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Five Lessons From the BP Oil Spill

• Andrew Winston

It’s very easy to pile onto BP right now. The “accident,” which may be due more to negligence, is bad enough. The company lost 11 employees — after losing 15 in a high-profile explosion at a refinery 5 years ago. The damage to the Gulf, its species, and the people who depend on it is […]

It’s very easy to pile onto BP right now. The “accident,” which may be due more to negligence, is bad enough. The company lost 11 employees — after losing 15 in a high-profile explosion at a refinery 5 years ago. The damage to the Gulf, its species, and the people who depend on it is almost incalculable. But surprisingly, it’s even easier to criticize BP’s behavior since the explosion — the company has tried hard to downplay the scale of the tragedy and it has moved slowly to stop the torrent of oil pouring into the Gulf.

• Andrew Winston is one of the world’s leading thinkers on sustainable business strategy. His books include Green to Gold , The Big Pivot , and Net Positive . AndrewWinston

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A deep dive into BP’s Deepwater Horizon Spill: a case study

Under pressure – the disaster

Considered as the biggest marine disaster in history, on April 20 th , 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded in the Gulf of Mexico, killing 11 crew members working onsite. The rig eventually sank and damaged the pipe underneath and started to spew millions of barrels of crude oil into the gulf over the next four months. It contaminated about 400 square miles of the sea floor and 1,300 miles of shoreline of the Gulf of Mexico (DOI: 10.1002/jcaf.22306).

Search-and-rescue operations were executed on April 22 nd and within the same day, BP’s CEO Tony Hayward released a statement that they were determined to do everything to contain the oil spill and resolve the situation . When the rig capsized, BP’s initial response comprised of: 1) releasing of a small fleet of response vessels, 2) relief well planning, 3) skimming of oily surface water, 4) implementing protective boom to prevent oil from reaching the shoreline, and 5) placing chemical dispersants in the spill site to break up the oil and keep them from damaging marshes, mangroves, and beaches .

Efforts were made to seal the leaking well but were initially unsuccessful, and as a back-up, they have started drilling relief well in May. To reduce the leak, a tube tool was inserted into the ruptured riser pipe and containment cap was used to collect the oil and pump it to the gulf surface. On July 15 th , BP was able to stop the flow of oil for the first time in 87 days but was still under monitoring to ensure that the cap would stay in place. More than 2 weeks later, the US government announced that almost three-quarters of the spilled oil had been cleaned up, and on September 19 th , BP reported that the leak had been successfully and permanently plugged .

Several service providers (DOI: 10.1002/jcaf.22306) were involved in the offshore drilling operations of the Macondo well, the area of exploration where BP is operating. BP leased the rig from TransOcean, while the processes such as cementing the well and other critical functions were done by Sperry-Sun, Halliburton’s subsidiary. Other companies involved were Dril-Wuip, Oceaneering, M-I-SWACO, Cameron, and Weatherford.

Numerous investigations were held to find the root cause of the disaster, as well as the parties responsible for the damages. The BP report 2010, the Commission Report 2011 and the Joint Report 2011 concluded that the tragedy occurred due to a series of failures from the multiple parties involved in the operation. BP had been identified as the primary responsible for ensuring the safety and protection of personnel, equipment, natural resources, and the environment under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA). The other companies also shared the same accountability for violating several offshore safety regulations based on the Joint Report 2011.

It was revealed that the crisis has cost BP more than US$65 billion covering the total charges, net of reimbursements and recoveries, as well as insurance claims. However, a study (DOI: 10.1002/jcaf.22306) showed that the ultimate cost of the oil spill was twice what was reported in BP’s income statement, amounting to US$144.89 billion. The detailed computation included not just those mentioned above but also the hidden costs such as the revenue lost, unearned profit, and reputational damage. Needless to say, the spill also damaged fisheries, beaches, and coastal wetlands, including several species of birds, sea turtles, marine mammals, fishes, oysters, and other sea animals. A recent study showed that Gulf inhabitants such as brown pelican and menhaden fish have showed robust recovery while many species such as deep-sea coral, common loons, and spotted sea trout are still struggling to multiply.

The Deepwater Horizon spill also brought significant impacts to the economic activity in the surrounding communities. A research (DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-11605-7_33) revealed that the total economic costs during the period of 2010-2020 of the foregone commercial fishing revenues and recreational fishing expenditures are loss of 25,000 jobs, US$2.3 billion worth of industry output, US$1.2 billion gross regional product, US$700 million labor income, US$160 million state and local tax revenues, and US$160 million federal tax revenues.

A deep well of learnings

Oil spills are not uncommon in the Gulf of Mexico but the magnitude of impact of BP’s Deepwater Horizon had been massive that it attracted so much attention from various stakeholders, not to mention the several missteps BP took as they navigated through the whole crisis. Here is the list of some lessons learned from the accident that, in some way or another, brought lasting impact on the safety of succeeding oil operations in the industry.

• Never learning enough from previous mistakes. In a high-risk business like oil-drilling, it is expected that large companies such as BP would have anticipated negative events in many of its operations. Even more so when there had been several accidents that happened prior the major oil spill. In 2005, BP’s refinery in Texas City exploded and their Thunder Horse rig in the same gulf got into an accident. In the following year, BP’s pipeline leaked in Prudhoe Bay. It was reported that BP was still paying for the violations in these previous disasters when the Deepwater Horizon spill happened .
• Culture of safety must be embraced by the whole industry. The disaster showed how neither the industry, nor the governments were prepared for risks involved in oil exploration. The investigations revealed how failures in following procedures to mitigate risks, and loose coordination among operators and regulatory bodies led to this disaster. It is important for organizations to understand that regulations are for their benefit, and it can provide level playing field for all stakeholders, especially during a crisis. In addition, regulations must be well-enforced, and penalties must be tantamount to the damages incurred in a disaster. Lax safety enforcement for the part of Minerals Management Service (MMS), the regulating body for offshore oil drilling, was found in the investigations. In fact, in the report released by the General Accountability Office (GAO), MMS showed a series of inconsistencies and omissions in their National Environmental Policy Act analyses and was described to lack organization, guidance, technical expertise, and qualified personnel .
• Plans must be prepared and reviewed to the highest standard possible. BP had MMS-approved Gulf Oil Spill Response Plan that detailed cleanup equipment and techniques, surface containment methods, and the use of chemical dispersants while missing out the more important parts of preventing or stopping a blowout. It was later found that BP’s response plan was written by the same contractor that prepared the plans for other oil companies such as ExxonMobil, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, and Shell Oil. Congressional inquiry described the plans as “cookie-cutter” that similar errors were found in some of the companies’ response plan . Furthermore, BP received a categorical exclusion for exploration plan for Macondo Prospect, allowing them to drill without preparing detailed site-specific environmental assessment based on the outdated assumption that “the impacts from the common operations are expected to be negligible to non-existent…”.
• Ensure that Business Continuity Plan includes third-party agreement. Several subcontractors involved in the Deepwater Horizon operations had made the already complex nature of the business even more complicated. Complex risks may arise from third party contractors and their capability to continue their operations. This is why it is important that critical suppliers must have Business Continuity Management arrangement in place. Furthermore, a robust action plans as part of collective response among suppliers in case of a disruption must be included in their contractual obligations. Had the employees well-informed of their responsibilities and safety actions, the death of 11 crew members would have been prevented. Had BP and its contractors have pre-arrangement contracts that included BCM, they would have not blamed each other and engaged in multi-billion dollar litigation after the accident.
• Communication is an integral aspect of crisis management. BP has become a textbook example of how not to handle public relations. Several studies evaluating BP’s actions in terms of crisis communication have been published following the major incident. Below is a quick rundown of both weaknesses and strengths of BP’s campaign (DOI: 10.1080/13527266.2018.1559218).

Digging deeper

Initially, BP’s several mishaps in managing the disaster making it easy for environmentalists, politicians, media, and other concerned individuals to paint the company as uncaring and greedy organization that cares for profits more than anything else . When the rig exploded and oil spill happened, BP was quick to shift the blame to TransOcean through their official statements, and the former CEO Hayward’s media interview. He said: “ This wasn’t our accident. This was a drilling rig operated by another company. It was their people, their systems, their processes. We are responsible not for the accident, but we are responsible for the oil and for dealing with it and cleaning the situation up.”

Lack of concern for the victims was also seen by many when there were reports that BP asked the cleanup workers and those who were affected by the spill to sign a waiver that would limit BP’s liability. This was during the ironic time that BP reported their 135% first quarter profit of $5.6 billion. The company also failed to be transparent, hindering people to build confidence and trust that they were on top of the situation early on. For example, the initial estimate of the leak was only 1,000 barrels per day, increased it to 5,000 barrel per day after more than a week, then later submitted a figure of 100,000 barrels per day to the Congress for investigation.

Lastly, former CEO Tony Hayward’s statements and actions attracted a lot of negative attention. In an interview with The Times of London, he mentioned that some victims would try to scam them for profit (Ibid) “I could give you lots of examples. This is America – come on. We’re going to have lots of illegitimate claims. We all know that.” Furthermore, he tried to downplay the damage caused by the accident by saying “ the Gulf of Mexico is a very big ocean. The amount of volume of oil and dispersant we are putting into it is tiny in relation to the total water volume.” He was also recorded saying in front of many reporters, “The first thing to say is I’m sorry. We’re sorry for the massive disruption it’s caused their lives. There’s no one who wants this over more than I do. I would like my life back.” He was later seen on a yacht off the Isle of Wight, 2 days after testifying before Congress.

The reputation repair

As BP struggled to find solution to stop the oil spill and its dwindling reputation, its share price and credit rating also grappled. The shareholder value of BP plummeted by 55% after the incident, from US$59.48 per share on April 19 th , 2010 to US$27 per share on June 25 th , 2010 . Furthermore, Fitch cut its credit rating from AA to BBB after US politicians demanded US$20 billion deposits in an escrow account to fund the damage claims for the oil spill as the agency was concerned about the ratio between long-term and near-term cost payments would become skewed towards the near-term cost . However, the meeting of BP’s executives with Obama in June was considered a turning point. BP’s Chairman Carl-Henric Svanberg told Obama: “ Our boat is keeling over right now. We’re not taking on water but we’re not far away. If you and the administration can be supportive going forward, that would help us do the right thing.” Obama responded that it is the country’s interest for the company to remain strong and viable to be able to fulfill its commitments . It was on this meeting that BP agreed to fund the US$20 billion escrow account, which investors received positively .

In the same month, BP hired Purple Strategies, a public affairs firm run by a Democratic and a Republican strategist, for its US campaign, alongside Anne Womack Kolton, a former US Energy Department official, to manage its US media relations. The new strategy team was able to showcase what BP had been doing for those affected by the crisis. Television, radio, and print campaign featured BP workers and Gulf Coast locals, volunteers, and BP officials. They were able to put faces on the real and human stories related to the incident. After the leak was plugged, they expanded the communication strategies to image-building by highlighting how BP was helping the Gulf Coast residents to get back to business as usual. They created two major campaigns – “Voices from the Gulf” and “My Gulf”.

Voices from the Gulf: Mississippi Fishermen

Voices from the Gulf: Louisiana’s Restaurant Owners

Voices from the Gulf: Florida Business Owners

My Gulf: Dawn Moliterno – Walton Tourism Development

My Gulf: New Orleans, Louisiana – Cooking the Perfect Gumbo

My Gulf: Josephine, Alabama: Shrimpin’ with Papa Roy

Another unprecedented albeit necessary decision happened in the following month, Tony Hayward, whose gaffes had enraged a lot of Americans, announced that he was stepping down as CEO and would be replaced in October by Bob Dudley, a Mississippi native who was in charge of BP’s clean-up response .

A year of change – the post crisis phase

Changing leadership amidst the crisis was a pivotal step for BP to redirect its direction through the crisis. Bob Dudley’s first tasks as the CEO were: 1) securing the company’s finances, 2) ensuring the safety of BP’s operations worldwide, and 3) restoring the environment of the Gulf Coast . He needed to sell BP’s oil and gas assets quickly, including their prized assets such as the Texas City refinery, Gulf of Mexico oilfields and Russian joint venture , and also do forward sale oil to safeguard BP’s future while meeting its commitment to the Gulf.

Guided by his principle of “value over volume”, Dudley cut the number of BP-operated upstream installation by 50%, the number of wells by more than 30%, and oil and gas reserves by 10%. In addition, he formed a new global Safety and Operational Risk team to instill the culture of safety in the company . Apart from the operation and culture, he mentioned in an interview that capital allocation and decision-making were also reformed . BP became “ inclusive, and modern place to work where leaders were encouraged to listen to the quietest voices in the room ”.

BP’s support to its business partners and people during the crisis did not wane but even strengthened. Dudley found that while several of BP’s partners such as banks were pulling away, there were some partners that were supportive and willing to help. Moreover, he also felt the need to rebuild the confidence of their employees in their company as he was worried that competitors might try to hire their talent away .

The oil company remained committed to environmental restoration. They provided up to US$1 billion for restoring natural resources that were impacted by the accident. In addition, BP has allocated US$500 million for a decade of support to independent research designed to provide better understanding of the Gulf ecosystem and industry. With the help of experts in high-hazard sectors such as nuclear energy, chemicals and the military, BP strengthened their operational risk function. Furthermore, they were able to design and prepare a capping stack that can be used in case another leak in deep water happens .

BP: A year of change

Rising above pressure

The post-crisis organizational reform was able to regain the investors’ trust as shown by the share price increase from June 29 th , 2010. Although the share has not gone back to its pre-oil spill crisis price at around US$60, it did not go below US$27 until the COVID-19 pandemic hit.

BP strengthened its finances after the crisis by cutting costs to reduce breakeven point while improving oil production . In 2017, Moody’s increased BP’s credit rating for the first time in 19 years citing the company’s resilience to oil price volatility and increased clarity in terms of the remaining cash payments related to the US$20 billion Deepwater Horizon settlement .

BP continued to acquire various projects including those that focus on natural gas such as shale gas production from about 200 wells in Oman , the natural gas production at Atoll gas field in Egypt , and several American oil and shale projects bought from mining firm BHP, its first major US investment since the oil spill ,  among others. Although only a small fraction of their total spending, BP started investing in renewable energy at around US$400 million a year. They invested in startup firms like Freewire, which possesses a technology that allow charging electric vehicles faster. It also acquired Chargemaster, UK’s biggest network of EV charging stations, as well as 43% share of Lightsource, Europe’s largest solar development firm . Like other oil companies, BP received several criticisms for doing inadequate efforts to reduce carbon emissions and increase renewable energy, especially that between 2016 and 2019, BP expanded its oil and gas production by 20% .

In 2020, BP announced that it aims to become a net-zero emissions company by 2050 or sooner. It revealed their commitment to a 10-fold increase in low-carbon investment or an estimate of US$5 billion per year, and a 20-fold increase in renewable generating capacity to 50 gigawatts . Headed by the current CEO Bernard Looney, who succeeded Dudley in February 2020, the oil giant plans US$25 billion in fossil-fuel asset sales by 2025, with US$15 billions of which has already been liquidated by unloading the Oman deal, oil and gas field in Alaska and the North Sea, and BP’s entire petrochemical operation . Although the company does not expect profits from its clean-energy business such as solar, EV-charging, and wind ventures until 2025, Looney continues to spend on renewable energy.

The Final Cap

To keep its commitment to meet its obligations in the Gulf of Mexico in spite of almost losing its whole business to the accident is praiseworthy; to move forward, learn its lessons, and transform into a better organization is even more admirable; but nothing can beat a well-prepared company that can prevent a crisis to happen, or at least mitigate the risks. The BP’s Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill is a great example of how return on investment of robust emergency response and business continuity programs can worth priceless.

In addition, the accident showed us that the most critical aspect of crisis leadership is clear and trustworthy communication. The goal of communicating during a crisis is not to lessen the uncertainty but to acknowledge it and the fear that comes with it. Transparency, honesty, and empathy are always the best policy.

If you liked this case study, you might also want to read this one .

Author: Lucil Aguada

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Deepwater Horizon – BP Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill

On April 20, 2010, the oil drilling rig Deepwater Horizon , operating in the Macondo Prospect in the Gulf of Mexico, exploded and sank resulting in the death of 11 workers on the Deepwater Horizon and the largest spill of oil in the history of marine oil drilling operations.  4 million barrels of oil flowed from the damaged Macondo well over an 87-day period, before it was finally capped on July 15, 2010.  On December 15, 2010, the United States filed a complaint in District Court against BP Exploration & Production and several other defendants alleged to be responsible for the spill.  

This webpage provides information and materials on EPA’s enforcement response to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, settlements with several of the defendants, including the record-setting settlement with BP Exploration & Production for an unprecedented $5.5 billion Clean Water Act penalty and up to $8.8 billion in natural resource damages.  

This webpage is limited to EPA’s enforcement-related activities only, and does not cover all legal or other actions against BP Exploration & Production and other parties for the spill, such as private party/class action settlements for medical claims and economic damages, or other actions against those responsible for the spill.  The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana has established the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill website for this purpose.  In addition, links for additional information on the spill, cleanup activities and other responses are provided below.

On this page:

Case and Settlement Information

• Additional Information
• December 15, 2010: Civil complaint of the United States
• February 17, 2012: $90 million civil settlement with MOEX Offshore 2007 LLC 
• June 4, 2014: 5 th Circuit decision affirming ruling on summary judgment - 5th Circuit Decision June 4, 2014  
• November 5, 2014:  5 th Circuit decision denying panel reconsideration and affirming summary judgment ruling - Nondispositive Panel Opinion  
• January 9, 2015: 5 th Circuit order denying petition for rehearing en banc - Deepwater Horizon order denying petition for rehearing en banc  
• November 15, 2012: $4 billion criminal plea agreement with BP Exploration & Production  
• January 3, 2013: $1 billion civil settlement with Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling Inc., Transocean Deepwater Inc., Transocean Holdings LLC, and Triton Asset Leasing GmbH (“Transocean”)
• January 3, 2013: $400 million criminal plea agreement with Transocean  
• September 4, 2014:   Phase One Trial:  Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Gross Negligence and Willful Misconduct
• January 15, 2015: Phase Two Trial: Findings of Fact on Source Control and the Amount of Oil Spilled
• February 19, 2015:  Ruling on Maximum Dollars-Per-Barrel Penalty Amount, as Adjusted by the Penalty Inflation Act
• October 5, 2015:  $14.9 billion civil settlement with BP Exploration & Production
• November 30, 2015: $159.5 million Civil Penalty Ruling Against Anadarko Petroleum Co.

Additional Information on the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill

• Restoring the Gulf of Mexico After the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
• 2010 National Coastal Condition Assessment Results and Report
• RestoreTheGulf: official federal government site for spill response and recovery  
• Final Report of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
• Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team 
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• Enforcement and Compliance Annual Results for FY 2023
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10.7: Case Study- Energy and the BP Oil Disaster

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On the night of April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, one of hundreds operating in the Gulf of Mexico, exploded, killing eleven men, and placing one of the most rich and diverse coastal regions on earth in imminent danger of petroleum poisoning. BP had been drilling in waters a mile deep, and in the next two days, as the rig slowly sank, it tore a gash in the pipe leading to the oil well on the ocean floor. Over the next three months, two hundred million gallons of crude oil poured into the Gulf, before the technological means could be found to seal the undersea well. It was the worst environmental disaster in American history, and the largest peacetime oil spill ever.

The BP oil disaster caused untold short- and long-term damage to the region. The initial impact on the Gulf—the oil washing up on beaches from Texas to Florida, and economic hardship caused by the closing down of Gulf fishing—was covered closely by the news media. The longer term impacts of the oil spill on wetlands erosion, and fish and wildlife populations, however, will not likely receive as much attention.

Much public debate over the spill has focused on the specific causes of the spill itself, and in apportioning responsibility. As with the example of bee colony collapse, however, the search for simple, definitive causes can be frustrating, because the breakdown is essentially systemic. Advanced industries such as crop pollination and oil extraction involve highly complex interactions among technological, governmental, economic, and natural resource systems. With that complexity comes vulnerability. The more complex a system, the more points at which its resiliency may be suddenly exposed. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon rig, multiple technological “safeguards” simply did not work, while poor and sometimes corrupt government oversight of the rig’s operation also amplified the vulnerability of the overall system—a case of governmental system failure making technological failure in industry more likely, with an environmental disaster as the result.

In hindsight, looking at all the weaknesses in the Gulf oil drilling system, the BP spill appears inevitable. But predicting the specific vulnerabilities within large, complex systems ahead of time can be next to impossible because of the quantity of variables at work. Oil extraction takes place within a culture of profit maximization and the normalization of risk, but in the end, the lesson of BP oil disaster is more than a cautionary tale of corporate recklessness and lax government oversight. The very fact that BP was drilling under such risky conditions—a mile underwater, in quest of oil another three miles under the ocean floor—is an expression of the global demand for oil, the world’s most valuable energy resource. To understand that demand, and the lengths to which the global energy industry will go to meet it, regardless of environmental risk, requires the longer view of our modern history as a fossil-fueled species.

Review Questions

• In what ways is the BP Oil Disaster of 2010 an example of complex human systems failure, and what are its longer chains of causation in the history of human industrialization?

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The BP Oil Disaster, 10 Years Later

Debbie Elliott

It's been 10 years since the worst environmental disaster in U.S. history: the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Here's how the Gulf Coast is recovering.

Copyright © 2020 NPR. All rights reserved. Visit our website terms of use and permissions pages at www.npr.org for further information.

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Sustainability: Ethics, Culture, and History

Case study: energy and the bp oil disaster, learning objectives.

The BP Oil Disaster of 2010 is presented as an example of complex human systems failure.

On the night of April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, one of hundreds operating in the Gulf of Mexico, exploded, killing eleven men, and placing one of the most rich and diverse coastal regions on earth in imminent danger of petroleum poisoning. BP had been drilling in waters a mile deep, and in the next two days, as the rig slowly sank, it tore a gash in the pipe leading to the oil well on the ocean floor. Over the next three months, two hundred million gallons of crude oil poured into the Gulf, before the technological means could be found to seal the undersea well. It was the worst environmental disaster in American history, and the largest peacetime oil spill ever.

The Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig on Fire The Deepwater Horizon oil rig on fire, April, 2010. It would later sink, precipitating the worst environmental disaster in United States history. Source: Public Domain U.S. Coast Guard

The BP oil disaster caused untold short- and long-term damage to the region. The initial impact on the Gulf—the oil washing up on beaches from Texas to Florida, and economic hardship caused by the closing down of Gulf fishing—was covered closely by the news media. The longer term impacts of the oil spill on wetlands erosion, and fish and wildlife populations, however, will not likely receive as much attention.

Much public debate over the spill has focused on the specific causes of the spill itself, and in apportioning responsibility. As with the example of bee colony collapse, however, the search for simple, definitive causes can be frustrating, because the breakdown is essentially systemic. Advanced industries such as crop pollination and oil extraction involve highly complex interactions among technological, governmental, economic, and natural resource systems. With that complexity comes vulnerability. The more complex a system, the more points at which its resiliency may be suddenly exposed. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon rig, multiple technological “safeguards” simply did not work, while poor and sometimes corrupt government oversight of the rig’s operation also amplified the vulnerability of the overall system—a case of governmental system failure making technological failure in industry more likely, with an environmental disaster as the result.

In hindsight, looking at all the weaknesses in the Gulf oil drilling system, the BP spill appears inevitable. But predicting the specific vulnerabilities within large, complex systems ahead of time can be next to impossible because of the quantity of variables at work. Oil extraction takes place within a culture of profit maximization and the normalization of risk, but in the end, the lesson of BP oil disaster is more than a cautionary tale of corporate recklessness and lax government oversight. The very fact that BP was drilling under such risky conditions—a mile underwater, in quest of oil another three miles under the ocean floor—is an expression of the global demand for oil, the world’s most valuable energy resource. To understand that demand, and the lengths to which the global energy industry will go to meet it, regardless of environmental risk, requires the longer view of our modern history as a fossil-fueled species.

Review Questions

In what ways is the BP Oil Disaster of 2010 an example of complex human systems failure, and what are its longer chains of causation in the history of human industrialization?

• Sustainability: A Comprehensive Foundation. Authored by : Tom Theis and Jonathan Tomkin, Editors.. Provided by : OpenStax CNX. Located at : http://cnx.org/contents/[email protected] . License : CC BY: Attribution . License Terms : Download for free at http://cnx.org/contents/[email protected]

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The explosion

Leaking oil.

• Cleanup efforts
• Aftermath and impact
• Charges, settlements, and penalties
• Charges against individuals
• The civil trial
• Environmental costs
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• National Ocean Service - Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
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• National Center for Biotechnology Information - PubMed Central - Improving the Integration of Restoration and Conservation in Marine and Coastal Ecosystems: Lessons from the Deepwater Horizon Disaster
• Texas Parks and Wildlife - Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
• Marine Mammal Commission - Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico
• Smithsonian Ocean - Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Milestones
• Deepwater Horizon oil spill of 2010 - Student Encyclopedia (Ages 11 and up)
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When did the Deepwater Horizon oil spill happen?

The Deepwater Horizon oil spill began on April 20, 2010, when an explosion damaged the Deepwater Horizon oil rig. The rig's sinking on April 22 began the discharge of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.

Who owned the rig responsible for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill?

The oil rig involved in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill was owned and operated by offshore oil-drilling company Transocean and leased by the oil company BP .

The Deepwater Horizon oil spill occurred after a surge of natural gas blasted through a concrete core recently installed to seal an oil well for later use. Once released, the natural gas traveled up a riser to the platform of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig that was over the well, where it ignited, killing 11 workers and injuring 17.

Birds were particularly vulnerable to the effects of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Many died from ingesting oil or because it interfered with their ability to regulate their body temperatures. Brown pelicans and laughing gulls were among the species most affected. A study showed that up to 800,000 birds were thought to have died.

Deepwater Horizon oil spill , largest marine oil spill in history, caused by an April 20, 2010, explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig—located in the Gulf of Mexico , approximately 41 miles (66 km) off the coast of Louisiana —and its subsequent sinking on April 22.

The Deepwater Horizon rig, owned and operated by offshore-oil-drilling company Transocean and leased by oil company BP , was situated in the Macondo oil prospect in the Mississippi Canyon, a valley in the continental shelf . The oil well over which it was positioned was located on the seabed 4,993 feet (1,522 metres) below the surface and extended approximately 18,000 feet (5,486 metres) into the rock . On the night of April 20 a surge of natural gas blasted through a concrete core recently installed by contractor Halliburton in order to seal the well for later use. It later emerged through documents released by Wikileaks that a similar incident had occurred on a BP-owned rig in the Caspian Sea in September 2008. Both cores were likely too weak to withstand the pressure because they were composed of a concrete mixture that used nitrogen gas to accelerate curing.

Once released by the fracture of the core, the natural gas traveled up the Deepwater rig’s riser to the platform, where it ignited, killing 11 workers and injuring 17. The rig capsized and sank on the morning of April 22, rupturing the riser, through which drilling mud had been injected in order to counteract the upward pressure of oil and natural gas. Without any opposing force , oil began to discharge into the gulf. The volume of oil escaping the damaged well—originally estimated by BP to be about 1,000 barrels per day—was thought by U.S. government officials to have peaked at more than 60,000 barrels per day.

Although BP attempted to activate the rig’s blowout preventer (BOP), a fail-safe mechanism designed to close the channel through which oil was drawn, the device malfunctioned. Forensic analysis of the BOP completed the following year determined that a set of massive blades known as blind shear rams—designed to slice through the pipe carrying oil—had malfunctioned because the pipe had bent under the pressure of the rising gas and oil. (A 2014 report by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board claimed that the blind shear rams had activated sooner than previously thought and may have actually punctured the pipe.)

Efforts in May to place a containment dome over the largest leak in the broken riser were thwarted by the buoyant action of gas hydrates —gas molecules in an ice matrix—formed by the reaction of natural gas and cold water. When an attempt to employ a “ top kill,” whereby drilling mud was pumped into the well to stanch the flow of oil, also failed, BP in early June turned to an apparatus called the Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) cap. With the damaged riser shorn from the LMRP—the top segment of the BOP—the cap was lowered into place. Though fitted loosely over the BOP and allowing some oil to escape, the cap enabled BP to siphon approximately 15,000 barrels of oil per day to a tanker . The addition of an ancillary collection system comprising several devices, also tapped into the BOP, increased the collection rate to approximately 25,000 barrels of oil a day.

In early July the LMRP cap was removed for several days so that a more permanent seal could be installed; this capping stack was in place by July 12. Though the leak had slowed, it was estimated by a government-commissioned panel of scientists that 4,900,000 barrels of oil had already leaked into the gulf. Only about 800,000 barrels had been captured. On August 3 BP conducted a “ static kill,” a procedure in which drilling mud was pumped into the well through the BOP . Though similar to the failed top kill, mud could be injected at much lower pressures during the static kill because of the stabilizing influence of the capping stack. The defective BOP and the capping stack were removed in early September and replaced by a functioning BOP.

The success of these procedures cleared the way for a “ bottom kill,” considered to be the most likely means of permanently sealing the leak. This entailed pumping cement through a channel—known as a relief well—that paralleled and eventually intersected the original well. Construction of two such wells had begun in May. On September 17 the bottom kill maneuver was successfully executed through the first relief well. The second had been intended to serve as a backup and was not completed. Two days later, following a series of pressure tests, it was announced that the well was completely sealed.

Claims by several research groups that subsurface plumes of dispersed hydrocarbons had been detected in May were initially dismissed by BP and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). However, it was verified in June that the plumes were in fact from the Deepwater spill. The effect of the microscopic oil droplets on the ecosystem was unknown, though their presence, along with that of a layer of oil several inches thick discovered on portions of the seafloor in September, cast doubt on earlier predictions about the speed with which the discharged oil would dissipate. Bacteria that had adapted to consuming naturally occurring gas and oil seeping from the seabed were thought to have consumed a portion of it.

bp: An agility pioneer in the energy industry

Energy companies are facing major challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic has significantly shifted energy-demand curves, cost management needs to be resilient to commodity price cycles, and technological advancements are reshaping the industry. In addition, a finite global carbon budget and an impending energy transition present the biggest challenges yet for the industry. Energy companies need to respond quickly; survival will require a transformation, not incremental change.

bp’s new purpose

Our purpose is reimagining energy for people and our planet.

Our ambition is to be a net-zero company by 2050 or sooner. And to help the world get to net zero.

Ten net-zero aims

• Net zero across bp’s operations on an absolute basis by 2050 or sooner
• Net zero on carbon in bp’s oil and gas production on an absolute basis by 2050 or sooner
• Fifty percent cut in the carbon intensity of products bp sells by 2050 or sooner
• Install methane measurement at all bp’s major oil and gas processing sites by 2023 and reduce methane intensity of operations by 50 percent
• Increase the proportion of investment into non-oil and gas businesses over time
• More active advocacy for policies that support net zero, including carbon pricing
• Further incentivize bp’s workforce to deliver aims and mobilize them to advocate for net zero
• Set new expectations for relationships with trade associations
• Aim to be recognized as a leader for transparency of reporting, including supporting the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD)
• Launch a new team to help countries, cities, and large companies decarbonize

bp has recognized the need for bold action. At the start of 2020, new CEO Bernard Looney announced an updated purpose for the company: to reimagine energy for people and the planet and to be a net-zero company by 2050 or sooner (see sidebar, “bp’s new purpose”). To achieve these goals, bp would have to shift from a traditional business model to a much more focused and integrated organization. Bernard described this radical shift as “reinventing bp.”

The company already had a head start: bp started the transformation journey in its upstream business in 2016, founded on agile ways of working and accompanied by investments in digital technology and by ways of working that could spur ongoing growth and innovation. The “Reinvent bp” program in 2020 amplified this experience to redesign Production & Operations (P&O) around an agile operating model with mission-driven, crossdisciplinary teams. These teams—or squads—are laser-focused on value, pursuing high-priority initiatives to optimize current assets and harness future opportunities.

Several executives who spearheaded bp’s adoption of agility discuss the company’s transformation from its initial start in 2016 to its broader rollout.

McKinsey: Why did you start this transformation?

Gordon Birrell: With the pace of change in the world right now, the old hierarchical, top-down management of day-to-day operations was too slow. We needed to drive awareness and ownership of the business deep into the organization. That meant reinventing bp with a new organization and fundamental changes to how we work (Exhibit 1).

We were confident a new agile organizational structure at the heart of our operating model would allow us to break down silos, move faster, and reallocate our people and resources. I believe we are the first energy company to organize for agility in this way. This model allows us to apply technical excellence through the disciplines while quickly deploying expertise for the highest-value opportunities. It has sped up decision making on complex issues and enabled rapid technical responses.

Although it was a big step for bp, we had already deployed a successful frontrunner in Azerbaijan with impressive results: a more motivated workforce, faster decision times, and an expected 20 percent improvement in productivity. We learned a lot from that experience—and it proved to us that agility could work at scale.

Things are moving quickly. We already have around 700 agile squads across P&O, maintenance, wells, projects, and subsurface aligned to clear objectives and to prioritize high-value work. By the end of this year, we expect to have more than 14,000 people working in squads across bp.

We are seeing the success of this right now. One recent story that comes to mind is our project teams that started using agility to bring new subsea tiebacks online quicker— they called them “fast-paced tiebacks.” While this was already a high-performing team, they achieved an average improvement in cycle time of ten months across project execution and operation. This was not a one-off experience; this cycle time improvement continued across the full program of seven tiebacks that year.

McKinsey: How did you get started, and when did you know agility could work for you?

Ian Cavanagh: When we began our transformation in the upstream part of the organization, we asked ourselves two questions: what would it take to fundamentally improve business performance, and how do we want it to feel to work here? We took inspiration from other industries and companies. We looked at tech companies in Silicon Valley, we visited banks, we learned from other big engineering companies, and we adapted their experiences to our own industry. We also looked across bp and learned from our colleagues in the downstream business to create a better sense of cost discipline and ownership. This helped us focus our program on what we believed would make the most difference—digital, mindset, and agility.

There was an air of mystery about agility; it was easier for people to understand the benefits of investing in technology and dialing up certain behaviors. For agility, the question was, “How can we, as a large company, retain what’s important to us—our management systems, professionalism, risk management, and quality—but apply them in a nimble way, like much smaller companies do?” That’s the magic here.

We started by dipping our toes in the water rather than jumping straight in. We launched some pilots and, as the experience of that team grew, others were eager to adopt this approach because they could see the pace of decision making and energy levels at a totally different scale. As one of the first, our North Sea business initially trained four teams in the scrum methodology. We saw improvements of 40 to 50 percent in cycle times while maintaining focus on safety and quality. Employee experience also started to improve. Based on these early success stories, we then rolled out these tools, approaches, and capabilities more widely to locations across the world.

Donna Riley: At this stage, we were less interested in structural changes and more in breaking through the traditional hierarchical culture and moving to an environment where people felt trusted and empowered. We wanted this effort to feel different from previous transformation initiatives. We ran it largely on a “pull” basis—with teams choosing to opt in, experiment, and learn.

Alongside the agility pilots and digital investment, we launched our biggest leadership development program in over a decade—“Your Leadership, Our Future.” We designed this program around the mindsets and leadership behaviors we knew would be vital to achieve the transformation bp needed. Around 3,000 of our leaders attended the program, and many of them are leading teams in the reinvented bp, championing agility and empowering people to succeed.

We made enormous progress in a short time, but we could see a limit to what we could really achieve through agile techniques and leadership behaviors. To make this change sustainable, we had to start thinking about how to build agility into the fabric of our processes, performance management, and culture.

McKinsey: What did you do to get alignment and gain momentum on organizing for agility?

Gary Jones: We wanted to test the benefits that agility could bring at scale, so we launched a frontrunner in our Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey (AGT) business. The frontrunner comprised 75 people with a shared mission of providing onshore production management, operations, and maintenance support for six offshore platforms. We were getting ready to launch the frontrunner right as the COVID-19 pandemic hit. We had a choice: delay, or adapt our plans and get started anyway. Fortunately, we decided to go ahead. The frontrunner allowed us to test not only a new way of working but also what this could look like in a world of remote working.

What excited me most about the frontrunner was that it gave us the opportunity to test what it would be like if everybody adopted this way of working all the time. There were a couple of instances when we started to detect it was really working. One was literally how people felt. We did some surveys, and it was so clear people did not want to go back to the old way of working, despite some initial challenges. They liked the control and the transparency of what everyone was going to deliver. Another milestone was the reaction of our operational sites, both offshore and at the terminals. Frontline employees really liked the customer focus at the sites and knowing exactly who among the onshore team was dealing with their problems.

We had people from other parts of the company come and talk to the employees who were actually doing agility rather than just hearing about it from leaders or through word of mouth. That is how more and more people started to understand how truly different this way of working was.

Elkhan Mammadov: The frontrunner in Azerbaijan was distinct from the earlier pilots. It was no longer about experimenting and evaluating whether agility could be beneficial but rather about implementing all the components as a system in one organization. This was a true test of structural and process changes, new roles, performance management, and cultural and behavioral expectations (Exhibit 2).

Through the frontrunner we could see significant improvements in business performance. Actually, this way of working probably helped us be more reactive and adaptable during the COVID-19 pandemic, when things seemed to change from day to day. After five months, the organization had accelerated response times from onshore production to offshore by 10 percent, reduced existing anomalies and production-deferral cycle time by 25 percent, decreased the outstanding maintenance backlog by 30 percent, and cut procurement cycle times threefold.

There was also an increase in employee engagement scores for both offshore and onshore employees. All surveyed staff wanted to continue working in the agile way. Crucially, all safety and risk metrics remained stable.

The real breakthrough came when the executive leadership team, CEO, and chairman visited AGT and witnessed firsthand the benefits by speaking to squads that had experienced the new ways of working.

Every day we are seeing more examples of how this new way of working is helping. One of our assets had a 2022 production challenge. We found that one of the critical levers was to increase the well delivery contribution. In the past, this would have been a piece of work delivered across multiple parts of the organization with many teams, interdependencies, and handovers. In the new model, our subsurface and wells units stood up a joint squad around a single objective: optimize our reservoir management and business delivery. In just ten days, the team managed to increase the well delivery for 2022 from 19.7 thousand barrels a day to 33.3 thousand barrels a day (a 69 percent increase).

McKinsey: How did you stand up this new operating model after the frontrunner?

Ian Cavanagh: The pilots and the frontrunner showed us what agility could look like for us in our organization and in our industry. It also started to show the tangible benefits in terms of performance as well as creating an environment where our people flourish. By the end of 2019, 350 agile teams had already contributed to more than $1 billion of accelerated delivery through cost savings, engineering innovation, and efficient delivery.

This way of working was not only relevant for our upstream business—we saw the same for our downstream business. We had two complex turnarounds (TARs) scheduled in close succession for one of our refineries. That increases the risks of start-up delays as there was little margin for error in the schedule. We set up an agile working environment to bring two teams together and included experts from one of our other facilities directly in the team. This way of working resulted in a safe start-up from the TAR, largely due to our ability to share learnings and bring a team together with exactly the skills and experience needed.

When Bernard Looney became group CEO in February 2020, we started an ambitious effort to reinvent the entire organization as an integrated energy company. That meant taking our learnings from the past and fundamentally reshaping the organization around end-to-end value chains with mission-focused teams, strengthening our technical disciplines, centralizing activity, digitalizing operations, and focusing on our prioritization and deployment processes.

On January 1, 2021, we implemented agile teams for 7,500 people within P&O, with new roles and reporting lines. This approach was still new to many people, so we provided role-specific training and onboarding sessions to ensure people understood their new role and the operating model, as well as to give them the opportunity to ask questions and learn from one another.

For me, five things are on my mind when thinking about what we did:

• Communication and engagement are critical. An agile transformation really affects the day-to-day experience of almost every employee. It is critical to be transparent about what people can expect. Employees who had been involved in the pilots and frontrunner talked to their colleagues about how their day was different, how their roles were more rewarding and satisfying, how they got decisions quicker, and how they felt more connected to each other.
• Culture eats structure for breakfast. It is easy to change a reporting line, but changing culture and behavior is far more difficult. An agile transformation succeeds or fails with leaders showing up as role models. For example, leaders should not require prereads and update sessions; instead, they should walk the floor and join the sprint review sessions to understand how they can help teams. Our biggest focus continues to be supporting our leaders in getting comfortable and understanding their role in the new organization.
• Provide people with training options. It is very important to give employees the space they need to adjust. There are new roles, new ways of working, and slightly changed expectations. Rather than pushing a lot of training, we made courses available online in a self-service format so people could access the right training depending on the maturity of their squad.
• Make sure you support with robust change management. In our industry in particular, risk and safety are always top of mind. Throughout the transformation, we kept focus on our safety-critical processes and roles to make sure we maintained the highest standards.
• Don’t forget to build the supporting systems and processes. Once the agile organization is set up, systems must support the new ways of working rather than complicating them. For example, we are changing performance reviews and career paths to match the new model.

A lot of this was about getting teams to share their own experiences and stories with each other. An example of one of those powerful stories is from one of our North Sea assets. We had experienced production deferrals of ten thousand barrels of oil equivalent per day (BOED) due to issues with the produced water reinjection (PWRI) system. Our new cross-functional production management squad worked across the four choke points to identify system constraints as well as opportunities to increase PWRI capacity, add production, and shelter planned well tests. Working closely with the offshore team, the squad was able to make decisions promptly. The result was an impressive increase of three thousand BOED within two weeks.

Sobana Poopalasundaram: We could not have made this progress without providing our teams with hands-on support and coaching. It was crucial to have the right number and quality of agility coaches from the outset so, in addition to our external coaches, we created an in-house agility center of expertise. We selected 25 members of our technical teams to be part of the first cohort of coaches in 2019. Since then, we’ve expanded the team and now have a mix of internal and external team members.

In addition, prioritization is a critical part of the new operating model. It ensures all of us are pulling in the same direction and enables us to manage our workload and activities better. Historically, a big challenge has been figuring out what not to do, so we sought to improve prioritization at all levels of the organization.

Across all of P&O, we wanted to empower businesses to rely on central functions where they needed help. We made changes to our annual planning event, putting our assets at the heart of it as the unit of value. To get a baseline on our track record in terms of prioritization, we examined last year’s portfolio. One of our businesses had been able to complete about 15 percent of the priority programs; 65 percent were still in flight, and 20 percent had not been started. Anecdotally, this is true in all of them. This year, we started to take our capacity constraints into account when looking at activity on top of our baseload.

At the business level, we piloted the quarterly business review (QBR) in Azerbaijan as well as in Trinidad and Tobago (Exhibit 3). The beauty of the QBR is it provides that linkage between the overall business priorities of the region with the individual priorities of parts of the business. Each area of the business came together to align on the top four priorities for the upcoming quarter. These conversations integrated a bottom-up view of capacity from discipline and squad leads, as well as high-level business priorities set by the leadership team. Each unit then created a small number of objectives and key results to plan how they will deliver the priorities and measure success. This approach provides transparency into whether we are deploying our resources in the right way.

At team and unit level, we needed to make the workload more sustainable. Agility coaches worked with squads to truly understand their capacity and size their activity for each sprint. We didn’t prescribe one capacity-management technique for the organization; rather, teams and units experimented and iterated to improve their planning accuracy. Simple conversations at the start of sprints, such as documenting planned vacation for each team member and “T-shirt sizing” tasks, created visibility and helped team members make their workload more manageable.

McKinsey: How did your leaders change their operating model?

Donna Riley: The biggest shift leaders had to make was not around structure or processes—it was behavior and culture. An agile organization requires a fundamentally different approach. The biggest change for leaders is to learn how to step back. Leaders decide the “what,” but the squads agree how to deliver. For the leader, it’s about empowering teams to deliver and coaching where needed. It’s a long way from the traditional command-and-control environment.

Gary Jones: We like to call it servant leadership, and it turns the whole pyramid leadership structure on its head. The people doing the work are key, and everyone else supports them. I think of it like gardening. You’ve got to prepare the soil and put the plants in the right location, and then you’ve got to water them and nurture them. That produces fantastic outcomes. Servant leadership, role-modeling, and listening to the people who understand how the work gets done are all part of this new approach.

As an executive team, we are also taking our own medicine. We have our own biweekly stand-ups as a team to discuss our biggest blockers and dependencies, and we’re very conscious of how we affect the organization.

Elkhan Mammadov: My biggest change was giving up control and delegating. It wasn’t easy, but that’s exactly the change that is needed for the agile setup. Instead of asking teams for updates and reports, leaders go to the sprint reviews and see the work in progress. They focus on giving context, setting the mission, and defining the purpose and intent. Leaders ask, “How can I help?” when engaging with teams and focus on tackling problems. Teams are empowered to figure out how to deliver the mission within the boundaries defined by standard processes.

To achieve this change, we introduced a set of leadership expectations and ways of working in line with the new operating model. Our leaders are actively supported by our agility coaches every day to reflect on how to behave during agile ceremonies. In addition, we have organized a series of leadership webinars, nudges, and peer groups so people can share their experiences.

McKinsey: What advice would you share with others thinking about starting on this journey?

Gary Jones: Pace is important. An agile transformation is about emotions, mindsets, and leadership change, and it takes time to absorb. That happens through training as well as discussing ideas and getting on board with them as a leadership team. It’s not just about a presentation; it’s about talking to people, getting their questions, taking out the terminology, and linking their business to the strategy and their impact on it. It’s more important to lay the foundations on which you can build and be patient. This journey takes years, not weeks or months.

Elkhan Mammadov: My advice for the leaders of other companies that are preparing themselves for agile transformation is to be ready as early as possible for mindset shifts because that’s really needed. It’s not easy to do. Be transparent with your team and with your organization, and be bold in your experiments.

Sobana Poopalasundaram: Leaders should also seek to hold onto things that already work and to start small. Create proof points that allow confidence—both what works in your company and what gives you the outcomes you are seeking. Companies will often need to adjust their way of working with the right practices, tools, and behaviors.

Donna Riley: Organizations often swing from centralized to decentralized, from asset to functional. With agility, you get the best of all worlds: you can bring together multidisciplinary teams flexibly, you can collaborate across teams and businesses, and you can keep your stable backbone by being organized by discipline. However, it takes time to get it right and requires teams of people who lean into change, experience, and learning as they go.

McKinsey: What do the next steps look like for bp?

Ian Cavanagh: We need to recognize that this was a very fundamental change for our organization, a material shift in our operating model from top to bottom. Across the company, we moved away from our historic segment organization (upstream and downstream) to an integrated energy company. We rationalized leadership roles, flattened the organization, and created new business and functional groupings. We pulled through talent and made material gains on overall diversity. This level of change was unprecedented in our history, and we fully recognize it takes continued support and investment for this to truly feel simpler and more impactful at all levels.

One advantage is that now all levels of the organization can surface areas of improvement more quickly and easily. We are also more flexible to act on this feedback than some traditional approaches. As conditions change and as we learn, we will continue to refine our operating model. We now have an engine for driving improvements in organizational effectiveness and efficiency.

From this strong foundation, we have an important agenda in front of us: continuing to embed culture and behaviors, clarifying career paths, and ensuring our workflows and performance systems are fully optimized for our new way of working. Implementing such a big change in essentially a remote work setting has been an incredible achievement, and I give massive credit to all in the organization for delivering such strong safety, change management, and performance outcomes through this period. Looking forward, as we implement our new hybrid (office and home) working model for many of our staff, it gives us the added benefits of face-to-face interactions within our teams, with our key stakeholders, and our coaches.

P&O is not the only part of bp that has been progressing agility as a key part of its transformation, and we have strong networks in place to share learning, not least through our bp-wide Agility Centre of Expertise. While one size definitely does not fit all, the learnings have proven very transferrable.

We are proud of our progress so far. It began with an understanding of the necessity of change and a belief in a way of working—an operating model—that is already playing a key role in supporting the organization to deliver improvements in performance and creating an environment within the company for our teams to be the best they can be.

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The Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 is one of the most exhaustively analysed environmental and management crises in recent history. And BP‘s response will probably be remembered for a generation as the perfect example of how not to manage a crisis.

But it wasn’t always that way. This year marks the 25th anniversary of another BP oil spill which is now virtually forgotten, but was regarded at the time as a gold standard in how to respond effectively and protect reputation.

Although it is eclipsed by a litany of subsequent high profile oil spill disasters – such as the Erika breaking up off Brittany in 1999 and the Montara oil rig fire off northwest Australia in 2009 – there is much to be learned from what happened 25 years ago on the coast of Southern California.

In February 1990, less than a year after the debacle of the Exxon Valdez running aground in Alaska, the BP-chartered tanker American Trader accidentally ran over its own anchor off Huntington Beach in Orange County, spilling 400,000 gallons of crude oil, which came ashore on the prestigious surfing strip.

BP’s response was prompt and unequivocal. In just over two hours, oil skimming vessels were on the scene and the company’s crisis team was in the air. And within 24 hours there were 36 BP specialists on-site.

Even more impressive was the leadership of BP America Chairman James Ross, who flew straight to the scene. In a memorable press conference on the polluted breach Ross told reporters: “Our lawyers tell us it’s not our fault. But we feel like it’s our fault and we are going to act like it’s our own fault.”

Contrast this statesmanlike approach with the denial and blame-shifting which blighted BP’s response in 2010 when fire destroyed the oil rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, killing 11 workers and starting a torrent of oil onto a massive swathe of coastline. Then-BP CEO Tony Hayward commented that the amount of oil was “relatively tiny in a very big ocean.” His now infamous comment to the media that he would “like his life back”, was dubbed by the New York Times as “the sound bite from hell”.

The clean-up at Huntington Beach was swift and efficient. More than 100 people from other big oil companies took part on the spill response, and BP trained and equipped volunteer bird rescuers, who became some of the company’s strongest supporters in the community. And they worked very closely with government agencies, and the parade of political figures who wanted to be photographed on the beach. Ross later commented: “We are convinced that by working with them, we avoided jurisdictional disputes and a ton of controversy.”

The outcome is strikingly evident. The Los Angeles Times ran a story praising the company’s efforts under the headline “After spill, BP soaks up oil and good press.” It later ran a front-page photograph of the company’s crisis manager fulfilling his pledge to be the first to swim at the cleaned-up beach.

When BP America President James Ross was summoned to Washington he found himself praised by lawmakers. Compare that with the concerted attack by American politicians on BP after the Deepwater Horizon spill. President Barack Obama himself called for Hayward to be sacked.

Of course the volume of the Deepwater Horizon spill was much greater. But the lesson for today is not about the challenges of clean-up. It’s about the response at a management level, and what it teaches us about crisis leadership. Just like the Huntington Beach spill, James Ross too was quickly forgotten by the media and he went on to a successful career as CEO of Cable and Wireless and company Director.

By contrast British-born Hayward was famously pilloried by a headline in the New York Times - “BP’s CEO Tony Hayward: The most hated – and most clueless – man in America.” And when he was appointed to a role in a small oil company two years later the New York Times observed that for bewildered Americans who saw oil plumes rising, livelihoods crumbling and seabirds dying in the viscous crude, Hayward came to personify the catastrophe.

The starkly different outcomes of the two incidents could be put down to failure of corporate memory. To a rigidly hierarchical executive style which was acknowledged to exist at BP Headquarters. Or to over-dependence on a single spokesperson who was ill-suited to the task of conveying compassion and conviction. Whatever the cause, BP’s Gulf of Mexico oil spill has well and truly earned its place in the pantheon of bona fide PR disasters. And it’s a brutal warning that the impact of bad management can persist for decades.

But perhaps most importantly, it’s a reminder that individual managers set the tone in a crisis. Even after 25 years, there is much more to be learned from the little-known success of James Ross of BP in 1990 than can ever be gained from raking over the much studied disaster of BP and Tony Hayward in 2010.

This is part of an ongoing series on ‘bad’ management. Read more in the series here .

• Deepwater Horizon
• BP oil spill
• Bad management

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Business Continuity and Crisis Management Consultants

Crisis Management Case Study: Deepwater Horizon

April 5, 2022 By //  by  Bryan Strawser

The Deepwater Horizon oil spill was truly a crisis. Unfortunately, it was also handled in one of the worse ways possible. When a crisis occurs, management and communication become some of the largest and most significant issues. In this particular case, BP failed in both of those areas. It’s important to look at how this occurred and why in order to have a better understanding of the event and its aftermath. Additionally, determining ways to avoid the issue in the future and better manage the next crisis is a valuable part of learning lessons from the Deepwater Horizon spill, so the risk of another spill and its resulting damage can be reduced. Here is everything you need to know about this event and the lack of proper crisis management from BP at the time it occurred.

A Summary of the Situation

On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil platform exploded in the Gulf of Mexico. The resulting spill was deemed to be among history’s worst environmental disasters. In addition to the damage inflicted on the planet, eleven workers died in the explosion. Nearly five million barrels of crude oil entered the Gulf before the leak created by the explosion was stopped, and there have been suggestions that the local environment was irreparably harmed by the oil. While some of the oil was cleaned up or contained, much of it made its way into areas where cleaning wasn’t easy or where containment was not really an option. Due to the way oil spreads and the amount of it being released in the spill, collecting all of it and restoring the environment was not really possible.

Additionally, the oil-coated fish, birds, and other animals, and made it more difficult for businesses in communities along the Gulf Coast to survive due to the dip in tourism the spill created. But the problem wasn’t just in what actually happened. It was also in how BP handled the explosion, the leak in the Gulf that went on for far too long, and what the public was being told about the event and the efforts to clean it up. Through a series of missteps and poor choices, BP not only made the situation more complicated but also added to the damage that was being done. Before it was over, BP would be chastised by environmental groups and many others for the decisions made immediately after the explosion took place and in the days and weeks following it, while the leak continued.

BP Failed at Crisis Management

While the explosion, loss of life, and immediate impact of the spill were all devastating, it was what BP did after that which became the subject of discussion and frustration for a lot of people. There was a distinct lack of leadership right from the beginning, and gas stations around the country that carried the BP branding changed their names. They did not want the association with the company and were seeing their sales drop based on the way people felt about BP and the choices the company had made. The lacking leadership was not the only problem the company had, though. It also showed a strong lack of compassion during a time when compassion could have been its greatest asset. The company missed an amazing opportunity to make things right.

Instead of making it right, BP allowed oil to pour into the Gulf of Mexico without really doing anything about it for weeks. There were some failed “attempts” to cap the spill, but it seemed that these were half-hearted, at best. They really failed to get to the heart of what would have helped improve the situation, and what would have addressed the concerns of the public, as well. Among the most obvious gaffes was the realization that BP had not planned for crisis management in any way. It was as though the company assumed a serious problem like the Deepwater Horizon explosion and resulting oil spill could not, or would not, happen to them, so there was no point in “wasting” any time or money being ready for it. When it happened, they clearly were not ready.

There were two facets to BP’s lack of readiness. The first had to do with the health and safety of their workers and the environment, while the second was related to their public image. The company had slashed PR budgets and also cut costs where government relations were concerned, in order to reduce overhead. But that only worked as long as nothing went wrong. When a catastrophe like Deepwater Horizon occurred, there was no plan in place to save the company’s reputation. At the same time, the company had not put any money into crisis management, either, so the ways to handle environmental and worker impacts were not funded or even considered. Both areas were in serious need of correction, which would have been far easier before the oil spill occurred.

It is generally not good practice for a company to have a major disaster and then choose to hire a crisis management firm to address the fallout. Most large companies have these firms already available to them and plans in place for potential problems. Since BP did not have any of that at the time, they had to start from scratch on what they were going to do and say. That delay cost the company significantly, because of the heavy environmental damage and perceived lack of compassion the company displayed in the days and weeks after the Deepwater Horizon explosion. As millions of gallons of oil poured into the Gulf of Mexico, the company seemed to take its time doing anything at all about the issue. That did not sit well with the majority of people in the country.

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Communications — Where BP Really Went Wrong

It was not just in the way the company handled the Deepwater Horizon event that was a real problem, though. It was also in the way the company talked about the event. The CEO of BP, Tony Hayward, was quoted as saying, “There’s no one who wants this thing over more than I do. You know, I’d like my life back.” His insensitivity to the people who had lost their lives and the others who had their lives damaged or disrupted due to the oil spill was talked about for some time. Even if the CEO felt that way, which would be understandable due to the stress of everything taking place, he should have focused his public statements on the tragedy of the people who died, and all the serious environmental impacts of the Deepwater Horizon incident caused, instead of himself.

Hayward received significant backlash for his comments and the ways he seemed to ignore or misunderstand the gravity of the issue around him. He was also quoted as saying there would be minimal impact on the Gulf, and talked about his sympathy for the “small people” who lived along the coast. Naturally, people who lived and worked in the area did not take kindly to Hayward, who appeared to think of himself as being far above most “normal” people. The lack of planning for crisis communications really affected BP the longer the situation went on without public information being provided to those who were worried about their health, their jobs, and their local environment. Even when crisis planning help was offered, BP was slow to take the offerers up on that option.

While BP did eventually launch an ad campaign in an effort to communicate with the public about how they would clean up the spill and restore the environment, that was met with a lot of skepticism given the company’s tone-deaf response to concerns up to that point. Additionally, the ad campaign cost the company $50 million, which could have been used for clean-up efforts. A far less expensive campaign would have been enough, and the biggest focus should have been on getting the work done, instead of telling people that the work would get done. It was six weeks after the Deepwater Horizon exploded before these ads even began to air, showing that BP did not seem to see that time was of the essence, or take the future of the Gulf Coast seriously.

US Government Actions Led to Big Company Changes

The fines BP received for their damage to the environment and careless response to it were unprecedented. There was a fine of $5.5 billion for violations of the Clean Water Act and another $8.8 billion penalty for the damages to natural resources. Those were only the fines and penalties levied by the EPA and did not take into account all the other lawsuits that came about from environmental damage, business harm, and loss of life. Between 2012 and 2015, there were a lot of different settlements between the US government and BP or BP’s partners, based on lawsuits and assessed penalties. Most of those settlements were in the millions of dollars. But the biggest impact was not to BP’s bottom line. Instead, it was really to their reputation and branding.

In 2018, BP re-emerged from all the trauma it had been dealing with as a stronger and leaner company. Robert Dudley had taken over from Hayward and was committed to re-inventing the company so it could remain viable. Now, BP is not the big-name it once was. But it is a strong company that is smaller and more compact than before. It was forced to sell off millions in assets to pay the fines and lawsuits resulting from the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon and the resulting 87 days that un-capped well pumped oil into the Gulf of Mexico. There were times when it was questionable as to whether the company would survive at all. But it did, and it seems as though lessons have been learned from the way it failed to handle one of the biggest environmental disasters of all time.

Lessons Learned From the Oil Spill

There are several takeaways to be considered from the Deepwater Horizon incident. While these are likely lessons that BP has learned the hard way, they are also lessons that any company can use to have a better understanding of crisis management and how it should be handled. The most important thing to remember about crisis management is that it needs to be fully and completely in place before a crisis occurs. Waiting until it happens and then hoping to get quick, quality help with it is just not realistic for the majority of companies. Instead, every company should have a fully planned and functional crisis management plan in place that is periodically reviewed and updated. That plan should include PR, which is one of the areas where BP had the most trouble.

About Bryan Strawser

Bryan Strawser is Founder, Principal, and Chief Executive at Bryghtpath LLC, a strategic advisory firm he founded in 2014. He has more than twenty-five years of experience in the areas of, business continuity, disaster recovery, crisis management, enterprise risk, intelligence, and crisis communications.

At Bryghtpath, Bryan leads a team of experts that offer strategic counsel and support to the world’s leading brands, public sector agencies, and nonprofit organizations to strategically navigate uncertainty and disruption.

Learn more about Bryan at this link .

PO Box 131416 Saint Paul, MN 55113 USA

[email protected]

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Case Study: BP Oil Spill

This lesson has addressed the key components of ethical principles in crisis communication, including the ethical principles of responsibility, accountability, and humanistic care. The case of BP oil spill in 2010 provides an important example for understanding how these principles are valued by public opinion in a crisis situation, and how the communication actions by a corporation in this type of circumstances might have long-term effect on the brand image of the organization.

On April 20, 2010, a BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded, causing what has been called the worst environmental disaster in U.S. history and taking the lives of 11 rig workers. For 87 straight days, oil and methane gas spewed from an uncapped wellhead, 1 mile below the surface of the ocean. The federal government estimated 4.2 million barrels of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico.

Mistakes in Initial Response

According to NPR, BP’s action has become a textbook example of how not to do crisis management. BP executives declared it was not their accident, blamed their contractors and made the company look arrogant and callous. CEO Tony Hayward repeated insensitive comments in public, like this one: “There’s no one who wants this thing over more than I do. You know, I'd like my life back.” He also suggested that the environmental impact of the spill would be “very, very modest.” Images of Hayward attending a yacht race just 48 hours after a hostile interrogation by a US congressional committee on the oil spill, provoked sharp criticism on both sides of the Atlantic. Although the company, formerly British Petroleum, officially changed its name to BP in 2001, Americans consider it a foreign company even though it has just as many American shareholders as British ones, and its biggest operations are in the United States.

To sooth angry Americans, BP aired a multimillion-dollar national TV spot in June in which Hayward pledges: "We will make this right." Hayward also promised BP would clean up every drop of oil and “restore the shoreline to its original state.” President Barack Obama said the money spent on the ads should have gone to cleanup and compensating devastated fisherman and small business owners. The ad indicated that the company didn't even follow its own internal guidelines for damage control after a spill. Its own spill plan, filed the year before with the federal government, says of public relations: “No statement shall be made containing any of the following: promises that property, ecology or anything else will be restored to normal.”

BP also bought online ads that pop up when people search for information about the oil spill on Google and Yahoo. The ads, which link to BP's own oil-response sites, typically appear above or to the right of other search results. BP said the idea was to help people on the Gulf find the right forms to fill out quickly and effectively. However, many people suggest it's a move to steer searchers away from bad press for BP.

Crisis management experts stated the only reliable way to repair BP's badly tarnished image should be the obvious one — to plug the hole where oil was still leaking out. It would take nearly 3 months before the leak was stopped, and nearly 5 months before the well was declared effectively dead. Public relations experts pointed out that BP ran its crisis communications in the same “ham-fisted” manner they’ve run the clean-up operation in the Gulf.

"BP's handling of the spill from a crisis management perspective will go down in history as one of the great examples of how to make a situation worse by bad communications," said Michael Gordon, of New York-based crisis PR firm Group Gordon Strategic Communications. “It was a combination of a lack of transparency, a lack of straight talking and a lack of sensitivity to the victims. When you're managing an environmental disaster of this magnitude you not only have to manage the problem but also manage all the stakeholders.”

Consequences

BP attempts to convince people that it appears the Gulf of Mexico is healing itself after a while. In 2015, BP released PR materials that highlight the Gulf’s resilience, as well as a scientific report showing the area is making a rapid recovery. But evidence is mounting that five years after millions of gallons of oil spilled into the Gulf, wildlife there is still struggling to rebound.

In June 2016, BP issued its final estimate of the cost of the spill, the largest in U.S. history. The total amount for the cost of the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico was $61.6 billion. Under the settlement with BP, five states in the Gulf area and local governments will receive payments over the next dozen years. The funds will enable them to ramp up vital restoration work along the coast. BP continues to settle claims from business owners and residents who say they were harmed.

Moral of the Story

In conclusion, this is a classic case example of why organizational decision making in crisis situations should be based on ethical principles such as accountability and responsibility. Public criticism and outrage following the incident not only focused on the oil spill, but on the lack of remorse and sincerity from the top management in crisis response, particularly the lack of sympathy to the victims of the disaster. The failure by BP’s leadership to respond to the disaster with sufficient speed and attention demonstrates that crisis preparedness and ethical guidelines should become part of the organization culture.

Works Cited & Resources

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Bp: a case study in why csr matters.

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Today's lead story in The New York Times is a brisk, thorough, gripping account of BP's history of repeatedly cutting corners on safety in a mad dash for ever increasing profit, with catastrophe following more often than most people know.  The record is appalling, and the article describes how Exxon took a different route after the Exxon Valdez disaster, making safety paramount.  It adds up to a case study in why corporate social responsibility in the broadest sense is crucial, as by skimping on every more far-reaching interest beyond speed and profit, the company ultimately not only lost lives and ravaged the environment, it also caused enormous damage to itself and its profits.

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Crisis communication failures: The BP Case Study

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The world now invests almost twice as much in clean energy as it does in fossil fuels…, global investment in clean energy and fossil fuels, 2015-2024, …but there are major imbalances in investment, and emerging market and developing economies (emde) outside china account for only around 15% of global clean energy spending, annual investment in clean energy by selected country and region, 2019 and 2024, investment in solar pv now surpasses all other generation technologies combined, global annual investment in solar pv and other generation technologies, 2021-2024, the integration of renewables and upgrades to existing infrastructure have sparked a recovery in spending on grids and storage, investment in power grids and storage by region 2017-2024, rising investments in clean energy push overall energy investment above usd 3 trillion for the first time.

Global energy investment is set to exceed USD 3 trillion for the first time in 2024, with USD 2 trillion going to clean energy technologies and infrastructure. Investment in clean energy has accelerated since 2020, and spending on renewable power, grids and storage is now higher than total spending on oil, gas, and coal.

As the era of cheap borrowing comes to an end, certain kinds of investment are being held back by higher financing costs. However, the impact on project economics has been partially offset by easing supply chain pressures and falling prices. Solar panel costs have decreased by 30% over the last two years, and prices for minerals and metals crucial for energy transitions have also sharply dropped, especially the metals required for batteries.

The annual World Energy Investment report has consistently warned of energy investment flow imbalances, particularly insufficient clean energy investments in EMDE outside China. There are tentative signs of a pick-up in these investments: in our assessment, clean energy investments are set to approach USD 320 billion in 2024, up by more 50% since 2020. This is similar to the growth seen in advanced economies (+50%), although trailing China (+75%). The gains primarily come from higher investments in renewable power, now representing half of all power sector investments in these economies. Progress in India, Brazil, parts of Southeast Asia and Africa reflects new policy initiatives, well-managed public tenders, and improved grid infrastructure. Africa’s clean energy investments in 2024, at over USD 40 billion, are nearly double those in 2020.

Yet much more needs to be done. In most cases, this growth comes from a very low base and many of the least-developed economies are being left behind (several face acute problems servicing high levels of debt). In 2024, the share of global clean energy investment in EMDE outside China is expected to remain around 15% of the total. Both in terms of volume and share, this is far below the amounts that are required to ensure full access to modern energy and to meet rising energy demand in a sustainable way.

Power sector investment in solar photovoltaic (PV) technology is projected to exceed USD 500 billion in 2024, surpassing all other generation sources combined. Though growth may moderate slightly in 2024 due to falling PV module prices, solar remains central to the power sector’s transformation. In 2023, each dollar invested in wind and solar PV yielded 2.5 times more energy output than a dollar spent on the same technologies a decade prior.

In 2015, the ratio of clean power to unabated fossil fuel power investments was roughly 2:1. In 2024, this ratio is set to reach 10:1. The rise in solar and wind deployment has driven wholesale prices down in some countries, occasionally below zero, particularly during peak periods of wind and solar generation. This lowers the potential for spot market earnings for producers and highlights the need for complementary investments in flexibility and storage capacity.

Investments in nuclear power are expected to pick up in 2024, with its share (9%) in clean power investments rising after two consecutive years of decline. Total investment in nuclear is projected to reach USD 80 billion in 2024, nearly double the 2018 level, which was the lowest point in a decade.

Grids have become a bottleneck for energy transitions, but investment is rising. After stagnating around USD 300 billion per year since 2015, spending is expected to hit USD 400 billion in 2024, driven by new policies and funding in Europe, the United States, China, and parts of Latin America. Advanced economies and China account for 80% of global grid spending. Investment in Latin America has almost doubled since 2021, notably in Colombia, Chile, and Brazil, where spending doubled in 2023 alone. However, investment remains worryingly low elsewhere.

Investments in battery storage are ramping up and are set to exceed USD 50 billion in 2024. But spending is highly concentrated. In 2023, for every dollar invested in battery storage in advanced economies and China, only one cent was invested in other EMDE.

Investment in energy efficiency and electrification in buildings and industry has been quite resilient, despite the economic headwinds. But most of the dynamism in the end-use sectors is coming from transport, where investment is set to reach new highs in 2024 (+8% compared to 2023), driven by strong electric vehicle (EV) sales.

The rise in clean energy spending is underpinned by emissions reduction goals, technological gains, energy security imperatives (particularly in the European Union), and an additional strategic element: major economies are deploying new industrial strategies to spur clean energy manufacturing and establish stronger market positions. Such policies can bring local benefits, although gaining a cost-competitive foothold in sectors with ample global capacity like solar PV can be challenging. Policy makers need to balance the costs and benefits of these programmes so that they increase the resilience of clean energy supply chains while maintaining gains from trade.

In the United States, investment in clean energy increases to an estimated more than USD 300 billion in 2024, 1.6 times the 2020 level and well ahead of the amount invested in fossil fuels. The European Union spends USD 370 billion on clean energy today, while China is set to spend almost USD 680 billion in 2024, supported by its large domestic market and rapid growth in the so-called “new three” industries: solar cells, lithium battery production and EV manufacturing.

Overall upstream oil and gas investment in 2024 is set to return to 2017 levels, but companies in the Middle East and Asia now account for a much larger share of the total

Change in upstream oil and gas investment by company type, 2017-2024, newly approved lng projects, led by the united states and qatar, bring a new wave of investment that could boost global lng export capacity by 50%, investment and cumulative capacity in lng liquefaction, 2015-2028, investment in fuel supply remains largely dominated by fossil fuels, although interest in low-emissions fuels is growing fast from a low base.

Upstream oil and gas investment is expected to increase by 7% in 2024 to reach USD 570 billion, following a 9% rise in 2023. This is being led by Middle East and Asian NOCs, which have increased their investments in oil and gas by over 50% since 2017, and which account for almost the entire rise in spending for 2023-2024.

Lower cost inflation means that the headline rise in spending results in an even larger rise in activity, by approximately 25% compared with 2022. Existing fields account for around 40% total oil and gas upstream investment, while another 33% goes to new fields and exploration. The remainder goes to tight oil and shale gas.

Most of the huge influx of cashflows to the oil and gas industry in 2022-2023 was either returned to shareholders, used to buy back shares or to pay down debt; these uses exceeded capital expenditure again in 2023. A surge in profits has also spurred a wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&A), especially among US shale companies, which represented 75% of M&A activity in 2023. Clean energy spending by oil and gas companies grew to around USD 30 billion in 2023 (of which just USD 1.5 billion was by NOCs), but this represents less than 4% of global capital investment on clean energy.

A significant wave of new investment is expected in LNG in the coming years as new liquefaction plants are built, primarily in the United States and Qatar. The concentration of projects looking to start operation in the second half of this decade could increase competition and raise costs for the limited number of specialised contractors in this area. For the moment, the prospect of ample gas supplies has not triggered a major reaction further down the value chain. The amount of new gas-fired power capacity being approved and coming online remains stable at around 50-60 GW per year.

Investment in coal has been rising steadily in recent years, and more than 50 GW of unabated coal-fired power generation was approved in 2023, the most since 2015, and almost all of this was in China.

Investment in low-emissions fuels is only 1.4% of the amount spent on fossil fuels (compared to about 0.5% a decade ago). There are some fast-growing areas. Investments in hydrogen electrolysers have risen to around USD 3 billion per year, although they remain constrained by uncertainty about demand and a lack of reliable offtakers. Investments in sustainable aviation fuels have reached USD 1 billion, while USD 800 million is going to direct air capture projects (a 140% increase from 2023). Some 20 commercial-scale carbon capture utilisation and storage (CCUS) projects in seven countries reached final investment decision (FID) in 2023; according to company announcements, another 110 capture facilities, transport and storage projects could do the same in 2024.

Energy investment decisions are primarily driven and financed by the private sector, but governments have essential direct and indirect roles in shaping capital flows

Sources of investment in the energy sector, average 2018-2023, sources of finance in the energy sector, average 2018-2023, households are emerging as important actors for consumer-facing clean energy investments, highlighting the importance of affordability and access to capital, change in energy investment volume by region and fuel category, 2016 versus 2023, market sentiment around sustainable finance is down from the high point in 2021, with lower levels of sustainable debt issuances and inflows into sustainable funds, sustainable debt issuances, 2020-2023, sustainable fund launches, 2020-2023, energy transitions are reshaping how energy investment decisions are made, and by whom.

This year’s World Energy Investment report contains new analysis on sources of investments and sources of finance, making a clear distinction between those making investment decisions (governments, often via state-owned enterprises (SOEs), private firms and households) and the institutions providing the capital (the public sector, commercial lenders, and development finance institutions) to finance these investments.

Overall, most investments in the energy sector are made by corporates, with firms accounting for the largest share of investments in both the fossil fuel and clean energy sectors. However, there are significant country-by-country variations: half of all energy investments in EMDE are made by governments or SOEs, compared with just 15% in advanced economies. Investments by state-owned enterprises come mainly from national oil companies, notably in the Middle East and Asia where they have risen substantially in recent years, and among some state-owned utilities. The financial sustainability, investment strategies and the ability for SOEs to attract private capital therefore become a central issue for secure and affordable transitions.

The share of total energy investments made or decided by private households (if not necessarily financed by them directly) has doubled from 9% in 2015 to 18% today, thanks to the combined growth in rooftop solar installations, investments in buildings efficiency and electric vehicle purchases. For the moment, these investments are mainly made by wealthier households – and well-designed policies are essential to making clean energy technologies more accessible to all . A comparison shows that households have contributed to more than 40% of the increase in investment in clean energy spending since 2016 – by far the largest share. It was particularly pronounced in advanced economies, where, because of strong policy support, households accounted for nearly 60% of the growth in energy investments.

Three quarters of global energy investments today are funded from private and commercial sources, and around 25% from public finance, and just 1% from national and international development finance institutions (DFIs).

Other financing options for energy transition have faced challenges and are focused on advanced economies. In 2023, sustainable debt issuances exceeded USD 1 trillion for the third consecutive year, but were still 25% below their 2021 peak, as rising coupon rates dampened issuers’ borrowing appetite. Market sentiment for sustainable finance is wavering, with flows to ESG funds decreasing in 2023, due to potential higher returns elsewhere and credibility concerns. Transition finance is emerging to mobilise capital for high-emitting sectors, but greater harmonisation and credible standards are required for these instruments to reach scale.

A secure and affordable transitioning away from fossil fuels requires a major rebalancing of investments

Investment change in 2023-2024, and additional average annual change in investment in the net zero scenario, 2023-2030, a doubling of investments to triple renewables capacity and a tripling of spending to double efficiency: a steep hill needs climbing to keep 1.5°c within reach, investments in renewables, grids and battery storage in the net zero emissions by 2050 scenario, historical versus 2030, investments in end-use sectors in the net zero emissions by 2050 scenario, historical versus 2030, meeting cop28 goals requires a doubling of clean energy investment by 2030 worldwide, and a quadrupling in emde outside china, investments in renewables, grids, batteries and end use in the net zero emissions by 2050 scenario, 2024 and 2030, mobilising additional, affordable financing is the key to a safer and more sustainable future, breakdown of dfi financing by instrument, currency, technology and region, average 2019-2022, much greater efforts are needed to get on track to meet energy & climate goals, including those agreed at cop28.

Today’s investment trends are not aligned with the levels necessary for the world to have a chance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and to achieve the interim goals agreed at COP28. The current momentum behind renewable power is impressive, and if the current spending trend continues, it would cover approximately two-thirds of the total investment needed to triple renewable capacity by 2030. But an extra USD 500 billion per year is required in the IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario (NZE Scenario) to fill the gap completely (including spending for grids and battery storage). This equates to a doubling of current annual spending on renewable power generation, grids, and storage in 2030, in order to triple renewable capacity.

The goal of doubling the pace of energy efficiency improvement requires an even greater additional effort. While investment in the electrification of transport is relatively strong and brings important efficiency gains, investment in other efficiency measures – notably building retrofits – is well below where it needs to be: efficiency investments in buildings fell in 2023 and are expected to decline further in 2024. A tripling in the current annual rate of spending on efficiency and electrification – to about USD 1.9 trillion in 2030 – is needed to double the rate of energy efficiency improvements.

Anticipated oil and gas investment in 2024 is broadly in line with the level of investment required in 2030 in the Stated Policies Scenario, a scenario which sees oil and natural gas demand levelling off before 2030. However, global spare oil production capacity is already close to 6 million barrels per day (excluding Iran and Russia) and there is a shift expected in the coming years towards a buyers’ market for LNG. Against this backdrop, the risk of over-investment would be strong if the world moves swiftly to meet the net zero pledges and climate goals in the Announced Pledges Scenario (APS) and the NZE Scenario.

The NZE Scenario sees a major rebalancing of investments in fuel supply, away from fossil fuels and towards low-emissions fuels, such as bioenergy and low-emissions hydrogen, as well as CCUS. Achieving net zero emissions globally by 2050 would mean annual investment in oil, gas, and coal falls by more than half, from just over USD 1 trillion in 2024 to below USD 450 billion per year in 2030, while spending on low-emissions fuels increases tenfold, to about USD 200 billion in 2030 from just under USD 20 billion today.

The required increase in clean energy investments in the NZE Scenario is particularly steep in many emerging and developing economies. The cost of capital remains one of the largest barriers to investment in clean energy projects and infrastructure in many EMDE, with financing costs at least twice as high as in advanced economies as well as China. Macroeconomic and country-specific factors are the major contributors to the high cost of capital for clean energy projects, but so, too, are risks specific to the energy sector. Alongside actions by national policy makers, enhanced support from DFIs can play a major role in lowering financing costs and bringing in much larger volumes of private capital.

Targeted concessional support is particularly important for the least-developed countries that will otherwise struggle to access adequate capital. Our analysis shows cumulative financing for energy projects by DFIs was USD 470 billion between 2013 and 2021, with China-based DFIs accounting for slightly over half of the total. There was a significant reduction in financing for fossil fuel projects over this period, largely because of reduced Chinese support. However, this was not accompanied by a surge in support for clean energy projects. DFI support was provided almost exclusively (more than 90%) as debt (not all concessional) with only about 3% reported as equity financing and about 6% as grants. This debt was provided in hard currency or in the currency of donors, with almost no local-currency financing being reported.

The lack of local-currency lending pushes up borrowing costs and in many cases is the primary reason behind the much higher cost of capital in EMDE compared to advanced economies. High hedging costs often make this financing unaffordable to many of the least-developed countries and raises questions of debt sustainability. More attention is needed from DFIs to focus interventions on project de-risking that can mobilise much higher multiples of private capital.

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Large-Scale Intensive BP Intervention Proves Sustainable for CVD Prevention

— community-based program reduced events regardless of age, diabetes.

by Nicole Lou , Senior Staff Writer, MedPage Today June 18, 2024

A community-based intensive blood pressure (BP) intervention was safe and effective for both older and younger adults with hypertension, a randomized trial conducted in rural China showed.

Among participants ages 60 and older in the intervention group compared with a usual-care group, there was a significantly lower rate of total cardiovascular disease (CVD; 2.7% vs 3.5% per year, HR 0.75, 95% CI 0.69-0.81) and all-cause mortality (2.5% vs 2.8% per year, HR 0.90, 95% CI 0.83-0.98) during a median 4 years, reported Yingxian Sun, MD, PhD, of First Hospital of China Medical University in Shenyang, and colleagues.

Similarly, participants younger than 60 in the intervention group also showed reductions in total CVD (1.3% vs 2%, HR 0.64, 95% CI 0.56-0.75), as well as stroke (HR 0.64, 95% CI 0.55-0.76), heart failure (HR 0.39, 95% CI 0.18-0.87), and cardiovascular death (HR 0.54, 95% CI 0.37-0.77), they wrote in JAMA Cardiology .

"The benefit of intensive BP control was consistent among patients in both age ranges regardless of their baseline BP level, CVD risk category, or diabetes status," Sun's group noted. Additionally, the incidence of injurious falls, symptomatic hypotension, syncope, and kidney outcomes were not different between the two groups.

"An effective, safe, and sustainable strategy for hypertension management among the older population with higher CVD burden will have a substantial public health impact," they stressed, adding that the strategy "should be integrated into hypertension control programs in low-resource settings in China and worldwide."

In an accompanying editorial , Daniel Jones, MD, of the University of Mississippi Medical Center in Jackson, agreed that this kind of strategy should be applied broadly.

"Today, all the tools necessary to improve hypertension control rates are available: effective and safe medications, access to healthy foods, collective wealth, and overwhelming evidence of benefit (now including reduction of dementia risk). Add to this the evidence that a safe, effective, and feasible approach to patient management that can be implemented anywhere -- including in the U.S.," he wrote.

This study, a 48-month follow-up to the China Rural Hypertension Control Project, adds credence to reports that nurse- and pharmacist-led hypertension clinics can get BP to goal -- or close to goal -- quickly.

This study differs from the SPRINT and STEP trials that had excluded patients with diabetes and prior stroke to find evidence favoring intensive hypertension treatment.

"Making up for all these deficiencies, our trial for the first time, per our knowledge, provided strong evidence to support a BP treatment goal of less than 130/80 mm Hg in the older general population with hypertension in a community-based setting," Sun and colleagues wrote.

Jones noted that "a key question is whether the U.S. healthcare community is willing to embrace this evidence."

"Can the mindset of forcing chronic disease management into healthcare systems designed for management of acute illnesses be changed?" he posed. "Can federal and state government agencies, insurers, and healthcare executives make the necessary changes to allow something so simple yet effective to be integrated into systems of care?"

This multifaceted intervention treating participants to a BP goal of <130/80 mm Hg was tested in an open-cluster randomized trial in which "village doctors" with junior medical education were instructed to initiate or titrate antihypertensive medications under the supervision of primary care physicians.

The trial was conducted from 2018 to 2023 and included participants from 326 villages in rural China who met criteria for untreated BP ≥140/90 mm Hg and treated BP ≥130/80 mm Hg.

The randomization phase included participants ages 60 and older (n=22,386) and younger than 60 (n=11,609) who were assigned to either the intervention or usual care.

Participants saw the village doctors monthly until they met the BP goal, then quarterly.

Altogether, mean age of participants was 63 years, and 61.3% were women. Over 20% were current smokers. Approximately half had baseline systolic/diastolic BP in the 140-159/90-99 mm Hg range.

The primary endpoint of incident CVD was defined as a composite of myocardial infarction, stroke, heart failure requiring hospitalization, and cardiovascular disease death.

Sun and team cautioned that they had no measures of serum creatinine at 48 months. Another limitation was the lack of analysis among a frail subgroup.

Notably, outside of this study, the ESPRIT trialists took BP targeting even lower in Chinese patients ages 50 and older -- down to 120 mm Hg systolic -- and recently reported that such intensive treatment safely reduced cardiovascular events at 3 years.

Nicole Lou is a reporter for MedPage Today, where she covers cardiology news and other developments in medicine. Follow

Disclosures

The study was supported by Chinese government grants with additional support from China Medical University and the First Hospital of China Medical University.

The study authors had no disclosures.

Jones had no disclosures.

Primary Source

JAMA Cardiology

Source Reference: Guo X, et al "Multifaceted intensive blood pressure control model in older and younger individuals with hypertension: a randomized clinical trial" JAMA Cardiol 2024; DOI: 10.1001/jamacardio.2024.1449.

Secondary Source

Source Reference: Jones DW "A pathway to better blood pressure control" JAMA Cardiol 2024; DOI: 10.1001/jamacardio.2024.1463.

• Open access
• Published: 19 June 2024

Genetic characteristics of chromosomally integrated carbapenemase gene ( bla NDM−1 ) in isolates of Proteus mirabilis

• Qingyu Wang 1 ,
• Kai Dong 2 ,
• Xudong Liu 1 ,
• Wanxiang Li 1 &
• Qianyu Bian 3  

BMC Microbiology volume  24 , Article number:  216 ( 2024 ) Cite this article

Metrics details

This study aims to conduct an in-depth genomic analysis of a carbapenem-resistant Proteus mirabilis strain to uncover the distribution and mechanisms of its resistance genes.

The research primarily utilized whole-genome sequencing to analyze the genome of the Proteus mirabilis strain. Additionally, antibiotic susceptibility tests were conducted to evaluate the strain’s sensitivity to various antibiotics, and related case information was collected to analyze the clinical distribution characteristics of the resistant strain.

Study on bacterial strain WF3430 from a tetanus and pneumonia patient reveals resistance to multiple antibiotics due to extensive use. Whole-genome sequencing exposes a 4,045,480 bp chromosome carrying 29 antibiotic resistance genes. Two multidrug-resistant (MDR) gene regions, resembling Tn 6577 and Tn 6589 , were identified (MDR Region 1: 64.83 Kb, MDR Region 2: 85.64 Kbp). These regions, consist of integrative and conjugative elements (ICE) structures, highlight the intricate multidrug resistance in clinical settings.

This study found that a CR-PMI strain exhibits a unique mechanism for acquiring antimicrobial resistance genes, such as bla NDM−1 , located on the chromosome instead of plasmids. According to the results, there is increasing complexity in the mechanisms of horizontal transmission of resistance, necessitating a comprehensive understanding and implementation of targeted control measures in both hospital and community settings.

Peer Review reports

Introduction

The global escalation in antibiotic resistance poses a formidable challenge to public health, particularly the resistance against carbapenem antibiotics in bacteria such as Proteus mirabilis , a prevalent member of the Enterobacteriaceae family [ 1 , 2 , 3 ]. This bacterium, naturally occurring in various environments and within host organisms, is capable of inciting infections across multiple human systems [ 4 , 5 , 6 ]. The advent and widespread application of antibiotics have led to an increased incidence of resistance in Proteus mirabilis , especially concerning carbapenems, thereby severely constraining therapeutic avenues and elevating the risk of treatment failures [ 7 , 8 ]. Recognizing the gravity of this issue, the World Health Organization (WHO) has classified carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) [ 9 ], particularly strains harboring resistance genes, as a top-tier threat to global health. This classification highlights the pressing need for in-depth research into the resistance mechanisms employed by these pathogens.

Carbapenems are the favored last resort drugs for treatment of severe multidrug-resistant gram-negative bacterial infections, yet their efficacy is waning due to the proliferation of resistance genes like bla NDM−1 [ 7 , 8 , 10 ]. These genes are predominantly found on plasmids, facilitating their horizontal transfer among various bacterial species and hastening the dissemination of resistance [ 11 ]. Conversely, chromosomal carriage of such resistance genes is uncommon [ 12 , 13 ] and the dynamics of gene transfer in these contexts remain poorly understood, warranting further exploration. In light of this, our study zeroes in on a carbapenem-resistant strain of Proteus mirabilis (CR-PMI) that intriguingly harbors the bla NDM−1 gene within its chromosome. This phenomenon is relatively rare, and studies of its molecular characteristics benefit our understanding of the spread of carbapenem resistance.

One of our research objectives is to investigate the molecular mechanisms through which the bla NDM−1 gene integrates into the chromosomes of Proteus mirabilis . While we have not specifically assessed the impact of this mechanism on bacterial resistance and dissemination, our findings contributes the importance of understanding these molecular processes for the development of new antimicrobial strategies and controlling the spread of resistance.

Materials and methods

Clinical data collection.

In this study, detailed inquiries were made into the patients’ medical history records during their hospitalization by accessing the hospital’s electronic medical record system. This process was aimed at collecting key data such as the patients’ basic information, reasons for hospitalization, treatment process, and the antimicrobial drugs used. All data collection and analysis were conducted in accordance with the hospital’s privacy protection policy and the requirements of the ethics review committee, ensuring the security and confidentiality of patient information.

Strain collection

The CR-PMI strain was isolated in December 2020 from a tertiary teaching hospital located in northern China, which houses over 3,000 beds. The identification of this bacterial strain was conducted using Matrix-Assisted Laser Desorption/Ionization Time of Flight Mass Spectrometry (MALDI-TOF-MS) Vitek-MS, provided by Sysmex-bioMerieux in Marcy l’Etoile, France. For quality control purposes, Escherichia coli (ATCC 8739) was utilized as the reference strain.

Antimicrobial susceptibility testing

To evaluate the susceptibility of key bacterial strains, the BD Phoenix™ M50 System (Becton, Dickinson and Company, New Jersey, USA) was employed to test 25 commonly used antimicrobial agents in clinical settings. The antibiotics tested include ampicillin (AMP), ciprofloxacin (CIP), meropenem (MEM), imipenem (IPM), ertapenem (ETP), piperacillin (PIP), cefuroxime (CXM), cefoperazone/sulbactam (CSL), cefotaxime (CTX), cefoxitin (FOX), levofloxacin (LVX), amikacin (AMK), amoxicillin-clavulanate (AMC), ampicillin-sulbactam (SAM), aztreonam (ATM), trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole (SXT), piperacillin-tazobactam (TZP), gentamicin (GEN), cefepime (FEP), cefotetan (CTT), cefazolin (CZO), ceftazidime (CAZ), tobramycin (TOB), chloramphenicol (CHL), and ceftriaxone (CRO). The 2021 Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI) guidelines provided the criteria for determining the susceptibility of these agents [ 14 ]. Escherichia coli ATCC 25,922 served as the quality control strain in this evaluation, ensuring the accuracy and reliability of the testing process.

Whole genome sequencing, de novo assembly, and annotation

Bacterial DNA from the CR-PMI strains was extracted using the Omega Bio-Tek kit(Doraville, GA, USA). Whole-genome sequencing was conducted on a NovaSeq 6000 sequencer (Illumina, CA, USA), with Unicycler v0.4.9 used for assembling and correcting the reads. TrimGalore v0.5.0 ( https://github.com/FelixKrueger/TrimGalore ). Quality analysis of the sequences was performed with FastQC ( https://www.bioinformatics.babraham.ac.uk/projects/fastqc/ ). The CR-PMI strain also underwent long-read sequencing using the Nanopore PromethION platform(Oxford Nanopore Technologies, OX, UK), followed by a hybrid assembly using Unicycler v0.4.9 [ 15 ]. Sequence annotation and comparison involved predicting ORFs and pseudogenes through RAST 2.0 and the RefSeq database [ 16 , 17 ], with online databases used for annotating resistance genes and other elements. Sequence comparisons were conducted using BLASTN. Figures of gene structures was drawn using the method provided in the DANMEL database [ 18 ].

Clinical data and strain collection

In December 2020, a 57-year-old male patient was admitted to the infectious diseases department of our hospital due to tetanus and bacterial pneumonia. The patient underwent several invasive procedures, including tracheostomy, gastric tube insertion, subclavian central venous catheterization, fiberoptic bronchoscopy with lavage, and nail removal surgery due to a thumb injury. The antimicrobial treatment regimen included CAZ and MEM for two days, ETP for 14 days, and CSL for 9 days before bacterial isolation. After isolating the bacteria, the treatment was switched to TGC and LVX for 14 days, after which the patient showed improvement and was discharged. The total hospitalization period was 52 days, during which the patient was hospitalized in the ICU for a total of 25 days and later moved back to the infectious diseases department. A Proteus mirabilis bacterial strain (WF3430) was isolated from the patient’s sputum sample.

Results of drug susceptibility and drug resistance genes testing

Antibiotic susceptibility testing revealed that the bacterial strain was resistant to AMC, SAM, AMP, PIP, CIP, CSL, LVX, IPM, ETP, CZO, FOX, CXM, CTX, CAZ, CRO, FEP, SXT, CHL, TOB, and GEN. It showed intermediate resistance to AMK and TZP, while being sensitive to MEM, ATM, and CTT (Table  1 ).

Long-read sequencing has revealed that the bacterial strain WF3430 comprises a single chromosome and one plasmid. The chromosome is 4,045,480 bp in length with a GC content of 39.2%, and it contains 3,096 open reading frames (ORFs). The plasmid is 10,359 bp long, with a GC content of 42.1%, and it has 8 ORFs, identified as belonging to the ColE10_1 replicon type with the accession number X01654. Further analysis of the assembled genome has uncovered the presence of 29 antibiotic resistance genes, including carbapenemase bla NDM−1 , aminoglycosides ( AAC(3)-IId, AAC(3)-IV, AAC(6’)-Ib-cr, aadA2, APH(4)-Ia, arr-3, rmtB ), fluoroquinolones ( QnrA1 ), β-lactams ( bla CMY−59 , bla OXA−1 , bla TEM−1 ), chloramphenicol ( catA4, catB3, floR ), macrolides ( EreA, Erm(42), mphA ), trimethoprim ( dfrA1, dfrA12, dfrA32 ), sulfonamides (sul1, sul2 ), tetracyclines ( tet(G), tet(J) ), and fosfomycin ( fosA3 ). among them, the carbapenem-resistant gene bla NDM−1 was the only predicted carbapenem-resistant gene. The copy numbers of sul1 , bla TEM−1 , aadA2, floR , and arr-3 genes were 4, 2, 2, 2, and 2 respectively. Upon comparing the antimicrobial susceptibility profiles with the genotypic data, it was observed that the majority of antimicrobial phenotypes matched the genotypes. However, the susceptibility profile revealed resistance to carbapenems, including ETP and IPM, while MEM showed sensitivity. Notably, all these resistance genes are located on the chromosome. No antibiotic resistance genes were found on the plasmid.

Structures of chromosomally integrated MDR regions

In our study, we identified and analyzed two significant multidrug resistance (MDR) gene regions, named MDR region 1 and MDR region 2, which are located on the bacterial chromosome. These regions exhibit unique structural features and a composition of resistance genes at specific chromosomal locations.

MDR region 1 spans from 459,351 to 524,181 on the chromosome, covering 64.83Kb. This region matches specific parts of the Tn6577 transposon, specifically from 1 to 12,675 bp and from 78,652 to 137,547 bp. Within this MDR region, we discovered an integron structure composed of two parts: the 5’-conserved segment (5’-CS) and the 3’-conserved segment (3’-CS), both located downstream of the IS 26 sequence. Additionally, the region contains multiple antibiotic resistance genes, such as APH(4)-Ia , floR , sul2 , bla OXA−1 , catB3 , arr-3 , sul1 , dfrA32 , EreA , and aadA2 , along with several insertion sequences (IS). These resistance genes and IS sequences from multiple identified resistance units as depicted in Fig.  1 .

Organization of the MDR region 1 from WF3430. Genes are denoted by arrows. Genes, mobile genetic elements and other features are coloured based on their functional classification. Shading denotes regions of homology (light blue: ≥99% nucleotide identity). The accession number of Tn 6577 used as reference is CP042857-2

The MDR region 2, spanning the chromosome from positions 3,955,246 to 4,040,886, encompasses an 85.64 Kbp length. This region shares partial structural similarity with Tn 6582 (9321.13445 bp) and segments of p112298-KPC (23369.26698 bp), while the majority aligns more closely with the transposon Tn 6589 , exhibiting extensive structural homology. Notably, this area incorporates two composite integrons( intI 1-1and intI 1-2), an array of insertion sequences (IS), and a resistance module composed of multiple antimicrobial resistance genes, as depicted in Fig.  2 .

Organization of the MDR region 2 from WF3430. Genes, mobile genetic elements and other features are coloured based on their functional classification

The composite integron intI 1-1 located on the downstream of an IS 26 sequence, displaying an atypical structure where its 3’-CS2 is solely constituted by truncated versions of sul1 and qacED1 , absent of the orf5 and orf6 coding frames. This integron intI1-1 harbors variable regions carrying resistance genes such as dfrA1 , gcuC , qnrA1 , and ampR . Conversely, the right-side composite integron intI1-2 exhibits a structure mirroring that of the left, positioned upstream of IS 26 and a truncated IS 6100 sequence, according to the direction of translation. This integron was noteworthy for carrying the bla NDM−1 gene, pivotal for the bacterium’s resistance to carbapenem antibiotics, located within its second variable region (VR2). This variable region also integrates multiple mobile genetic elements including IS CR1 , ΔTn 125 , and ΔISA ba125 , thereby also encompassing genes such as arr-3 , Δ catB3 , and ble MBL . Additionally, the VR1 area of this integron carries resistance genes including aadA2 , gcuF , and dfrA12 , further contributing to its complex resistance profile.

MDR region 1 and MDR region 2 containing 10 and 13 IS sequences, respectively. Which typically located upstream or downstream of resistance genes, forming various known resistance units. These resistance units, along with the mentioned integron structures, define the characteristics of the two MDR regions. The annotation of the overall genetic structure for MDR region 1 and MDR region 2 indicates that both sequences include attL (attachment site at the left end of the ICE), int (integrase), xis (excisionase), oriT (origin of conjugative replication), a F (TivF)-type T4SS machinery (mating pair formation), and attR (attachment site at the right end of the ICE). Not only that, the 3’ and 5’ termini of MDR region 1was the same as the 3’and 5’ termini of Tn6577, respectively. demonstrating that both segments belong to an integrative conjugative element (ICE) structure.

In both hospital and community settings, Proteus mirabilis has become a significant causative agent of various infections [ 2 , 19 , 20 , 21 ]. The escalating challenge posed by this bacterium is amplified by its acquired resistance to multiple antibiotics, notably including carbapenems. The surge in resistance to carbapenem antibiotics, a last resort drugs utilized for treating infections caused by multidrug-resistant gram negative bacteria, adds complexity to the already intricate landscape of clinical management [ 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 ]. Addressing this critical concern, the focus of this study is a meticulous examination of a clinical strain identified as CR-PMI. By undertaking an in-depth exploration of the molecular mechanisms governing its antibiotic resistance. The aim was to furnish essential data that can guide strategies for implementing effective measures for clinical infection control.

The subject of this study is an elderly male patient admitted for tetanus and bacterial pneumonia, undergoing multiple invasive treatments during the course of his medical care. This patient, being at a high risk for nosocomial infections, shares similarities with previous cases involving infections caused by Proteus mirabilis [ 2 , 5 , 6 , 26 ]. This suggests a pronounced infectivity and pathogenicity of Proteus mirabilis , especially in immunocompromised individuals. It is worth noting that the CR-PMI strain was promptly isolated when patients was transferred from the intensive care unit to the infectious disease department, indicating the potential acquisition of CR-PMI through nosocomial transmission. This raises concerns about a potential localized outbreak of the bacterium within our healthcare facility. Emphasizing the need for comprehensive epidemiological investigations, it is crucial to conduct a thorough examination to ascertain the presence and extent of CR-PMI within our hospital setting.

In this study, the strains detected drug resistance genes containing most commonly used antimicrobial drugs, and the resistance phenotype showed highly resistance, which is consistent with the results of recent studies [ 27 , 28 , 29 ], which indicates that the resistance has been increasing in recent years. Moreover, a comparison of the bacterium’s resistance phenotype and genotype reveals a correlation between most drug resistances and the carried resistance genes. However, the sensitivity of this strain to meropenem (MEM) contradicts the typical phenotype of Enterobacteriaceae harboring bla NDM−1 , as previous studies have indicated that bla NDM−1 -positive strains are generally resistant to all carbapenems [ 27 , 30 , 31 , 32 ]. The phenomenon of MEM sensitivity in bla NDM -positive strains [ 33 ] warrants additional experimental investigations to uncover the underlying reasons for this phenomenon.

Through whole-genome sequencing, it was discovered that all resistance genes of this bacterium, including bla NDM−1 , are located on the chromosome, with the sole predicted plasmid carrying no antimicrobial resistance genes. This deviates from the conventional understanding that Carbapenemase resistance genes in Enterobacteriaceae are primarily plasmid-borne [ 33 , 34 , 35 ]. This peculiar characteristic might be attributed to distinct mechanism of acquire antimicrobial resistance genes in Proteus mirabilis , necessitating further research to enhance our understanding of its role in antibiotic resistance development.

Analysis of the sequencing data revealed that the chromosome of this bacterium carries two regions associated with resistance genes (MDR region 1 and MDR region 2). Within these regions, three copies of Class I integrons were identified, all containing numerous IS sequences closely related to the resistance genes discovered in this study. These IS sequences constitute various known resistance units, crucial for the bacterium’s resistance to multiple clinical antimicrobial drugs. In particular, IS 26, located upstream or downstream of the three integrons and some resistance genes in this study. It indicates that it should play a very important role in the horizontal transmission of drug resistance genes and integrons. Importantly, the three integron variable regions identified in this study carry multiple resistance genes, contributing to the bacterium’s resistance profile. Of significance, the bla NDM−1 gene is also found within the variable region of composite integron(intI1-2). However, its location within the second variable region (VR2) of the integron may influence its expression levels due to the distance from the promoter, as suggested by previous research on the relationship between resistance gene expression and integron promoter structure [ 36 , 37 ]. Furthermore, it has been traditionally believed that integrons primarily integrate carbapenem resistance genes such as bla GIM , bla VIM , and bla IMP into plasmids, with bla NDM being less commonly associated with integrons, and integration into the chromosome even rarer [ 37 , 38 , 39 ]. This observation underscores the significant contribution of integrons to resistance development in Proteus mirabilis [ 37 , 38 , 39 ], highlighting the need for further investigation into integron structure and function.

Upon detailed annotation of the two MDR regions, we observed that both regions belong to ICE structures. Previous studies have indicated that ICEs constitute a type of mobile genetic elements (MGEs) primarily residing in the bacterial chromosome, with the ability to carry resistance genes [ 40 ]. Furthermore, ICEs can be transferred between cells through conjugation, a self-encoded function. Therefore, we propose that the composite integron containing bla NDM−1 gene may have been integrated into the ICE (MDR region 2) transposon through IS sequences, subsequently transposing into the chromosome. This mode of transfer was previously observed in Proteus mirabilis isolated from livestock and food sources, where the chromosome-encoded bla NDM−1 gene was reported [ 2 , 27 , 29 ]. However, to our knowledge, this phenomenon is not common in CR-PMI strain isolated from human specimens. Additionally, similar occurrences have been documented in recent years in other strains, as seen in carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae, Escherichia coli, Acinetobacter baumannii a nd other bacteria, where chromosome-encoded carbapenem resistance genes such as bla KPC−2, bla VIM−4 and bla OXA−48 -like have been identified [ 12 , 13 , 31 , 41 , 42 ].

The emergence of such strains highlights the increasing complexity of resistance mechanisms, emphasizing the need to not only focus on resistance genes themselves and their presence on plasmids but also investigate the mechanisms by which chromosome-encoded resistance genes are formed. This is particularly crucial in the case of Proteus mirabilis , where multiple genetic elements collaboratively contribute to the spread of resistance mechanisms.

This study found that a CR-PMI strain exhibits a unique mechanism for acquiring antimicrobial resistance genes, such as bla NDM−1 , located on the chromosome instead of plasmids. Multidrug-resistant regions on the chromosome serve as mobile genetic elements carrying resistance genes belonging to ICE structures. The presence of Class I integrons and IS sequences within these regions is significant for the transfer of resistance genes. According to the results, there is increasing complexity in the mechanisms of horizontal transmission of resistance, necessitating a comprehensive understanding and implementation of targeted control measures in both hospital and community settings.

Data availability

The WGS sequence data of Proteus mirabilis isolate has been deposited in the NCBI database and are available under BioProject: PRJNA885151 (For short reads: SAMN31078299, accession number: JAOSFI000000000, and for long reads: SAMN39972476, accession number: CP145479.1).

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Acknowledgements

We would like to express my profound appreciation to the clinical staff and fellow interns for their significant contributions to the preservation of bacterial strains. Their dedication and meticulous attention to detail were instrumental in the successful completion of our experiments. This collaboration not only advanced our research but also served as a prime example of the teamwork and dedication necessary in scientific endeavors.

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Q. B. designed the study, K.D., X.L., W.L., and Q.W.conducted the study, Q.W., K.D. and Q. B. wrote the main manuscript text and W.L. prepared Figs.  1 and 2 . All authors reviewed the manuscript.

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Wang, Q., Dong, K., Liu, X. et al. Genetic characteristics of chromosomally integrated carbapenemase gene ( bla NDM−1 ) in isolates of Proteus mirabilis . BMC Microbiol 24 , 216 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12866-024-03365-7

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DOI : https://doi.org/10.1186/s12866-024-03365-7

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Spatial development and coupling coordination of society–physics–informational smart cities: a case study on thirty capitals in china.

1. Introduction

2. materials and review, 2.1. study area, 2.2. literature review, 3. methods and data sources, 3.1. modeling, 3.2. construction of the evaluation index system, 3.2.1. construction of evaluation index system for informational space, 3.2.2. construction of evaluation index system for physical space, 3.2.3. construction of evaluation index system for social space, 3.3. methods, 3.3.1. entropy weight method, 3.3.2. revised coupling coordination.

• U 1 , U 2 , and U 3 represent the comprehensive evaluation indices of the dimensions of information space, physical space, and social space, respectively.
• C represents the coupling degree of the tri-dimensional space in smart city governance.
• D represents the fusion coordination index of the tri-dimensional space in smart city governance, with a value range of [0, 1].
• T represents the comprehensive development index of the coupling system in smart city governance, reflecting the synergistic effects among the tri-dimensional space in smart city governance.
• α ,     β , and γ refer to the contribution degrees of information space, physical space, and social space in the coupling system, respectively.
• α + β + γ = 1 . The closer the value is to 1, the greater the contribution degree. This study considers the equal importance of the tri-dimensional space, hence α = β = γ = 1 3 .

3.3.3. Dagum Gini Coefficient Decomposition

• n represents the number of cities;
• k represents the number of subgroups, representing the eastern, central, western, and northeastern regions in this study;
• n j ( n h ) represents the number of cities in the j h -th subgroup;
• j h represents the number of divisions in the subgroup, and i and r represent the number of cities within the subgroup;
• G represents the overall Gini coefficient;
• y j i y h r represents the coordination level of any city in the j h -th subgroup;
• Y ¯ represents the average coordination level of the tri-dimensional space for all cities, calculated by ∑ j = 1 k ∑ i = 1 n j y j i / n ;
• G j h represents the Gini coefficient between the j -th subgroup and the j -th subgroup;
• Y j ¯ represents the average coordination level of the j -th subgroup’s tri-dimensional space;
• D j h represents the relative influence between region j and region h .

3.3.4. Kernel Density Estimation

• N represents the number of study objects, representing the number of smart cities in the observed area in this study;
• X i represents the observation value of each smart city’s spatial coupling coordination in the observed area;
• X represents the mean value of observation;
• K · is the kernel function;
• h represents the bandwidth which determines the precision of the kernel density and the smoothness of the density graph; h = 0.9 N 4 5 is usually adopted ( N is the sample size, S is the sample standard deviation).

3.3.5. BP Neural Network

• m represents the number of input layer nodes;
• n represents the number of output layer nodes;
• α represents a constant between 0 and 10;
• K represents the number of hidden layer nodes.

3.4. Architecture of Methods

4.1. assessment of smart city spatial development, 4.1.1. comprehensive assessment of smart city spatial development, 4.1.2. subsystem assessment of smart city spatial development, 4.2. descriptive analysis of smart city spatial coupling coordination, 4.2.1. overall characteristics, 4.2.2. regional disparities, 4.2.3. dynamic evolution, 4.3. inferential analysis of smart city spatial coupling coordination, 5. discussion, 5.1. pathways of development, 5.2. limitations, 6. conclusions, 6.1. overall positive development trend but still in early stages, 6.2. important influence of regional environment and development characteristics, 6.3. significant differences of contribution in evaluation indicators, author contributions, data availability statement, conflicts of interest.

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Wang, C.; Zhu, C.; Du, M. Spatial Development and Coupling Coordination of Society–Physics–Informational Smart Cities: A Case Study on Thirty Capitals in China. Land 2024 , 13 , 872. https://doi.org/10.3390/land13060872

Wang C, Zhu C, Du M. Spatial Development and Coupling Coordination of Society–Physics–Informational Smart Cities: A Case Study on Thirty Capitals in China. Land . 2024; 13(6):872. https://doi.org/10.3390/land13060872

Wang, Chao, Changhao Zhu, and Mingrun Du. 2024. "Spatial Development and Coupling Coordination of Society–Physics–Informational Smart Cities: A Case Study on Thirty Capitals in China" Land 13, no. 6: 872. https://doi.org/10.3390/land13060872

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