thesis goddess of creation

Thesis The Greek Primordial Goddess of Creation

In Greek mythology , Thesis is the primordial goddess of creation , often associated with the concept of Physis (Mother Nature). She is believed to have emerged at the beginning of creation alongside Hydros (the Primordial Waters) and Mud. Thesis is sometimes portrayed as the female aspect of the first-born deity, Phanes. She holds a significant role in ancient cosmology and mythology’s origins.

Key Takeaways:

Thesis is the Greek primordial goddess of creation in ancient Greek mythology .
She is associated with Physis (Mother Nature) and emerged alongside Hydros and Mud at the beginning of creation .
Thesis may be considered the female aspect of the first-born deity, Phanes.
She embodies the concept of creation and plays a vital role in ancient cosmology .
Thesis’s origins, family connections, and powers contribute to her importance as a mythological figure .

Origins of Thesis

Thesis, the Greek primordial goddess of creation , holds a significant place in Greek mythology and ancient cosmology . As the first being to emerge at the creation of the universe, she embodies the concept of the birth of the cosmos. Thesis is closely associated with Hydros and Mud, representing the elemental forces of water and earth, respectively. Some interpretations suggest that she is the female aspect of Phanes, a bi-gendered deity symbolizing the essence of life.

In the Orphic Theogonies, Thesis is prominently mentioned as the initial manifestation of creation. This mythological text provides insights into her role in the ancient Greek pantheon. As the Greek primordial goddess of creation , Thesis sets the foundation for the entire mythological framework and cosmological understanding of the ancient Greeks.

Family of Thesis

As a primordial goddess , Thesis does not have traditional parents. She is considered to have spontaneously emerged at the beginning of creation. However, she is associated with several important beings in Greek mythology.

Hydros: The primordial god of water, is mentioned as a possible parent of Thesis. Together, they represent the fundamental elements of creation, water and earth.
Mud: Another possible parent of Thesis, Mud symbolizes the primordial nature of the earth.
Chronos: Thesis is connected to the birth of Chronos, the primordial god of time. This relationship highlights her role as a progenitor of important deities.
Ananke: Thesis is also associated with Ananke, the primordial goddess of necessity. This connection further underscores her significance in the realm of Greek primordial gods .

These relationships highlight Thesis’s role in the family tree of primordial gods , emphasizing her importance as a foundational figure in Greek mythology.

Powers and Attributes of Thesis

As the Greek primordial goddess of creation, Thesis possesses a range of impressive powers and attributes. Her divine nature grants her omnipresence , meaning that she pervades every aspect of the universe. She exists in all places simultaneously, her essence intertwined with the fabric of reality.

Moreover, Thesis is blessed with omniscience . From the moment of creation, she has witnessed and comprehended every event that has unfolded in the cosmos. Her vast knowledge encompasses the intricate details of the universe, past, present, and future.

Thesis’s creative abilities are truly awe-inspiring. With a mere thought, she has the power to shape existence, bringing forth life and shaping the destiny of all beings. From the grandest celestial bodies to the tiniest microorganisms, Thesis can conjure them effortlessly out of nothingness.

Although Thesis is an ethereal being, she can manifest a physical form at will. She can assume any appearance, captivating mortals and immortals alike with her divine beauty and grace. This ability allows her to interact with the world and its inhabitants on a more tangible level, if she desires.

It is also crucial to note that Thesis transcends the constraints of mortality. As a primordial deity , she exists beyond the boundaries of time and the cycle of life and death. Her essence is eternal, sustaining the very essence of creation itself.

Role in Creation and Mythology

Thesis, the Greek primordial goddess , played a significant role in the creation of the cosmos. She is believed to have created a cosmic egg from water, which served as the vessel for the emergence of the first-born deity, Phanes. Phanes, also known as Life, became the first king of the universe and the ancestor of all other living beings.

Thesis is considered the mother of Hydros, the grandmother of Phanes, and the creator of the cosmic egg . Her involvement in the creation of life and the universe establishes her as a foundational figure in Greek mythology, symbolizing the origins of all living beings.

Mystery and Interpretations of Thesis

Despite her significant role in Greek mythology and ancient cosmology, much remains unknown about Thesis, the primordial goddess of creation. She remains a mysterious figure, with limited records and descriptions. Yet, the enigmatic nature of Thesis only adds to her allure and intrigue.

Thesis is often depicted as an ethereal being, capable of shape-shifting and assuming various forms. While she is typically referred to with female pronouns, it is believed that she has the ability to change her gender at will, further adding to the mystique surrounding her.

One prevailing theory suggests that Thesis, along with other primordial deities , has chosen to cast aside her anthropomorphized form. This deliberate act of transcendence may explain the scarcity of information and records about her existence. It is as if Thesis embodies the essence of creation itself, transcending human comprehension and defying categorization.

“Thesis, with her shape-shifting abilities, seems to elude our understanding, much like the very essence of creation she represents.”

Despite the lack of concrete information about Thesis, scholars and myth enthusiasts continue to speculate and interpret her character and motivations. Some theories delve into the metaphysical aspects of creation, linking Thesis to the concept of thesis as an idea or proposition that initiates the birth of new understanding.

In the absence of concrete facts, we are left to contemplate the elusive nature of this ancient deity. Perhaps the true essence of Thesis lies not in predefined descriptions and accounts but in the layers of interpretation and imagination that continue to unfold as we explore the depths of Greek mythology and the primordial deities .

Ethymology of Thesis

The word “thesis” comes from the Greek term “θέσις” (thésis), which means “a setting, a position, or a proposition.” This etymology further emphasizes the underlying connection between Thesis and the concept of creation, as she is the very embodiment of the initiating force behind the birth of the cosmos.

Comparative Analysis of Primordial Deities

Influence and legacy of thesis.

Thesis, the primordial goddess of creation in Greek mythology, had a profound influence on the cosmology and origins of mythology itself. As the embodiment of creation, she played a pivotal role in shaping the universe and the emergence of life. Her legacy as a revered deity continues to resonate in ancient Greek culture.

One of Thesis’s significant contributions to Greek mythology was her creation of the cosmic egg . This cosmic egg served as the vessel from which Phanes, the first-born deity and embodiment of life, emerged. Symbolizing the origins of all living beings, the birth of Phanes represents the intrinsic connection between Thesis and the creation of life.

“Thesis, as the primordial goddess of creation, brought forth the cosmic egg, giving birth to the first deity and the essence of life itself.” – Greek Mythologist

Thesis’s presence in Greek mythology reinforces her importance as a divine being and one of the ancient deities revered by the ancient Greeks. As the primordial goddess of creation, she not only birthed the universe but also established the foundation for the ancient Greek cosmology .

Her legacy extends beyond Greek mythology, influencing the understanding and interpretation of creation in various cultures and religious beliefs. Thesis’s role as a creation deity highlights her significance and enduring influence, shaping the understanding of cosmology and the origins of existence.

Thesis’s influence and legacy continue to captivate scholars, historians, and enthusiasts who dive into the depths of Greek mythology. As one of the foundational figures in ancient Greek cosmology , she continues to inspire and provoke thoughtful analysis of the origins of existence and the ancient Greek understanding of creation. Thesis’s impact on mythology remains an enduring testament to her role as a primordial goddess.

The Primordial Goddess in Ancient Cosmology

In ancient Greek cosmology , Thesis occupies a significant role as the primordial goddess of creation. Rooted in the belief systems of ancient Greece, the concept of the cosmos emerging from primordial elements and beings is central to understanding the origins and structure of the world. Thesis represents the initial manifestation of creation, symbolizing the birth of life and the universe itself.

Within the framework of ancient creation beliefs , Thesis’s presence is instrumental in explaining the emergence of the cosmos. As a primordial deity , she embodies the primal forces that form the foundation of all existence. Her significance lies in her ability to symbolize the birth of life and the universe, delineating the beginnings of Greek cosmology.

“Thesis represents the initiation of creation, a symbol of the universe’s birth and the formation of life itself.” – Greek Scholar

Exploring the Primordial Deity

As a primordial deity , Thesis has a unique place in ancient Greek cosmology. She is considered a divine figure of immense power and influence, integral to the very fabric of the universe. While her character and motivations are often shrouded in mystery, her role as a primordial deity reflects the ancient Greeks’ understanding of creation and the forces that govern the cosmos.

Thesis’s presence in ancient cosmology highlights the importance of primordial deities in ancient Greek mythology and belief systems. These deities represent the fundamental aspects of the universe, embodying the elemental forces that shape reality. As the primordial goddess of creation, Thesis serves as a powerful symbol of the origins and structure of the world.

The Significance of Thesis in Ancient Greek Beliefs

Thesis’s role as the primordial goddess of creation aligns with ancient Greek beliefs regarding the origins of the universe. According to these ancient creation beliefs , the cosmos arose from a primordial state, with Thesis symbolizing the emergence of life and the birth of the universe.

Within the ancient Greek cosmological framework, Thesis’s presence signifies the beginning of existence and the formation of the natural world. She represents the creative force that brings order and structure to the chaotic primordial state, establishing the foundations upon which all subsequent beings and phenomena would arise.

Thesis’s presence in ancient Greek cosmology provides insight into the ancient Greeks’ understanding of the universe and their attempts to explain its formation. Her role as the primordial goddess of creation underscores the importance of divine beings in shaping the beliefs and worldview of the ancient Greeks.

Reflections in Literature and Mythology

References to Thesis can be found in various ancient literary works and mythological texts. Homer, in the Iliad , depicts Okeanos and Tethys (another name for Thesis) as the primordial gods of creation. Alcman describes Thesis as the first being to emerge, followed by Chronos and Ananke. Plato mentions Thesis as the mother of Eros (Procreation). These references point to the significance of Thesis in ancient Greek literature and mythology, solidifying her role as a mythological figure .

Speculations and Interpretations

Due to the limited information available about Thesis, speculation and interpretation surround her character and motivations. Some theories suggest that she was one of the first deities to cast aside her anthropomorphic form, leading to the scarcity of records about her. Others delve into the metaphysical aspects of creation and thesis as a concept. These speculations highlight the intrigue and fascination surrounding this enigmatic Greek primordial goddess.

Modern Influence and Popularity

While Thesis may not enjoy the same level of recognition as other Greek mythological figures, her significance resonates within the realm of mythological studies. Scholars and enthusiasts continue to explore and interpret her role in creation and mythology. Additionally, her portrayal in ancient texts and her connection to primordial deities contribute to the ongoing fascination with Greek mythology. Thesis’s presence in the realm of mythological characters remains intriguing to modern audiences.

Thesis, the Greek primordial goddess of creation, holds a prominent position in Greek mythology and ancient cosmology. As the embodiment of creation, she is intricately connected to the birth of the universe, the emergence of life, and the formation of deities. Although shrouded in mystery, her role as a foundational figure in Greek mythology and ancient beliefs is undeniable. Thesis’s influence and legacy continue to be explored and interpreted, captivating those who delve into the rich tapestry of ancient myth and lore.

Who is Thesis in Greek mythology?

Thesis is the primordial goddess of creation, often associated with the concept of Physis (Mother Nature). She is believed to have emerged at the beginning of creation alongside Hydros (the Primordial Waters) and Mud.

What role does Thesis play in ancient cosmology?

Thesis represents the initial manifestation of creation, symbolizing the emergence of life and the universe. Her presence in ancient cosmology underscores the significance of the primordial deities in explaining the origins and structure of the world.

Who are the possible parents of Thesis?

Thesis is associated with Hydros, the primordial god of water, and Mud. She is also connected to the birth of Chronos, the primordial god of time, and Ananke, the primordial goddess of necessity.

What powers and attributes does Thesis possess?

Thesis is omnipresent, omniscient, and has the ability to create anything from nothing. She can manifest a physical form when desired and exists outside the limitations of mortality as a primordial deity.

What is the role of Thesis in the creation of the cosmos?

Thesis created a cosmic egg from water, from which the first-born deity, Phanes, emerged. Phanes became the first king of the universe and ancestor to all other living beings.

Why is there limited information about Thesis?

Thesis remains a mysterious figure with limited records and descriptions. It is believed that she, like other primordial deities, has chosen to cast aside her anthropomorphized form, leading to a lack of information about her existence.

What is the legacy of Thesis in Greek mythology?

As the primordial goddess of creation, Thesis holds a prominent position in Greek mythology and ancient cosmology. She embodies the concept of the birth of the universe and the subsequent emergence of life, establishing her as a foundational figure.

How is Thesis portrayed in ancient literature and mythology?

References to Thesis can be found in various ancient literary works and mythological texts, including those by Homer, Alcman, and Plato. These references solidify her role as a mythological figure in ancient Greek literature and mythology.

What are the speculations and interpretations surrounding Thesis?

Due to limited information, there are speculations about Thesis’s motivations and character. Some theories suggest that she was one of the first deities to cast aside her anthropomorphic form, leading to the scarcity of records about her.

Does Thesis have modern influence and popularity?

What is the role of the primordial goddess in ancient cosmology?

In ancient Greek cosmology, the primordial goddess represents the initial manifestation of creation, symbolizing the emergence of life and the universe. She is intricately connected to the birth of the cosmos and the formation of deities.

How does Thesis’s influence extend beyond her existence in Greek mythology?

Thesis’s role as the primordial goddess of creation aligns with ancient Greek cosmology. Her presence in ancient creation beliefs highlights the significance of the primordial deities in explaining the origins and structure of the world.

What is the significance of Thesis in ancient mythology and cosmology?

As the Greek primordial goddess of creation, Thesis played a prominent role in the formation of the cosmos and the emergence of life. Her importance as a divine being and one of the ancient deities revered by the Greeks cannot be overlooked.

Source Links

https://www.theoi.com/Protogenos/Thesis.html
https://superhuman-characters-and-their-powers.fandom.com/wiki/Thesis_(Greek_Mythology)
https://www.worldanvil.com/w/a-world-of-myth-and-magic-power-of-a-name/a/thesis3A-primordial-goddess-of-creation-person

Thesis (goddess)

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Thesis ( Greek Θέσις ; Thesis ) is a primordial goddess of creation in ancient Greek religion. [1] She is sometimes thought to be the child of Chaos , and emerged with Hydros . It is believed that she and her sibling created the world Gaia and the waters that surround her, or either that cooperated with Chaos in the process. She is sometimes identified with Physis .

Thesis Greek God

Enshrined in ancient lore as the god of creation and the personification of divine order and natural law, Thesis occupies a significant position in the intricate pantheon of Hellenic deities, casting a profound and enduring influence on the philosophical and artistic currents that have flowed through human history.

The name “Thesis” finds its etymological roots in the Greek term “thésis,” meaning “a proposition” or “a setting down.” This linguistic connection serves as a poignant reflection of Thesis’s paramount role in laying down the fundamental principles that govern the cosmos, establishing the bedrock upon which the intricate complexities of life and existence unfold. Often depicted as a majestic figure adorned in regal attire, with a countenance exuding wisdom and authority, Thesis symbolizes the inherent balance and harmony that underlie the intricate tapestry of the natural world.

Central to Thesis’s divine essence is the concept of cosmic order, an intricate web of interconnected forces that govern the ebb and flow of existence. As the divine architect of the universe, he is credited with orchestrating the harmonious interplay of elements, guiding the celestial bodies in their celestial dance and imbuing the natural world with an inherent sense of purpose and design. Through his unwavering commitment to balance and equilibrium, Thesis represents the philosophical underpinnings that have shaped humanity’s understanding of the delicate interplay between order and chaos, form and void.

In the annals of Greek mythology, Thesis’s influence extends far beyond the realm of celestial mechanics, permeating various aspects of human civilization, from the realms of art and literature to the spheres of governance and jurisprudence. His essence embodies the inherent desire for structure and coherence that lies at the heart of human endeavors, inspiring generations of thinkers and visionaries to seek out patterns and meaning within the complex tapestry of existence.

Parents [ ]

Ancient text [ ].

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Creation and Conservation

In the philosophy of religion, creation is the action by which God brings an object into existence, while conservation is the action by which God maintains the existence of an object over time. The major monotheisms unambiguously affirm that God both created the world and conserves it. It is less clear, however, whether creation and conservation are to be conceived as distinct kinds of actions. The question has its roots in medieval and early modern characterizations of divine action, and it has received renewed attention in recent decades.

On the predominant traditional view, conservation is continuous creation. Adherents of this view typically say with Francisco Suárez that God’s creation and conservation of things are “only conceptually distinct” (Suárez 1597, 120). Jonathan Edwards, for example, says, “God’s upholding created substance, or causing its existence in each successive moment, is altogether equivalent to an immediate production out of nothing, at each moment…. So that this effect differs not at all from the first creation, but only circumstantially…” (Edwards 1758, 402). In other words, there is no real difference between the act of creation and the act of conservation, though different words may be used for them. Descartes, Malebranche, Leibniz, and Berkeley all express similar views. More recently, Philip Quinn likewise treats both God’s creating and God’s conserving as species of bringing about a thing’s existence. We call the act ‘creation’ if it occurs at the first time at which the creature exists, and we call it ‘conservation’ if it occurs at a later time, but the action is the same (e.g., Quinn 1988, 54).

The alternative to this view is that the act of conserving beings that already exist differs from calling beings into existence from nothing. Some argue that each persisting creature plays a causal role in its ongoing existence, so that God is not the sole agent as in an ex nihilo creation. Some also argue that conservation must be an ongoing act, whereas creation occurs at an instant.

A large part of what is at stake in the debate is the relationship between divine action and creaturely action. Continuous creation theorists may reject a distinction between creation and conservation as an attempt to attribute a divine prerogative to created things. On the other hand, those who endorse a distinction may regard continuous creation theory as (to borrow a phrase) “one of those high-minded philosophical depreciations of God’s works that come disguised as compliments to God’s person” (van Inwagen 1988, 46 n4). The debate also raises a number of interesting questions about causation, time, and their relations.

1. Distinguishing Theses about Divine Conservation

2.1 from divine atemporality, 2.2 from the superfluity of a distinction, 2.3 from the inability of created things to sustain their own existence.

3.1 From Secondary Causation
3.2 From the Persistence of Created Things
3.3 From the Nature of Time
3.4 From Differences in the Causal Patient and the Time of Occurrence

Other Internet Resources

Related entries.

It will be useful to distinguish between several theses.

The conservation thesis: The continued existence of created things depends on God’s activity.
The same-action thesis: God’s action of creating things is the same action as God’s conserving things.
The sole-source thesis: God alone brings about the continued existence of created things.
Occasionalism: God is the only genuine cause of any effect.

The conservation thesis is inconsistent with the Deistic understanding of God’s relationship to the world, on which the world’s existence and operation require no divine involvement after the world is brought into being. In a different way, the conservation thesis is inconsistent with any view that denies that created things truly persist through time. If no created thing exists for more than an instant, God may well be continuously creating, but God is not conserving what has been created. Within traditional Jewish, Christian, and Muslim theology the conservation thesis is relatively uncontroversial, in part because the thesis is apparently implied by the sacred texts. (One biblical example is Hebrews 1:3: “[The Son] is the reflection of God’s glory and the exact imprint of God’s very being, and he sustains all things by his powerful word.” One quranic example is Al-Baqarah 2:255: “His eternal power overspreads the heavens and the earth, and their upholding wearies Him not.” For a challenge to the conservation thesis, see Beaudoin 2007.)

One who affirms that conservation is a continuation of creation goes beyond the mere affirmation of conservation to a theory about the nature of conservation. Such a person might have either the same-action thesis or the sole-source thesis in mind. The same-action thesis implies that conservation is continued (or “continuous”) creation in the sense that the ongoing existence of created things through time is an effect of the very action that caused them to exist in the first place. The action itself may well be timeless, so it is the effect that is really continued.

The sole-source thesis implies that conservation is continued creation in the sense that God conserves in just the way that God creates, i.e., without the aid of created things, either as causal co-agents or as patients. Like creation, conservation is an ex nihilo act. The view Edwards expresses above is a representative example of this claim.

Both the same-action thesis and the sole-source thesis have a prominent role in the historical discussion of conservation, but they are distinct claims. Typically ‘continuous creation theory’ names the sole-source thesis, which has come to be the salient idea, but the language of continuous creation has also sometimes referred to the same-action thesis (e.g., see the ‘ continuata creatio ’ entry in Muller 1985).

Yet another thesis is occasionalism, which says that God is not only the sole cause of the ongoing existence of created things but also of every other event that they may be involved in, including those in which created things may appear to affect others. Some have objected to continuous creation theory on the grounds that it implies occasionalism. (See section 3.1.)

2. Arguments for Conservation as Continuous Creation

Because of the ambiguity noted above, both defenders and deniers of continuous creation can find some inspiration in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. In Summa Theologiae he says,

The preservation of things by God is a continuation of that action by which He gives existence, which action is without either motion or time; so also the light in the air is by the continual influence of the sun. (Ia.104.1, reply to obj. 4)

Here the doctrine of divine atemporality supports the same-action thesis. By one unchanging action God brings about the existence of creatures (i.e., created things) at whatever times they exist. (Malebranche echoes this view in, e.g., Dialogues on Metaphysics , VII.7.)

In the article that follows, however, Aquinas argues explicitly that this does not imply that God preserves created things immediately (i.e., without an intermediate cause). Some creatures depend on other creatures for their preservation, as well as on God as their principle cause (Ia.104.2). Aquinas’s claim implies that the preservation of created things differs from their creation, and that the sole-source thesis is false.

Contemporary philosophers Jonathan Kvanvig and Hugh McCann argue for continuous creation theory on the basis of divine immutability. They defend their case against replies of two sorts: (1) attempts to limit the object of divine creation so as to exclude the continuing existence of creatures (while granting divine immutability), and (2) objections to divine immutability. As Kvanvig and McCann acknowledge, the notion of divine immutability faces a non-trivial challenge from the argument that an omniscient being must know what time it is, and must therefore change (see Kretzmann 1966). For this reason they suggest bolstering the case for continuous creation theory with additional arguments.

Francisco Suárez endorses the same-action thesis, attributing the view to Aquinas and others. For Suárez, creation and conservation are the same act and do not differ “except merely conceptually or because of some connotation and relation” (Suárez 1597, 121). He concludes that conservation has no patient; God does not do something to an already existing creature to preserve it. Rather, its preservation is an instance of creation ex nihilo . So Suárez’s position includes the sole-source thesis as well.

Suárez supports his position by arguing that any distinction between creation and conservation would be superfluous. He argues, for example, that if creation and conservation were two distinct actions, then the second would have to last for the whole time the creature was conserved. But if so, the first action could last for that time equally well, and there would be no point in positing two actions.

Suárez also emphasizes that the effect of creation and conservation is the same: the existence of the creature.

… an action has its unity from its terminus and its principle—or from its patient as well, if it is an action on a patient. But the production and the conservation have exactly the same terminus; therefore, if the principle is the same, as we are presupposing, then the action we are discussing here will be the same, since creation has no subject [i.e., no patient] ( ibid. , 122).

The arguments of Aquinas, Suárez, and others were influential enough that Descartes could later describe the same-action thesis as “an opinion commonly accepted among theologians” ( Discourse on the Method , Part Five, 133).

A number of thinkers have argued for the sole-source thesis not (or not only) on the basis of the nature of divine action, but on the basis of creatures’ inability to preserve themselves. In Principles of Philosophy , Descartes argued for God’s existence from the persistence of objects through time. His reasoning makes it clear that he regarded conservation as a continual re-creation.

It will be impossible for anything to obscure the clarity of this proof, if we attend to the nature of time or of the duration of things. For the nature of time is such that its parts are not mutually dependent, and never coexist. Thus, from the fact that we now exist, it does not follow that we shall exist a moment from now, unless there is some cause—the same cause which originally produced us—which continually reproduces us, as it were, that is to say, which keeps us in existence. For we easily understand that there is no power in us enabling us to keep ourselves in existence. We also understand that he who has so great a power that he can keep us in existence, although we are distinct from him, must be all the more able to keep himself in existence; or rather, he requires no other being to keep him in existence, and hence, in short, is God ( Principles of Philosophy , 200).

If created things were able to contribute causally to their ongoing existence, then God would cooperate with the creatures in conserving them. This would make creation and conservation distinct on the assumption that the creatures’ causal contributions are not redundant. But Descartes claims that, given the nature of time, creatures have no power to conserve themselves, and that God alone causes their continued existence.

Jonathan Edwards, a zealous defender of divine majesty and sovereignty, gives a similar argument for creatures’ dependence on God for their present existence.

[The cause of the present existence of a created substance] can’t be the antecedent existence of the same substance. For instance, the existence of the body of the moon at this present moment, can’t be the effect of its existence at the last foregoing moment. For not only was what existed the last moment, no active cause, but wholly a passive thing; but this also is to be considered, that no cause can produce effects in a time and place on which itself is not . ‘Tis plain, nothing can exert itself, or operate, when and where it is not existing. But the moon’s past existence was neither where nor when its present existence is. (1758, 400)

Later Edwards adds that the same reasoning shows that no part of the effect is due to the antecedent existence of the substance in question ( ibid ., 402). He concludes, “God’s preserving created things in being is perfectly equivalent to a continued creation , or to his creating those things out of nothing at each moment of their existence” ( ibid ., 401).

While Descartes’s argument, as stated, assumes that created things persist through time, Edwards comes close to claiming that created things do not persist at all. Given continuous creation theory, he says, “there is no such thing as any identity or oneness in created objects, existing at different times, but what depends on God’s sovereign constitution ” ( ibid ., 404). However, he qualifies this with the claims that there are different kinds of identity and oneness, and that God’s constitution—that is, God’s decree or ordaining—is what makes truths of this sort.

Edwards’s view has two disadvantages with respect to the case for continuous creation theory. One is that the argument implies that created things are not genuine causes, a position explicitly rejected by most thinkers in the tradition (a matter to which we will return below). The other is that, because creatures arguably do not persist on this view, it is inaccurate to say that they are conserved. God does indeed continuously create, but the objects so created are new objects. So understood, the view implies that nothing is conserved, properly speaking.

Edwards regarded creatures’ inability to sustain themselves as “plain.” Kvanvig and McCann attempt to bolster this position by undermining several potential reasons for thinking the contrary. For example, one might think that the diachronic character of physical laws shows that physical objects have an innate ability to persist. If they did not, what would make the laws reliable predictors of objects’ behavior? Kvanvig and McCann find this thought lacking on the grounds that physical laws presuppose the continuing existence of the world. They are reliable because the presupposition is correct, but not because the objects they characterize are self -sustaining.

Is the idea of an innate self-sustaining quality tenable? Kvanvig and McCann consider a number of possible construals and argue that they are of dubious coherence. They also give an argument with an Edwardsian flavor. A power to perpetuate one’s own existence would be an ability to cause something to occur at a future time, a time at which the exercise of the power would no longer exist. No physical sequence of events could be the basis for such a time-jumping power, since such a sequence would itself depend on a power of this sort. So the power would need to bring about a future effect without the aid of any intervening events to connect them. But nothing that no longer exists can be causally operative, so there can be no such power (Kvanvig and McCann 1988, 42–3).

3. Arguments for a distinction between creation and conservation

3.1 from secondary causation.

(See also Occasionalism .)

One persistent worry about the sole-source thesis has its roots in the medieval debate over whether there is secondary causation (i.e., genuine causation by created things). Suppose that created things are causes: fire really does cause water to boil, and ice really does cause it to cool. If creatures can affect future events in this way, why should they not at least help to bring about their own future existence? Why should their causal powers be limited to affecting the qualities of things without contributing to their own presence in the world? Contrapositively, if created things cannot bring about their own future existence, are they also unable to have any effect on the future?

Occasionalism is the theory that there is no genuine secondary causation, since God is not only the first cause but the only cause. We might be tempted to regard a fire beneath a pot of water as a created cause, but its presence is merely an occasion for God to cause the water to boil. The worry about the sole-source thesis, then, is that it implies occasionalism. William Lane Craig, for example, says that continuous creation theory “runs the risk of falling into the radical occasionalism of certain medieval Islamic theologians …” (Craig 1998, 183). [ 1 ] The Ash’arites, for example, believed on scriptural grounds that only God has agency (McGinnis 2006). They offered a variety of arguments for occasionalism and against Avicenna’s position that created objects have natures as Aristotle conceived of them and thus have causal powers essentially.

Nonetheless, occasionalism has been a minority view among theists. Aquinas and Suárez both hold that conservation is in some sense continued creation but reject occasionalism in very strong terms. This is a typical position among theists, for most of whom the proposition that continuous creation theory implies occasionalism would constitute an objection to the former.

It is easy to produce arguments for continuous creation theory that also support occasionalism. In particular, the arguments that are driven by the inability of created things to affect the future (such as those by Descartes and Edwards, above, and similar arguments by Malebranche) appear to have occasionalism as a corollary. If no cause can have an effect at a time at which it does not exist, then created things do not bring about their future states, nor those of other created things. The changes in the world can only be caused by God. Malebranche and Edwards would have happily accepted this result; Descartes’ case is less clear. In contrast, Kvanvig and McCann (1988, 43–44) deny that their similar argument implies occasionalism.

Apart from any particular argument for continuous creation theory, Philip Quinn argues that the view itself does not imply occasionalism (Quinn 1988). Whether causal relations are understood as Humean regularities, Lewisian counterfactual dependences, or necessary connections, the proposition that God is the sole cause of the existence of contingent beings does not entail that God is the only cause of events. It remains possible that contingent beings nonetheless have causal influence over the qualities and behavior of other such beings. The result is a cooperative picture of the evolving state of the world. “God and the lit match collaborate to produce the heated water: God provides the water, and the lit match provides the heat” (Quinn 1988, 70).

Andrew Pavelich poses what we may call the first-moment objection to such a view. If we consider the moment at which God creates a universe of objects in motion, it seems that the causal powers of the created objects could not account for the character of other objects, including their motion. At the first moment, only God’s creative power could affect their state. But if each later time is one at which God creates the world ex nihilo , then each time is relevantly similar to the first. At no time will a created thing be able to exercise its causal powers (Pavelich 2007, 12–13).

One possible reply (discussed by Pavelich) grants that a thing created at time t has no effect on other things at t , but nonetheless affects things at later times (whether the things affected are identical to things that existed at t or distinct from them). Later times differ from the first at least in that they are preceded by earlier times, and this opens up the possibility that things existing at later times are affected by causal powers exercised earlier. Such a reply is not available to one who, like Jonathan Edwards, assumes that no object can have an effect at a place or time at which it is not. However, for those who affirm causal relations across time, a position that includes continuous creation but rejects occasionalism is a theoretical option.

3.2 From the persistence of created things

One reason for thinking that the persistence of created objects must depend on some exercise of those objects’ causal powers, and not God’s creative power alone, is that an object that did not depend on its earlier existence could not really be the same object. To persist, an object’s later existence must be due (at least in part) to its own earlier existence. Persistence, in turn, is a necessary condition of conservation, since a world without persistent objects would not be conserved in being but rather succeeded in being.

We have already noted (in section 2.3) that Edwards’s case for continuous creation comes close to denying that created things do, strictly, persist through time. One might well wonder, then, whether the sole-source thesis precludes creatures’ identity over time. The intuition that persistence requires causal dependence (at the least) is widely shared. Peter van Inwagen, for example, accepts it as a constraint on acceptable answers to the question of how physical persons could persist between death and resurrection. In that context he writes:

In the end, there would seem to be no way round the following requirement: if I am a material thing, then, if a man who lives at some time in the future is to be I, there will have to be some sort of material and causal continuity between this matter that composes me now and the matter that will then compose that man. (van Inwagen 1995, 486)

Most physicalists who have since addressed this puzzle have shared van Inwagen’s assumption despite the fact that denying the causal requirement would make it much easier to provide a solution. This suggests that the causal requirement has considerable intuitive force.

The sole-source thesis may even threaten the persistence of creatures apart from the causal requirement. Craig articulates the question whether the lack of a patient in conservation has this result.

Is it even coherent to affirm that God creates a persistent entity anew at every instant? If at every t God created ex nihilo , is it really x which exists at successive instants rather than a series of simulacra? Since there is no patient subject on which the agent acts in creation, how is it that it is the identical subject which is re-created each instant out of nothing rather than a numerically distinct, but similar, subject? (Craig 1998, 184)

One way to defend continuous creation theory from the persistence objection is to argue that it is possible to create the same object more than once. Quinn distinguishes between creating something (bringing about its existence) and introducing something (bringing about its existence for the first time). It is clearly impossible to introduce something at more than one time, but, Quinn argues, it is not at all clear that it is impossible to create something at more than one time. Quinn thus calls the causal requirement into question (Quinn 1983). [ 2 ]

Temporal parts theory may suggest another line of defense. William Vallicella says briefly that an occasionalist can affirm the persistence of created things by holding that time is continuous and that persisting objects are composed of continuum-many temporal parts (Vallicella 1996, 353 n. 20). If this is correct, then a continuous creation theorist can presumably do the same. David Vander Laan considers a temporal-parts strategy and finds it problematic. Given a sufficiently inclusive theory of composition, he argues, a series of objects may indeed compose an object that exists at various times and thereby persists, but if there are no causal relations between these objects it does not seem that their sum could be, e.g., a human person. Arbitrary cross-temporal sums need not be united by internal causal relations, but persons must (Vander Laan 2006, 164).

Vander Laan explores the range of options for resolving the tension between continuous creation theory and the causal requirement. The continuous creation theorist should explain what, if not causal continuity, could distinguish a case of persistence from a case of replacement by qualitative duplicates. Of the options he considers, Vander Laan suggests that the most viable one locates the difference in a divine fiat that is present in the persistence case and absent in the replacement case (2006, 165–6). On the other hand, one who affirms the causal requirement should explain in what sense God sustains things in existence. Vander Laan identifies two possibilities: (1) a joint-sufficiency theory on which God’s causal contribution and the creature’s causal contribution are both needed for the creature’s persistence, and (2) a co-operative divine sufficiency theory on which God’s act must cause the creature to bring about its continued existence (2006, 172–4).

3.3 From the nature of time

One recent objection to continuous creation theory maintains that it implies that time is not real (Pavelich 2007, 16–19). Pavelich argues that for time to be real, it must have a kind of “temporal inertia,” a natural tendency to move from each moment to succeeding moments. This inertia would include a natural tendency of things existing at times to continue existing. But it is this very sort of inertia that continuous creation theory denies, since it says that the existence of times and objects in time depend solely on divine acts.

Pavelich suggests that the tension between time and continuous creation runs even deeper. Given continuous creation theory, times only stand in relations of before and after because of God’s creative activity. But then we cannot say that God creates one moment before or after another, as temporal relations hold only subsequent to those acts of creation.

One possible response to these claims is that time can be real without “temporal inertia.” Some will reject the intuition that time must move or pass due to its own natural disposition. Some reject the passage of time entirely. Others will say that temporal passage is real and that it occurs precisely because of God’s creative activity. (Recall the argument of Descartes quoted in section 2.3.)

Another possible response is that there is a creation-independent time in which God operates that could confer reality on the time of the created world. Pavelich contends that even if such a time were real, it would not succeed in conferring reality on the time of the created world. The moments of the created world would still not be directly related to each other so as to make time real. God could even create them out of sequence or change the past, Pavelich argues, without causing anything odd that a created being could notice.

3.4 From differences in the causal patient and the time of occurrence

According to Craig, it is intuitively clear that creation and conservation are distinct actions since conservation has a patient (or object) and creation does not. To conserve a thing in being is to act on that thing. In contrast, to create a thing is not to act on it or on any other thing, but to bring it into existence from nothing. Thus the “circumstantial” distinction between creation and conservation (i.e., causing the existence of something that did not exist earlier vs. causing the existence of something that did exist earlier) requires a deeper distinction between the natures of the actions themselves (Craig 1998, 183). We may call this an agent-patient theory of conservation (Miller 2009). Craig finds this intuitive distinction expressed in Scotus, though Timothy Miller disputes this interpretation (2009, 475).

This difference between creation and conservation also makes it clear, Craig argues, that the two occur at different times. Creation is instantaneous; it occurs at the moment that the created thing first exists. Though the creation of a thing is generally preceded by the thing’s nonexistence, the act itself is not an extended process of moving something from nonexistence to existence. Until it exists the thing is not there to be acted upon. But conservation is the act of preserving a thing in existence from one time to another, so it must occur over an interval of time (Craig 1998, 186–7). In other words, creation is synchronic, but conservation is diachronic. In several ways, then, reflection on the very notions of creation and conservation lead us to see that the two are to be distinguished.

The agent-patient theory has elicited two objections related to the time at which conservation occurs. Vallicella argues that on this view God cannot begin conserving an object (Vallicella 2002) and Miller argues that on this view God cannot conserve things continuously (2009, 478–483).

Vallicella observes first that if conservation has a patient, God’s conservation of it must be diachronic. If the act of conservation were simultaneous with the effect of the object’s existence, then God’s act at a time would both cause and presuppose the existence of that object at that time. So the act must occur at an earlier time or over an earlier interval. Next Vallicella argues that if God creates an object ex nihilo at t , God cannot conserve it at t since it does not yet exist. Clearly God cannot begin to conserve an object at a time after it is created, since the object would only exist at that time if it had already been conserved. So there is no time at which God can begin to conserve an object. Miller responds by wondering why the object would not exist at t . Vallicella’s distinction between the time of an object’s coming into existence and the first time at which it exists is dubious, since a nonexistent object could not undergo a process of coming into existence (Miller 2009, 477).

Miller’s own objection to the agent-patient theory is that it does not allow God to conserve continuously (2009, 478–483). Though conservation is in general diachronic on the agent-patient theory, God’s initial act of conservation must occur at the moment the patient first exists. This act either brings about the existence of the patient at a later moment or through a later interval. If at a later moment, then the patient will not exist at the times between its creation and the moment in question. If through a later interval, [ 3 ] then during that interval God would not need to conserve the patient, since its existence over that interval then would have already been secured by God’s conserving act at its first moment. Any conserving act during the interval would be redundant. Beyond the interval the dilemma arises again, suggesting that conservation on the agent-patient theory would need to be discontinuous, something like a person pushing a merry-go-round every few seconds to keep it spinning.

One further problem of the agent-patient theory, Miller adds, is that if the act of conservation can bring about the existence of a thing over an interval, then there seems to be no reason that any sustaining act is needed after the moment of its creation. The interval of existence caused at its first moment could be long enough to include the object’s entire span of existence. So conservation over time appears to be unnecessary. Vander Laan (2022) explores whether Miller’s objection to the agent-patient theory can be circumvented by theories on which God’s conserving action brings about the later existence of the patient only in conjunction with additional, continuous divine activity.

The arguments surveyed above illustrate how both the historical discussion and the contemporary debate about creation and conservation are multifaceted. Considerations regarding divine nature, human nature, causation, and time are all relevant to whether conservation should be understood as continuous creation. A key task of those who wish to stake out a position in the debate, then, is to assess which of these varied arguments are most powerful and which can be met by credible objections.

Aquinas, Thomas, 1274. Summa Theologiae , Fathers of the English Dominican Province (tr.), second revised edition, available online .
Beaudoin, John, 2007. “The World’s Continuance: Divine Conservation or Existential Inertia?” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion , 61: 83–98.
Craig, William Lane, 1998. “Creation and Conservation Once More,” Religious Studies , 34: 177–88.
Descartes, Rene, 1637. Discourse on the Method , in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes , John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 111–51.
–––, 1644. Principles of Philosophy , in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes , John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 177–291.
Edwards, Jonathan, 1758. Original Sin , in The Works of Jonathan Edwards (Volume 3), Clyde Holbrook (ed.), New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.
Fakhry, Majid, 1958. Islamic Occasionalism and it Critique by Averroes and Aquinas , London: George Allen & Unwin.
Freddoso, Alfred, 1988. “Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case against Secondary Causation in Nature,” in Thomas V. Morris (ed.), Divine and Human Action , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 74–118.
–––, 1991. “God’s General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservation is Not Enough,” Philosophical Perspectives (Volume 5), James E. Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing, pp. 553–85.
Kretzmann, Norman, 1966. “Omniscience and Immutability,” Journal of Philosophy , 63: 409–21.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. and McCann, Hugh J., 1988. “Divine Conservation and the Persistence of the World,” in Divine and Human Action , Thomas V. Morris (ed.), Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 13–49.
–––, 1991. “The Occasionalist Proselytizer: A Modified Catechism,” in Philosophical Perspectives (Volume 5), James E. Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing, pp. 587–616.
Malebranche, Nicholas, 1688. “Selections from Dialogues on Metaphysics ,”in Philosophical Selections , Willis Doney (tr.), Steven Nadler (ed.), Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1992, pp. 145–256.
McGinnis, Jon, 2006. “Occasionalism, Natural Causation and Science in al-Ghazali,” in Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy, From Many to the One: Essays in Celebration of Richard M. Frank , James E. Montgomery (ed.), Leuven: Peeters Publishers, pp. 441–63.
Miller, Timothy D., 2009. “On the Distinction between Creation and Conservation: A Partial Defense of Continuous Creation,” Religious Studies , 45: 471–85.
–––, 2011. “Continuous Creation and Secondary Causation: The Threat of Occasionalism,” Religious Studies , 47: 3–22.
Muller, Richard A. 1985. Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology , Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House.
Pavelich, Andrew, 2007. “On the Idea that God is Continuously Re-Creating the Universe,” Sophia , 46: 7–20.
Quinn, Philip L., 1983. “Divine Conservation, Continuous Creation, and Human Action,” in The Existence and Nature of God , Alfred J. Freddoso (ed.), Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 55–80.
–––, 1988. “Divine Conservation, Secondary Causes, and Occasionalism,” in Divine and Human Action , Thomas V. Morris (ed.), Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 50–73.
–––, 1993. “Creation, Conservation, and the Big Bang,” in Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External Worlds , John Earman, Allen I. Janis, Gerald J. Massey, and Nicholas Rescher (eds.), Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 589–612.
Suárez, Francisco, 1597. On Creation, Conservation, & Concurrence, : Metaphysical Disputations 20–22 , Alfred J. Freddoso (tr.), South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2002.
Vallicella, William, 1996. “Concurrentism or Occasionalism?” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly , 70: 339–59.
–––, 2002. “The Creation-Conservation Dilemma and Presentist Four-Dimensionalism,” Religious Studies , 38: 187–200.
van Inwagen, Peter, 1995. “Dualism and Materialism: Athens and Jerusalem?” Faith and Philosophy , 12: 475–88.
–––, 1988. “The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God,” in Divine and Human Action , Thomas V. Morris (ed.), Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 211–35.
Vander Laan, David, 2006. “Persistence and Divine Conservation,” Religious Studies , 42: 159–76.
–––, 2022. “The Timing of Divine Conservation,” forthcoming in Philosophical Essays on Divine Causation , Greg E. Ganssle (ed.), New York, NY: Routledge.
Yang, Eric Timothy, 2009. “Conservation, Discontinuous Time, and Causal Continuity,” Religious Studies , 45: 85–93.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

Kvanvig, Jonathan and David Vander Laan, “Creation and Conservation,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/creation-conservation/ >. [This was the previous entry on Creation and Conservation in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy — see the version history .]

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Conjuration
Manifestation

Thesis (Greek Mythology)

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Thesis was the primordial goddess of creation, a divinity related to Physis . She occurs in the Orphic Theogonies as the first being to emerge at creation alongside Hydros and Mud. Thesis was sometimes portrayed as the female aspect of the first-born, bi-gendered god Phanes

Omnipresence : As the physical embodiment of creation, Thesis is present everywhere at all times. Nothing can evade her presence, besides the actions of Chaos , one of the only other beings more powerful than him.

Omniscience : As the physical embodiment of creation, Thesis has seen, heard, and understood everything that has happened since creation of the universe. Thus, she is an expert in the history of the universe.

Creation : As the physical embodiment of creation, Thesis is able to create anything from nothing, including living beings, other deities, or objects.

Manifestation : As a primordial deity, Thesis is an incorporeal being who is capable of manifesting a physical form if she wishes.

Amortality : As a primordial deity, Thesis physically embodies an intangible concept. As such, she is essentially immortal in the fact that she has never actually been alive. Thus, she cannot be killed since she isn't truly alive.

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The Doctrine of Creation

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The doctrine of creation states that God, who alone is uncreated and eternal, has formed and given existence to everything outside of himself. He did this from nothing by the word of his power, and all of it was very good.

Historical Christianity has always believed—as indicated in both The Apostles’ Creed and The Nicene Creed—that God is the creator of the universe. This article will focus on providing an examination of the historic doctrine of creation and many of the relevant theological implications that flow from it. Attention will be given to the main aspects of this doctrine that have been broadly embraced by Christians throughout the centuries rather than to those areas about which Christians have disagreed with one another. In tracing out these main aspects, the following article will start by examining two important phrases from Genesis 1:1, “In the beginning, God” and “God created the heavens and the earth.” After that, the article will spend time reflecting upon some of the things that those phrases imply theologically, namely, that God is the source and sustainer of everything, that God created everything good, that God invested His creatures with responsibility and significance, that this diversity within creation is reflective of the doctrine of the Trinity, and that God’s creative actions are not identical with those of human beings.

Introduction

It is hard to imagine that there is any topic within Christianity that has been responsible for more debate and disagreement than the doctrine of creation. The question of whether or not God created everything in the universe is a line in the sand, so to speak, that immediately divides everyone in the world into two camps: those who believe in creation and those who don’t. 1 But this question doesn’t just divide the world into two opposing camps, it also raises a number of secondary questions, the answers to which have frequently been the cause of further division and disagreement, especially among believers. Questions pertaining to the length of the creation days, the age of the earth, and the relationship between creation and evolution—just by way of example—have fostered great debate among Christians. These matters have often taken center stage when the doctrine of creation has been discussed and have frequently overshadowed the more fundamental aspects of it. In this article, our main focus will be to examine some of these more fundamental aspects of the doctrine of creation about which there has typically been broad consensus among Christians, as well as many of the theological deductions that flow from them.

“In the beginning, God”

The first four words of the Bible place immediate emphasis upon God. They tell us from the very beginning that before anything else in the universe existed, God already was. Nothing brought him into being. Nothing gave him existence. He was around long before anything else was. He was around long before there was even such a thing as time itself.

God’s name and the way in which it was given to Moses in Exodus 3 both confirm and highlight this independence of being. The name YHWH in verse 15, which is typically translated by the English word “Lord” (in all capital letters), is connected to the “to be” verb in verse 14. In other words, when God gave his name to Moses, he expressed that name in terms of being: “Say this to the people of Israel, ‘I AM has sent me to you’” (Exod. 3:14). This tells us that God is the being one, the one who is. And he gives his name to Moses from the midst of a bush that was burning but not being consumed (3:2-3). In other words, the fire in the bush was not in any way dependent upon the bush for its energy to burn. It was independent, self-existent, and self-sustaining.

This is the picture of God presented to us in the opening words of the creation account. Before anything else existed, God existed. He alone is uncreated and eternal (Psa. 102:25-27; Rev. 1:8). Nothing gave him existence. Instead he gave existence to all things outside of himself.

This means that God did not need to create in order not to be lonely. He did not need to create in order for him to be able to love. He was self-sufficient; he needed nothing outside of himself. For all eternity, he had been enjoying perfect fellowship and perfect love as the three-in-one God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Creation was an overflow of his perfection not a manifestation of his inherent imperfection or lack. 2

God created “the heavens and the earth”

When the Bible says that God “created the heavens and the earth” (Gen. 1:1), it does not mean to suggest that he only created those two things and nothing else. The Bible is here employing a figure of speech called merism, in which two contrasting terms are used to express totality. We do the same thing regularly in our marriage vows when we pledge to love one another “for better or for worse” or “for richer or for poorer.” Our pledge is not just for the two extremes of life but for the extremes and everywhere in between. We are using two contrasting words to express totality. We are promising to love one another all the time , regardless of circumstance. Likewise, when the Bible says that God “created the heavens and the earth,” it is saying that God created the heavens and the earth (the extremes) and everything in between. It is expressing totality. The point is that God has created everything in the universe (cf. Gen. 14:19). 3

Even though God has created all things, he has not created them all alike in significance or value. The Bible is clear that humankind is the apex of God’s creative work. Human beings were the final creative act of God on the final “day” of creation, created in the image of God and charged with exercising dominion over everything else (Gen. 1:24-8). And while we don’t know exactly what all the image of God entails, it is fairly obvious from Scripture that it at least involves a creative element. In other words, it appears that God has created human beings to mirror His image as creator. To be sure, human beings cannot and do not create in the exact same way that God does—a point to which we will return shortly. But it still remains true that part of what it means to be created in the image of God is that we are made to be vice-creators (Gen. 1:27-8; cf. Gen. 3:7; Gen. 6:14-16; Gen. 8:6; Gen. 11:4; just by way of example).

God is source and sustainer of everything

The fact that God is the only uncreated and eternal being in the universe, who is also creator of all, means that he is the source and sustainer of everything that exists. We not only “have our being” in him, but we “live and move” in him as well (Acts 17:28; cf. Heb. 1:3; 2 Pet. 3:7). This means that every person in the universe is subject to God and dependent upon him as creator and sustainer. No one is autonomous or independent. We are all derived and dependent creatures. We belong to God, the absolute owner of everything (Gen. 14:19, 22), and that means that we are accountable to him (Rom. 3:19). 4

It is this aspect of the doctrine of creation that paves the way for the gospel. No doubt this is why Herman Bavinck, Francis Schaeffer, and many others emphasized the importance of the doctrine of creation as, what Bavinck called, the “starting point of true religion.” 5 Without accountability, the need for grace and forgiveness evaporates. No doubt this is also why so many non-Christians seek to undercut or disprove the doctrine of creation. It gives them the freedom to do what is right in their own eyes (Judges 21:25) without incurring any kind of feelings of guilt.

God created everything good

These initial aspects of the doctrine of creation also mean that good and evil are not competing powers in the universe, as dualistic worldviews might suggest. God is good, and the creation he brings into existence reflects that goodness. Evil—which I take to be an anti-God posture, what the Bible calls un godliness—was not a part of the original creation in any way. It was introduced into the universe by the very creatures that God made. 6 Evil is, therefore, subject to the sovereignty of God in the same way that those creatures who choose to reject him are as well.

God invested his creatures with responsibility and significance

The fact that God created humankind in his image and invested us with the right to exercise dominion means that we are stewards of his creation and accountable to him for how well we care for what he has made. We are responsible not only for how we personally take care of God’s creation as individuals, but for how everyone else does as well. After all, we are our brother’s keeper (Gen. 4:9; Mal. 2:10).

In addition to being created to be creators, human beings are also equally invested with significance and value. There is no hierarchy among humankind in God’s creation. No one tribe, tongue, or race of people is created to exercise dominion over all others. Every human being is created in God’s image, regardless of what he or she might look like, where he or she might live, or what he or she might do. In this sense, it is proper to speak of the universal fatherhood of God and the universal brotherhood of man (Mal. 2:10) in this sense. Every human being receives life from the same “parent.” This means that there is no place in the world for racism or prejudice of any kind based on skin color, hair color, gender, height, weight, ancestry, or anything else that is a part of the created order.

The diversity in creation is suggestive of the Trinity

The human race is incredibly diverse. Differences in physical appearance, gender, mental capability, personality, gifting, and relationship all exist in the human race from the moment of creation. The fact that God has created the entire human race in His own image indicates that his image obviously encompasses the incredible diversity that we see all around us. That is at least suggestive of the diversity, or maybe better, complexity, that exists within God himself. To be sure, the creation account does not make this explicit. But it does make more suggestions in this direction by making special mention of the “Spirit of God” (Gen. 1:2) and by recording the way that God speaks about himself in the plural: “let us make man in our image, after our likeness” (Gen. 1:26, emphasis added).

This isn’t a full-fledged doctrine of the Trinity. But it is at least a hint in that direction. And it is enough of a hint that we should not be surprised at the full-fledged doctrine. It was foreshadowed in the diversity of the image of God in creation. 7

God’s creating is not the same as human creating

As mentioned previously, God’s creative action is different from ours. When we make something, we use pre-existing materials to do it. We do not create anything that did not already exist. But when God created the universe, he did not use anything that was pre-existing, because “in the beginning” God alone existed. This means that God created the universe ex nihilo , or out of nothing. He did not use pre-existing material. That is the point of Hebrews 11:3, where the apostle says that “what is seen was not made out of things that are visible.” It is the point of Romans 4:17, which tells us that God “calls into existence the things that do not exist.” And it would also seem to be the point of the Hebrew word bārā’ in Genesis 1:1 (translated “created”). This word, when it occurs in the Qal stem, is only and always used of God and the kind of creating that He alone does (see Ex. 34:10). 8 It is never used to describe the secondary creation that human beings carry out by manipulating things that already exist.

If creation is not ex nihilo then a difficult theological issue results: where did the pre-existent material come from? If we say that it was created, then many questions arise: Who created it? When? Why? Was God not able to create it? What is the relationship between this “creator” and the God of the Bible? If we say that the pre-existent material is eternal, then we are saying that a rival god exists who, like the God of the Bible, is eternal and uncreated but who, unlike the God of the Bible, is wholly impersonal and uncommunicative. The Bible’s teaching about the nature of God requires ex nihilo creation. Anything less would undercut the Bible’s picture of God as sovereign, eternal, holy, and free.

God’s act of creating is also different from ours in the way in which it was carried out. God spoke his creation into being (Gen. 1:3, 6, 9, 11, 14-15, 20, 24, 26; Ps. 33:6; 148:5). He did not put it together by hand or with the use of special tools. He spoke, and it was. This tells us that our God is a communicating God. He is a God who speaks and makes himself known (Rom. 1:18-20). Once we understand this, we should not be surprised that he would later choose to reveal himself specially in the written word and in the person of his Son—the incarnate Word of God (John 1:1-2; Col. 1:16; Heb. 1:2).

God’s creative work may not be identical with that of human beings, but it clearly sets the pattern for it. Not only is human creativity a product of God’s work in creation, but the weekly cycle of work and rest is as well. This weekly pattern is mirrored in eternity, as human beings work for their lifetimes and then enjoy an eternal Sabbath rest in heaven through faith in Jesus Christ. The doctrine of creation, therefore, ultimately points us to that reality and calls us to “strive to enter that rest” by holding fast to Jesus Christ by faith to the end (Heb. 4:9-11).