bam iran earthquake 2003 case study

Scientists Expose 'Buried' Fault That Caused Deadly 2003 Quake

Scientists have observed, for the first time, the healing of subtle surface scars from an earthquake that occurred on a "buried" fault several miles below the surface.

PASADENA, Calif. - Using satellite radar data, NASA-funded scientists have observed, for the first time, the healing of subtle, natural surface scars from an earthquake that occurred on a "buried" fault several miles below the surface-a fault whose fractures are not easily observed at Earth's surface. Reporting in the March 5 issue of Nature, geophysicist Eric Fielding of NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, Calif., describes how so-called "buried" faults are not so hidden after all. Using the magnitude 6.6 earthquake that devastated Bam, Iran, in 2003 as a case study, Fielding and his university colleagues analyzed radar images from the European Space Agency's Envisat satellite to study the land surface above a fault that is buried about 1 kilometer (half a mile) under Earth's surface. They discovered a shallow, narrow surface depression that formed and evolved after the quake, which killed more than 30,000 people. The results have implications for assessing the risk of future earthquakes associated with known buried faults, which can be found around the world but are often missed by geologists or assumed not to be active. Buried faults are thought to be responsible for the major 1992 Landers and 1999 Hector Mine earthquakes in Southern California. Previous seismic and satellite studies showed that the fault under Bam had slipped by about 2 to 3 meters (6.6 to 9.8 feet) at the time of the earthquake. But when scientists from Iran went out in the field after the earthquake, the cracks they found at the surface only showed 25 centimeters (9.8 inches) of slip or less. If indeed there had been 2 to 3 meters of slip at depth, the surface must have somehow absorbed that slip. Fielding and colleagues suspected the fault zone below could reveal itself in a slight deformation of Earth's surface because the pressure and stress during an earthquake causes rocks in the fault zone to expand and become more porous. After the quake, the ground will "heal" over a period of years, settling and forming a depression. To investigate the extent and rate of surface deformation after the 2003 earthquake, the researchers turned to the Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar instrument on Envisat. Researchers use images from that instrument to precisely measure elevation by bouncing a beam of microwave radiation off Earth's surface and observing the reflection back to the satellite. Fielding and colleagues then compared images from the 3.5 years following the Bam quake to see how the surface elevation changed, using a technique known as interferometric synthetic aperture radar, or InSAR. "The advantage of InSAR is that you get a map of the pattern," said Fielding, "whereas a single surveying station on the ground would just reveal that something funny was going on at one place." Indeed, InSAR revealed a shallow, ditch-like depression on the surface -- measuring between 200 to 400 meters (219 to 437 yards) wide and about 3 centimeters (1.2 inches) deep -- directly above the ruptured fault. "Using InSAR, we know that the deformation and the earthquake are associated," he said. "The depression deepened for at least 3.5 years after the earthquake." The team also modeled the sinking throughout the fault zone, using a model that is normally used to study crustal compaction and expansion around volcanoes. By analyzing an array of points along the fault to estimate how compaction produced the features at the surface, the researchers concluded that the 2 to 3 meters of slip at depth was absorbed by a "damage zone," close to Earth's surface. This means that the earthquake slip was spread over a wide volume of rock in the surface layers instead of a single fault. "There's a big, crushed-up mass of the rock that absorbs this slip that occurred at depth, and it is only visible at the surface as a subtle deformation after the earthquake," Fielding said. The study is helping the researchers anticipate the future behavior of the fault. Initially, they were concerned that if stress at depth was not relieved at the surface, then a subsequent earthquake could result. Because the rupture's stress was absorbed in the damage zone, the researchers believe the fault that shook Bam in 2003 is no longer a risk. "There's always the chance that a nearby, related fault could rupture, as eastern Iran is full of faults that are active at some scale," Fielding said. "But this one beneath Bam is the type that ruptures every 2,000 years or longer, and the stress on it seems to have been relieved." Other researchers on the study include Paul Lundgren of JPL; Roland Bürgmann of the University of California, Berkeley; and Gareth Funning of the University of California, Riverside. NASA is studying designs for a future Earth observation mission called Deformation, Ecosystem Structure and Dynamics of Ice. A key objective of the mission would be to enable InSAR measurements of deformation on fault zones around the world to better understand the processes that cause earthquakes. JPL is managed for NASA by the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena.

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Article Contents

1 introduction, 2 differential sar interferometry and data processing, 3 inversion for the source parameters, 4 discussion and conclusions.

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The 2003 Bam (SE Iran) earthquake: precise source parameters from satellite radar interferometry

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R. Wang, Y. Xia, H. Grosser, H.-U. Wetzel, H. Kaufmann, J. Zschau, The 2003 Bam (SE Iran) earthquake: precise source parameters from satellite radar interferometry, Geophysical Journal International , Volume 159, Issue 3, December 2004, Pages 917–922, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-246X.2004.02476.x

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Differential radar interferometry provided high-quality near-field deformation data for the 2003 Bam earthquake and therefore strong constraints on its source parameters. The ruptured fault segments could be clearly detected by using a Sobel Edge Filter on the phase-unwrapped deformation field. The estimated total rupture length is about 24 km. More than 80 per cent of the seismic moment was released from its southern segment of about 13 km, where the slip reached a maximum of up to 270 cm resulting in a stress drop of at least 6 MPa. In addition, optical remote sensing data show that the Bam fault is not a single fault but consists of a 4–5 km wide fault system with the known main branch running between the city of Bam and Baravat. The fault ruptured by the Bam earthquake appears to continue the NW branch of this fault system from Bam city southwards. Based on these results, we suggest that the Bam earthquake ruptured a hidden or new fault and that in this process an unusually strong asperity was involved.

The M w = 6.5 Bam earthquake occurred on 2003 December 26 at 05:56 local time. According to official estimates, more than 26000 people were killed, about 30000 injured and up to 75000 left homeless ().

The city of Bam is located directly in the Bam fault zone and bounds about the known main branch of this fault on the east. The city was built on soft alluvium (erosion deposits and river deposits) where local amplification of the strong ground shaking due to seismic waves are generally expected. The Gowk fault and the Bam fault separate the Zagros collision zone from the relatively rigid Lut block ( Berberian et al. 2000 ). The former was considered as the only seismically active fault in this region ( Ambraseys & Melville 1982 ; Walker & Jackson 2002 ). In the Zagros the convergence rate between the Arabian and Eurasian plates was estimated to be 3.1 cm yr −1 ( DeMets et al. 1990 , 1994 ), but recent GPS studies have shown a lower rate of ∼2.1 cm yr −1 (e.g. Sella et al. 2002 ; McClusky et al. 2003 ; Vernant et al. 2004 ). The latter is in good agreement with the recent study of McQuarrie et al. (2003) giving a constant rate of ∼2.0 cm yr −1 over the last 10 Myr. Moreover, the convergence rate is not only accommodated by the Zagros but also to the north in several areas ( Vernant et al. 2004 ). At the SE end of the Zagros, the Gowk and Bam faults are both of the right-lateral strike-slip type accommodating the difference of motion of the Lut block relative to the Central Iranian block (CIB) with a rate of approximately 0.8 cm yr −1 ( Vernant et al. 2004 ). The differential motion between the Lut and the Central Iranian block are due to the propagation to the north of the transition between the collision of the Zagros (S of CIB) and the Makran subduction (S of Lut). In the Bam region GPS results suggest a motion of only 1.4 cm yr −1 ( Nilforoushan et al. 2003 ).

The seismically most active fault in the considered region is the Gowk fault ( Fig. 1 ). Five earthquakes of M w = 5.4–7.1 occurred on the Gowk fault since 1981 ( Berberian & Yeats 1999 ; Walker & Jackson 2002 ), but all are more than 100 km distant from Bam. In comparison, the Bam fault is a comparatively small fault in the region. No strong historical earthquakes have been reported on this fault. Optical remote sensing data ( Fig. 1 ) show that the northern part of the Bam fault is not a single fracture element, but consists of a 4–5 km wide fault system. With data available only from strong distant earthquakes mostly along the Gowk fault, the seismic hazard in the area was rated moderate (i.e. with an expected ground acceleration of up to 2.5 m s −2 ) to high (3.0 m s −2 ) for a return period of 75 yr ( Tavakoli & Ghafory-Ashtiany 1999 ). This was an underestimation, because peak ground accelerations of 7.0 –10.0 m s −2 were recorded in the epicentral area of the Bam earthquake in both horizontal and vertical directions ( Hosseini et al. 2004 ).

Remote sensing image of Iran (inset) and a perspective view from east to the central part of Bam fault system (ASTER-DEM completed with data of GTOPO30-DEM of EOS Data Center, overlay LANDSAT-TM 159-40, 1987-09-22, bands 7, 4, 1 > R, G, B, processed with Virtual GIS tool of ERDAS-Imagine). Dashed white lines represent the main elements of dextral strike-slip zones of Bam and Gowk (according to Walker & Jackson 2002; modified). Yellow lines show the elements of the Bam fault system from interpretation of the present optical remote sensing data. Directions of the movement of the Gowk fault and interpreted movements of the Bam fault system are marked with black arrows. Note that the scale is valid only for the forefront.

From teleseismic data, different agencies determined all a dominant strike-slip mechanism for the Bam earthquake, but their preliminary locations of the epicentre had large errors. The most accurate epicentres given by USGS, Harvard and IIEES differed from each other by 10–18 km. Tatar et al. (2004) recorded aftershocks that are centred in the eastern part of the city of Bam near the known main branch of the Bam fault and have hypocentral depths between 9 and 20 km. From the aftershock distribution, the authors estimated the rupture length of the main shock to be about 18 km.

Differential radar interferometry (D-InSAR) provides high-precision coseismic deformation data which can be used to precisely determine the source parameters (see e.g. Feigl et al. 1995 ). The first successful image of an earthquake's deformation field was obtained by Massonnet et al. (1993) for the 1992 Landers earthquake, California. Since then, this technique has been used to map the deformation field of several dozen earthquakes world wide (see e.g. Wright 2002 ). Recently, Talebian et al. (2004) has presented a preliminary source model for the Bam earthquake based on the ENVISAT ASAR descending interferogram. In this paper, we show both descending and ascending interferograms and determine the source model of the Bam earthquake by a joint inversion and by a different inversion method.

Owing to its arid character, the area of Bam is free of vegetation apart from a few irrigation schemes. Hence, it is perfectly suited for applying the InSAR technique for detection of surface deformation. The European Space Agency provided an ENVISAT ASAR data set for the Bam area including three descending and three ascending pass single look complex images: orbit 6687, 9192, 9693, 8956, 9958 and 10 459, acquired on 2003 June 11, 2003 December 3, 2004 January 7, 2003 November 16, 2004 January 25 and 2004 February 29, respectively. The first two passes were acquired before the event and were used to generate a digital elevation model. The orbit 9693 and 10459 were acquired after the earthquake and thus contain certainly all information for the co-seismic surface motion due to the strong Bam earthquake in the direction of the satellite's line of sight (LOS). Using the three data pairs (9192/6687, 9192/9693 and 8956/10 459), we generated one interferogram and two differential interferograms.

Though the time interval for our first interferogram is about half a year, the coherence value is still very high and the interferometric fringes are very clear. Phase unwrapping was uncritical. The problem in data processing is the inaccuracy of the ENVISAT orbit parameters. In addition, the passes in the illumination interval, usually about 16 s, are not exactly parallel to each other. As a consequence, some unphysical fringe residues remain in the differential interferograms. In most cases, the residual fringes are significant and have to be removed. Usually, they vary in both directions, from near range to far range and from start acquisition time to stop time. The estimation of the ratio between the residual fringes and the baseline correction therefore becomes difficult. To solve this problem, the interferometric phase of the selected ellipsoid reference surface was not directly computed from the parallel baseline, but based on the estimation of the interferometric fringe frequency pattern of the reference surface ( Xia et al. 2003 ).

The differential interferograms show the coseismic displacements of the 2003 Bam earthquake mapped in the LOS direction in descending and ascending passes ( Figs 2a and b ), respectively. Each colour period represents a LOS displacement of 2.8 cm. Both differential interferograms were geocoded with a digital elevation model (DEM) derived from ASTER optical data. In the case of descending orbit, the maximum uplift along the LOS reaches about 30 cm and is located at (28.981°N, 58.381°E) ± 100 m. The maximum subsidence cannot be located such accurately. It is about 18 cm at about 12 km north from the maximum uplift.

Differential ENVISAT ASAR interferograms (geocoded) (a) from the data pair of descending orbit 9192 and 9693 and (b) from the data pair of ascending orbit 10 459 and 8956. The geo-coded area are limited by the ASTER's DEM. Each fringe step represents a LOS displacement of 2.8 cm. The software GFZ-InSAR developed by the GeoForschungsZentrum Potsdam (GFZ) was used for the data processing. (c) shows the Sobel Edge filtered descending LOS displacements for detecting the rupture trace, and (d) the derived fault (dotted yellow line) ruptured by the 2003 Bam earthquake drawn on the optical image. Red star marks the location at (29.052°N, 58.365°E), where the slip reached a maximum of up to 270 cm in the depth of 2–4 km. White stars show a few teleseismic locations of the epicentre (, 2003).

In order to detect the ruptured fault on the surface, a Sobel Edge Filter was used on the phase-unwrapped deformation field. This is based on the fact that the horizontal gradient of the deformation should take its maximum near and along the ruptured fault. From the filtered data, we could clearly identify the position and orientation of the ruptured fault ( Fig. 2c ). Approximately, it consists of three straight segments. The southern segment is about 13 km and runs from (28.971°N, 58.357°E) to (29.088°N, 58.351°E), and the northern one is about 6 km from (29.126°N, 58.382°E) to (29.178°N, 58.382°E). The middle one disappeared below the city area of Bam, where a lack of coherence prevents its tracking. For simplicity, we suppose that the fault in this area connects the southern and northern segments. The connecting line is about 5 km, so then the total length of the ruptured fault is estimated to be 24–26 km. Drawing them on the optical image ( Fig. 2d ), we see that the main southern segment is located at 4–5 km west to the known main branch of the Bam fault, whereas the northern segment coincides with it.

The earthquake was therefore simulated by three rectangular fault planes with length and strike of (14 km, 357°), (5 km, 35°) and (7 km, 0°), respectively. From a number of forward modelling runs, we found that the southern and middle fault planes dip 75–80° to the east, while the northern one dips 55° to the west. The maximum width of the ruptured area reaches about 12 km. In the next step, we fixed this fault geometry and determined the inhomogeneous slip distribution by a joint inversion from both descending and ascending ENVISAT ASAR interferograms ( Figs 2a and b ). To increase the computation efficiency, the InSAR data were filtered to a spatial resolution of 0.5 × 0.5 km 2 . A comparable spatial resolution was used to discretize the rupture area, resulting in about 1200 point sources to be determined from about 250000 and 150000 observed displacements in the descending and ascending LOS directions, respectively.

For shallow events, such as the Bam earthquake, we may suppose that any two orthogonal slip terms will produce two incoherent surface deformations. Under this condition, the coefficients S m n in eq. (1) can be determined successively from term to term, so that the computation efficiency is considerably increased in comparison with the direct inversion method. In the present case, such condition is more or less satisfied for the low-degree (long wave length) slip terms. Therefore, we start with the lowest degree ( n , m ) = (1, 1) and determine the term S 1 1 by e.g. the least-squares fitting to the observed LOS displacements. The remaining residuals should be caused by terms of higher degrees. In the next step, we then process the degree (1,2) or (2,1) and determine the corresponding slip term S 2 1 or S 1 2 by fitting the residuals remaining after the first step, and so on up to the cut-off degree ( N , M ). This new inversion approach may be called the successive approximation (SA) method. The advantage of this method is that one can always obtain a stable slip distribution with a resolution as high as resolvable from the data. Additional constraints such as smoothing are not needed.

For comparison, we also solved the complete set of the slip coefficients simultaneously by the least-squares (LS) fitting method with the smoothing condition. A similar approach has been used by Pollitz et al. (1998) . The modelling results from the two different methods are compared in Fig. 3 and the corresponding best-fitting slip models in Fig. 4 .

Modelling results for the surface deformation of the 2003 Bam earthquake. Left: (a) and (b) show the predicted and residual descending ENVISAT ASAR interferograms, respectively, using the slip model obtained from the successive approximation method ( Fig. 4a ). (c) and (d) are the same as (a) and (b), but for the ascending data. Right: (e)–(h) are as same as (a)–(d), but using the slip model obtained from the least-squares method ( Fig. 4b ). The dotted yellow line marks the fault ruptured by the earthquake.

The best-fitting slip models (strike-slip component) inversed from the two differential ENVISAT ASAR interferograms shown in Fig. 2 by using (a) the successive approximation method and (b) the least-squares fitting method with the smoothing condition. The cut-off degrees of the slip distribution [see eq. (1) ] are N = 16 and M = 8 for the strike and dip directions, respectively. The thick white line is the −25 cm contour (negative = right-lateral), marking about the rupture area. The dip-slip component for both models is about one order smaller than the strike-slip component and is not shown here. Dotted lines mark the connecting positions of the different fault segments.

In general, the LOS displacements observed in both descending and ascending LOS directions can be well simulated by the two different fitting methods. The maximum residuals are all smaller than 10 cm and only appear near the fault because of local irregularities of the rupture. Measuring by the root-mean-square residual, however, the fitting quality of the successive approximation (1.0 cm for the descending data and 1.3 cm for the ascending data) are significantly better than that of the least-squares method (2.7 and 2.1 cm).

Both slip models ( Fig. 4 ) show a nearly pure strike-slip mechanism for the earthquake. More than 80 per cent of the seismic moment was released from the southern fault segment. The slip direction is right-lateral as expected for the Bam fault. The magnitude of the slip on the northern segment is significantly smaller and seems to be not clearly resolvable by both inversion methods. We suggest that this part of surface rupture may be caused by shallow local effects due to the strong ground shaking. In particular, the same moment magnitude of M w = 6.5 has been derived from the two slip models ( Fig. 4 ). Other important parameters such as the spatial extension of the ruptured area (∼16 × 12 km 2 ), the maximum slip (∼270 cm) as well as its location (∼10 km from the southern end and at ∼3 km depth) are in agreement, too. In comparison, it appears that the slip distribution was better resolved by the SA method than by the LS method.

Differential ENVISAT ASAR interferometry has provided high-quality deformation data for the M w = 6.5 Bam (SE Iran) earthquake of 2003 December 26. Using the two data sets obtained from both descending and ascending orbit pairs, we could precisely determine the source parameters of the strong 2003 Bam earthquake. The fault-plane solution indicates that it was a right-lateral strike-slip earthquake as expected for the Bam fault. The derived rupture area strikes from south to north. The total length of the ruptured fault is about 24 km and consists of three segments. More than 80 per cent of the seismic moment was released from the southern fault segment of 13–14 km, where the slip reached a maximum of up to 270 cm. According to Wells & Coppersmith (1994) , this slip value is unusually large for a M w = 6.5 earthquake. It results consequently in an unusually high stress drop of at least 6 MPa on this fault segment, implying that a strong asperity was involved in the rupture process.

The nearly NS orientation of the ruptured fault corresponds about to that of the known main branch of the Bam fault between the city of Bam and Baravat. The present results suggest, however, that the earthquake ruptured a hidden or new fault which dips by about 80° to east and is located 4–5 km west from this main branch. Drawing the ruptured fault on the optical remote sensing image ( Fig. 2d ), we see that the earthquake appears to have continued the NW branch of the Bam fault system from Bam city southwards.

In our source model, we have considered three fault segments which were detected by using a Sobel Edge Filter on the phase-unwrapped deformation field. In comparison, Talebian et al. (2004) constructed their source model by adopting the mechanism from teleseismic observations. It consists of the main strike-slip fault (strike 357°, dip 88°, and rake −166°), and an additional pure thrust fault (strike 180°, dip 30°, and rake 90°). The strike-slip fault corresponds about to the southern fault segment of our source model shown in Fig. 2(c) . The thrust fault is located at 10 km east and nearly parallel to the strike-slip fault. Though it is difficult to imagine how these two contradictory faults interact with each other, the modelling results of these authors give the impression that the combination of the two faults is necessary for explaining the descending interferogram (see their Auxiliary Fig. 4 ). From the present study, we could verify the main strike-slip fault, but found no evidence for the second, thrust fault at the given location. Both descending and ascending interferograms can be satisfactorily predicted when the fault geometry is used which is directly derived from the InSAR data.

Acknowledgments

We thank the European Space Agency for providing the ENVISAT ASAR data. S. M. Richwalski read the manuscript and gave constructive suggestions for improvement. M. Motagh provided useful information about the Bam area. Comments and suggestions from P. Vernant and M. Wyss were very helpful for improving the paper.

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The Bam Earthquake of 26 December 2003

• Published: January 2004
• Volume 2 , pages 119–153, ( 2004 )

Cite this article

• Farrokh Nadim 1 ,
• Masoud Moghtaderi-Zadeh 2 ,
• Conrad Lindholm 3 ,
• Arild Andresen 4 ,
• Svein Remseth 5 ,
• Mohammad Javad Bolourchi 6 ,
• Mohammad Mokhtari 7 &
• Eirik Tvedt 8  

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The devastating earthquake of 26 December 2003 claimed more than 26,000 lives in the city of Bam and surrounding towns and villages in Southeast Iran, and left the majority of the Bam population homeless. The reason for this tragedy was an unfortunate combination of geological, social and human circumstances. The causative fault practically traversed the city of Bam and the earthquake occurred at a shallow depth. The residential buildings were completely inappropriate for a seismic region, being extremely vulnerable to earthquake shaking, and the earthquake occurred early in the morning when most people were still sleeping. The damage pattern was nearly symmetric about a line 3 km to the west of the surface expression of the Bam fault, and the damage attenuated rapidly with distance from this line. The industrial facilities and the lifelines performed relatively well and experienced slight to moderate damage, but this might have been due to their distance from the earthquake epicentre. However, many of the “qanat” (traditional subterranean irrigation channels) chains that served the twin cities of Bam and Baravat collapsed. Emergency facilities (hospitals, police and fire stations), schools and the university were destroyed and/or heavily damaged during the earthquake. The geotechnical effects of the earthquake were not significant. There was little evidence that site response effects played a major role in the damage pattern in the city. There were no reports of liquefaction and only minor sliding activity took place during the event. A unique set of strong motion acceleration recordings were obtained at the Bam accelerograph station. The highest peak ground acceleration (nearly 1g) was recorded for the vertical component of the motion. However, the longitudinal component (fault-parallel motion in N–S direction) clearly had the largest energy flux, as well as the largest maximum velocity and displacement.

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Farrokh Nadim

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Masoud Moghtaderi-Zadeh

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Conrad Lindholm

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Nadim, F., Moghtaderi-Zadeh, M., Lindholm, C. et al. The Bam Earthquake of 26 December 2003. Bull Earthquake Eng 2 , 119–153 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10518-004-2286-4

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Received : 05 June 2004

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Issue Date : January 2004

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s10518-004-2286-4

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Iran: undac mission report following the bam earthquake of 26 dec 2003.

26 December 2003 - 9 January 2004 Facts and figures

On the morning of 26 December 2003, at 05:28 hrs local time, a major earthquake measuring 6.5 on the Richter scale struck the city of Bam in the province of Kerman. The earthquake had a depth of only 10 - 12 kilometres and its epicentre was directly below Bam city. More than 41,000 people were killed and 30,000 injured. The earthquake destroyed 87% of the buildings in Bam city and left some 75,000 people homeless. A total of 18,000 buildings in Bam and surrounding villages were destroyed including 131 school buildings, 3 hospitals, 95 health centres and 14 rural health clinics.

The Iranian government responded very swiftly to the emergency. Only hours after the earthquake Search and Rescue (SAR) teams from the region started to work in Bam. During the first days after the earthquake, the Iranian Government evacuate 10,000 injured to hospitals in other parts of the country. The Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS) mobilized 8,500 relief workers and distributed 108,000 tents 380,000 blankets, 65,000 plastic sheets.

In the initial phase of the emergency, the international community responded very generously to the Iranian request for assistance. Within two days of the request some 34 urban search and rescue (USAR) teams from 27 countries arrived in Bam. A total of 13 international field hospitals (with 560 doctors and nurses) were dispatched. Five days after the earthquake approximately 1,600 international staff from 44 countries were operating in the affected area. A total of 200 international flights with emergency response teams and relief supplies arrived in Kerman and Bam airports within the first two weeks of the emergency.

The weather conditions in the affected area were very harsh with up to 20 degrees during the day and down to below freezing point at night.

Occasionally heavy sandstorms swept across the area and hampering the relief operation and periodically closing the two airports in the region, as well as in a minor way affecting the equipment such as computers, etc.

Activity Overview

26/12 The first notification was posted on the Virtual OSOCC at 03:42 hrs UTC. The initial indications were not alarming. The OCHA duty officer notified FCSS at 0600. Even though the reports from the area did not indicate a large-scale emergency, later that morning, it was decided to place the European and Asian UNDAC team members on stand by. Just before midday the UNDAC Team members were selected and routed to Geneva, where an agreement had been made with the Iranian Permanent Mission to issue them with visas before their departure to Bam, via Teheran. At 15.30 the Iranian authorities launched a request for international assistance and it was decided to deploy the UNDAC members already in Geneva by the next flight to Teheran. USAR teams travelling to the area were requested to include national UNDAC members on their flight.

27/12 The first UNDAC Member arrived with the Swiss USAR Team at Bam airport and opened the Reception Centre in accordance with the INSARAG Guidelines. Later in the morning, two UNDAC members arrived with the UK USAR Team at Kerman airport. Here also they opened a Reception Centre to assist the arriving international teams. The UNDAC Team Leader met with the Acting UNDP Resident Representative in Teheran. The UNDAC Team member already in Bam facilitated the first USAR Coordination meetings with the local emergency management agency (LEMA). The Governor of Kerman led the meeting were it was decided to establish an international campsite for the International SAR Teams, at the military base in Bam.

28/12 The main part of the UNDAC Team arrived very early in the morning in Bam. The first rapid assessments were undertaken and meetings were held with the head of LEMA. At 0800 the UNDAC Team facilitated the first USAR Coordination meeting. The UNDAC Team leader met with the Iranian Minister of Interior and the Governor of Kerman. The On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC) was established and operational by 13:00 hrs. Meanwhile, two UNDAC members, in cooperation with DFID, carried out an aerial damage assessment of the affected area. A second USAR Coordination meeting took place in the evening and the first situation report was issued that evening. OCHA dispatched an OCHA delegate to Teheran to support the work of the UN Country team in the capital.

29/12 The UNDAC Team facilitated two USAR Coordination meetings and a general relief meeting with more than 80 participants. At this point it was decided to start a sectoral meeting structure. The IFRC FACT Team (Field Assessment Coordination Team) was briefed and areas of responsibilities decided. Members of the Finnish USAR Team carried out damage assessment in surrounding villages. The first damage maps of Bam were produced and distributed and the second situation report was finalized. President Khatami visited the OSOCC in the evening and thanked international staff for their assistance. At this stage, approximately 1,600 international rescue workers from 44 countries had been registered by the OSOCC. WHO opened a "Health cell" in the OSOCC and remained present throughout the operations.

30/12 Immediate relief needs in the area were met and the USAR operations in zones 4 and 6 were completed. The first sectoral meetings were facilitated (Health, Field hospitals and Water and Sanitation (WATSAN)) and took place in the OSOCC. During the day UNDAC Team members gave more than 20 interviews to the international media. The third Situation report was issued. UNICEF established a presence in the OSOCC and remained present throughout the operation.

31/12 The USAR operation changed from one of general search in the zones to "dispatch on request" from Iranian SAR Teams operating in the area. The UNDAC Team facilitated the departure of the international teams. Tents and food supplies left behind by the international teams were stored and later distributed to NGOs arriving on site without basic supplies for survival. The UNDAC Team initiated a "rapid mapping" of the humanitarian situation in the designated areas to cover the information gap, before the IRCS completed the detailed mapping and registration. The UNDAC Team met in the afternoon with the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs and later in the evening facilitated the visit of the Governor of Kerman, who met all International teams to wish the staff a happy new year and to thank the team members for their contribution.

01/01 All international relief workers were requested to wear an ID badge. The OSOCC was requested by the Iranian authorities to be the clearinghouse for the issuing of the badges. The FACT WATSAN assessment was completed and the UNDAC Team carried out the first environmental assessments. By this time only 10 USAR Teams remained operational in the area. The UN Resident Representative in Iran visited the area and during the day held day several meetings with members of the UNDAC Team.

02/01 The OSOCC was moved to the former "Norwegian Tents". The Reception Centres in Bam and Kerman airports were closed and the activities handed over to IRCS. A security plan for International Teams operating in the area was produced and introduced. The UNDAC Team was scaled down to five members. In addition staff from the UN Country team and the USAID Team were now working in the OSOCC. The UNDAC Team met with representatives from the Iranian Government to discuss the procedures for the reinstatement of visas and how relief workers without visas could be issued with visas.

03/01 The UNDAC Team assisted the UN Appeals team with the development of the Flash Appeal. A total of 10 sectoral meetings took place in the OSOCC during the day. The UNDAC Team received 50 mobile phones from Ericsson, which were distributed to UN Agencies and NGOs present in the field. (Additional mobile phones were provided to local authorities, IRCS and IFRC Staff and it was agreed to create a local "Humanitarian phonebook".)

04/01 UNDAC/DART Humanitarian mapping was completed. A representative from the UN Security Team in Iran visited the OSOCC and approved the security plan developed for the team and for the International camp personnel.

05/01 The visa requirements were restored and the Iranian authorities opened a "Visa office" in the vicinity of the OSOCC. The UNDAC Team completed the Environmental Assessment of the area. At the request of the Iranian Authorities it was decided to move all international organizations out of the military camp. The UNDAC Team, in cooperation with the Iranian authorities, selected a new location and the conditions for the arrangements for the transfer to and management of the camp were agreed. During the evening/night the OSOCC was moved to a new location at the Bam city football stadium, to facilitate the arrival of the international teams during the following day.

06/01 All international teams (some 200 staff) moved into the new location and the transfer of the teams was completed during the afternoon/evening. At the general relief coordination meeting that took place in the OSOCC the UNDAC team introduced rules and regulations for the occupation and operations in the camp. A program for the appeal launch was developed jointly with the Governorship of Kerman, IRCS and FACT.

07/01 The OCHA Senior Humanitarian Affairs Officer, who had been appointed to take over and continue the facilitation of coordination of the UN operation in Bam after the departure of the UNDAC team was in place and by the end of the day the coordination and operational tasks were transferred. Additional local staff were hired to support the operation of the "UN Transitional Team".

08/01 The UNDAC Team, jointly with FACT and IRCS, facilitated the visit of the high-level representatives to Bam and the launch of the IFRC and UN appeals The groups included the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the President of the IFRC along with members of the Iranian authorities, representatives from the UN country team and representatives from the donor community in Teheran, in total more than 90 persons. The remaining members of the UNDAC Team left Bam in the afternoon and the continuation of the operation was handed over to the UN Transitional Team

09/01 The Iranian Minister of Health, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Deputy President of IFRC together with the UNDAC Team provided a presentation on findings and recommendations from the mission during at a general donor meeting in Geneva.

Mission Evaluation

The main part of the Team was deployed in two waves via Teheran. The team members passed through Geneva to obtain visas at the Iranian Permanent Mission to the United Nations. The remaining team members deployed with SAR Teams directly to the affected area. The main section of the UNDAC Team only arrived in Bam during the night between 27 - 28 December. Only the UK SAR team offered to stop over and pick up the UNDAC Team in Geneva, but, for technical reasons, this could not be carried out.

Methods of more speedy deployment of the main section of the UNDAC Team need to be explored (own aircraft or secure seats along with SAR Teams). The Operational manager in FCSS should facilitate the tactical management of the UNDAC Team when the team is deployed in sections, until the TL arrives on site.

In the initial phase of the emergency, the UNDAC Team did not have sufficient manpower to carry out independent assessment missions. The first aerial assessment was carried out jointly with DFID and the damage assessment was carried out by the respective SAR Teams. At the request of the UNDAC Team, members of the Finnish SAR Team did carry out assessments in the surrounding villages. Following the completion of the SAR phase, it was decided that the IRCS would carry out a complete mapping of the Humanitarian situation, including registration of people in the area. While the completion of this detailed assessment was estimated to take more than a week, the UNDAC Team, with vital support from the US DART, initiated a more rapid "humanitarian mapping" of the affected area in order to provide the international community with valuable information for the continuation of the emergency operation under way. The UNDAC Team also carried out several environmental assessments, participated in joint WHO/UNDAC Health assessments and supported the work of the UN agencies in development of the Flash Appeal. The findings of the UNDAC assessment were shared with actors on the ground and posted on the Virtual OSOCC.

The role of UNDAC has over the past years changed from carrying out "on the ground assessment" to facilitation and coordination of assessments carried out by other entities and ensuring that all areas are covered. The role of the UNDAC team at the onset of a disaster has become more focused on information management and ensuring that all areas are covered. This new emphasis needs to be reflected in the methodology and training concept

Coordination - Cooperation

Search and Rescue

Nearly all International USAR Teams operating in Bam were familiar with the INSARAG Guidelines and were to a large degree self-sufficient. Most of the teams, together with the OSOCC, were accommodated in the "International camp" and all teams participated in the twice-daily SAR Coordination meetings. On the morning of 28 December, it became apparent that due to the nature of the collapsed buildings, the international SAR assets were not being used optimally. It was decided to reorganize and concentrate the SAR Teams in zones rather than on individual targets, the UNDAC team managed this procedure. The search and rescue activities in the zones determined continued until the afternoon of the 31 December, after which the USAR Teams were only deployed to selected sites on request.

It is and would be unrealistic to expect that the UNDAC Team would be able to carry out detailed damage assessments for the engagement of the International SAR Teams. Instead it would be useful to develop a standard assessment form to be used by the SAR Teams to ensure the quality of the feedback from the teams operating in the area. Only very few of SAR Teams offered automatically to place their liaison officers permanently in the OSOCC, but staff were released on direct request from the UNDAC Team

Local Authorities

Daily meetings with representatives from the Governorship of Kerman were key for the identification of the priorities in the relief operations as well as serving as a platform where information on the humanitarian situation in the area was shared and contradictions clarified. The openness and transparency in the discussions and cooperation were clearly instrumental in ensuring the successful use of the response from the international community. At the request from the Iranian Authorities, the OSOCC acted as the focal point for all international relief workers in the area and was instrumental in ensuring that everybody was instructed in respect of the code of conduct and basic security. In addition

Representatives from the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs did, at an early stage, establish a permanent presence within the vicinity of the OSOCC and participated in the general Coordination meetings and served as a focal point for matters related to the continuing presence of the international relief workers.

The fact that most of the relief workers were staying within the same camp and that all had to register at the OSOCC did place the UNDAC Team in a central role with regards to coordination, but did at the same time raised huge expectations regarding the UNDAC team as the key problem solver and to a certain degree entity for tasking of the organisations engaged in the relief operations. OCHA needs to engage constantly with disaster-prone countries to support their preparedness activities and to facilitate the interaction between providing and receiving countries in emergencies.

UN Country Team

During his transition through Teheran, the UNDAC Team leader met with the Acting UN Country representative, who briefed the team on the situation in the area well as the action taken by the respective UN Agencies present in country. During the first five days of the operations in Bam, the UNDAC team, along with WHO, were the only permanent UN presence in the area. The interaction with the UN Country team was very limited, during this period, due to technical difficulties in reaching representatives in Teheran. The Country representative of UNICEF did visit the area on 30 December. Her visit was shortly after followed by a visit from the UN Country representative, where the outline for the Appeal, the role of the UNDAC Team in the appeal process, as well as the ongoing facilitation of the coordination of the relief operation were discussed.

The setting up of the respective sectoral relief coordination mechanisms would clearly have benefited from an early presence by representatives from the UN Specialized Agencies, which also would have placed the UN country team in a stronger position towards the large number of NGOs moving into the area

IFRC FACT Team (Field Assessment Coordination Team)

On arrival in Bam, the FACT Team leader immediately contacted the OSOCC to get briefed on the Humanitarian situation in the affected area. Here it was agreed to continue close cooperation through transparent information sharing and twice-daily meetings. All basic facts and figures ware shared in the respective Field situation reports. In addition, it was agreed that the FACT Team would take the lead in the cooperation with the Iranian Red Crescent Society, while the UNDAC Team would take the lead in the cooperation with the Iranian Authorities. The joint launch of the IFRC and UN Appeals in Bam on 8 January 2004 was one of the results of the cooperation between the FACT and the UNDAC Teams.

Years of cooperation and joint training clearly facilitated the smooth cooperation between the FACT and UNDAC teams and both organisations would benefit from further development of these relations.

The representative of the "EU Mechanism" proposed the setting up of a separate forum for the SAR Teams from the EU member countries and that he should represent these teams at the SAR Coordination meetings. This proposal was not acceptable either for the OSOCC or the SAR Team leaders, since, to ensure the optimal use and coordination of the SAR assets, it was essential that representatives from all teams were present at the SAR Coordination meetings. The EU Mechanism representative was invited to support the work of the OSOCC by providing a physical presence in the coordination centre and as an option to take the lead in one of the relief sectors where no lead agency had been identified. However, before his departure he had not replied to this request and the EU team ended up playing only a marginal role in the information exchange between the teams from within EU.

During the two visits by the ECHO team, the representatives openly discussed with the UNDAC team the humanitarian issues in the affected area and received recommendations on areas of priority. ECHO contributed successfully to relief operations by providing not only financial support to the relief operation but also assistance in areas, which traditionally would not be considered as high priorities. Amongst these initiatives was the "Internet café", which was highly appreciated by all international organizations in the area.

Establishment of Coordination structures

Reception centres

The UNDAC Members arriving with the UK SAR Team in Kerman Airport and with the Swiss SAR Team directly to Bam airport established, in accordance with the INSARAG Guidelines, reception centres in the respective airports. At a later stage, the reception centres were taken over by fresh UNDAC Members arriving on site. It was agreed with the IRCS, that the UNDAC Reception centres should facilitate the arrival (and later departure) of international teams and ensure the onward travel of these, while the IRCS would be responsible for the incoming relief items. The Reception centres remained open until 3 January, when the main number of the SAR Teams had departed.

The activities of the Reception centres were handed over in part to the IRCS and in part to the IFRC Logistics Emergency Response Unit, which meanwhile had established a permanent presence in the airports.

The SAR Liaison officers should be equipped with a minimum of IT, communications and office equipment, which would enable them to establish functional reception centres to receive/send information to the OSOCC and OCHA Geneva and if possible send updates directly to the Virtual OSOCC. All relief items were handled by the IRCS, which in the initial phase of the emergency was clearly overloaded with the tasks. It would have been useful if the UNJLC had been able to deploy along with the UNDAC Team and support the establishment of the Reception centres, assist with airport logistical issues and facilitate the logistical coordination of the response from the UN Agencies. The UNDAC Members manning the reception centres expressed the need for additional training in the practical establishment of a reception centre as well as more knowledge on the functions of an international airport.

The OSOCC, in the initial phase, was established at the centre of the camp housing the main group of the International SAR Teams. The OSOCC was temporarily accommodated with the Finnish SAR team and later on the first day, it was moved to two large office tents provided by THW and DEMA. The OSOCC became a natural centre for information exchange and general services to the international teams. Telecoms Sans Frontiers established an Internet café, in the vicinity of the OSOCC, and the Iranian authorities established services for the provision of badges and later visas. The OSOCC later moved to the new camp, to which all international teams in the area were required to relocate. On the departure of the UNDAC Team, the facilities were handed over to the UN country team and became the UN Coordination centre.

Due to its timely establishment, central location, and adequate facilities, the OSOCC successfully managed to facilitate the coordination of and provision of information to the International teams operating in the area. The open-house policy, the high-level of services provided and the number of daily general as well as sectoral meetings ensured the key position of the OSOCC in the coordination of the international response. During its 2 weeks of operation, the OSOCC registered more than 120 teams, produced more than 40 reports/maps, distributed more than 700 copies of various documents and facilitated more than 80 meetings. In addition, the OSOCC facilitated the work of the UN Flash Appeal team and planned for, and supported the launch of the joint IFRC and UN appeals.

Equipment and staff support

A one-person support module was deployed along with the second wave of the UNDAC team. On the second day, it became apparent that additional support for the operation would be required and a basic support module was requested from DEMA (deployed with the Danish SAR Team). The UK SAR team provided the necessary equipment for the establishment of the Reception Centre in Kerman, while the Reception Centre in Bam was supplied by the Finnish SAR team. On departure the Norwegian SAR Team handed over their camp facilities to be used by the UNDAC Team and it was agreed that these facilities would be offered to facilitate the long-term presence of the UN in Bam. In total 1 augmented camp module, 2 basic office modules, 2 communications modules and 6 Support staff members were deployed from the IHP countries to support the UNDAC Team. Most of the IHP support staff members departed with their respective SAR Teams and were replaced with members from the US DART team. The first module provided by SRSA was mislaid in transit and never arrived in Bam. This module unfortunately included the server with the UNDAC Mission software.

The generous and timely support from the IHP organisations with staff and equipment were instrumental in the success of the UNDAC Team The cooperation and support from the IHP organisations on the ground were excellent.

The GSM link established by Ericsson and Turkcell could also have been important to facilitate the communication between the humanitarian actors on the ground, had the facilities arrived at an earlier stage. And had Turkcell in the first phase only attempted to facilitate the local communication, at the same time discussing with the Iranian authorities the conditions for connecting the GSM node to the existing network. The IHP organisations should consider reaching out and inviting organizations and the private sector, such as Ericsson and Telecom sans Frontiers, which provide complementary and gratis services, to join the IHP network. In addition they should ensure that similar networks are established in other UNDAC regions. The IHP could also consider positioning a basic office/communications module with FCSS in Geneva to be launched with the UNDAC Team leader.

Exit strategy

As the SAR operations scaled down and the majority of the SAR Teams left the area, it was agreed to let the UNDAC members who had originally arrived with SAR team depart with their respective teams. Only the UNDAC Members with visas would remain in the area. It was agreed during the development of the framework for the appeal, that OCHA should facilitate the coordination of the UN Team in the 3-month period covered in the appeal. A Senior OCHA Humanitarian Affairs Officer was appointed to take over lead of the coordination after the departure of the UNDAC Team and he arrived, in a timely fashion, to ensure a smooth hand-over of the UNDAC activities and to be introduced to all partners in the area.

The hand-over process was eased by the fact that the coordination responsibilities were taken over by an experienced OCHA officer (and UNDAC Member) and that the UNDAC Team was able to leave behind the camp and office equipment for the continuum of the operation.

Team organisation and functioning

The team was organised with members manning the two reception centres and the OSOCC and the TL facilitating the internal team coordination. The team members did not at any stage during the operation all get together, but internal information exchange and cooperation was managed on the phone or via e-mail. In spite of this the team and its associated members functioned very well even though the workload demanded up to 24-hr working days and left no time for internal evaluation of activities carried out. One or two more team members in the initial phase of the operations would have been useful especially to facilitate information management and administrative functions in the OSOCC. Team members arriving with SAR teams easily integrated into the team. Due to the workload and the institutional knowledge gained during the work, it was decided not to rotate the staff. Some of the UNDAC Members therefore remained in the Reception Centres throughout the operation.

The joint training of the UNDAC Members and the additional training of the Support team members carried out over the past years is key for the seamless formation of the UNDAC Team and the capability of the team to hit the ground running. A senior and very experienced member of the team was appointed as the daily manager of the OSOCC, which gave the UNDAC Team leader the space to facilitate the overall coordination of the emergency response and the management of the entire UNDAC team. The round"The Clock" Support by staff in the Field Coordination Support Section and the responsible OCHA Desk officer Mr. Rudi Muller was instrumental in ensuring the high performance of the team throughout the mission.

Team Composition:

1) Mr. Jesper Holmer Lund (OCHA, team leader) 2) Mr. Edward Pearn (United Kingdom, OSOCC Manager) 3) Mr. Alois Hirschmugl (Austria, Reception Centre Kerman Airport 4) Mr. Alain Pasche, (Switzerland, Reception center, OSOCC, Environmental assessment) 5) Mr. Argo Parts (Estonia, SAR Logistics, OSOCC, Health) 6) Mr. Alexej Avdeed (Russian Federation, SAR Coordination, assessment) 7) Mr. Vladimir Boreiko (Russian Federation, SAR Coordination, assessment 8) Mr. Neil Barry (United Kingdom, Reception centre Kerman airport, assessment) 9) Mr. Robert Holden (United Kingdom, Reception centre Kerman airport, assessment) 10) Mr. Heinrich Gloor (Switzerland, Reception centre Bam airport) 11) Mr. Michael Zein (Denmark, Reception centre Bam airport) 12) Mr. Peter Kaas-Claesson (Denmark, SAR Coordination, OSOCC) 13) Mr. Hossein Sarem-Kalali (UNDP, Shelter) 14) Dr. Khalid Shibib (WHO, Health) 15) Mr. Leif Wall (Sweden, UNDAC Support module, OSOCC) 16) Mr. Lars Stage (Denmark, UNDAC Support module, Bam Airport) 17) Mr. Arto Lappi, Finn Rescue Forces (Support Staff in Bam Airport) 18) Mr. Per Anders Berthlin, SRSA (Support staff

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