lost due to the delay and be credible. The Court specified that evidence could include contemporaneous records of potential projects, tendering opportunities declined due to delays, financial statements, and contract clauses related to delays and compensation.
The Court outlined conditions for successful loss of profit claims: ( i ) a delay not attributable to the claimant; ( ii ) the claimant’s established contractor status; and ( iii ) credible evidence substantiating the claim. In the present case, the Supreme Court found the last condition unsatisfied, deeming the arbitral award illegal and in conflict with the public policy of India under Section 34(2)( b ) of the Act. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, citing a lack of merit.
*Founder and Head of Trinity Chambers, Delhi.
**Counsel at Trinity Chambers, Delhi.
1. (2023) 5 SCC 421 .
2. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 55 .
3. (2009) 17 SCC 796 .
4. (2019) 9 SCC 462 .
5. (2018) 9 SCC 49 .
6. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 389.
7. Unique India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Antique Art Exports (P) Ltd. , (2019) 5 SCC 362 .
8. (2021) 2 SCC 1 .
9. N.N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1666 .
10. (2021) 4 SCC 379 .
11. (2021) 4 SCC 379 .
12. (2005) 8 SCC 618 .
13. (2017) 9 SCC 729 .
14. (2019) 8 SCC 714 .
15. (2021) 4 SCC 379 .
16. (2011) 14 SCC 66 .
17. (2019) 9 SCC 209 .
18. (2021) 2 SCC 1 .
19. (2019) 9 SCC 209 .
20. (2023) 7 SCC 1 .
21. (2021) 4 SCC 379 .
22. (2011) 14 SCC 66 .
23. (2023) 7 SCC 1 .
24. (2021) 4 SCC 379 .
25. (2021) 4 SCC 379 .
26. (2023) 7 SCC 1 .
27. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1666 .
28. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1666 .
29. Food Corporation of India v. Indian Council of Arbitration , (2003) 6 SCC 564 .
30. Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (7th Edn, Oxford University Press, 2023) p. 388.
31. Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. , (2001) 8 SCC 470 ; P. Anand Gajapathi Raju v. P.V.G. Raju , (2000) 4 SCC 539 .
32. State of Bihar v. Bihar Rajya M.S.E.S.K.K. Mahasangh , (2005) 9 SCC 129 ; Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram , (1986) 4 SCC 447 .
33. Subal Paul v. Malina Paul , (2003) 10 SCC 361 .
34. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1666 .
35. (2023) 7 SCC 1 .
36. (2011) 14 SCC 66 .
37. (2019) 9 SCC 209 .
38. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 982 .
39. (2019) 8 SCC 329 .
40. Associate Builders v. DDA , (2015) 3 SCC 49 ; Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India , (2019) 15 SCC 131 ; and Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd. v. DMRC Ltd. , (2022) 1 SCC 131 .
41. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1063 .
42. (2017) 4 SCC 665 .
43. (2021) 7 SCC 657 .
44. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1634 .
45. (2022) 8 SCC 1 .
46. (2013) 1 SCC 641 .
47. (2013) 1 SCC 641 .
48. (2022) 8 SCC 1 .
49. (2022) 8 SCC 1 .
50. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1634 .
51. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1634 .
52. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1634 .
53. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1634 .
54. (2022) 8 SCC 42 .
55. (2013) 1 SCC 641 .
56. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1370 .
57. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1122 .
58. (2018) 12 SCC 471 .
59. International Airports Authority of India v. K.D. Bali , (1988) 2 SCC 360 .
60. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1122 .
61. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1422 .
62. (2020) 20 SCC 760 .
63. (2019) 4 SCC 401 .
64. (2020) 20 SCC 760 .
65. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1366 .
66. (2003) 5 SCC 705 .
67. (2015) 3 SCC 49 .
68. (2004) 5 SCC 109 .
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James Dworkin
I have served as both a mediator and as an arbitrator in my career. These techniques are both very useful because disputes get resolved in a much speedier and more economical fashion than going into a court setting. Mediation and arbitration are used extensively in the United States and around the world. I have been involved in resolving labor management disputes from Ketchikan, Alaska, to Miami Beach, Florida, and in many other parts of the U.S.
Many of the cases I arbitrate involve discipline or discharge of employees for a variety of reasons. I also arbitrate contract interpretation cases. The cases I mediate typically involve helping the parties to finalize their negotiations over a successor collective bargaining agreement.
The two biggest recent changes I have seen in the usage of mediation and arbitration are the conducting of remote hearings and the growing influence of artificial intelligence in alternative dispute resolution.
Before Covid impacted all of us in 2020, all of my cases were conducted in-person. Covid changed that. Almost all hearings were held remotely for a couple of years. Things have rebounded back to the point where today about 30 percent of my cases are held remotely; 70 percent are in-person.
Just like in many other areas of society, the impacts of artificial intelligence have been felt in both mediation and arbitration. Whether it is assisting with the construction of contract language or the usage of AI to actually write awards, we are just beginning to see how AI will impact the field of alternative dispute resolution. I am a member of the prestigious National Academy of Arbitrators where an ad hoc committee is currently studying the area of artificial intelligence and how it is likely to change mediation and arbitration in the future.
Mediation and arbitration, both referred to as alternative dispute resolution techniques, have some similarities, but they are also quite different and both require a very different set of skills to practice effectively.
Both techniques involve a neutral person who assists two or more parties to resolve a dispute. In arbitration, the neutral arbitrator does have the final and binding power to resolve the dispute. When you enter arbitration, you know that you will get the dispute resolved. Both parties agree in advance to be bound by the decision of the arbitrator.
In mediation, the neutral person helps to facilitate a solution by basically asking key questions of the parties. The whole idea is to try to make the parties doubt the viability of their stated positions in order to reach a compromise. Mediators have no power to impose a solution on the parties. Mediators control the process but have no control over the outcome. Whether or not a deal is reached is entirely up to the parties.
James Dworkin is Chancellor Emeritus and a professor of management at Purdue’s Daniels School. His main teaching interests include collective bargaining, negotiations, and dispute resolution. In addition to arbitration and mediation, Dworkin’s areas of research are employment law, labor, leadership, sports, strikes and unions.
Scanning the digital: using survey data to support digital scholarship initiatives at the university of mississippi, what contributes to a qualified digital humanities librarian and ideal digital humanities pedagogy an exploratory qualitative study, exploring the digital humanities research agenda: a text mining approach, digital humanities degrees and supplemental credentials in information schools (ischools), the wrong side of the spreadsheets: a life in the digital humanities, from collection curation to knowledge creation: exploring new roles of academic librarians in digital humanities research, teaching gis in a digital humanities environment, digital humanities research: interdisciplinary collaborations, themes and implications to library and information science, 17 librarians and one big undertaking: creating a digital project from start to finish, facilitating collaborative metadata creation for faculty-initiated digital projects, related papers.
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