trust in your environment essay

How it works

Transform your enterprise with the scalable mindsets, skills, & behavior change that drive performance.

Explore how BetterUp connects to your core business systems.

We pair AI with the latest in human-centered coaching to drive powerful, lasting learning and behavior change.

Build leaders that accelerate team performance and engagement.

Unlock performance potential at scale with AI-powered curated growth journeys.

Build resilience, well-being and agility to drive performance across your entire enterprise.

Transform your business, starting with your sales leaders.

Unlock business impact from the top with executive coaching.

Foster a culture of inclusion and belonging.

Accelerate the performance and potential of your agencies and employees.

See how innovative organizations use BetterUp to build a thriving workforce.

Discover how BetterUp measurably impacts key business outcomes for organizations like yours.

Daring Leadership Institute: a groundbreaking partnership that amplifies Brené Brown's empirically based, courage-building curriculum with BetterUp’s human transformation platform.

• What is coaching?

Learn how 1:1 coaching works, who its for, and if it's right for you.

Accelerate your personal and professional growth with the expert guidance of a BetterUp Coach.

Types of Coaching

Navigate career transitions, accelerate your professional growth, and achieve your career goals with expert coaching.

Enhance your communication skills for better personal and professional relationships, with tailored coaching that focuses on your needs.

Find balance, resilience, and well-being in all areas of your life with holistic coaching designed to empower you.

Discover your perfect match : Take our 5-minute assessment and let us pair you with one of our top Coaches tailored just for you.

Find your coach

Research, expert insights, and resources to develop courageous leaders within your organization.

Best practices, research, and tools to fuel individual and business growth.

View on-demand BetterUp events and learn about upcoming live discussions.

The latest insights and ideas for building a high-performing workplace.

• BetterUp Briefing

The online magazine that helps you understand tomorrow's workforce trends, today.

Innovative research featured in peer-reviewed journals, press, and more.

Founded in 2022 to deepen the understanding of the intersection of well-being, purpose, and performance

We're on a mission to help everyone live with clarity, purpose, and passion.

Join us and create impactful change.

Read the buzz about BetterUp.

Meet the leadership that's passionate about empowering your workforce.

For Business

For Individuals

How to build trust in the workplace: 10 effective solutions

Jump to section

The basics — what is trust?

The two types of trust that you need to know, why building trust is crucial in any relationship, ten of the most effective ways to build trust, building trust doesn’t happen overnight.

Learning how to build trust at work is critical if you’re going to be successful as an employee, a manager, or an effective leader. Oftentimes, the first step to building trust is building rapport . 

If you don’t have trust, it’ll be more difficult to communicate and coordinate with your peers or colleagues. 

You may get passed over for promotions in favor of someone more trustworthy. In extreme cases, a lack of trust can even bring down your entire team or organization.

Unfortunately, the truth is that most people haven’t been taught how to build trust.

Thankfully, there are proven and effective ways to build trust in the workplace.

We’ll take a look at a step-by-step process that you can use to start building trust in the workplace today. But first, let’s quickly review the basics of trust and the two main types of trust.

You might not even be sure how to define trust. So let’s start there. When we discuss trust, we are talking about:

• Being able to have a sense of security and confidence when dealing with someone
• Having the ability to predict that someone will act in specific ways and be dependable
• Earning a level of credibility that has built up over time

Trust is a critical part of all interactions that we have as humans. It also plays an integral role in  communicating in the workplace . 

How long would you be the client of an accountant or lawyer if you didn’t trust that they had your best interest at heart? How long would you stay in a relationship or maintain a friendship with someone you didn’t trust?

But figuring out how to trust someone can also be as important as being trustworthy yourself.

Unfortunately, the statistics show that  people trust each other less  today than 40 years ago.

At an individual level, you need to have mutual trust with your romantic partners, family members, and friends.

The same is true in the workplace. You need to have a sense of trust built up with your coworkers. A high level of trust creates a  more positive employee experience . It also leads to a  more productive workplace  where people feel safe and respected.

But we never get explicitly taught how to build trust in school or anywhere else. Learning how to trust is something we’re just expected to develop as we grow up. 

Some people naturally excel at building trust. For others, the trust-building process we’ll discuss below may be entirely new.

Why should you care about trust at work?

When trust breaks down, you’ll notice an obvious shift in how someone speaks and acts around you. 

People who work at high-trust companies  experience 74% less stress . The opposite is also true. A low-trust work environment can be stressful for everyone involved.

A boss or manager who doesn’t trust you is less likely to give you freedom and flexibility to work on your own terms. They’ll be more likely to micromanage you and carefully check your work.

Coworkers who don’t trust you are unlikely to collaborate with you or help you out. You also likely won’t get invited to after-work gatherings and events.

Building trust in teams from the beginning and maintaining it is crucial. Once your credibility starts to slip, people may see you as less reliable. 

Since people are unlikely to befriend untrustworthy people, your perception at work may continue to fall.

Especially now, with more people working from home as part of a virtual team,  trust is more important than ever . A remote team must have a high level of trust.

When we talk about building trust, there are actually two distinct types of trust that you should know about.

These types of trust are developed in different ways. Both are important and work together synergistically. So it’s critical that you simultaneously develop both types of trust.

The two types are practical trust and emotional trust.

1. Practical trust

This is the more traditional type of trust, and the one that usually first comes to mind when thinking about how to trust someone. 

You earn this kind of trust by being a hard-working employee. You show up on time. You get your work done and meet deadlines.

Earning this kind of trust will get you the reputation of being someone who’s reliable and competent. When you say you’ll do something, you actually do it.

Without this kind of trust,  people will micromanage you . Communication can break down, and productivity will decrease.

Keep in mind: employers building trust with their staff is just as important as the other way around. Whether you’re a manager or an entry-level employee, it’s crucial that you build trust with those around you. 

2. Emotional trust

People are less likely to be aware of this type of trust. You create emotional trust by going above and beyond what’s expected of you, and creating meaningful bonds with your team. It requires a level of emotional intelligence. 

Successful leaders  tend to have higher levels of emotional intelligence, so this is definitely a good skill to start developing. 

If you’ve ever had a best friend at work, then there’s likely a lot of emotional trust between you. 

You knew that you had each other’s backs. You treated each other with respect. And you felt comfortable sharing ideas, thoughts, and feelings that you may not have expressed with other coworkers.

Building trust in this way is more complex as it doesn’t  follow a set formula . It’s more about networking and relationship building.

Emotional trust is even something that can be built at an organizational level. 

Take Netflix, for example. 70% of their employees on Glassdoor would recommend working at Netflix to a friend. 

We would argue this is because Netflix hires with inclusivity and integrity in mind. Their employees work in a high-trust environment. They are also given more decision-making and information-sharing freedom.

Learning how to build trust in the workplace (and anywhere else) is necessary if you want to create lasting relationships.

In romantic relationships, a lack of trust is one of the  primary reasons for divorce . Learning how to trust someone again can be difficult after such a situation.

In the workplace, Millennials are  22x more likely  to work for a company with a high trust culture.

Whether you’re building trust in teams or between individuals, the end goal is the same. You want to create an environment where people feel comfortable sharing their thoughts and helping each other out. 

To have a sense of well-being and good mental health, we need to know that other people understand us and have our best interests at heart. This comes with having high levels of trust. 

It gives us peace of mind to know that everyone is working together as a team.

Being trustworthy also  makes you more likable . It makes you more likely to get promoted or be positively recommended by colleagues. It unlocks potential for new or faster growth within your company.

It’s not just people that do better in high-trust environments either. Companies with high-trust workplace cultures  perform nearly 2x better  than the general market in terms of earnings.

Once trust is lost in any relationship, it can create an awkward feeling like something is off-balance. 

Things just don’t flow smoothly. Even if you can’t quite put your finger on why. While trust initially takes time to build up, it’s even harder to get back once you break it.

Now that you know what trust is, and why it’s so important, it’s time to learn how to build trust in your own life and workplace. You need to take actionable steps to build trust. It won’t happen automatically.

Below is a step-by-step list that will outline how to build trust with nearly anyone. 

1. Value long-term relationships

Trust requires long-term thinking. It might seem convenient in the moment to blame someone else or to make decisions that benefit you in the short term. But before you act, think about how they may affect how others perceive you in the future.

2. Be honest

Developing a reputation as someone who is dishonest is one of the fastest ways to erode trust. Always tell the truth, even if it’s awkward; don’t give people an opportunity to catch you in a lie.

3. Honor your commitments

A trustworthy person does everything in their power to stick to agreements they’ve made. If you make a promise, follow through on it. Avoid making promises that you might not be able to keep.

4. Admit when you’re wrong

People don’t like to hear excuses. If you do something wrong, it’s best to just be upfront about it. If you realize you were incorrect about something, own up to it. 

Being vulnerable enough to admit fault can humanize you and make you appear more trustworthy. Admitting mistakes is also part of being honest.

5. Communicate effectively

Trust can be easily damaged by miscommunication. Try your best to communicate in a way that doesn’t leave room for misinterpretation.

If you aren’t sure about something during a conversation, ask questions to clarify. 

Listening is just as important as speaking for effective communication. Make sure that you give others a chance to talk. It will show that you care if you genuinely listen.

6. Be vulnerable

Being open about your emotions and showing some feelings can  help with building trust . It shows that you care and that you're a person too. 

Don’t be afraid to let coworkers know if something has upset you or stressed you out.

This one needs to be approached carefully. You don’t want to go telling all of your coworkers' overly-personal details. 

A level of emotional intelligence  is needed to make sure that you aren’t over-sharing or under-sharing. Begin by sharing gradually. Done correctly, opening up about your feelings can strengthen a trusting relationship.

7. Be helpful

Someone who is trustworthy will tend to go out of their way to help people if they can. Not because of some agenda or because they expect to get something out of it. But because they're genuinely a good person.

Maybe you’ve done all of your work for the day. You could just sit at your desk browsing the internet. Or you could be helpful. 

If you notice a coworker who is struggling with their own workload, offer to help. Or ask your manager if there’s anything extra you can take on. Also, there is never any harm in giving guidance and advice to that new hire who seems overwhelmed. 

8. Show people that you care

People will naturally trust you more if they feel like you’re truly interested in them. Remembering little details like the name of a coworker’s child, or asking how their weekend was is a good place to start.

You’ve probably worked with someone who seemed to be in their own bubble. They didn’t seem to care about anyone else besides themselves. You’ve likely also worked with someone who was friendly and regularly checked in to see how you were doing. Which person did you find more trustworthy?

Even something as simple as remembering and saying someone’s name can show that you care. As Dale Carnegie once said, “A person’s name is, to that person, the sweetest, most important sound in any language.”

9. Stand up for what’s right

People respect honesty. 

While some bosses may like “yes” people who agree with everything they say, the best leaders value insights and opinions. Don’t sacrifice your values and what you believe just to appease your manager or try to get ahead. This will decrease trust with others.

10. Be transparent

As long as you can explain what you’re doing and why you’re doing it, most people will be able to understand.

Don’t keep secrets or hoard information for yourself. The people you’re building trust with are usually people on your team that you should be working collaboratively with. Share the information with them that they need to succeed too.

Learning how to build trust effectively will help you in all your relationships. You need to know how to build trust in the workplace if you want to progress. But it’s also for personal relationships as well.

When it comes to building trust, try to keep a long-term approach. Be honest, honor your commitments, admit when you’re wrong, and you’ll be well on your way to being seen as a trustworthy person.

Figuring out how to build trust doesn’t have to be difficult if you follow the steps we’ve outlined. Now it’s time for you to start taking steps to build more trust in your own life. 

If you want more support, reach out and discover how coaching can help you advance in life and your career.

Understand Yourself Better:

Big 5 Personality Test

Maggie Wooll, MBA

Maggie Wooll is a researcher, author, and speaker focused on the evolving future of work. Formerly the lead researcher at the Deloitte Center for the Edge, she holds a Bachelor of Science in Education from Princeton University and an MBA from the University of Virginia Darden School of Business. Maggie is passionate about creating better work and greater opportunities for all.

Build the dream team you need. 9 steps show you how

How leadership trust guides high-performing teams, you need more than a quote to motivate a team, 3 research-backed ways to build trust, unlock your team’s superpowers with effective team management, you crushed sales kickoff, but how do you nail adoption, how the best managers follow-up after 360-degree reviews, how to build agile teams with the right workforce development strategy, building influence at work: be the best leader you can be, how to build rapport: 6 tactics to build strong relationships, take the initiative: a how-to guide in 10 steps, 13 ways to start a conversation online, benefits of humor in the workplace (we found at least 10), make the connection: 10 effective ways to connect with people, find out how to build a network from scratch, how to build a high performance team, according to patty mccord, nonverbal communication in the workplace: the secret to team trust, stay connected with betterup, get our newsletter, event invites, plus product insights and research..

3100 E 5th Street, Suite 350 Austin, TX 78702

• Platform Overview
• Integrations
• Powered by AI
• BetterUp Lead™
• BetterUp Manage™
• BetterUp Care®
• Sales Performance
• Diversity & Inclusion
• Case Studies
• Why BetterUp?
• About Coaching
• Find your Coach
• Career Coaching
• Communication Coaching
• Personal Coaching
• News and Press
• Leadership Team
• Become a BetterUp Coach
• BetterUp Labs
• Center for Purpose & Performance
• Leadership Training
• Business Coaching
• Contact Support
• Contact Sales
• Privacy Policy
• Acceptable Use Policy
• Trust & Security
• Cookie Preferences

More From Forbes

The essential importance of trust: how to build it or restore it.

• Share to Facebook
• Share to Twitter
• Share to Linkedin

“To earn trust, money and power aren’t enough; you have to show some concern for others. You can’t buy trust in the supermarket." – His Holiness the Dalai Lama

Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama Photographer: Adam Berry/Bloomberg News

There are just a few elemental forces that hold our world together. The one that’s the glue of society is called trust. Its presence cements relationships by allowing people to live and work together, feel safe and belong to a group. Trust in a leader allows organizations and communities to flourish, while the absence of trust can cause fragmentation, conflict and even war. That’s why we need to trust our leaders, our family members, our friends and our co-workers, albeit in different ways.

Trust is hard to define, but we do know when it’s lost. When that happens, we withdraw our energy and level of engagement. We go on an internal strike, not wanting to be sympathetic to the person who we feel has hurt us or treated us wrongly. We may not show it outwardly, but we are less likely to tell the formerly trusted person that we are upset, to share what is important to us or to follow through on commitments. As a result, we pull back from that person and no longer feel part of their world. This loss of trust can be obvious or somewhat hidden — especially if we pretend to be present but inwardly disengage. And those who have done something to lose our trust may not even know it.

On the positive side, trust makes people feel eager to be part of a relationship or group, with a shared purpose and a willingness to depend on each other. When trust is intact, we will willingly contribute what is needed, not just by offering our presence, but also by sharing our dedication, talent, energy and honest thoughts on how the relationship or group is working.

One dictionary definition of trust is “feeling safe when vulnerable.” When we depend on a leader, family member or friend, we can feel vulnerable, and we need trust to manage the anxiety of this feeling. When trust is present, things go well; but when trust is lost, the relationship is at risk.

If the level of trust is low in a relationship or organization, people limit their involvement and what they are willing to do or share. They might think to themselves, “This is all you deserve,” or, “This is as all I am willing to give.” In contrast, when the trust level is high, people reward it by giving more. But, more often than not, people feel that their distrust is not safe to share. So a leader or loved one may be slow to discover that they have lost a person’s trust.

The hiddenness and personal nature of trust can be a problem for relationships, teams or organizations. How can you fix something that is not expressed or shared? How do you even know that trust is lost? Paradoxically, there must be at least a little trust in order to discuss its lack and make attempts to rebuild it, while if the loss of trust remains unaddressed, the relationship will grow more and more distant.

Trust is often related to leadership and power, but it is not a given. To be effective, a leader must earn the trust of his or her constituents to ensure their participation and allegiance. Indeed, any successful relationship — whether it’s leader to follower, consultant or coach to client or the relationship between spouses, siblings and friends — relies on a level of trust that must be earned. Yet even trust that is earned can be quickly lost and cannot be quickly regained. If members of a team or relationship lose trust in each other, it takes a great deal of work to restore it. People are not quick to reinvest in a relationship where trust has been broken. They generally move on.

Six Building Blocks of Trust

Since trust is so important in both working and personal relationships, how can we monitor it, build upon it and heal it when it becomes frayed? It is useful to view trust as a natural response to certain qualities in a person, group or organization, and the absence of these qualities will diminish the level of trust. These qualities are:

• Reliability and Dependability: A person or group that is true to their word and fulfills their commitments encourages trust.
• Transparency: People are anxious about unknowns and tend to assume the worst when they’re not informed about a new development. When management meets in secret or does not share important information, team members can easily become distrustful. On the other hand, when people share their thoughts, feelings and considerations, or when an organization, usually through its leader, tells its members what is going on, everyone knows where they stand and trust can flourish.
• Competency: This is another element that is central to building trust. If you think a person, leader or organization is not capable of doing what they are supposed to do, you cannot trust them. Therefore, even when a person has a good heart or good intentions and we like them personally, they cannot win our trust if they’re not capable of doing what they promise.
• Sincerity, Authenticity and Congruency: People can often sense when someone says something that is not aligned with what they are feeling inside. When a leader is insincere or inauthentic, people don’t believe what he or she is saying. A leader who says one thing but who acts differently is not congruent. For example, it is hard to believe someone who says they want to listen but does not give you a chance to speak, or someone who says she is concerned about people yet seems to have a plan to lay people off. People may think they can hide their true feelings or contradictions, but others can quickly detect a lack of sincerity or congruency. That’s when trust is eroded.
• Fairness: Some people act as if the needs and desires of others are not important, or they don’t truly listen to or respect both sides. Trust cannot grow in a relationship where it’s all about one person or in a workplace where all the energy is focused on the company or leader.
• Openness and Vulnerability : If a person never says they are wrong and apologizes or acknowledges their mistakes, other people do not feel comfortable disagreeing with them or sharing their own thoughts. A leader who is “never wrong” never gets the truth from others. Yet a timely apology or admission of being wrong is a powerful weapon to build or rebuild trust.

All of these qualities contribute to the degree of trust people have for each other. If you are feeling a shift of trust in a relationship, it is helpful to assess the presence or absence of each of these six qualities. This allows you to discover what is lacking in the relationship and find ways to restore trust. To build or rebuild trust, a leader must open the conversation about the degree to which each of the six qualities are present and be open to hearing what others feel, observe and need. Of course, the leader will need some trust in the others in order to begin this process.

Similarly, it takes courage in a family or personal relationship to bring up loss of trust and to request that another person modify their behavior. This may lead to learning that you need to look at your own behavior too. Trust is a two-way street, built by the behavior of each person in the relationship.

Restoring Trust That’s Been Lost or Broken

Trust is often lost when we feel hurt by another’s action and believe that this action (or inaction) was intentional. But by sharing our feelings with the person who hurt us, we might begin to see things differently and realize that their intention was not what we imagined. This may repair the breach quickly as misunderstandings are unraveled and communication deepens. It may be difficult to initiate such a conversation; however, given the tendency to withdraw when we feel hurt. Still, a person who is able to do this will find that they are less frequently hurt.

In the same way, if we feel that we have done something to lose the trust of another, we can seek the other out and inquire about what has happened. True, this can feel awkward and risky — especially if one is a leader, parent or person of authority — and this is not something that comes naturally. But this willingness to be vulnerable can ultimately lead to greater trust because the other person feels that their own vulnerability and needs are being respected.

The dynamics of trust are delicate in important relationships, and the loss of trust can be costly — not only psychologically, but also financially and in terms or work and livelihood. What’s helpful to remember is that trust is an ongoing exchange between people and is not static. Trust can be earned. It can be lost. And it can be regained.

• Editorial Standards
• Reprints & Permissions

Beyond Intractability

The Hyper-Polarization Challenge to the Conflict Resolution Field We invite you to participate in an online exploration of what those with conflict and peacebuilding expertise can do to help defend liberal democracies and encourage them live up to their ideals.

Follow BI and the Hyper-Polarization Discussion on BI's New Substack Newsletter .

Hyper-Polarization, COVID, Racism, and the Constructive Conflict Initiative Read about (and contribute to) the  Constructive Conflict Initiative  and its associated Blog —our effort to assemble what we collectively know about how to move beyond our hyperpolarized politics and start solving society's problems. 

By Roy J. Lewicki Edward C. Tomlinson

December 2003  

Trust- Overview

The phenomenon of trust has been extensively explored by a variety of disciplines across the social sciences, including economics, social psychology, and political science. The breadth of this literature offers rich insight, and this is noted in the common elements that appear in the definition of trust.

For example, Rousseau and her colleagues offer the following definition: "Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another."[1] Similarly, Lewicki and his colleagues describe trust as "an individual's belief in, and willingness to act on the basis of, the words, actions, and decisions of another."[2]

The need for trust arises from our interdependence with others. We often depend on other people to help us obtain, or at least not to frustrate, the outcomes we value (and they on us). As our interests with others are intertwined, we also must recognize that there is an element of risk involved insofar as we often encounter situations in which we cannot compel the cooperation we seek. Therefore, trust can be very valuable in social interactions.

Trust has been identified as a key element of successful conflict resolution (including negotiation and mediation ). This is not surprising insofar as trust is associated with enhanced cooperation , information sharing, and problem solving.

Origins and Development of Trust

Armed with a definition of trust and a description of the benefits it brings, we now turn to examine its origins and development. Theory on the origins of interpersonal trust has proceeded broadly along three fronts: (1) explaining differences in the individual propensity to trust, (2) understanding dimensions of trustworthy behavior, and (3) suggesting levels of trust development.

Individual propensity to trust

Personality theorists have developed one of the oldest theoretical perspectives on trust, and argued that some people are more likely to trust than others. Viewed as a fairly stable trait over time, trust is regarded as a generalized expectancy that other people can be relied on. This expectancy is a function of the degree to which trust has been honored in that individual's history of prior social interactions, and may have its most pronounced effect in novel or ambiguous situations. While this expectancy shapes perceptions of the character of people in general, more recent work has identified the characteristics of trustees that allow for the formation of trust and its growth to higher levels.

Dimensions of trustworthy behavior

Our trust in another individual can be grounded in our evaluation of his/her ability, integrity, and benevolence. That is, the more we observe these characteristics in another person, our level of trust in that person is likely to grow.

Ability refers to an assessment of the other's knowledge, skill, or competency. This dimension recognizes that trust requires some sense that the other is able to perform in a manner that meets our expectations.

Integrity is the degree to which the trustee adheres to principles that are acceptable to the trustor. This dimension leads to trust based on consistency of past actions, credibility of communication, commitment to standards of fairness, and the congruence of the other's word and deed.

Benevolence is our assessment that the trusted individual is concerned enough about our welfare to either advance our interests, or at least not impede them. The other's perceived intentions or motives of the trustee are most central. Honest and open communication, delegating decisions, and sharing control indicate evidence of one's benevolence.

Although these three dimensions are likely to be linked to each other, they each contribute separately to influence the level of trust in another within a relationship. However, ability and integrity are likely to be most influential early in a relationship, as information on one's benevolence needs more time to emerge. The effect of benevolence will increase as the relationship between the parties grows closer. The next section describes trust development in relationships in more detail.

Levels of trust development

Early theories of trust described it as a unidimensional phenomenon that simply increased or decreased in magnitude and strength within a relationship. However, more recent approaches to trust suggests that trust builds along a continuum of hierarchical and sequential stages, such that as trust grows to 'higher' levels, it becomes stronger and more resilient and changes in character. This is the primary perspective we adopt in the remainder of these essays.

At early stages of a relationship, trust is at a calculus-based level. In other words, an individual will carefully calculate how the other party is likely to behave in a given situation depending on the rewards for being trustworthy and the deterrents against untrustworthy behavior. In this manner, rewards and punishments form the basis of control that a trustor has in ensuring the trustee's behavioral consistency. Individuals deciding to trust the other mentally contemplate the benefits of staying in the relationship with the trustee versus the benefits of 'cheating' on the relationship, and the costs of staying in the relationship versus the costs of breaking the relationship. Trust will only be extended to the other to the extent that this cost-benefit calculation indicates that the continued trust will yield a net positive benefit. Over time, calculus-based trust (CBT) can be built as individuals manage their reputation and assure the stability of their behavior by behaving consistently, meeting agreed-to deadlines, and fulfilling promises. CBT is a largely cognitively-driven trust phenomenon, grounded in judgments of the trustees predictability and reliability.

However, as the parties come to a deeper understanding of each other through repeated interactions, they may become aware of shared values and goals. This allows trust to grow to a higher and qualitatively different level. When trust evolves to the highest level, it is said to function as identification-based trust (IBT). At this stage trust has been built to the point that the parties have internalized each other's desires and intentions. They understand what the other party really cares about so completely that each party is able to act as an agent for the other. Trust at this advanced stage is also enhanced by a strong emotional bond between the parties, based on a sense of shared goals and values. So, in contrast to CBT, IBT is a more emotionally-driven phenomenon, grounded in perceptions of interpersonal care and concern, and mutual need satisfaction.

Violated Expectations

Trust violations occur when the trustor's (i.e., the victim's) confident positive expectations of the trustee (i.e., the offender) are disconfirmed. These violations result in lower subsequent trust, and may reduce the extent to which victims of these violations cooperate with the offender. Research within organizations has shown that trust violations stifle mutual support and information sharing, and even exert negative effects on organizational citizenship behaviors, job performance, turnover, and profits.

The experience of a trust violation is likely to result in the trustor making (1) a cognitive appraisal of the situation and (2) experiencing a distressed emotional state. The cognitive appraisal refers to the victim's assignment of culpability to the offender and the evaluation of the costs associated with the violation. The emotional reaction is likely to be composed of some mixture of anger , disappointment, and/or frustration at oneself for trusting and at the offender for exploiting that trust.

We proceed to consider how violations damage interpersonal trust.

In some cases, a single trust violation may seriously damage or irreparably destroy trust. In other cases, one trust violation may not be that damaging when considered in isolation. Rather, a pattern of violations may be needed to create serious damage to the relationship. In other words, not all trust violations are created equally. So, to analyze the effect of trust violations on a relationship, we need a way to describe how much harm (cognitive and/or emotional) a given violation has created. We will broadly refer to this extent of harm as the Offense Severity, and note that as it increases, it is likely to be met with more active and extreme responses by the trustor (victim), and signal greater harm to interpersonal trust.

For example, minor offenses may be met with simply a reduced level of trust. That is, one may have simply lower trust in another in a given context. The victim will be motivated to avoid transactions with the trustee (offender) in the future, and to withhold further support and cooperation. In situations where the relationship cannot be terminated (e.g., the parties have to continue to interact or work together), the relationship continues as a hollow "shell," a facade of superficial cooperation and/or specific transactions that are tightly controlled. These are relatively passive approaches to low trust management strategies -- i.e., "Okay, you got me. I'm simply not going to trust you any more, even though we have to deal with each other."

As Offense Severity grows, however, the victim is more likely to experience stronger negative cognitive and emotional reactions, including a sense of moral outrage. Serious offenses harm trust severely, often to the point of complete destruction. These serious offenses may also stimulate the rapid growth of distrust . Accordingly, the victim is more likely to engage in more severe reactions to the trust violation, including exacting retribution , escalating the conflict, and/or terminating the relationship .

Offense Severity exists along a continuum from low to high. Offenses can be severe in several ways:

• Magnitude of the offense. The magnitude of the offense is an indication of the seriousness of consequences incurred by the victim. To illustrate, when a dry cleaner loses an old shirt you were planning to replace soon anyway, this may be viewed as a trivial violation of your trust in the dry cleaner. However, it will be much more than a mere nuisance if that dry cleaner damaged a brand new, expensive suit!
• Number of prior violations. When there is a clear pattern of prior trust violations, even if they are each relatively minor when viewed in isolation, the overall pattern may be deemed a serious breach. As the proverbial "straw that broke the camel's back," it is the pattern of trust violations that provides evidence that the offender is not worthy of future trust. However, when there are few past violations, any given trust violation may be viewed as the exception rather than the rule.
• Specific dimension of trust that was violated. Violations of integrity and benevolence are likely to be experienced as more severe and damaging than violations that implicate one's ability. Examples may include intentional deception, purposefully reneging on a promise or obligation, and rude, disrespectful treatment.

At this point, we also wish to point out that trust violations that may be very disruptive to Calculus-Based Trust (CBT) relationships may be viewed as trivial nuisances or not violations at all in Identification-Based Trust (IBT) relationships. Because the relationship itself is the basis for IBT, and because such a major emotional investment goes into creating and sustaining it, the parties are relatively more motivated to maintain them. IBT relationships can become rather resilient to trust violations as long as the violations do not challenge the underlying basis of the relationship. However, when the basis of an IBT relationship becomes called into question by a trust violation (e.g., marital infidelity), this has the potential to devastate the entire relationship .

Rebuilding Trust

Despite the assertions of some scholars that broken trust cannot be repaired, we draw on recent research indicating a more optimistic view. However, we caution that rebuilding trust is not as straightforward as building trust in the first place. After trust has been damaged, there are two key considerations for the victim: (1) dealing with the stress the violation imposed on the relationship, and (2) determining if future violations will occur. After a trust violation and the cognitive and affective fallout that ensues, the first critical question is, is the victim willing to reconcile ? If the victim believes that the violator will not make efforts at righting the wrongs and minimizing future violations, the victim has no incentive to attempt reconciliation and restore trust.

Let us first clarify the distinction between reconciliation and forgiveness . Reconciliation occurs when both parties exert effort to rebuild a damaged relationship, and strive to settle the issues that led to the disruption of that relationship. Reconciliation is a behavioral manifestation of forgiveness, defined as a deliberate decision by the victim to surrender feelings of resentment and grant amnesty to the offender. However, it is possible to forgive someone (release him or her from responsibility for damage he/she has inflicted) without exhibiting a willingness to reconcile the relationship or trust him or her again in the future. An example may be when a battered woman forgives her abuser (as a means of coping and psychological healing ), but does not allow the relationship to continue. Thus, following a trust violation, the trust cannot be rebuilt if the victim is not willing to reconcile. On the other hand, if the victim is willing to reconcile, rebuilding trust in the relationship becomes possible (although not guaranteed). We will now describe this repair process as it relates to CBT and IBT.

Rebuilding CBT

In CBT relationships, expectations of the other party are grounded in a cognitive appraisal of the costs and benefits involved in a given transaction, with minimal emphasis on the emotional investment in the relationship (i.e., emotional concerns are not irrelevant, but just not as central as cognitive concerns). Violations in a CBT relationship involve a focus on the exchange itself and the loss of the specific benefits the victim was relying on from the exchange. In short, in order to repair CBT, parties tend to focus on the impact (i.e., the direct consequences) of the trust violation as the primary issue to address in any repair effort.

Accordingly, it is essential for the offender to take the initiative in stimulating reconciliation, and this is most likely when the offender actually desires to rebuild trust and is skilled at perspective taking (the ability to visualize the world as it appears to someone else). It may be that there were incongruent or unclear expectations between the parties that can be quickly clarified. Alternatively, there may be some explanation or justification that places the unexpected behavior in context such that the event is no longer perceived by the victim as a violation. For example, pushing someone to the ground so a car won't hit him or her would reframe an otherwise hostile act as an act of trustworthiness. Finally, apologies and promises signal remorse and assurance for the future, respectively. These are important forms of communication that help to restore balance in the relationship and convince the victim that it will be safe to trust again in the future.

This repair may involve acts of restitution that compensate the victim for the specific consequences of a violation. Restitution also carries important symbolism in that the offender is actually trying to redeem his/her trustworthiness with concrete actions. In CBT relationships, actions may speak louder than words, so it is imperative for the offender to honor trust in subsequent interactions with tangible offerings designed to restore ' fairness ' in the relationship.

Notice that while communication and action are both central elements to reconciliation and trust recovery, the repair process for CBT is dominantly a material, transactional effort. To illustrate, simply giving someone a hug after this type of violation is not likely to help, and may in fact make things worse. Tangible reparation has to occur.

Rebuilding IBT

In contrast, in IBT relationships, trust of the other party is grounded in the shared interests and values of the parties and their collective emotional investment in the relationship. Thus, violations may lead the victim to conclude that the parties are not as 'together' as they once may have appeared. Compared to the exchange of tangible resources in a CBT relationship, IBT relationships are more heavily grounded in intangible resources such as perceptions of mutual attraction, support and caring for each other . Therefore, in contrast to the focus on impact in CBT violations, violations of IBT lead the victim to question the intent (i.e., motives and desires) of the other party that prompted the perceived betrayal. As mentioned earlier, IBT relationships are often resilient to transactional discrepancies that would be sufficient to seriously damage a CBT relationship, as long as the identification with the other party is not called into question. Since an IBT violation threatens the very basis of identification with the other, the victim's reaction to the violation involves the feeling that he/she may no longer really 'know' the offender after all. Feelings of abandonment, estrangement, and alienation may not be uncommon.

For the offender to re-establish perceptions of his/her benevolent intent, the offender should quickly and voluntarily offer a thorough and sincere apology which conveys remorse for harm inflicted, an explanation of the details surrounding the betrayal, and a promise of future cooperation. Further, it is critical for the parties to substantively reaffirm their commitment to each other and to the ideals and values upon which the relationship is built. The offender should explicitly recommit to the relationship, and discuss strategies to avoid similar problems in the future.

As before, both communication and action are essential to the trust rebuilding process, but IBT repair involves an emotional, relational focus. For example, simply paying some form of material compensation may not be sufficient to re-assert shared values and rebuild the common sense of identity that was the foundation of the trust.

Practical Implications for Building Trust

What individuals can do.

It should be noted that trust building is a bilateral process that requires mutual commitment and effort, especially when attempting to de-escalate conflict . Nonetheless, there are several ways individuals can act on their own to initiate or encourage the trust building process. This is accomplished by either taking steps to minimize the risk that the other party will act in untrustworthy ways (also see the essay on distrust ), or by policing one's own actions to ensure they are perceived as evidence of trustworthiness.

At the CBT level, individuals can take several steps to strengthen another's trust in them, particularly when these steps are performed repeatedly and within several different contexts of the relationship.

• Perform competently. One should perform one's duties and obligations competently. Individuals should continuously strive to demonstrate proficiency in carrying out their obligations. In some cases, this may entail updating skills and abilities as technology advances. As others contemplate how much to trust you, they will assess your qualifications and ability to perform.
• Establish consistency and predictability. We can enhance the degree to which others will regard us as trustworthy when we behave in consistent and predictable ways. Every effort should be made to ensure that our words are congruent with our subsequent actions and that we honor pledged commitments. Our integrity is reinforced to the extent that we Do What We Say We Will Do (DWWSWWD).
• Communicate accurately, openly and transparently. In addition, one should act openly--that is, be clear about the intentions and motives for one's actions. This helps the other party calculate our trustworthiness accurately, because we are willing to act transparently and to be monitored for compliance.
• Share and delegate control. Trust often needs to be given for it to be returned. There is symbolic value in soliciting input and sharing decision control with others . Likewise, when such control is hoarded and others feel that they are not trusted (such as with monitoring and surveillance systems), they may be more likely to act out against this with behaviors that reinforce a distrustful image.
• Show concern for others. The trust others have in you will grow when you show sensitivity to their needs , desires, and interests. Acting in a way that respects and protects other people, and refraining from engaging in self-interested pursuits to the detriment of others will also contribute greatly to the trust others place in you. When you violate someone's trust, they deem that you are acting in your own self-interest. Accordingly, their attention will be diverted to their own self-interest and self-protection rather than on conflict resolution.

At the IBT level, prescriptions for trust building entail a number of additional steps.

• Establish a common name and identity. Nurturing a common identity creates a sense of unity that can further strengthen trust. Engage in talk and actions that build a sense of 'we' rather than 'me'. A common name and shared identity reduces divisiveness and encourages individuals to work together.
• Capitalize on co-location. As conflicting parties co-locate, their more frequent interaction can help them get to know one another better, strengthen their perceived common identity, and reduce distrust by exposing false stereotypes and prejudices . When used in conjunction with the recommendation above, co-location may demonstrate to the parties that they have more commonalities than differences.
• Create joint products and goals. Working toward the collective achievement of superordinate goals fosters a feeling of "one-ness" that can bring the parties together in a way that strengthens a salient, shared identity. Parties create and build products, services and activities that define their commonality and uniqueness.
• Promote shared values and emotional attraction. Individuals should model a concern for other people by getting to know them, engaging in active listening , showing a focus on their interests, recognizing the contributions of others, and demonstrating confidence in other's abilities.

What the Media Can Do

The media can play an important role in the trust building process by using news reporting as a way to increase the value of established, functional trust while simultaneously encouraging the parties not to violate that trust. Journalism aimed at wide audiences encourages parties to place more value on their reputations, as good reputations carry additional benefits, while bad reputations carry heightened costs. The media can also create and report stories, which build trust by featuring common identities, values, and concerns across diverse populations. In some cases, the media can also act as a third party that can facilitate greater openness and transparency. The parties can potentially use this forum to provide evidence of the compliance and trustworthiness of conflicting parties. For example, the media frequently uses consumer advocate reporting to investigate disputes between consumers and service providers. Finally, the media can promote accurate information of the parties in order to dispel inaccurate and negative stereotypes that forestall any trust-building efforts.

What the Educational System Can Do

Educators can assist by using classroom experiences such as dialog groups, problem-solving workshops , simulations and role-plays to practice trust-building at various stages of relationships. Subsequent debriefing sessions can also highlight how students manage their emotional reactions in the trust building process (i.e., making the conversion from suspicion and fear to benevolence and hope). These experiences have the benefit of allowing students to develop their trust building skills in a safe environment that is somewhat detached from more emotionally-charged and less controlled environments where trust may be hard to establish and easy to break.

Practical Implications for Rebuilding Trust

As we have noted earlier, effective trust repair is often necessary to resolve conflicts. Although this process is difficult, there are steps the offender can take to enhance the likelihood of stimulating the victim's willingness to reconcile, and further the trust rebuilding process. However, we stress that rebuilding trust is a process, not an event. As such, it is likely to consume a lot of time and resources. Containing conflict in the short term may be confined to managing distrust . Nonetheless, we offer several recommendations for rebuilding trust in both CBT and IBT relationships.

For rebuilding CBT, the following steps are suggested:

• Take immediate action after the violation. Offenders should act quickly to engage in restorative efforts . This communicates sensitivity to the victim and the relationship, and avoids the double-burden the victim has to incur by both suffering the consequences of the violation and having to confront the offender with the consequences of his behavior.
• Provide an apology , and give a thorough account of what happened. Take responsibility for your actions if you are culpable, and express remorse for the harm that the victim endured because of the violation. Your remorse indicates to the victim that you have also suffered as a result of your actions, and the victim may be less likely to pursue vengeance and escalate the conflict. Also, be sure to carefully explain the circumstances that led to the violation, so the victim can understand the events that led you to your decisions. This will help them see the rationale behind your actions and give them a better sense of the values and parameters that are likely to shape your actions in the future.
• Be sincere. The victim is closely scrutinizing your motives and intentions, so it is imperative to sincerely strive to repair the harm from the violation. Take action unilaterally and volitionally, and make every effort to show through your words and actions that you genuinely desire to earn the victim's trust again.
• Be cognizant of the day-to-day history of the relationship. If the overall history of the relationship is good, and there are few if any past trust violations, the prospects for trust repair are more promising than in relationships characterized by many trust violations or few trust-confirming events. Make it a priority to honor trust on a daily basis in order to provide a conducive environment for trust repair should the need arise.
• Provide restitution/penance . Substantiate your verbal claims with concrete actions that demonstrate a good-faith effort to compensate the victim for the harmful effects of the violation. In CBT relationships, what the victim wants more than your kind words is some tangible aspect of the transaction that he/she was counting on.
• Restate and renegotiate expectations for the future, and be trustworthy in future interactions. You are likely to be on "probation" for a period, as the victim tests the waters to see if you actually resume trustworthy behavior. Be sure to take this into account, and take proactive steps to manage the expectations of the victim by specifically articulating what standards should be expected. Then commit to following these standards in the future.

In IBT relationships, the following steps should also be followed:

• Reaffirm commitment to the relationship. Reassert shared goals and interests, as well as the value placed on the relational bond between the parties. Re-establish the affective connection in the relationship by expressing your emotional attachment to the other party, and strive to demonstrate that the relationship is a top priority. You can re-gain credibility as you make clear sacrifices that establish the primacy of the relationship over your own self-interest.

A number of other helpful suggestions may be found in the essay on distrust .

Finally, we also wish to highlight possible obstacles to the trust rebuilding process. One of the most common is that some people are not clearly 'attuned' to other people's reactions, and hence do not understand when their behavior has violated someone else's trust. Thus, some individuals may have limited perspective-taking skills that make them less able to understand the consequences of trust violations they enact. Moreover, these same people may not know how to take the appropriate corrective action in order to begin to rebuild the other's trust. There is also an important psychological role for taking responsibility for one's actions, communicating remorse, and going to special lengths to compensate victims for harm inflicted by the offender. These types of restorative actions may threaten one's ego or self-esteem, and the expected benefits derived from such actions may not be deemed to be worth the expected costs for some individuals.

Another aspect to consider is the legal implications of our guidance. While apologies convey remorse and responsibility that aids in the trust rebuilding process, they also admit culpability that can be legally problematic. If trust rebuilding is the priority, the offender will have critical decisions to make regarding whether and how to apologize. Once again, there may be instances where the costs associated with trust rebuilding are unfortunately outweighed (for better or worse) by other considerations, such as minimizing legal liability.

While the media cannot directly rebuild trust between the parties, they can facilitate dialog and provide documentation of trust-rebuilding efforts. Reparative efforts by offenders may carry additional weight when conducted voluntarily and in a public forum. Knowing the risks to one's reputation by publicizing a complete account may provide additional credence and demonstrate sincerity. Media outlets may best provide this type of public forum.

As with trust-building initiatives, the educational system can help parties rebuild trust by promoting workshops and dialog groups that bring the parties together. Safe and structured programs can allow the victims to articulate their interests and expectations, and how these interests and expectations were violated, as well as provide the offender with an environment that can facilitate their efforts at reconciliation and trust repair.

[1] Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., and Camerer, C. (1998). "Not so Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust," in Academy of Management Review, 23, 393-404.

[2] Lewicki, R. J., McAllister, D. J., & Bies, R. J. (1998). Trust and distrust: New relationships and realities. Academy of Management Review, 23, 438-458.

Use the following to cite this article: Lewicki, Roy J. and Edward C. Tomlinson. "Trust and Trust Building." Beyond Intractability . Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: December 2003 < http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/trust-building >.

The Intractable Conflict Challenge

Our inability to constructively handle intractable conflict is the most serious, and the most neglected, problem facing humanity. Solving today's tough problems depends upon finding better ways of dealing with these conflicts.   More...

Selected Recent BI Posts Including Hyper-Polarization Posts

• Reprise: Constructive Confrontation: Applying Conflict Insights from a 1st Party (Not 3rd Party) Perspective -- A reprise of an old newsletter on constructive ways of engaging in conflict that is less likely to create backlash and more likely to achieve one's goals than typical adversarial approaches are likely to do.
• Guy and Heidi Burgess Talk with David Eisner about Threats to Democracy and How to Address Them -- The Burgesses talked with David Eisner about what he thinks the threats to democracy are, and how (and when) we might respond to them. We agreed, citizen involvement in governance is key.
• Updating Our Impartiality Discussions - Part 1 -- The Burgesses update their 2-year old discussion of impartiality, adding to it Martin Carcasson's notion of "principled impartiality" which adds in quality information and "small-d" democracy.

Get the Newsletter Check Out Our Quick Start Guide

Educators Consider a low-cost BI-based custom text .

Constructive Conflict Initiative

Join Us in calling for a dramatic expansion of efforts to limit the destructiveness of intractable conflict.

Things You Can Do to Help Ideas

Practical things we can all do to limit the destructive conflicts threatening our future.

Conflict Frontiers

A free, open, online seminar exploring new approaches for addressing difficult and intractable conflicts. Major topic areas include:

Scale, Complexity, & Intractability

Massively Parallel Peacebuilding

Authoritarian Populism

Constructive Confrontation

Conflict Fundamentals

An look at to the fundamental building blocks of the peace and conflict field covering both “tractable” and intractable conflict.

Beyond Intractability / CRInfo Knowledge Base

Home / Browse | Essays | Search | About

BI in Context

Links to thought-provoking articles exploring the larger, societal dimension of intractability.

Colleague Activities

Information about interesting conflict and peacebuilding efforts.

Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Beyond Intractability or the Conflict Information Consortium.

Beyond Intractability 

Unless otherwise noted on individual pages, all content is... Copyright © 2003-2022 The Beyond Intractability Project c/o the Conflict Information Consortium All rights reserved. Content may not be reproduced without prior written permission.

Guidelines for Using Beyond Intractability resources.

Citing Beyond Intractability resources.

Photo Credits for Homepage, Sidebars, and Landing Pages

Contact Beyond Intractability    Privacy Policy The Beyond Intractability Knowledge Base Project  Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess , Co-Directors and Editors  c/o  Conflict Information Consortium Mailing Address: Beyond Intractability, #1188, 1601 29th St. Suite 1292, Boulder CO 80301, USA Contact Form

Powered by  Drupal

production_1

How to Write an Essay on the Environment

• green living

The environment where we live affects how we function and socialize as human beings. Over the years, there has been a growing focus on climate change and how shifts in weather events and temperatures are affecting living organisms. 

Of course, although climate change is one of the threatening and pervasive things, currently, there are many other areas one can write about including biodiversity and pollution. Choosing what to write about is just one aspect of creating a good essay on the environment. 

When tasked with writing an assignment on the environment, there are some specific factors to consider. Of course, different instructors issue different guidelines for academic writing, including the format and citation style to use. Make sure to adhere to these and stick to the question as outlined in the assignment prompt. Here are additional tips for effective essay writing.

Start by Choosing a Good Topic

The most important step in effective academic writing is selecting an appropriate topic. There are many areas of the environment where you can base your writing. However, you have to make sure that your preferred topic is in line with your assignment question, as set out in the prompt. Of course, there are times when instructors provide specific topics for their students, eliminating the need for topic selection. 

In other instances, students are accorded the freedom to create their own topics. With such freedom, comes the responsibility of making sure that your topic is relevant for your project and current. Also, you have to make sure that your area of writing is precise enough to be covered within the scope of your essay. Those who are unable to find good topics can seek  custom writing  from professionals online. 

Your essay on the environment can be in any of the following areas:• Climate change or global warming and its impacts;• Biodiversity;• Environmental pollution and how it affects living organisms. 

Since the environment is a very broad topic area, you will need to conduct some research to make sure that you pick a relevant and current topic. Also, make sure to  narrow down your topic . 

Brainstorm for Ideas and Create a Plan

Once you have a topic for your essay, the next step is brainstorming. This is the process of thinking about the topic and noting down everything you know. The notes created here can form part of your outline.

When it comes to outlining, having a good plan will save you time much later in the course of your research and writing. This stage may require some preliminary research as well as the creation of a working thesis statement. 

Create an Interesting Thesis Statement

Now that you have a topic and an outline, it is time to create a working thesis. Please note that your statement may change several in the course of your research and writing. As you proceed with your work, you may encounter different ideas and change your perspective on important issues. In essence, your thesis should be clear, arguable, interesting, and simple. It should demonstrate the position you intend to take with your argumentation. 

Conduct Research and Document Sources

It is impossible to write a good essay on the environment if you don’t gather enough data and evidence. Quality academic papers present coherent arguments where ideas and points are supported using credible evidence. Conduct research on books, electronic journals, reputable websites, and primary sources. Just make sure to document the sources of your information to help with citations and references. Most importantly,  take keen notes that will make organizing  your essay easier. 

Start Writing as Soon as Possible

Do not spend so much time with preparations that you forget to make time for the actual writing. You may have heard that freewriting is the easiest way to overcome writer’s block. However, there is an even better way — writing from an outline and researching the various sections of your paper. Just make sure to give each main idea its own paragraph, supported using evidence and examples from credible sources. 

As you write your paper, grammar and syntax should not be your main priority. At this stage, just work on the drafting of your ideas and points. You can finish by editing your work for grammatical, content, and formatting consistency. 

Please note that the tips provided in this article are meant to guide you through the process of academic essay writing. You still have to make sure that your writing adheres to your assignment instructions. Most importantly, you need to ensure that you proofread and edit your work.

Related News

Hyundai Ioniq 5 N Edition: Test Drive Results

Norway’s Electric Vehicle Revolution: A Model for the World

Unleashing Power and Efficiency: GMC Sierra EV Denali Edition 1

Achieving Sustainable Milk Farming Practices

Share this:

How to build a strong trusting work environment.

Life is full of FUD right now - Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt - due to the global pandemic. It is critical to engender a work culture in which people feel safe sharing views, new methods of working and ideas for dealing with change.

Imagine you pluck up the courage to share an idea only to be shot down with a dismissive remark. Perhaps this is a pattern that is repeated in your workplace. Soon you learn to be cautious when voicing your opinions. Maybe next time you see in an opportunity for improvement you keep your views to yourself. Or perhaps you notice a flaw in an approach that the rest of the team are keen to try.  Do you feel it is safe to speak up? P robably not. Would this type of workplace enable you to grow, be at your best and stretch out of your comfort zone? It is highly unlikely. 

Creating an environment of trust in the workplace, and respecting different viewpoints makes good business sense as well as being the morally right thing to do. Research indicates that anticipating others will behave positively towards us increases our sense of security. From this standpoint, we are more likely to tolerate uncertainty and successfully navigate change. Trust is a key factor in team performance as it encourages collaboration and collective responsibility for goals leading to more productive outcomes and less negativity.

Conversely, when we don’t experience trust, we can become suspicious of others motives. In turn, this can promote a defensive mindset which increases our sense of vulnerability. Pretty soon our ne gativity bias can spin out of control. Then we only perceive problems and potential threats where there may be opportunities and constructive challenge. In such situations, team spirit dissolves as each person focuses on what they see as in their best interest. Goals and objectives suffer as conflict erupts, and precious time and energy ends up being directed at dealing with the fallout.*

Case-study: Noki The consequences of working in an environment where trust is lacking can be dire to the business as well as individuals. The mobile phone giant Noki discovered this the hard way. The company’s decline from brand leader to becoming an irrelevance and eventual failure is well-documented, thanks to a study by the graduate business school INSTEAD.**

Published in 2015, the study concluded that the culture of status combined with poor communication and low tolerance of critical feedback resulted in absolute stagnation. The staff didn’t feel it was safe to speak up when they noticed, for example, poor decisions, design problems or production issues. Managers didn’t share their concerns with leaders or with each other. Collaboration evaporated as people shunned opportunities to share information or pool resources. Leaders ignored the emerging competitive threats from Apple and Google and failed to communicate openly. The result being that Noki suffered a catastrophic decline. The key lessons from the Noki experience are:

• Openness is a powerful platform on which to build trust. Being open means timely communication with a commitment to listen to other viewpoints.
• Collaborative leadership means being willing to share knowledge, ideas and the glory as well as take responsibility for decisions – good or bad.
• Activating emotional intelligence enables an appreciation of the differences between individuals that can enrich the culture of an organisation.
• Controlled experimentation within a framework allows people to learn fast from failures so that innovation can flourish.
• Accepting challenges as catalysts for improvement creates a safe environment for constructive feedback at every level.

For further evidence of the benefit of trust in the workplace, you might like to read  The Fearless Organisation  is a book by  Amy Edmondson ,  the Novartis Professor of Leadership and Management at the Harvard Business School.  Professor Edmondson explains that in a fearless organisation, people act responsibly, courageously and know they can fail. They are not scared to speak up. They are willing to take the risk of openness and ‘tell it how it is’.  Dozens of examples are given of good and bad working cultures from more than twenty years of research. Best of all, Professor Edmondson sets out numerous practical measures that can be undertaken to create a fearless organisation in your workplace. To do so, managers need to learn how to invite participation from staff and how to respond positively. The book concludes with a leadership self-assessment tool so you can track your performance as a manager. 

Even if you are not the top boss in your organisation, you can begin to promote trust by adopting psychologically safe behaviours, such as: 

• Commitment. Show that you are doing more than expressing words by acting on what you learn. Are there opportunities to incorporate suggestions and new ways of working that demonstrate you are committed to improvement? Better still share your insights on the results with others and ask for their views to encourage further collaboration and innovation. Make a commitment to communicate openly and in a timely fashion. 
• Appreciation.  Notice the effort someone has put in regardless of the outcome. The encouragement received will give a boost and motivate them to push on. This is a growth mindset in action. Saying a simple ‘thank you’ for a specific task well done should be normal in the workplace. Sadly too many people feel it isn’t necessary or somehow ‘deserved’ (“they are just doing their job…”) . Don’t fall into this trap. A genuine appreciation of effort when made specific to a particular event, approach, or task will make all the difference to the recipient’s self-esteem and morale. 

Life is full of FUD right now – Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt – due to the global pandemic. Now more than ever, it is critical to engender a work culture in which employees feel safe sharing views, new methods of working and ideas for dealing with change. Being able to express hopes, fears and dreams can help strengthen the resolve to get through this difficult time – and prepare the way for long-term growth for you, your team, and your company.

Sources: 

* Jong, Bart A. De, Kurt T. Dirks, and Nicole Gillespie. “Trust and Team Performance: A Meta-analysis of Main Effects, Moderators, and Covariates.”  Journal of Applied Psychology  101.8 (2016): 1134-150. Web.

** Vuori, Timo and Huy, Quy. Distributed Attention and Shared Emotions in the Innovation Process: How Nokia Lost the Smartphone Battle. 0.13140/RG.2.1.1123.3764 (2015) 

Certified Personal & Team Coach: enabling people to be at their resourceful best

We live in an ever-changing dynamic world. At best, this can be exhilarating and provide excellent opportunities for personal growth. At worst, it can be exhausting and stressful as you try to do it all, which can lead to the feeling that you are doing nothing well. Maybe you are in such a situation? Perhaps you have reached a point where you long to create the life that you want rather than the one that is happening? If so, I may be the right coach to support you. My purpose is simple. I work with people to help them be at their resourceful best. I bring all of my expertise to the service of my clients. My skill set includes 30 years of experience in business, including board level. As a Professional Certified Coach and Positive Psychology Practitioner, I can help you to think your options through, make better choices and do the things that promote wellbeing, bring personal as well as professional satisfaction and make you happy. I am particularly skilled in supporting those who are at a crossroads in their life. My coaching approach can help you gain a clear understanding of your values, motivators, drivers, strengths and consider the impact of blind spots – and what you can do to mitigate these. I work via video calls, by phone and email. Should you wish to arrange a 30-minute complimentary discovery session, please contact me via [email protected]

Related content

How to build self-belief every day.

From being body confident to saying what you mean with conviction, Heidi Scrimgeour explores ways to foster a deeper sense of self-assurance…

Overcoming self-doubt: Identify your emotional blind spots

Learn to widen your perspective, chase down new challenges, and eliminate self-doubt, urges Holly Treacy

Healing Words: How Text Therapy at Calmerry Can Change Your Life

Find support, guidance, and mental wellness in the convenience of text-based therapy. Start your journey to emotional well-being today!

No thanks, I’m not interested!

The Importance of Trust in Leadership and Building Strong Teams

Trust is the cornerstone of effective leadership and the foundation for building strong teams. As a catalyst for collaboration and teamwork, trust fosters a positive work environment and drives increased productivity and employee engagement. Factors such as communication, consistency, transparency, and leader credibility influence trust levels. Assessing trust within teams requires careful observation, feedback seeking, and attention to non-verbal cues. Building and maintaining trust involves leading by example, promoting open communication, recognizing contributions, and nurturing relationships. This article explores the critical role of trust in leadership and the strategies for creating and sustaining trust within teams.

Table of Contents

Key Takeaways

• Trust is crucial for effective leadership and fosters collaboration and teamwork.
• Communication, consistency, transparency, and honesty are key factors in building trust.
• Trust levels can be assessed by observing team dynamics, feedback, and non-verbal cues.
• Building and maintaining trust requires leading by example, open communication, recognition, and accountability.

The Role of Trust in Effective Leadership

Trust plays a crucial role in effective leadership as it fosters collaboration, creates a positive work environment, and contributes to increased productivity and employee engagement. Trust is particularly important in decision making, as leaders who are trusted are more likely to be given the authority and autonomy to make important decisions. Trust also enables leaders to build strong relationships within their teams, which is essential for effective teamwork and collaboration. In virtual teams, trust is especially important as team members may not have the opportunity to build trust through face-to-face interactions. Building trust in virtual teams can be achieved through open and transparent communication, consistent actions and words, and establishing clear expectations and follow-through on commitments. Trust in decision making and building trust in virtual teams are critical components of effective leadership.

Trust as a Catalyst for Collaboration and Teamwork

Collaboration and teamwork thrive when individuals in a group demonstrate mutual reliance and a willingness to cooperate towards shared goals. Trust plays a crucial role in fostering effective collaboration and teamwork within teams. Building a culture of trust within teams is essential for creating an environment that encourages open communication, cooperation, and a sense of belonging. Trust enables team members to rely on each other, share information freely, and work together towards achieving common objectives. Nurturing effective collaboration through trust involves establishing transparent and honest communication channels, recognizing and appreciating the contributions of team members, and providing opportunities for open dialogue and feedback. By building trust within teams, leaders can create a foundation for effective collaboration and teamwork, leading to increased productivity and overall success.

The Impact of Trust on Productivity and Employee Engagement

The presence of trust within an organization has been found to positively influence productivity levels and employee engagement. Trust plays a crucial role in creating a work environment where employees feel supported and valued. It fosters collaboration and teamwork, allowing individuals to work together towards common goals. Trust also contributes to increased employee satisfaction and retention, as it creates a sense of psychological safety and job security. Furthermore, trust plays a significant role in fostering innovation and creativity within teams. When individuals trust each other and their leaders, they feel comfortable taking risks and sharing ideas, leading to the development of innovative solutions. Overall, trust is a fundamental aspect of organizational success, impacting productivity, employee satisfaction, retention, and the ability to foster innovation and creativity.

Creating a Positive Work Environment Through Trust

Creating a positive work environment is facilitated by fostering trust and promoting effective communication among team members. Building trust through transparency and accountability is key in establishing a foundation of trust within the team. Transparency involves being open and honest about decisions and actions, while accountability ensures that individuals take responsibility for their actions. Fostering trust through open communication channels and active listening is also crucial. Open communication allows team members to express their thoughts, concerns, and ideas freely, creating an environment of trust and mutual respect. Active listening, on the other hand, involves attentively listening to others without judgment or interruption, which enhances understanding and strengthens trust. By prioritizing transparency, accountability, open communication, and active listening, leaders can create a positive work environment where trust thrives, leading to increased collaboration, productivity, and overall team success.

Trust: the Foundation for Strong Relationships Within Teams

Establishing trust within teams is crucial for fostering positive relationships and creating a supportive work environment conducive to productivity and collaboration. Trust building activities can help enhance trust levels, leading to improved team performance.

• Engage in team-building exercises that promote trust and cooperation.
• Encourage open and honest communication among team members.
• Provide opportunities for team members to collaborate and work towards common goals.

Trust is closely linked to team performance, as it facilitates effective communication, cooperation, and the sharing of ideas. When team members trust one another, they are more likely to engage in open and constructive discussions, take risks, and support each other’s efforts. This, in turn, leads to increased creativity, innovation, and problem-solving within the team. Trust also fosters a sense of psychological safety, where team members feel comfortable expressing their opinions and ideas without fear of judgment or retribution. Overall, investing in trust-building activities can greatly contribute to the success and performance of teams.

Communication: A Key Factor in Building Trust

Effective communication plays a pivotal role in fostering trust within a team. It is essential for building strong relationships and creating a positive work environment. Trust is established through transparency and honesty in communication. When team members have open and transparent channels of communication, they feel valued and respected, leading to increased trust. By providing opportunities for team members to voice their opinions and concerns, leaders can demonstrate their commitment to transparency and build trust. Additionally, clear expectations and following through on commitments further contribute to trust-building. Effective communication also helps in addressing and resolving conflicts promptly, maintaining trust. By encouraging open dialogue and feedback within the team, leaders can continuously reinforce trust-building behaviors. Overall, effective communication is crucial for building trust through transparency in a team.

Consistency: Building Trust Through Actions and Words

Consistency in actions and words is a fundamental aspect of trust-building within a team. Building trust through integrity and reliability is essential for effective leadership and cohesive teamwork.

• Consistency in actions and words demonstrates reliability and predictability, allowing team members to feel secure and trust in their leader.
• By consistently aligning actions with words, leaders establish credibility and build a foundation of trust within the team.
• Reliability in keeping commitments and following through on promises fosters trust and confidence in the leader’s ability to deliver on their responsibilities.

Consistency in actions and words is not only crucial for trust-building, but it also promotes a positive work environment, encourages open communication, and enhances collaboration. Without consistency, trust can be easily eroded, leading to decreased productivity and strained relationships within the team. Therefore, leaders must prioritize consistency in their actions and words to establish and maintain trust among team members.

Transparency and Honesty: Essential Elements of Trust

Consistency in actions and words is essential for building trust in leadership. However, another crucial element of trust is transparency and honesty. Transparency refers to the open and clear communication of information, decisions, and intentions, while honesty entails truthfulness and integrity in all dealings. These aspects contribute to building trust through open communication channels. When leaders are transparent and honest, they create an environment that encourages trust among team members. Open communication allows for the sharing of ideas, concerns, and feedback, fostering collaboration and teamwork. By being transparent and honest, leaders demonstrate their commitment to building trust and credibility. This, in turn, cultivates a positive work environment where employees feel valued and respected. Therefore, transparency and honesty are essential elements for leaders seeking to build trust and establish strong teams.

The Influence of Past Experiences on Trust

Past experiences and interactions significantly shape individuals’ trust levels, influencing their perceptions of leaders and the overall team dynamics. The role of vulnerability in trust building is crucial, as it allows individuals to feel safe and open up to others. When leaders demonstrate vulnerability, it creates an environment where trust can flourish. Additionally, trust has a profound impact on decision-making processes. When trust is present within a team, members are more likely to share their ideas and opinions, leading to more informed and collaborative decision-making. On the other hand, in a low-trust environment, individuals may hesitate to speak up or contribute, which can hinder the quality of decisions made. Therefore, understanding the influence of past experiences on trust is essential in creating a trusting and effective team environment.

Credibility and Competence: Factors Affecting Trust in Leaders

Credibility and competence are crucial factors that influence the level of trust individuals have in their leaders. Building trustworthiness and earning respect are essential for effective leadership. Leaders who demonstrate credibility through their actions and words establish a foundation of trust with their team members. Consistency, transparency, and honesty are key elements that contribute to a leader’s credibility. In addition, leaders must possess the necessary competence to inspire trust. Competence is demonstrated through knowledge, skills, and the ability to make informed decisions. When leaders are perceived as competent, they instill confidence in their team members, leading to increased trust. Trust in leaders is essential for building strong teams and fostering collaboration. By prioritizing credibility and competence, leaders can establish a culture of trust within their organizations.

Assessing Trust Levels Within Teams

In order to foster trust within teams, leaders must first assess the existing trust levels. This allows leaders to identify any areas of improvement and implement effective trust-building strategies. Here are three key approaches for assessing trust levels within teams:

Observation: Leaders can observe team dynamics and interactions to gauge the level of trust within the group. This includes paying attention to non-verbal cues, body language, and the overall atmosphere within the team.

Feedback and Surveys: Gathering feedback from team members through surveys or interviews can provide valuable insights into their perceptions of trust within the team. This allows leaders to identify any areas of concern and address them accordingly.

Relationship Assessment: Assessing the level of trust in individual relationships within the team is crucial. This can be done through one-on-one conversations or by using trust assessment tools to identify any weak links that need to be strengthened.

Frequently Asked Questions

How can leaders build trust among team members.

Leaders can build trust among team members by fostering open communication and building relationships. This can be achieved through leading by example, providing opportunities for team members to voice their opinions, and recognizing their contributions.

What Are Some Strategies for Maintaining Trust Within a Team?

Strategies for maintaining trust within a team include effective communication techniques and team building activities. These strategies promote open dialogue, address conflicts promptly, and foster accountability among team members, ultimately strengthening trust and cohesion within the team.

How Can Leaders Assess the Level of Trust Within Their Team?

Leaders can assess trust levels within their team by observing team dynamics, using feedback and surveys, paying attention to non-verbal cues, identifying signs of low trust, and assessing trust in individual relationships. Fostering trust is crucial for effective leadership and building strong teams.

What Are the Consequences of Low Trust Within a Team?

Negative effects of low trust within a team include impaired collaboration, decreased productivity, and low employee engagement. It creates a hostile work environment, leads to frequent conflicts, and hinders the establishment of strong relationships among team members.

How Can Leaders Address and Resolve Conflicts to Maintain Trust?

Leaders can address and resolve conflicts to maintain trust through conflict resolution techniques and trust-building exercises. These include active listening, facilitating open dialogue, finding common ground, and encouraging collaboration and compromise among team members.

UNLOCK YOUR COPY

Presentations made painless

• Get Premium

119 Environmental Issues Essay Topic Ideas & Examples

Inside This Article

The environment is facing numerous challenges today, and it is important for us to address these issues in order to create a sustainable future for our planet. In this article, we will explore 119 environmental issues essay topic ideas and provide examples to help you get started on your own essay.

• Climate change: Discuss the causes and effects of climate change and potential solutions to mitigate its impact.

Example: The role of deforestation in contributing to climate change and the importance of reforestation efforts.

• Air pollution: Analyze the sources of air pollution and its effects on human health and the environment.

Example: The impact of vehicle emissions on air quality in urban areas and ways to reduce pollution from transportation.

• Water pollution: Examine the sources of water pollution and the potential consequences for aquatic ecosystems and human health.

Example: The effects of agricultural runoff on water quality and strategies to prevent pollution from entering waterways.

• Deforestation: Discuss the causes and consequences of deforestation and the importance of preserving forests for biodiversity and climate regulation.

Example: The impact of deforestation on indigenous communities and the loss of traditional knowledge and cultural practices.

• Plastic pollution: Explore the sources and effects of plastic pollution in the ocean and ways to reduce plastic waste.

Example: The role of microplastics in marine ecosystems and the need for regulations to prevent further pollution.

• Biodiversity loss: Analyze the factors contributing to the loss of biodiversity and the importance of protecting endangered species.

Example: The impact of habitat destruction on wildlife populations and the need for conservation efforts to preserve biodiversity.

• Overfishing: Discuss the consequences of overfishing on marine ecosystems and sustainable fishing practices.

Example: The decline of fish stocks due to overfishing and the importance of implementing fishing quotas and marine protected areas.

• E-waste: Examine the growing problem of electronic waste and the environmental and health risks associated with improper disposal.

Example: The challenges of recycling electronic devices and the need for better e-waste management practices.

• Urban sprawl: Analyze the impact of urban sprawl on natural habitats and the importance of smart growth and sustainable urban planning.

Example: The loss of green spaces and farmland to urban development and the benefits of compact, walkable communities.

• Renewable energy: Discuss the potential of renewable energy sources to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and dependence on fossil fuels.

Example: The growth of solar and wind power as clean energy alternatives and the challenges of integrating renewables into the grid.

• Ocean acidification: Explore the causes and consequences of ocean acidification on marine ecosystems and the need for carbon emission reductions.

Example: The effects of ocean acidification on coral reefs and shellfish populations and the importance of marine conservation efforts.

• Soil erosion: Analyze the causes of soil erosion and the impact on agricultural productivity and ecosystem health.

Example: The loss of topsoil due to deforestation and unsustainable farming practices and strategies to prevent erosion through soil conservation.

• Wildlife trafficking: Discuss the illegal trade of wildlife and the threats to endangered species and biodiversity.

Example: The demand for exotic pets and animal products driving the illegal wildlife trade and the need for stronger enforcement of wildlife protection laws.

• Pesticide use: Examine the environmental and health risks associated with pesticide use in agriculture and the need for sustainable pest management practices.

Example: The impact of pesticide runoff on water quality and non-target species and the benefits of organic farming methods.

• Food waste: Analyze the causes and consequences of food waste and potential solutions to reduce waste and improve food security.

Example: The environmental footprint of food production and distribution and the benefits of composting and food rescue programs.

• Greenhouse gas emissions: Discuss the sources of greenhouse gas emissions and the need for global action to reduce carbon pollution.

Example: The role of the transportation sector in contributing to greenhouse gas emissions and the potential for electrification and public transit to reduce emissions.

• Climate refugees: Explore the impact of climate change on vulnerable communities and the need for adaptation and resilience measures.

Example: The displacement of communities due to sea-level rise and extreme weather events and the challenges of climate migration.

• Land degradation: Analyze the causes of land degradation and the consequences for food security, water quality, and ecosystem health.

Example: The loss of arable land to desertification and soil erosion and the importance of sustainable land management practices.

• Ocean pollution: Discuss the sources of ocean pollution, including plastic waste, oil spills, and chemical contaminants, and the need for marine conservation.

Example: The impact of oil spills on marine ecosystems and the challenges of cleaning up and restoring affected areas.

• Environmental justice: Explore the intersection of environmental issues with social justice and equity, including the disproportionate impacts on marginalized communities.

Example: The siting of polluting industries in low-income neighborhoods and communities of color and the need for environmental policies that prioritize equity and inclusion.

• Green infrastructure: Discuss

Want to research companies faster?

Instantly access industry insights

Let PitchGrade do this for me

Leverage powerful AI research capabilities

We will create your text and designs for you. Sit back and relax while we do the work.

Explore More Content

• Privacy Policy
• Terms of Service

© 2024 Pitchgrade

• Table of Contents
• Random Entry
• Chronological
• Editorial Information
• About the SEP
• Editorial Board
• How to Cite the SEP
• Special Characters
• Advanced Tools
• Support the SEP
• PDFs for SEP Friends
• Make a Donation
• SEPIA for Libraries
• Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

• Friends PDF Preview
• Author and Citation Info
• Back to Top

Trust is important, but it is also dangerous. It is important because it allows us to depend on others—for love, for advice, for help with our plumbing, or what have you—especially when we know that no outside force compels them to give us these things. But trust also involves the risk that people we trust will not pull through for us, for if there were some guarantee they would pull through, then we would have no need to trust them. [ 1 ] Trust is therefore dangerous. What we risk while trusting is the loss of valuable things that we entrust to others, including our self-respect perhaps, which can be shattered by the betrayal of our trust.

Because trust is risky, the question of when it is warranted is of particular importance. In this context, “warranted” means justified or well-grounded meaning, respectively, that the trust is rational (e.g., it is based on good evidence) or that it successfully targets a trustworthy person. If trust is warranted in these senses, then the danger of it is either minimized as with justified trust or eliminated altogether as with well-grounded trust. Leaving the danger of trust aside, one could also ask whether trust is warranted in the sense of being plausible. Trust may not be warranted in a particular situation because it is simply not plausible; the conditions necessary for it do not exist, as is the case when people feel only antagonism toward one another. This entry on trust is framed as a response to the general question of when trust is warranted, where “warranted” is broadly construed to include “justified”, “well-grounded” and “plausible”.

A complete philosophical answer to this question must explore the various philosophical dimensions of trust, including the conceptual nature of trust and trustworthiness, the epistemology of trust, the value of trust, and the kind of mental attitude trust is. To illustrate how each of these matters is relevant, note that trust is warranted, that is,

• plausible, again, only if the conditions required for trust exist (e.g., some optimism about one another’s ability). Knowing what these conditions are requires understanding the nature of trust.
• well-grounded, only if the trustee (the one trusted) is trustworthy, which makes the nature of trustworthiness important in determining when trust is warranted.
• justified, sometimes when the trustee is not in fact trustworthy, which suggests that the epistemology of trust is relevant.
• justified, often because some value will emerge from the trust or because it is valuable in and of itself. Hence, the value of trust is important.
• plausible, only when it is possible for one to develop trust, given one’s circumstances and the sort of mental attitude trust is. For instance, trust may not be the sort of attitude that one can will oneself to have without any evidence of a person’s trustworthiness.

This piece explores these different philosophical issues about trust. It deals predominantly with interpersonal trust, which arguably is the dominant paradigm of trust. Although some philosophers write about trust that is not interpersonal, including trust in groups (Hawley 2017), institutional trust (i.e., trust in institutions; see, e.g., Potter 2002; Govier 1997; Townley and Garfield 2013), trust in government (e.g., Hardin 2002; Budnik 2018) or science (e.g., Oreskes 2019), self-trust (Govier 1993; Lehrer 1997; Foley 2001; McLeod 2002; Goering 2009; Jones 2012b; Potter 2013), and trust in robots (e.g., Coeckelbergh 2012, Sullins 2020), most would agree that these forms of “trust” are coherent only if they share important features of (i.e., can be modeled on) interpersonal trust. The assumption going forward therefore is that the dominant paradigm is interpersonal.

In addition, while this entry focuses mainly on trust and trustworthiness, it also covers distrust (more so in this version than in previous versions). Distrust has received surprisingly little attention from philosophers, although it has recently become a topic of serious concern for some of them, particularly those who are interested in the politics of trust and distrust in societies marked by oppression and privilege. Relevant issues include when distrust is warranted by people who experience oppression and how misplaced distrust (i.e., in the oppressed) can be overcome by people who are privileged. This entry delves into these matters and also summarizes the few theories that exist about the nature of distrust.

1.1 Motives-based theories

1.2 non-motives-based theories, 1.3 distrust, 2.1 truth- vs. end-directed rationality, 2.2 internalism vs. externalism, 2.3 social and political climate, 3. the value of trust, 4. trust and the will, 5. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the nature of trust and trustworthiness.

Trust is an attitude we have towards people whom we hope will be trustworthy, where trustworthiness is a property not an attitude. Trust and trustworthiness are therefore distinct although, ideally, those whom we trust will be trustworthy, and those who are trustworthy will be trusted. For trust to be plausible in a relationship, the parties to the relationship must have attitudes toward one another that permit trust. Moreover, for trust to be well-grounded, both parties must be trustworthy. (Note that here and throughout, unless specified otherwise, “trustworthiness” is understood in a thin sense according to which X is trustworthy for me just in case I can trust X .)

Trusting requires that we can, (1) be vulnerable to others—vulnerable to betrayal in particular; (2) rely on others to be competent to do what we wish to trust them to do; and (3) rely on them to be willing to do it. [ 2 ] Notice that the second two conditions refer to a connection between trust and reliance. For most philosophers, trust is a kind of reliance although it is not mere reliance (Goldberg 2020). Rather, trust involves reliance “plus some extra factor” (Hawley 2014: 5). Controversy surrounds this extra factor, which generally concerns why the trustor (i.e., the one trusting) would rely on the trustee to be willing to do what they are trusted to do.

Trustworthiness is likewise a kind of reliability, although it’s not obvious what kind. Clear conditions for trustworthiness are that the trustworthy person is competent and willing to do what they are trusted to do. Yet this person may also have to be willing for certain reasons or as a result of having a certain kind of motive for acting (e.g., they care about the trustor).

This section explains these various conditions for trust and trustworthiness and highlights the controversy that surrounds the condition about motive and relatedly how trust differs from mere reliance. Included at the end is some discussion about the nature of distrust.

Let me begin with the idea that the trustor must accept some level of vulnerability or risk (Becker 1996; Baier 1986). Minimally, what this person risks, or is vulnerable to, is the failure by the trustee to do what the trustor is depending on them to do. The trustor might try to reduce this risk by monitoring or imposing certain constraints on the behavior of the trustee; but after a certain threshold perhaps, the more monitoring and constraining they do, the less they trust this person. Trust is relevant “before one can monitor the actions of … others” (Dasgupta 1988: 51) or when out of respect for others one refuses to monitor them. One must be content with them having some discretionary power or freedom, and as a result, with being somewhat vulnerable to them (Baier 1986; Dasgupta 1988).

One might think that if one is relying while trusting—that is, if trust is a species of reliance—then accepted vulnerability would not be essential for trust. Do we not rely on things only when we believe they will actually happen? And if we believe that, then we don’t perceive ourselves as being vulnerable. Many philosophers writing on trust and reliance say otherwise. They endorse the view of Richard Holton, who writes, “When I rely on something happening … I [only] need to plan on it happening; I need to work around the supposition that it will [happen]” (Holton 1994: 3). I need not be certain of it happening and I could even have doubts that it will happen (Goldberg 2020). I could therefore accept that I am vulnerable. I could do that while trusting if trust is a form of reliance.

What does trusting make us vulnerable to, in particular? Annette Baier writes that “trusting can be betrayed, or at least let down, and not just disappointed” (1986: 235). In her view, disappointment is the appropriate response when one merely relied on someone to do something but did not trust them to do it. To elaborate, although people who monitor and constrain others’ behavior may rely on them, they do not trust them if their reliance can only be disappointed rather than betrayed. One can rely on inanimate objects, such as alarm clocks, but when they break, one is not betrayed though one might be disappointed. This point reveals that reliance without the possibility of betrayal (or at least “let down”) is not trust; people who rely on one another in a way that makes this reaction impossible do not trust one another.

But does trust always involve the potential for betrayal? “Therapeutic trust” may be an exception (Nickel 2007: 318; and for further exceptions, see, e.g., Hinchman 2017). To illustrate this type of trust, consider parents who

trust their teenagers with the house or the family car, believing that their [children] may well abuse their trust, but hoping by such trust to elicit, in the fullness of time, more responsible and responsive trustworthy behaviour. (McGeer 2008: 241, her emphasis; see also Horsburgh 1960 and Pettit 1995)

Therapeutic trust is not likely to be betrayed rather than merely be disappointed. It is unusual in this respect (arguably) and in other respects that will become evident later on in this entry. The rest of this section deals with usual rather than unusual forms of trust and trustworthiness.

Without relying on people to display some competence, we also can’t trust them. We usually trust people to do certain things, such as look after our children, give us advice, or be honest with us, which we wouldn’t do that if we thought they lacked the relevant skills, including potentially moral skills of knowing what it means to be honest or caring (Jones 1996: 7). Rarely do we trust people completely (i.e., A simply trusts B ). Instead, “trust is generally a three-part relation: A trusts B to do X ” (Hardin 2002: 9)—or “ A trusts B with valued item C ” (Baier 1986) or A trusts B in domain D (D’Cruz 2019; Jones 2019). [ 3 ] To have trust in a relationship, we do not need to assume that the other person will be competent in every way. Optimism about the person’s competence in at least one area is essential, however.

When we trust people, we rely on them not only to be competent to do what we trust them to do, but also to be willing or motivated to do it. We could talk about this matter either in terms of what the trustor expects of the trustee or in terms of what the trustee possesses: that is, as a condition for trust or for trustworthiness (and the same is true, of course, of the competence condition). For simplicity’s sake and to focus some of this section on trustworthiness rather than trust, the following refers to the motivation of the trustee mostly as a condition for trustworthiness.

Although both the competence and motivational elements of trustworthiness are crucial, the exact nature of the latter is unclear. For some philosophers, it matters only that the trustee is motivated, where the central problem of trustworthiness in their view concerns the probability that this motivation will exist or endure (see, e.g., Hardin 2002: 28; Gambetta 1988b). Jones calls these “risk-assessment views” about trust (1999: 68). According to them, we trust people whenever we perceive that the risk of relying on them to act a certain way is low and so we rely on (i.e., “trust”) them. They are trustworthy if they are willing, for whatever reason, to do what they are trusted to do. Risk-assessment theories make no attempt to distinguish between trust and mere reliance and have been criticized for this reason (see, e.g., Jones 1999).

By contrast, other philosophers say that just being motivated to act in the relevant way is not sufficient for trustworthiness; according to them, the nature of the motivation matters, not just its existence or duration. It matters in particular, they say, for explaining the trust-reliance distinction, which is something they aim to do. The central problem of trustworthiness for them is not simply whether but also how the trustee is motivated to act. Will that person have the kind of motivation that makes trust appropriate? Katherine Hawley identifies theories that respond to this question as “motives-based” theories (2014).

To complicate matters, there are “non-motives-based theories”, which are also not risk-assessment theories (Hawley 2014). They strive to distinguish between trust and mere reliance, though not by associating a particular kind of motive with trustworthiness. Since most philosophical debate about the nature of trust and trustworthiness centers on theories that are either motives-based or non-motives-based, let me expand on each of these categories.

Philosophers who endorse this type of theory differ in terms of what kind of motive they associate with trustworthiness. For some, it is self-interest, while for others, it is goodwill or an explicitly moral motive, such as moral integrity or virtue. [ 4 ]

For example, Russell Hardin defines trustworthiness in terms of self-interest in his “encapsulated interests” account (2002). He says that trustworthy people are motivated by their own interest to maintain the relationship they have with the trustor, which in turn encourages them to encapsulate the interests of that person in their own interests. In addition, trusting people is appropriate when we can reasonably expect them to encapsulate our interests in their own, an expectation which is missing with mere reliance.

Hardin’s theory may be valuable in explaining many different types of trust relationships, including those between people who can predict little about one another’s motives beyond where their self-interest lies. Still, his theory is problematic. To see why, consider how it applies to a sexist employer who has an interest in maintaining relationships with women employees, who treats them reasonably well as a result, but whose interest stems from a desire to keep them around so that he can daydream about having sex with them. This interest conflicts with an interest the women have in not being objectified by their employer. At the same time, if they were not aware of his daydreaming—say they are not—then he can ignore this particular interest of theirs. He can keep his relationships with them going while ignoring this interest and encapsulating enough of their other interests in his own. And this would make him trustworthy on Hardin’s account. But is he trustworthy? The answer is “no” or at least the women themselves would say “no” if they knew the main reason for their employment. The point is that being motivated by a desire to maintain a relationship (the central motivation of a trustworthy person on the encapsulated interests view) may not require one to adopt all of the interests of the trustor that would actually make one trustworthy to that person. In the end, the encapsulated interests view seems to describe only reliability, not trustworthiness. The sexist employer may reliably treat the women well, because of his interest in daydreaming about them, but he is not trustworthy because of why he treats them well.

A different type of theory is what Jones calls a “will-based” account, which finds trustworthiness only where the trustee is motivated by goodwill (Jones 1999: 68). This view originates in the work of Annette Baier and is influential, even outside of moral philosophy (e.g., in bioethics and law, especially fiduciary law; see, e.g., Pellegrino and Thomasma 1993, O’Neill 2002, and Fox-Decent 2005). According to it, a trustee who is trustworthy will act out of goodwill toward the trustor, to what or to whom the trustee is entrusted with, or both. While many readers might find the goodwill view problematic—surely we can trust people without presuming their goodwill!—it is immune to a criticism that applies to Hardin’s theory and also to risk-assessment theories. The criticism is that they fail to require that the trustworthy person care about (i.e., feel goodwill towards) the trustor, or care about what the trustor cares about. As we have seen, such caring appears to be central to a complete account of trustworthiness.

The particular reason why care may be central is that it allows us to grasp how trust and reliance differ. The above suggested that they differ because only trust can be betrayed (or at least let down). But why is that true? Why can trust be betrayed, while mere reliance can only be disappointed? The answer Baier gives is that betrayal is the appropriate response to someone on whom one relied to act out of goodwill, as opposed to ill will, selfishness, or habit bred out of indifference (1986: 234–5; see also Baier 1991). Those who say that trusting could involve relying on people to act instead on motives like ill will or selfishness will have trouble distinguishing between trust and mere reliance.

While useful in some respects, Baier’s will-based account is not perfect. Criticisms have been made that suggest goodwill is neither necessary nor sufficient for trustworthiness. It is not necessary because we can trust other people without presuming that they have goodwill (e.g., O’Neill 2002; Jones 2004), as we arguably do when we put our trust in strangers.

As well as being unnecessary, goodwill may not be sufficient for trustworthiness, and that is true for at least three reasons. First, someone trying to manipulate you—a “confidence trickster” (Baier 1986)—could “rely on your goodwill without trusting you”, say, to give them money (Holton 1994: 65). You are not trustworthy for them, despite your goodwill, because they are not trusting you but rather are just trying to trick you. Second, basing trustworthiness on goodwill alone cannot explain unwelcome trust. We do not always welcome people’s trust, because trust can be burdensome or inappropriate. When that happens, we object not to these people’s optimism about our goodwill (who would object to that?), but only to the fact that they are counting on us. Third, we can expect people to be reliably benevolent toward us without trusting them (Jones 1996: 10). We can think that their benevolence is not shaped by the sorts of values that for us are essential to trustworthiness. [ 5 ]

Criticisms about goodwill not being sufficient for trustworthiness have prompted revisions to Baier’s theory and in some cases to the development of new will-based theories. For example, in response to the first criticism—about the confidence trickster—Zac Cogley argues that trust involves the belief not simply that the trustee will display goodwill toward us but that this person owes us goodwill (2012). Since the confidence trickster doesn’t believe that their mark owes them goodwill, they don’t trust this person, and neither is this person trustworthy for them. In response to the second criticism—the one about unwelcome trust—Jones claims that optimism about the trustee’s goodwill must be coupled with the expectation that the trustee will be “favorably moved by the thought that [we are] counting on her” (1996: 9). Jones does that in her early work on trust where she endorses a will-based theory. Finally, in response to the third concern about goodwill not being informed by the sorts of values that would make people trustworthy for us, some maintain that trust involves an expectation about some shared values, norms, or interests (Lahno 2001, 2020; McLeod 2002, 2020; Mullin 2005; Smith 2008). (To be clear, this last expectation tends not to be combined with goodwill to yield a new will-based theory.)

One final criticism of will-based accounts concerns how “goodwill” should be interpreted. In much of the discussion above, it is narrowly conceived so that it involves friendly feeling or personal liking. Jones urges us in her early work on trust to understand goodwill more broadly, so that it could amount to benevolence, conscientiousness, or the like, or friendly feeling (1996: 7). But then in her later work, she worries that by defining goodwill so broadly we

turn it into a meaningless catchall that merely reports the presence of some positive motive, and one that may or may not even be directed toward the truster. (2012a: 67)

Jones abandons her own will-based theory upon rejecting both a narrow and a broad construal of goodwill. (The kind of theory she endorses now is a trust responsive one; see below.) If her concerns about defining goodwill are valid, then will-based theories are in serious trouble.

To recapitulate about encapsulated-interest and will-based theories, they say that a trustworthy person is motivated by self-interest or goodwill, respectively. Encapsulated-interest theories struggle to explain how trustworthiness differs from mere reliability, while will-based theories are faced with the criticism that goodwill is neither necessary nor sufficient for trustworthiness. Some philosophers who say that goodwill is insufficient develop alternative will-based theories. An example is Cogley’s theory according to which trust involves a normative expectation of goodwill (2012).

The field of motives-based theories is not exhausted by encapsulated-interest and will-based theories, however. Other motives-based theories include those that describe the motive of trustworthy people in terms of a moral commitment, moral obligation, or virtue. To expand, consider that one could make sense of the trustworthiness of a stranger by presuming that the stranger is motivated not by self-interest or goodwill, but by a commitment to stand by their moral values. In that case, I could trust a stranger to be decent by presuming just that she is committed to common decency. Ultimately, what I am presuming about the stranger is moral integrity, which some say is the relevant motive for trust relations (those that are prototypical; see McLeod 2002). Others identify this motive similarly as moral obligation, and say it is ascribed to the trustee by the very act of trusting them (Nickel 2007; for a similar account, see Cohen and Dienhart 2013). Although compelling in some respects, the worry about these theories is that they moralize trust inappropriately by demanding that the trustworthy person have a moral motive (see below and also Mullin 2005; Jones 2017).

Yet one might insist that it is appropriate to moralize trust or at least moralize trustworthiness, which we often think of as a virtuous character trait. Nancy Nyquist Potter refers to the trait as “full trustworthiness”, and distinguishes it from “specific trustworthiness”, which is trustworthiness that is specific to certain relationships (and equivalent to the thin sense of trustworthiness I have used throughout; 2002: 25). To be fully trustworthy, one must have a disposition to be trustworthy toward everyone, according to Potter. Let us call this the “virtue” account.

It may sound odd to insist that trustworthiness is a virtue or, in other words, a moral disposition to be trustworthy (Potter 2002: 25; Hardin 2002: 32). What disposition exactly is it meant to be? A disposition normally to honor people’s trust? That would be strange, since trust can be unwanted if the trust is immoral (e.g., being trusted to hide a murder) or if it misinterprets the nature of one’s relationship with the trustee (e.g., being trusted to be friends with a mere acquaintance). Perhaps trustworthiness is instead a disposition to respond to trust in appropriate ways, given “who one is in relation” to the trustor and given other virtues that one possesses or ought to possess (e.g., justice, compassion) (Potter 2002: 25). This is essentially Potter’s view. Modeling trustworthiness on an Aristotelian conception of virtue, she defines a trustworthy person as “one who can be counted on, as a matter of the sort of person he or she is, to take care of those things that others entrust to one and (following the Doctrine of the Mean) whose ways of caring are neither excessive nor deficient” (her emphasis; 16). [ 6 ] A similar account of trustworthiness as a virtue—an epistemic one, specifically—can be found in the literature on testimony (see Frost-Arnold 2014; Daukas 2006, 2011).

Criticism of the virtue account comes from Karen Jones (2012a). As she explains, if being trustworthy were a virtue, then being untrustworthy would be a vice, but that can’t be right because we can never be required to exhibit a vice, yet we can be required to be untrustworthy (84). An example occurs when we are counted on by two different people to do two incompatible things and being trustworthy to the one demands that we are untrustworthy to the other (83). To defend her virtue theory, Potter would have to insist that in such situations, we are required either to disappoint someone’s trust rather than be untrustworthy, or to be untrustworthy in a specific not a full sense. [ 7 ]

Rather than cling to a virtue theory, however, why not just accept the thin conception of trustworthiness (i.e., “specific trustworthiness”), according to which X is trustworthy for me just in case I can trust X ? Two things can be said. First, the thick conception—of trustworthiness as a virtue—is not meant to displace the thin one. We can and do refer to some people as being trustworthy in the specific or thin sense and to others as being trustworthy in the full or thick sense. Second, one could argue that the thick conception explains better than the thin one why fully trustworthy people are as dependable as they are. It is ingrained in their character. They therefore must have an ongoing commitment to being accountable to others, and better still, a commitment that comes from a source that is compatible with trustworthiness (i.e., virtue as opposed to mere self-interest).

An account of trustworthiness that includes the idea that trustworthiness is a virtue will seem ideal only if we think that the genesis of the trustworthy person’s commitment matters. If we believe, like risk-assessment theorists, that it matters only whether, not how, the trustor will be motivated to act, then we could assume that ill will can do the job as well as a moral disposition. Such controversy explains how and why motives-based and risk-assessment theories diverge from one another.

A final category are theories that base trustworthiness neither on the kind of motivation a trustworthy person has nor on the mere willingness of this person to do what they are relied on to do. These are non-motives-based and also non-risk-assessment theories. The conditions that give rise to trustworthiness according to them reside ultimately in the stance the trustor takes toward the trustee or in what the trustor believes they ought to be able to expect from this person (i.e., in normative expectations of them). These theories share with motives-based theories the goal of describing how trust differs from mere reliance.

An example is Richard Holton’s theory of trust (1994). Holton argues that trust is unique because of the stance the trustor takes toward the trustee: the “participant stance”, which involves treating the trustee as a person—someone who is responsible for their actions—rather than simply as an object (see also Strawson 1962 [1974]). In the case of trust specifically, the stance entails a readiness to feel betrayal (Holton 1994: 4). Holton’s claim is that this stance and this readiness are absent when we merely rely on someone or something.

Although Holton’s theory has garnered positive attention (e.g., by Hieronymi 2008; McGeer 2008), some do find it dissatisfying. For example, some argue that it does not obviously explain what would justify a reaction of betrayal, rather than mere disappointment, when someone fails to do what they are trusted to do (Jones 2004; Nickel 2007). They could fail to do it just by accident, in which case feelings of betrayal would be inappropriate (Jones 2004). Others assert, by contrast, that taking the participant stance toward someone

does not always mean trusting that person: some interactions [of this sort] lie outside the realm of trust and distrust. (Hawley 2014: 7)

To use an example from Hawley, my partner could come to rely on me to make him dinner every night in a way that involves him taking the participant stance toward me. But he needn’t trust me to make him dinner and so needn’t feel betrayed if I do not. He might know that I am loath for him to trust me in this regard: “to make this [matter of making dinner] a matter of trust” between us (Hawley 2014: 7).

Some philosophers have expanded on Holton’s theory in a way that might deflect some criticism of it. Margaret Urban Walker emphasizes that in taking a participant stance, we hold people responsible (2006: 79). We expect them to act not simply as we assume they will , but as they should . We have, in other words, normative rather than merely predictive expectations of them. Call this a “normative-expectation” theory, which again is an elaboration on the participant-stance theory. Endorsed by Walker and others (e.g., Jones 2004 and 2012a; Frost-Arnold 2014), this view explains the trust-reliance distinction in terms of the distinction between normative and predictive expectations. It also describes the potential for betrayal in terms of the failure to live up a normative expectation.

Walker’s theory is non-motives-based because it doesn’t specify that trustworthy people must have a certain kind of motive for acting. She says that trustworthiness is compatible with having many different kinds of motives, including, among others, goodwill, “pride in one’s role”, “fear of penalties for poor performance”, and “an impersonal sense of obligation” (2006: 77). What accounts for whether someone is trustworthy in her view is whether they act as they should, not whether they are motivated in a certain way. (By contrast, Cogley’s normative-expectation theory says that the trustworthy person both will and ought to act with goodwill. His theory is motives-based.)

Prominent in the literature is a kind of normative-expectation theory called a “trust- (or dependence-) responsive” theory (see, e.g., Faulkner and Simpson 2017: 8; Faulkner 2011, 2017; Jones 2012a, 2017, 2019; McGeer and Petit 2017). According to this view, being trustworthy involves being appropriately responsive to the reason you have to do X —what you are being relied on (or “counted on”; Jones 2012a) to do—when it’s clear that someone is in fact relying on you. The reason you have to do X exists simply because someone is counting on you; other things being equal, you should do it for this reason. Being appropriately responsive to it, moreover, just means that you find it compelling (Jones 2012a: 70–71). The person trusting you expects you to have this reaction; in other words, they have a normative expectation that the “manifest fact of [their] reliance will weigh on you as a reason for choosing voluntarily to X ” (McGeer and Pettit 2017: 16). This expectation is missing in cases of mere reliance. When I merely rely on you, I do not expect my reliance to weigh on you as I do when I trust you.

Although trust-responsive theories might seem motives-based, they are not. One might think that to be trustworthy, they require that you to be motivated by the fact that you are being counted on. Instead, they demand only that you be appropriately responsive to the reason you have to do what you are being depended on to do. As Jones explains, you could be responsive in this way and act ultimately out of goodwill, conscientiousness, love, duty, or the like (2012a: 66). The reaction I expect of you, as the trustor, is compatible with you acting on different kinds of motives, although to be clear, not just any motive will do (not like in Walker’s theory); some motives are ruled out, including indifference and ill will (Jones 2012a: 68). Being indifferent or hateful towards me means that you are unlikely to view me counting on you as a reason to act. Hence, if I knew you were indifferent or hateful, I would not expect you to be trust responsive.

Trust-responsive theories are less restrictive than motives-based theories when it comes to defining what motives people need to be trustworthy. At the same time, they are more restrictive when it comes to stating whether, in order to be trustworthy or trusted, one must be aware that one is being counted on. One couldn’t be trust responsive otherwise. In trusting you, I therefore must “make clear to you my assumption that you will prove reliable in doing X ” (McGeer and Pettit 2017: 16). I do not have to do that by contrast if, in trusting you, I am relying on you instead to act with a motive like goodwill. Baier herself allows that trust can exist where the trustee is unaware of it (1986: 235; see also Hawley 2014; Lahno 2020). For her, trust is ubiquitous (Jones 2017: 102) in part for this reason; we trust people in a myriad of different ways every single day, often without them knowing it. If she’s right about this fact, then trust-responsive theories are incomplete.

These theories are also vulnerable to objections raised against normative-expectation theories, because they are again a type of normative-expectation theory. One such concern comes from Hawley. In writing about both trust and distrust, she states that

we need a story about when trust, distrust or neither is objectively appropriate—what is the worldly situation to which (dis)trust] is an appropriate response? When is it appropriate to have (dis)trust-related normative expectations of someone? (2014: 11)

Normative-expectation theories tend not to provide an answer. And trust-responsive theories suggest only that trust-related normative expectations are appropriate when certain motives are absent (e.g., ill will), which may not to be enough.

Hawley responds to the above concern within her “commitment account” of trust (2014, 2019). This theory states that in trusting others, we believe that they have a commitment to doing what we are trusting them to do (2014: 10), a fact which explains why we expect them to act this way, and also why we fail to do so in cases like that of my partner relying on me to make dinner; he knows I have no commitment to making his dinner (or anyone else’s) repeatedly. For Hawley, the relevant commitments

can be implicit or explicit, weighty or trivial, conferred by roles and external circumstances, default or acquired, welcome or unwelcome. (2014: 11)

They also needn’t actually motivate the trustworthy person. Her theory is non-motives-based because it states that to

be trustworthy, in some specific respect, it is enough to behave in accordance with one’s commitment, regardless of motive. (2014: 16)

Similarly, to trust me to do something, it is enough to believe that I

have a commitment to do it, and that I will do it, without believing that I will do it because of my commitment. (2014: 16; her emphasis)

Notice that unlike trust-responsive theories, the commitment account does not require that the trustee be aware of the trust in order to be trustworthy. This person simply needs to have a commitment and to act accordingly. They don’t even need to be committed to the trustor, but rather could be committed to anyone and one could trust them to follow through on that commitment (Hawley 2014: 11). So, relying on a promise your daughter’s friend makes to her to take her home from the party would count as an instance of trust (Hawley 2014: 11). In this way, the commitment account is less restrictive than trust-responsive theories are. In being non-motives-based, Hawley’s theory is also less restrictive than any motives-based theory. Trust could truly be ubiquitous if she’s correct about the nature of it.

Like the other theories considered here, however, the commitment account is open to criticisms. One might ask whether Hawley gives a satisfactory answer to the question that motivates her theory: when can we reasonably have the normative expectations of someone that go along with trusting them? Hawley’s answer is, when this person has the appropriate commitment, where “commitment” is understood very broadly. Yet where the relevant commitment is implicit or unwelcome, it’s unclear that we can predict much about the trustee’s behavior. In cases like these, the commitment theory may have little to say about whether it is reasonable to trust.

A further criticism comes from Andrew Kirton (2020) who claims that we sometimes trust people to act contrary to what they are committed to doing. His central example involves a navy veteran, an enlisted man, whose ship sunk at sea and who trusted those who rescued them (navy men) to ignore a commitment they had to save the officers first, because the officers were relatively safe on lifeboats compared to the enlisted men who were struggling in the water. Instead the rescuers adhered to their military duty, and the enlisted man felt betrayed by them for nearly letting him drown. Assuming it is compelling, this example shows that trust and commitment can come apart and that Hawley’s theory is incomplete. [ 8 ]

The struggle to find a complete theory of trust has led some philosophers to be pluralists about trust—that is, to say, “we must recognise plural forms of trust” (Simpson 2012: 551) or accept that trust is not just one form of reliance, but many forms of it (see also Jacoby 2011; Scheman 2020; McLeod 2020). Readers may be led to this conclusion from the rundown I’ve given of the many different theories of trust in philosophy and the objections that have been raised to them. Rather than go in the direction of pluralism, however, most philosophers continue to debate what unifies all trust such that it is different from mere reliance. They tend to believe that a unified and suitably developed motives-based theory or non-motives-based theory can explain this difference, although there is little consensus about what this theory should be like.

In spite of there being little settled agreement in philosophy about trust, there are thankfully things we can say for certain about it that are relevant to deciding when it is warranted. The trustor must be able to accept that by trusting, they are vulnerable usually to betrayal. Also, the trustee must be competent and willing to do what the trustor expects of them and may have to be willing because of certain attitudes they have. Last, in paradigmatic cases of trust, the trustor must be able to rely on the trustee to exhibit this competence and willingness.

As suggested above, distrust has been somewhat of an afterthought for philosophers (Hawley 2014), [ 9 ] although their attention to it has grown recently. As with trust and trustworthiness, philosophers would agree that distrust has certain features, although the few who have developed theories of distrust disagree ultimately about the nature of it.

The following are features of distrust that are relatively uncontroversial (see D’Cruz 2020):

• Distrust is not just the absence of trust since it is possible to neither distrust nor trust someone (Hawley 2014: 3; Jones 1996: 16; Krishnamurthy 2015). There is gap between the two—“the possibility of being suspended between” them (Ullmann-Margalit 2004 [2017: 184]). (For disagreement, see Faulkner 2017.)
• Although trust and distrust are not exhaustive, they are exclusive; one cannot at the same time trust and distrust someone about the same matter (Ullmann-Margalit 2004 [2017: 201]).
• Distrust is “not mere nonreliance” (Hawley 2014: 3). I could choose not to rely on a colleague’s assistance because I know she is terribly busy, not because I distrust her.
• Relatedly, distrust has a normative dimension. If I distrusted a colleague for no good reason and they found out about it, then they would probably be hurt or angry. But the same reaction would not accompany them knowing that I decided not to rely on them (Hawley 2014). Being distrusted is a bad thing (Domenicucci and Holton 2017: 150; D’Cruz 2019: 935), while not being relied on needn’t be bad at all.
• Distrust is normally a kind of nonreliance, just as trust is a kind (or many kinds) of reliance. Distrust involves “action-tendencies” of avoidance or withdrawal (D’Cruz 2019: 935–937), which make it incompatible with reliance—or at least complete reliance. We can be forced to rely on people we distrust, yet even then, we try to keep them at as safe a distance as possible.

Given the relationship between trust and distrust and the similarities between them (e.g., one is “richer than [mere] reliance” and the other is “richer than mere nonreliance”; Hawley 2014: 3), one would think that any theory of trust should be able to explain distrust and vice versa. Hawley makes this point and criticizes theories of trust for not being able to make sense of distrust (2014: 6–9). For example, will-based accounts imply that distrust must be nonreliance plus an expectation of ill will, yet the latter is not required for distrust. I could distrust someone because he is careless, not because he harbors ill will toward me (Hawley 2014: 6).

Hawley defends her commitment account of trust, in part, because she believes it is immune to the above criticism. It says that distrust is nonreliance plus the belief that the person distrusted is committed to doing what we will not rely on them to do. In spite of them being committed in this way (or so we believe), we do not rely on them (2014: 10). This account does not require that we impute any particular motive or feeling to the one distrusted, like ill will. At the same time, it tells us why distrust is not mere nonreliance and also why it is normative; the suspicion of the one distrusted is that they will fail to meet a commitment they have, which is bad.

Some have argued that Hawley’s theory of distrust is subject to counterexamples, however (D’Cruz 2020; Tallant 2017). For example, Jason D’Cruz describes a financier who “buys insurance on credit defaults, positioning himself to profit when borrowers default” (2020: 45). The financier believes that the borrowers have a commitment not to default, and he does not rely on them to meet this commitment. The conclusion that Hawley’s theory would have us reach is that he distrusts the borrowers, which doesn’t seem right.

A different kind of theory of distrust can be found in the work of Meena Krishnamurthy (2015), who is interested specifically in the value that distrust has for political democracies, and for political minorities in particular (2015). She offers what she calls a “narrow normative” account of distrust that she derives from the political writings of Martin Luther King Jr. The account is narrow because it serves a specific purpose: of explaining how distrust can motivate people to resist tyranny. It is normative because it concerns what they ought to do (again, resist; 392). The theory states that distrust is the confident belief that others will not act justly. It needn’t involve an expectation of ill will; King’s own distrust of white moderates was not grounded in such an expectation (Krishnamurthy 2015: 394). To be distrusting, one simply has to believe that others will not act justly, whether out of fear, ignorance, or what have you.

D’Cruz complains that Krishnamurthy’s theory is too narrow because it requires a belief that the one distrusted will fail to do something (i.e., act justly) (2020); but one can be distrustful of someone—say a salesperson who comes to your door (Jones 1996)—without predicting that they will do anything wrong or threatening. D’Cruz does not explain, however, why Krishnamurthy needs to account for cases like these in her theory, which again is meant to serve a specific purpose. Is it important that distrust can take a form other than “ X distrusts Y to [do] Φ” for it to motivate political resistance (D’Cruz 2020: 45)? D’Cruz’s objection is sound only if the answer is “yes”.

Nevertheless, D’Cruz’s work is helpful in showing what a descriptive account of distrust should look like—that is, an account that unlike Krishnamurthy’s, tracks how we use the concept in many different circumstances. He himself endorses a normative-expectation theory, according to which distrust involves

a tendency to withdraw from reliance or vulnerability in contexts of normative expectation, based on a construal of a person or persons as malevolent, incompetent, or lacking integrity. (2019: 936)

D’Cruz has yet to develop this theory fully, but once he does so, it will almost certainly be a welcome addition to the scant literature in philosophy on distrust.

In summary, among the relatively few philosophers who have written on distrust, there is settled agreement about some of its features but not about the nature of distrust in general. The agreed-upon features tell us something about when distrust is warranted (i.e., plausible). For distrust in someone to be plausible, one cannot also trust that person, and normally one will not be reliant on them either. Something else must be true as well, however. For example, one must believe that this person is committed to acting in a certain way but will not follow through on this commitment. The “something else” is crucial because distrust is not the negation of trust and neither is it mere nonreliance.

Philosophers have said comparatively little about what distrust is, but a lot about how distrust tends to be influenced by negative social stereotypes that portray whole groups of people as untrustworthy (e.g., Potter 2020; Scheman 2020; D’Cruz 2019; M. Fricker 2007). Trusting attitudes are similar—who we trust can depend significantly on social stereotypes, positive ones—yet there is less discussion about this fact in the literature on trust. This issue concerns the rationality (more precisely, the ir rationality) of trust and distrust, which makes it relevant to the next section, which is on the epistemology of trust.

2. The Epistemology of Trust

Writings on this topic obviously bear on the issue of when trust is warranted (i.e., justified). The central epistemological question about trust is, “Ought I to trust or not?” That is, given the way things seem to me, is it reasonable for me to trust? People tend to ask this sort of question only in situations where they can’t take trustworthiness for granted—that is, where they are conscious of the fact that trusting could get them into trouble. Examples are situations similar to those in which they have been betrayed in the past or unlike any they have ever been in before. The question, “Ought I to trust?” is therefore particularly pertinent to a somewhat odd mix of people that includes victims of abuse or the like, as well as immigrants and travelers.

The question “Ought I to distrust?” has received comparatively little attention in philosophy despite it arguably being as important as the question of when to trust. People can get into serious trouble by distrusting when they ought not to, rather than just by trusting when they ought not to. The harms of misplaced distrust are both moral and epistemic and include dishonoring people, being out of harmony with them, and being deprived of knowledge via testimony (D’Cruz 2019; M. Fricker 2007). Presumably because they believe that the harms of misplaced trust are greater (D’Cruz 2019), philosophers—and consequently I, in this entry—focus more on the rationality of trusting, as opposed to distrusting.

Philosophical work that is relevant to the issue of how to trust well appears either under the general heading of the epistemology or rationality of trust (e.g., Baker 1987; Webb 1992; Wanderer and Townsend 2013) or under the specific heading of testimony—that is, of putting one’s trust in the testimony of others. This section focuses on the epistemology of trust generally rather than on trust in testimony specifically. There is a large literature on testimony (see the entry in this encyclopedia) and on the related topic of epistemic injustice, both of which I discuss only insofar as they overlap with the epistemology of trust.

Philosophers sometimes ask whether it could ever be rational to trust other people. This question arises for two reasons. First, it appears that trust and rational reflection (e.g., on whether one should be trusting) are in tension with one another. Since trust inherently involves risk, any attempt to eliminate that risk through rational reflection could eliminate one’s trust by turning one’s stance into mere reliance. Second, trust tends to give us blinkered vision: it makes us resistant to evidence that may contradict our optimism about the trustee (Baker 1987; Jones 1996 and 2019). For example, if I trust my brother not to harm anyone, I will resist the truth of any evidence to the contrary. Here, trust and rationality seem to come apart.

Even if some of our trust could be rational, one might insist that not all of it could be rational for various reasons. First, if Baier is right that trust is ubiquitous (1986: 234), then we could not possibly subject all of it to rational reflection. We certainly could not reflect on every bit of knowledge we’ve acquired through the testimony of others, such as that the earth is round or Antarctica exists (Webb 1993; E. Fricker 1995; Coady 1992). Second, bioethicists point out that some trust is unavoidable and occurs in the absence of rational reflection (e.g., trust in emergency room nurses and physicians; see Zaner 1991). Lastly, some trust—namely the therapeutic variety—purposefully leaps beyond any evidence of trustworthiness in an effort to engender trustworthiness in the trustee. Is this sort of trust rational? Perhaps not, given that there isn’t sufficient evidence for it.

Many philosophers respond to the skepticism about the rationality of trust by saying that rationality, when applied to trust, needs to be understood differently than it is in each of the skeptical points above. There, “rationality” means something like this: it is rational to believe in something only if one has verified that it will happen or done as much as possible to verify it. For example, it is rational for me to believe that my brother has not harmed anyone only if the evidence points in that direction and I have discovered that to be the case. As we’ve seen, problems exist with applying this view of rationality to trust, yet it is not the only option; this view is both “truth-directed” and “internalist”, while the rationality of trust could instead be “end-directed” or “externalist”. Or it could be internalist without requiring that we have done the evidence gathering just discussed. Let me expand on these possibilities, starting with those that concern truth- or end-directed rationality.

In discussing the rationality of trust, some authors distinguish between these two types of rationality (also referred to as epistemic vs. strategic rationality; see, e.g., Baker 1987). One could say that we are rational in trusting emergency room physicians, for example, not necessarily because we have good reason to believe that they are trustworthy (our rationality is not truth-directed), but because by trusting them, we can remain calm in a situation over which we have little control (our rationality is therefore end-directed). Similarly, it may be rational for me to trust my brother not because I have good evidence of his trustworthiness but rather because trusting him is essential to our having a loving relationship. [ 10 ]

Trust can be rational, then, depending on whether one conceives of rationality as truth-directed or end-directed. Notice that it matters also how one conceives of trust, and more specifically, whether one conceives of it as a belief in someone’s trustworthiness (see section 4 ). If trust is a belief, then whether the rationality of trust can be end-directed will depend on whether the rationality of a belief can be end-directed. To put the point more generally, how trust is rationally justified will depend on how beliefs are rationally justified (Jones 1996).

Some of the literature on trust and rationality concerns whether the rationality of trust can indeed be end-directed and also what could make therapeutic trust and the like rational. Pamela Hieronymi argues that the ends for which we trust cannot provide reasons for us to trust in the first place (2008). Considerations about how useful or valuable trust is do not bear on the truth of a trusting belief (i.e., a belief in someone’s trustworthiness). But Hieronymi claims that trust, in a pure sense at least, always involves a trusting belief. How then does she account for trust that is motivated by how therapeutic (i.e., useful) the trust will be? She believes that trust of this sort is not pure or full-fledged trust. As she explains, people can legitimately complain about not being trusted fully when they are trusted in this way, which occurs when other people lack confidence in them but trust them nonetheless (2008: 230; see also Lahno 2001: 184–185).

By contrast, Victoria McGeer believes that trust is more substantial or pure when the available evidence does not support it (2008). She describes how trust of this sort—what she calls “substantial trust”—could be rational and does so without appealing to how important it might be or to the ends it might serve, but instead to whether the trustee will be trustworthy. [ 11 ] According to McGeer, what makes “substantial trust” rational is that it involves hope that the trustees will do what they are trusted to do, which “can have a galvanizing effect on how [they] see themselves, as trustors avowedly do, in the fullness of their potential” (2008: 252; see also McGeer and Pettit 2017). Rather than complain (as Hieronymi would assume that trustees might) about trustors being merely hopeful about their trustworthiness, they could respond well to the trustors’ attitude toward them. Moreover, if it is likely that they will respond well—in other words, that they will be trust-responsive—then the trust in them must be epistemically rational. That is particularly true if being trustworthy involves being trust-responsive, as it does for McGeer (McGeer and Pettit 2017).

McGeer’s work suggests that all trust—even therapeutic trust—can be rational in a truth-directed way. As we’ve seen, there is some dispute about whether trust can be rational in just an end-directed way. What matters here is whether trust is the sort of attitude whose rationality could be end-directed.

Philosophers who agree that trust can be rational (in a truth- or end-directed way or both) tend to disagree about the extent to which reasons that make it rational must be accessible to the trustor. Some say that these reasons must be available to this person in order for their trust to be rational; in that case, the person is or could be internally justified in trusting as they do. Others say that the reasons need not be internal but can instead be external to the trustor and lie in what caused the trust, or, more specifically, in the epistemic reliability of what caused it. The trustor also needn’t have access to or be aware of the reliability of these reasons. The latter’s epistemology of trust is externalist, while the former’s is internalist.

Some epistemologists write as though trust is only rational if the trustor themselves has rationally estimated the likelihood that the trustee is trustworthy. For example, Russell Hardin implies that if my trust in you is rational, then

I make a rough estimate of the truth of [the] claim … that you will be trustworthy under certain conditions … and then I correct my estimate, or “update,” as I obtain new evidence on you. (2002: 112)

On this view, I must have reasons for my estimate or for my updates (Hardin 2002: 130), which could come from inductive generalizations I make about my past experience, from my knowledge that social constraints exist that will encourage your trustworthiness or what have you. Such an internalist epistemology of trust is valuable because it coheres with the commonsense idea that one ought to have good reasons for trusting people (i.e., reasons grounded in evidence that they will be trustworthy) particularly when something important is at stake (E. Fricker 1995). One ought, in other words, to be epistemically responsible in one’s trusting (see Frost-Arnold 2020).

Such an epistemology is also open to criticisms, however. For example, it suggests that rational trust will always be partial rather than complete, given that the rational trustor is open to evidence that contradicts their trust on this theory, while someone who trusts completely in someone else lacks such openness. The theory also implies that the reasons for trusting well (i.e., in a justified way) are accessible to the trustor, at some point or another, which may simply be false. Some reasons for trust may be too “cunning” for this to be the case. Relevant here is the reason for trusting discussed by Philip Pettit (1995): that trust signals to people that they are being held in esteem, which is something they will want to maintain; they will honor the trust because they are naturally “esteem-seeking”. (Note that consciously having this as a reason for trusting—of using people’s need for esteem to get what you want from them—is incompatible with actually trusting (Wanderer and Townsend 2013: 9), if trust is motives-based and the required motive is something other than self-interest.)

Others say that reasons for trust are usually too numerous and varied to be open to the conscious consideration of the trustor (e.g., Baier 1986). There can be very subtle reasons to trust or distrust someone—for example, reasons that have to do with body language, with systematic yet veiled forms of oppression, or with a complicated history of trusting others about which one can’t easily generalize. Factors like these can influence trustors without them knowing it, sometimes making their trust irrational (e.g., because it is informed by oppressive biases), and other times making it rational.

The concern about there being complex reasons for trusting explain why some philosophers defend externalist epistemologies of trust. Some do so explicitly (e.g., McLeod 2002). They argue for reliabilist theories that make trust rationally justified if and only if it is formed and sustained by reliable processes (i.e., “processes that tend to produce accurate representations of the world”, such as drawing on expertise one has rather than simply guessing; Goldman 1992: 113; Goldman and Beddor 2015 [2016]). Others gesture towards externalism (Webb 1993; Baier 1986), as Baier does with what she calls “a moral test for trust”. The test is that

knowledge of what the other party is relying on for the continuance of the trust relationship would … itself destabilize the relation. (1986: 255)

The other party might be relying on a threat advantage or the concealment of their untrustworthiness, in which case the trust would probably fail the test. Because Baier’s test focuses on the causal basis for trust, or for what maintains the trust relation, it is externalist. Also, because the trustor often cannot gather the information needed for the test without ceasing to trust the other person (Baier 1986: 260), the test cannot be internalist.

Although an externalist theory of trust deals well with some of the worries one might have with an internalist theory, it has problems of its own. One of the most serious issues is the absence of any requirement that trustors themselves have good (motivating) reasons for trusting, especially when their trust makes them seriously vulnerable. Again, it appears that common sense dictates the opposite: that sometimes as trustors, we ought to be able to back up our decisions about when to trust. The same is true about our distrust presumably: that sometimes we ought to be able to defend it. Assuming externalists mean for their epistemology to apply to distrust and not just to trust, their theory violates this bit of common sense as well. Externalism about distrust also seems incompatible with a strategy that some philosophers recommend for dealing with biased distrust. The strategy is to develop what they call “corrective trust” (e.g., Scheman 2020) or “humble trust” (D’Cruz 2019), which demands a humble skepticism toward distrust that aligns with oppressive stereotypes and efforts at correcting the influence of these stereotypes (see also M. Fricker 2007). The concern about an externalist epistemology is that it does not encourage this sort of mental work, since it does not require that we reflect on our reasons for distrusting or trusting.

There are alternatives to the kinds of internalist and externalist theories just discussed, especially within the literature on testimony. [ 12 ] For example, Paul Faulkner develops an “assurance theory” of testimony that interprets speaker trustworthiness in terms of trust-responsiveness. Recall that on a trust-responsiveness theory of trust, being trusted gives people the reason to be trustworthy that someone is counting on them. They are trustworthy if they are appropriately responsive to this reason, which, in the case of offering testimony, involves giving one’s assurance that one is telling the truth (Adler 2006 [2017]). Faulkner uses the trust-responsiveness account of trust, along with a view of trust as an affective attitude (see section 4 ), to show “how trust can ground reasonable testimonial uptake” (Faulkner and Simpson 2017: 6; Faulkner 2011 and 2020).

He proposes that A affectively trust S if and only if A depends on S Φ-ing, and expects his dependence on S to motivate S to Φ—for A ’s dependence on S to be the reason for which S Φs …. As a result, affective trust is a bootstrapping attitude: I can choose to trust someone affectively and my doing so creates the reasons which justify the attitude. (Faulkner and Simpson 2017: 6)

Most likely, A (the trustor) is aware of the reasons that justify his trust or could be aware of them, making this theory an internalist one. The reasons are also normative and non-evidentiary (Faulkner 2020); they concern what S ought to do because of A ’s dependence, not what S will do based on evidence that A might gather about S . This view doesn’t require that A have evidentiary reasons, and so it is importantly different than the internalist epistemology discussed above. But it is then also subject to the criticisms made of externalist theories that they don’t require the kind of scrutiny of our trusting attitudes that we tend to expect and probably ought to expect in societies where some people are stereotyped as more trusting than others.

Presumably to avoid having to defend any particular epistemology of trust, some philosophers provide just a list of common justifiers for it (i.e., “facts or states of affairs that determine the justification status of [trust]”; Goldman 1999: 274), which someone could take into account in deciding when to trust (Govier 1998; Jones 1996). Included on these lists are such factors as the social role of the trustee, the domain in which the trust occurs, an “agent-specific” factor that concerns how good a trustor the agent tends to be (Jones 1996: 21), and the social or political climate in which the trust occurs. Philosophers have tended to emphasize this last factor as a justification condition for trust, and so let me elaborate on it briefly.

Although trust is paradigmatically a relation that holds between two individuals, forces larger than those individuals inevitably shape their trust and distrust in one another. Social or political climate contributes to how (un)trustworthy people tend to be and therefore to whether trust and distrust are justified. For example, a climate of virtue is one in which trustworthiness tends to be pervasive, assuming that virtues other than trustworthiness tend to enhance it (Baier 2004). [ 13 ] A climate of oppression is one in which untrustworthiness is prevalent, especially between people who are privileged and those who are less privileged (Baier 1986: 259; Potter 2002: 24; D’Cruz 2019). “Social trust”, as some call it, is low in these circumstances (Govier 1997; Welch 2013).

Social or political climate has a significant influence on the default stance that we ought to take toward people’s trustworthiness (see, e.g., Walker 2006). We need such a stance because we can’t always stop to reflect carefully on when to trust (i.e., assuming that some rational reflection is required for trusting well). Some philosophers say that the correct stance is trust and do so without referring to the social or political climate; Tony Coady takes this sort of position, for example, on our stance toward others’ testimony (Coady 1992). Others disagree that the correct stance could be so universal and claim instead that it is relative to climate, as well as to other factors such as domain (Jones 1999).

Our trust or distrust may be prima facie justified if we have the correct default stance, although most philosophers assume that it could only be fully justified (in a truth- or end-directed way) by reasons that are internal to us (evidentiary or non-evidentiary reasons) or by the causal processes that created the attitude in the first place. Whichever epistemology of trust we choose, it ought to be sensitive to the tension that exists between trusting somebody and rationally reflecting on the grounds for that trust. It would be odd, to say the least, if what made an attitude justified destroyed that very attitude. At the same time, our epistemology of trust ought to cohere as much as possible with common sense, which dictates that we should inspect rather than have pure faith in whatever makes us seriously vulnerable to other people, which trust can most definitely do.

Someone who asks, “When is trust warranted?” might be interested in knowing what the point of trust is. In other words, what value does it have? Although the value it has for particular people will depend on their circumstances, the value it could have for anyone will depend on why trust is valuable, generally speaking. Trust can have enormous instrumental value and may also have some intrinsic value. In discussing its instrumental value, this section refers to the “goods of trust”, which can benefit the trustor, the trustee, or society in general. They are therefore social and/or individual goods. What is more and as emphasized throughout, these goods tend to accompany justified trust, rather than any old trust. [ 14 ] Like the other sections of this entry, this one focuses predominantly though not exclusively on trust; it also mentions recent work on the value of distrust.

Consider first the possibility that trust has intrinsic value. If trust produced no goods independent of it, would there be any point in trusting? One might say “yes”, on the grounds that trust is (or can be; O’Neil 2012: 311) a sign of respect for others. (Similarly, distrust is a sign of disrespect; D’Cruz 2019.) If true, this fact about trust would make it intrinsically worthwhile, at least so long as the trust is justified. Presumably, if it was unjustified, then the respect would be misplaced and the intrinsic value would be lost. But these points are speculative, since philosophers have said comparatively little about trust being worthwhile in itself as opposed to worthwhile because of what it produces, or because of what accompanies it. The discussion going forward centers on the latter, more specifically on the goods of trust.

Turning first to the instrumental value of trust to the trustor , some argue that trusting vastly increases our opportunities for cooperating with others and for benefiting from that cooperation, although of course we would only benefit if people we trusted cooperated as well (Gambetta 1988b; Hardin 2002; Dimock 2020). Trust enhances cooperation, while perhaps not being necessary for it (Cook et al. 2005; Skyrms 2008). Because trust removes the incentive to check up on other people, it makes cooperation with trust less complicated than cooperation without it (Luhmann 1973/1975 [1979]).

Trust can make cooperation possible, rather than simply easier, if trust is essential to promising. Daniel Friedrich and Nicholas Southwood defend what they call the “Trust View” of promissory obligation (2011), according to which “making a promise involves inviting another individual to trust one to do something” (2011: 277). If this view is correct, then cooperation through promising is impossible without trust. Cooperation of this sort will also not be fruitful unless the trust is justified.

Trusting provides us with goods beyond those that come with cooperation, although again, for these goods to materialize, the trust must be justified. Sometimes, trust involves little or no cooperation, so that the trustor is completely dependent on the trustee while the reverse is not true. Examples are the trust of young children in their parents and the trust of severely ill or disabled people in their care providers. Trust is particularly important for these people because they tend to be powerless to exercise their rights or to enforce any kind of contract. The trust they place in their care providers also contributes to them being vulnerable, and so it is essential that they can trust these people (i.e., that their trust is justified). The goods at stake for them are all the goods involved in having a good or decent life.

Among the specific goods that philosophers associate with trusting are meaningful relationships or attachments (rather than simply cooperative relationships that further individual self-interests; Harding 2011, Kirton forthcoming) as well as knowledge and autonomy. [ 15 ] To expand, trust allows for the kinds of secure attachments that some developmental psychologists (“attachment” theorists) believe are crucial to our well-being and to our ability to be trusting of others (Bowlby 1969–1980; Ainsworth 1969; see Kirton 2020; Wonderly 2016). Particularly important here are parent-child relationships (McLeod et al. 2019).

Trust is also crucial for knowledge, given that scientific knowledge (Hardwig 1991), moral knowledge (Jones 1999), and almost all knowledge in fact (Webb 1993) depends for its acquisition on trust in the testimony of others. The basic argument for the need to trust what others say is that no one person has the time, intellect, and experience necessary to independently learn facts about the world that many of us do know. Examples include the scientific fact that the earth is round, the moral fact that the oppression of people from social groups different from our own can be severe (Jones 1999), and the mundane fact that we were born on such-in-such a day (Webb 1993: 261). Of course, trusting the people who testify to these facts could only generate knowledge if the trust was justified. If we were told our date of birth by people who were determined oddly to deceive us about when we were born, then we would not know when we were born.

Autonomy is another good that flows from trust insofar as people acquire or exercise autonomy only in social environments where they can trust people (or institutions, etc.) to support their autonomy. Feminists in particular tend to conceive of autonomy this way—that is, as a relational property (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000). Many feminists emphasize that oppressive social environments can inhibit autonomy, and some say explicitly that conditions necessary for autonomy (e.g., adequate options, knowledge relevant to one’s decisions) exist only with the help of people or institutions that are trustworthy (e.g., Oshana 2014; McLeod and Ryman 2020). Justified trust in others to ensure that these conditions exist is essential for our autonomy, if autonomy is indeed relational. [ 16 ]

Goods of trust that are instrumental to the well-being of the trustee also do not materialize unless the trust is justified. Trust can improve the self-respect and moral maturity of this person. Particularly if it involves reliance on a person’s moral character, trust can engender self-respect in the trustee (i.e., through them internalizing the respect signaled by that trust). Being trusted can allow us to be more respectful not only toward ourselves but also toward others, thus enhancing our moral maturity. The explicit goal of therapeutic trust is precisely to bring about this end. The above ( section 2 ) suggests that therapeutic trust can be justified in a truth-directed way over time, provided that the trust has its intended effect of making the trustee more trustworthy (McGeer 2008; Baker 1987: 12). Clearly, for therapeutic trust to benefit the trustee, it would have to be justified in this way, meaning that the therapy would normally have to work.

Finally, there are social goods of trust that are linked with the individual goods of cooperation and moral maturity. The former goods include the practice of morality, the very existence of society perhaps, as well as strong social networks. Morality itself is a cooperative activity, which can only get off the ground if people can trust one another to try, at least, to be moral. For this reason, among others, Baier claims that trust is “the very basis of morality” (2004: 180). It could also be the very basis of society, insofar as trust in our fellow citizens to honor social contracts makes those contracts possible.

A weaker claim is that trust makes society better or more livable. Some argue that trust is a form of “social capital”, meaning roughly that it enables “people to work together for common purposes in groups and organizations” (Fukuyama 1995: 10; quoted in Hardin 2002: 83). As a result, “high-trust” societies have stronger economies and stronger social networks in general than “low-trust” societies (Fukuyama 1995; Inglehart 1999). Of course, this fact about high-trust societies could only be true if, on the whole, the trust within them was justified—that is, if trustees tended not to “defect” and destroy chances for cooperating in the future.

The literature on distrust suggests that there are goods associated with it too. For example, there is the social good discussed by Krishnamurthy of “securing democracy by protecting political minorities from tyranny” (2015: 392). Distrust as she understands it (a confident belief that others will not act justly) plays this positive role when it is justified, which is roughly when the threat of tyranny or unjust action is real. Distrust in general is valuable when it is justified—for the distrustors at least, who protect themselves from harm. By contrast, the people distrusted tend to experience negative effects on their reputation or self-respect (D’Cruz 2019).

Both trust and distrust are therefore valuable particularly when they are justified. The value of justified trust must be very high if without it, we can’t have morality or society and can’t be morally mature, autonomous, knowledgeable, or invested with opportunities for collaborating with others. Justified distrust is also essential, for members of minority groups especially. Conversely, trust or distrust that is unjustified can be seriously problematic. Unjustified trust, for example, can leave us open to abuse, terror, and deception.

Trust may not be warranted (i.e., plausible) because the agent has lost the ability to trust or simply cannot bring themselves to trust. People can lose trust in almost everyone or everything as a result of trauma (Herman 1991). The trauma of rape, for example, can profoundly reduce one’s sense that the world is a safe place with caring people in it (Brison 2002). By contrast, people can lose trust just in particular people or institutions. They can also have no experience trusting in certain people or institutions, making them reluctant to do so. They or others might want them to become more trusting. But the question is, how can that happen? How can trust be restored or generated?

The process of building trust is often slow and difficult (Uslaner 1999; Baier 1986; Lahno 2020), and that is true, in part, because of the kind of mental attitude trust is. Many argue that it is not the sort of attitude we can simply will ourselves to have. At the same, it is possible to cultivate trust. [ 17 ] This section focuses on these issues, including what kind of mental attitude trust is (e.g., a belief or an emotion). Also discussed briefly is what kind of mental attitude distrust is. Like trust, distrust is an attitude that people may wish to cultivate, particularly when they are too trusting.

Consider first why one would think that trust can’t be willed. Baier questions whether people are able “to trust simply because of encouragement to trust” (1986: 244; my emphasis). She writes,

“Trust me!” is for most of us an invitation which we cannot accept at will—either we do already trust the one who says it, in which case it serves at best as reassurance, or it is properly responded to with, “Why should and how can I, until I have cause to?”. (my emphasis; 1986: 244)

Baier is not a voluntarist about trust, just as most people are not voluntarists about belief. In other words, she thinks that we can’t simply decide to trust for purely motivational rather than epistemic reasons (i.e., merely because we want to, rather than because we have reason to think that the other person is or could be trustworthy; Mills 1998). That many people feel compelled to say, “I wish I could trust you”, suggests that Baier’s view is correct; wishing or wanting is not enough. But Holton interprets Baier’s view differently. According to him, Baier’s point is that we can never decide to trust, not that we can never decide to trust for motivational purposes (1994). This interpretation ignores, however, the attention that Baier gives to situations in which all we have is encouragement (trusting “simply because of encouragement”). The “cause” she refers to (“Why should and how can I, until I have cause to [trust]?”; 1986: 244) is an epistemic cause. Once we have one of those, we can presumably decide whether to trust on the basis of it. [ 18 ] But we cannot decide to trust simply because we want to, according to Baier.

If trust resembles belief in being non-voluntary, then perhaps trust itself is a belief. Is that right? Many philosophers claim that it is (e.g., Hieronymi 2008; McMyler 2011; Keren 2014), while others disagree (e.g., Jones 1996; Faulkner 2007; D’Cruz 2019). The former contend that trust is a belief that the trustee is trustworthy, at least in the thin sense that the trustee will do what he is trusted to do (Keren 2020). Various reasons exist in favour of such theories, doxastic reasons (see Keren 2020) including that these theories suggest it is impossible to trust a person while holding the belief that this person is not trustworthy, even in the thin sense. Most of us accept this impossibility and would want any theory of trust to explain it. A doxastic account does so by saying that we can’t believe a contradiction (not knowingly anyway; Keren 2020: 113).

Those who say that trust is not a belief claim that it is possible to trust without believing the trustee is trustworthy. [ 19 ] Holton gives the nice example of trusting a friend to be sincere without believing that the friend will be sincere (1994: 75). Arguably, if one already believed that to be the case, then one would have no need to trust the friend. It is also possible to believe that someone is trustworthy without trusting that person, which suggests that trust couldn’t just be a belief in someone’s trustworthiness (McLeod 2002: 85). I might think that a particular person is trustworthy without trusting them because I have no cause to do so. I might even distrust them despite believing that they are trustworthy (Jones 1996, 2013). As Jones explains, distrust can be recalcitrant in parting “company with belief” (D’Cruz 2019: 940; citing Jones 2013), a fact which makes trouble for doxastic accounts not just of trust but of distrust too (e.g., Krishnamurthy 2015). The latter must explain how distrust could be a belief that someone is untrustworthy that could exist alongside the belief that the person is trustworthy.

Among the alternatives to doxasticism are theories stating that trust is an emotion, a kind of stance (i.e., the participant stance; Holton 1994), or a disposition (Kappel 2014; cited in Keren 2020). The most commonly held alternative is the first: that trust is an emotion. Reasons in favour of this view include the fact that trust resembles an emotion in having characteristics that are unique to emotions, at least according to an influential account of them (de Sousa 1987; Calhoun 1984; Rorty 1980; Lahno 2001, 2020). For example, emotions narrow our perception to “fields of evidence” that lend support to the emotions themselves (Jones 1996: 11). When we are in the grip of an emotion, we therefore tend to see facts that affirm its existence and ignore those that negate it. To illustrate, if I am really angry at my mother, then I tend to focus on things that justify my anger while ignoring or refusing to see things that make it unjustified. I can only see those other things once my anger subsides. Similarly with trust: if I genuinely trust my mother, my attention falls on those aspects of her that justify my trust and is averted from evidence that suggests she is untrustworthy (Baker 1987). The same sort of thing happens with distrust, according to Jones (Jones 2019). She refers to this phenomenon as “affective looping”, which, in her words, occurs when “a prior emotional state provides grounds for its own continuance” (2019: 956). She also insists that only affective-attitude accounts of trust and distrust can adequately explain it (2019).

There may be a kind of doxastic theory, however, that can account for the affective looping of trust, if not of distrust. Arnon Keren, whose work focuses specifically on trust, defends what he calls an “impurely doxastic” theory. He describes trust as believing in someone’s trustworthiness and responding to reasons (“preemptive” ones) against taking precautions that this person will not be trustworthy (Keren 2020, 2014). Reasons for trust are themselves reasons of this sort, according to Keren; they oppose actions like those of carefully monitoring the behavior of the trustee or weighing the available evidence that this person is trustworthy. The trustor’s response to these preemptive reasons would explain why this person is resistant (or at least not attune) to counter evidence to their trust (Keren 2014, 2020).

Deciding in favour of an affective-attitude theory or a purely or impurely doxastic one is important for understanding features of trust like affective looping. Yet it may have little bearing on whether or how trust can be cultivated. For, regardless of whether trust is a belief or an emotion, presumably we can cultivate it by purposefully placing ourselves in a position that allows us to focus on evidence of people’s trustworthiness. The goal here could be self-improvement: that is, becoming more trusting, in a good way so that we can reap the benefits of justified trust. Alternatively, we might be striving for the improvement of others: making them more trustworthy by trusting them therapeutically. Alternatively still, we could be engaging in “corrective trust”. (See the above discussions of therapeutic and corrective trust.)

This section has centered on how to develop trust and how to account for facts about it such as the blinkered vision of the trustor. Similar facts about distrust were also mentioned: those that concern what kind of mental attitude it is. Theorizing about whether trust and distrust are beliefs, emotions or something else allows us to appreciate why they have certain features and also how to build these attitudes. The process for building them, which may be similar regardless of whether they are beliefs or emotions, will be relevant to people who don’t trust enough or who trust too much.

This entry as a whole has examined an important practical question about trust: “When is trust warranted?” Also woven into the discussion has been some consideration of when distrust is warranted. Centerstage has been given to trust, however, because philosophers have debated it much more than distrust.

Different answers to the question of when trust is warranted give rise to different philosophical puzzles. For example, in response, one could appeal to the nature of trust and trustworthiness and consider whether the conditions are ripe for them (e.g., for the proposed trustor to rely on the trustee’s competence). But one would first have to settle the difficult issue of what trust and trustworthiness are, and more specifically, how they differ from mere reliance and reliability, assuming there are these differences.

Alternatively, in deciding whether trust is warranted, one could consider whether trust would be rationally justified or valuable. One would consider these things simultaneously when rational justification is understood in an end-directed way, making it dependent on trust’s instrumental value. With respect to rational justification alone, puzzles arise when trying to sort out whether reasons for trust must be internal to trustors or could be external to them. In other words, is trust’s epistemology internalist or externalist? Because good arguments exist on both sides, it’s not clear how trust is rationally justified. Neither is it entirely clear what sort of value trust can have, given the nature of it. For example, trust may or may not have intrinsic moral value depending on whether it signals respect for others.

Lastly, one might focus on the fact that trust cannot be warranted when it is impossible, which is the case when the agent does not already exhibit trust and cannot simply will themselves to have it. While trust is arguably not the sort of attitude that one can just will oneself to have, trust can be cultivated. The exact manner or extent to which it can be cultivated, however, may depend again on what sort of mental attitude it is.

Since one can respond to the question, “When is trust warranted?” by referring to each of the above dimensions of trust, a complete philosophical answer to this question is complex. The same is true about the question of when to distrust, because the same dimensions (the epistemology of distrust, its value, etc.) are relevant to it. Complete answers to these broad questions about trust and distrust would be philosophically exciting and also socially important. They would be exciting both because of their complexity and because they would draw on a number of different philosophical areas, including epistemology, philosophy of mind, and value theory. The answers would be important because trust and distrust that are warranted contribute to the foundation of a good society, where people thrive through healthy cooperation with others, become morally mature human beings, and are not subject to social ills like tyranny or oppression.

• Adler, Jonathan, 2006 [2017], “Epistemological Problems of Testimony”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/testimony-episprob/ >.
• Ainsworth, Mary D. Salter, 1969, “Object Relations, Dependency, and Attachment: A Theoretical Review of the Infant-Mother Relationship”, Child Development , 40(4): 969–1025.
• Baier, Annette, 1986, “Trust and Antitrust”, Ethics , 96(2): 231–260. doi:10.1086/292745
• –––, 1991, Two lectures on “Trust”: Lecture 1, “Trust and Its Vulnerabilities” and Lecture 2, “Sustaining Trust”, in Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Volume 13), Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, pp. 109–174. [ Baier 1991 available online (pdf) ]
• –––, 2004, “Demoralization, Trust, and the Virtues”, in Setting the Moral Compass: Essays by Women Philosophers , Cheshire Calhoun (ed.), New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 176–189.
• Baker, Judith, 1987, “Trust and Rationality”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 68(1): 1–13. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1987.tb00280.x
• Becker, Lawrence C., 1996, “Trust as Noncognitive Security about Motives”, Ethics , 107(1): 43–61. doi:10.1086/233696
• Blackburn, Simon, 1998, Ruling Passion: A Theory of Practical Reasoning , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• 1969, Volume I: Attachment
• 1973, Volume II: Separation, Anxiety and Anger
• 1980, Volume III: Loss, Sadness and Depression
• Brison, Susan J., 2002, Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of the Self , Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Budnik, Christian, 2018, “Trust, Reliance, and Democracy”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies , 26(2): 221–239. doi:10.1080/09672559.2018.1450082
• Calhoun, Cheshire (ed.), 1984, “Cognitive Emotions?” in What is an Emotion? Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology , Cheshire Calhoun and Robert C. Solomon (eds), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 327–342.
• Coady, C.A.J., 1992, Testimony: A Philosophical Study , Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0198235518.001.0001
• Coeckelbergh, Mark, 2012, “Can We Trust Robots?”, Ethics and Information Technology , 14(1): 53–60. doi:10.1007/s10676-011-9279-1
• Cogley, Zac, 2012, “Trust and the Trickster Problem”, Analytic Philosophy , 53(1): 30–47. doi:10.1111/j.2153-960X.2012.00546.x
• Cohen, Marc A. and John Dienhart, 2013, “Moral and Amoral Conceptions of Trust, with an Application in Organizational Ethics”, Journal of Business Ethics , 112(1): 1–13. doi:10.1007/s10551-012-1218-5
• Cook, Karen S., Russell Hardin, and Margaret Levi, 2005, Cooperation Without Trust? , New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
• Dasgupta, Partha, 1988, “Trust as a Commodity”, in Gambetta 1988a: 49–72.
• Daukas, Nancy, 2006, “Epistemic Trust and Social Location”, Episteme , 3(1–2): 109–124. doi:10.3366/epi.2006.3.1-2.109
• –––, 2011, “Altogether Now: A Virtue-Theoretic Approach to Pluralism in Feminist Epistemology”, in Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science , Heidi E. Grasswick (ed.), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 45–67. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6835-5_3
• D’Cruz, Jason, 2019, “Humble Trust”, Philosophical Studies , 176(4): 933–953. doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1220-6
• –––, 2020, “Trust and Distrust”, in Simon 2020: 41–51.
• de Sousa, Ronald, 1987, The Rationality of Emotion , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Dimock, Susan, 2020, “Trust and Cooperation”, in Simon 2020: 160–174.
• Domenicucci, Jacopo and Richard Holton, 2017, “Trust as a Two-Place Relation”, in Faulkner and Simpson 2017: 150–161. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732549.003.0009
• Faulkner, Paul, 2007, “A Genealogy of Trust”, Episteme , 4(3): 305–321. doi:10.3366/E174236000700010X
• –––, 2011, Knowledge on Trust , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589784.001.0001
• –––, 2015, “The Attitude of Trust Is Basic”, Analysis , 75(3): 424–429. doi:10.1093/analys/anv037
• –––, 2017, “The Problem of Trust”, in Faulkner and Simpson 2017: 110–129. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732549.003.0007
• –––, 2020, “Trust and Testimony”, in Simon 2020: 329–340.
• Faulkner, Paul and Thomas Simpson (eds), 2017, The Philosophy of Trust , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732549.001.0001
• Foley, Richard, 2001, Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511498923
• –––, 2005, “Universal Intellectual Trust”, Episteme , 2(1): 5–12. doi:10.3366/epi.2005.2.1.5
• Fox-Decent, Evan, 2005, “The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority”, Queen’s Law Journal , 31: 259–310.
• Fricker, Elizabeth, 1995, “Critical Notice: Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony”, Mind , 104(414): 393–411. doi:10.1093/mind/104.414.393
• Fricker, Miranda, 2007, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001
• Friedrich, Daniel and Nicholas Southwood, 2011, “Promises and Trust”, in Promises and Agreements: Philosophical Essays , Hanoch Sheinman (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 275–292.
• Frost-Arnold, Karen, 2014, “Imposters, Tricksters, and Trustworthiness as an Epistemic Virtue”, Hypatia , 29(4): 790–807. doi:10.1111/hypa.12107
• –––, 2020, “Trust and Epistemic Responsibility”, in Simon 2020: 64–75.
• Fukuyama, Francis, 1995, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity , New York, NY: The Free Press.
• Gambetta, Diego (ed.), 1988a, Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations , New York: Basil Blackwell.
• –––, 1988b, “Can We Trust Trust?” in Gambetta 1988a: 213–237.
• Goering, Sara, 2009, “ Postnatal Reproductive Autonomy: Promoting Relational Autonomy and Self-Trust in New Parents”, Bioethics , 23(1): 9–19. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2008.00678.x
• Goldberg, Sanford C., 2020, “Trust and Reliance”, in Simon 2020: 97–108.
• Goldman, Alvin I., 1992, Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• –––, 1999, “Internalism Exposed”:, Journal of Philosophy , 96(6): 271–293. doi:10.2307/2564679
• Goldman, Alvin and Bob Beddor, 2015 [2016], “Reliabilist Epistemology”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/reliabilism/ >.
• Govier, Trudy, 1992a, “Trust, Distrust, and Feminist Theory”, Hypatia , 7(1): 16–33. doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.1992.tb00695.x
• –––, 1992b, “Distrust as a Practical Problem”, Journal of Social Philosophy , 23(1): 52–63. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9833.1992.tb00484.x
• –––, 1993, “Self-Trust, Autonomy, and Self-Esteem”, Hypatia , 8(1): 99–120. doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.1993.tb00630.x
• –––, 1997, Social Trust and Human Communities , Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
• –––, 1998, Dilemmas of Trust , Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
• Hardin, Russell, 2002, Trust and Trustworthiness , New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
• ––– (ed.), 2004, Distrust , New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
• Harding, Matthew, 2011, “Responding to Trust: Responding to Trust”, Ratio Juris , 24(1): 75–87. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9337.2010.00475.x
• Hardwig, John, 1991, “The Role of Trust in Knowledge”, The Journal of Philosophy , 88(12): 693–708. doi:10.2307/2027007
• Hawley, Katherine, 2014, “Trust, Distrust and Commitment”, Noûs , 48(1): 1–20. doi:10.1111/nous.12000
• –––, 2017, “Trustworthy Groups and Organizations”, in Faulkner and Simpson 2017: 52–70. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732549.003.0014
• –––, 2019, How to Be Trustworthy , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198843900.001.0001
• Herman, Judith Lewis, 1991, Trauma and Recovery , New York: Basic Books.
• Hertzberg, Lars, 1988, “On the Attitude of Trust”, Inquiry , 31(3): 307–322. doi:10.1080/00201748808602157
• Hieronymi, Pamela, 2008, “The Reasons of Trust”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 86(2): 213–236. doi:10.1080/00048400801886496
• Hinchman, Edward S., 2003, “Trust and Diachronic Agency”, Noûs , 37(1): 25–51. doi:10.1111/1468-0068.00427
• –––, 2017, “On the Risks of Resting Assured: An Assurance Theory of Trust”, in Faulkner and Simpson 2017: 52–70. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732549.003.0004
• Hollis, Martin, 1998, Trust Within Reason , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511612244
• Holton, Richard, 1994, “Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 72(1): 63–76. doi:10.1080/00048409412345881
• Horsburgh, H. J. N., 1960, “The Ethics of Trust”, The Philosophical Quarterly , 10(41): 343–354. doi:10.2307/2216409
• Inglehart, Ronald, 1999, “Trust, Well-Being and Democracy”, in Warren 1999: 88–120. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511659959.004
• Jacoby, Brennan, 2011, Trust and Betrayal: A Conceptual Analysis , Ph.D. Dissertation, Philosophy Department, Macquarie University. [ Jacoby 2011 available online ]
• Jones, Karen, 1996, “Trust as an Affective Attitude”, Ethics , 107(1): 4–25. doi:10.1086/233694
• –––, 1999, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge”, The Journal of Philosophy , 96(2): 55–78. doi:10.2307/2564672
• –––, 2004, “Trust and Terror”, in Moral Psychology: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory , Peggy DesAutels and Margaret Urban Walker (eds), Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 3–18.
• –––, 2012a, “Trustworthiness”, Ethics , 123(1): 61–85. doi:10.1086/667838
• –––, 2012b, “The Politics of Intellectual Self-Trust”, Social Epistemology , 26(2): 237–251. doi:10.1080/02691728.2011.652215
• –––, 2013, “Distrusting the Trustworthy”, in Reading Onora O’Neill , David Archard, Monique Deveaux, Neil Manson, and Daniel. Weinstock (eds), New York: Routledge, ch. 13.
• –––, 2017, “‘But I Was Counting On You!’”, in Faulkner and Simpson 2017: 91–109. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732549.003.0006
• –––, 2019, “Trust, Distrust, and Affective Looping”, Philosophical Studies , 176(4): 955–968. doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1221-5
• Kappel, Klemens, 2014, “Believing on Trust”, Synthese , 191(9): 2009–2028. doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0376-z
• Keren, Arnon, 2014, “Trust and Belief: A Preemptive Reasons Account”, Synthese , 191(12): 2593–2615. doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0416-3
• –––, 2020, “Trust and Belief”, in Simon 2020: 109–120.
• Kirton, Andrew, 2020, “Matters of Trust as Matters of Attachment Security”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies , 28(5): 583–602. doi:10.1080/09672559.2020.1802971
• Krishnamurthy, Meena, 2015, “(White) Tyranny and the Democratic Value of Distrust”, The Monist , 98(4): 391–406. doi:10.1093/monist/onv020
• Lagerspetz, Olli, 1998, Trust: The Tacit Demand , (Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy 1), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. doi:10.1007/978-94-015-8986-4
• Lahno, Bernd, 2001, “On the Emotional Character of Trust”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , 4(2): 171–189. doi:10.1023/A:1011425102875
• –––, 2020, “Trust and Emotion”, in Simon 2020: 147–159.
• Lehrer, Keith, 1997, Self-Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge, and Autonomy , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236658.001.0001
• Luhmann, Niklas, 1973/1975 [1979], Vertrauen , Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1973, and Macht , Stuttgart, Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1975. Both translated in Trust and Power: Two Works , Howard Davies, John Raffan and Kathryn Rooney (trans.), Toronto: Wiley, 1979.
• Mackenzie, Catriona and Natalie Stoljar (eds), 2000, Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self , New York: Oxford University Press.
• McGeer, Victoria, 2008, “Trust, Hope and Empowerment”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 86(2): 237–254. doi:10.1080/00048400801886413
• McGeer, Victoria and Philip Pettit, 2017, “The Empowering Theory of Trust”, in Faulkner and Simpson 2017: 15–35. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732549.003.0002
• McLeod, Carolyn, 2002, Self-Trust and Reproductive Autonomy , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• –––, 2020, “Damage to Trust”, in her Conscience in Reproductive Health Care: Prioritizing Patient Interests , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 65–87. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198732723.003.0004
• McLeod, Carolyn and Emma Ryman, 2020, “Trust, Autonomy, and the Fiduciary Relationship”, in Fiduciaries and Trust: Ethics, Politics, Economics, and Law , Paul B. Miller and Matthew Harding (eds), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 74–86. doi:10.1017/9781108616225.006
• McLeod, Carolyn, Lorraine Davies, Nicole Fice, Leona Bruijns, Emily Cichocki, Hale Doguoglu, Heather Stewart, Austin Horn, Jaclyn Rekis, and Tara Filipovich, 2019, “Time to Attach: An Argument in Favour of EI Attachment Benefits”, report created for Ontario’s Adoptive Parents Association and the Adoption Council of Canada, McLeod et al. 2019 available online .
• McMyler, Benjamin, 2011, Testimony, Trust, and Authority , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794331.001.0001
• Mills, Eugene, 1998, “The Unity of Justification”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 58(1): 27–50. doi:10.2307/2653629
• Mullin, Amy, 2005, “Trust, Social Norms, and Motherhood”, Journal of Social Philosophy , 36(3): 316–330. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9833.2005.00278.x
• Nickel, Philip J., 2007, “Trust and Obligation-Ascription”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , 10(3): 309–319. doi:10.1007/s10677-007-9069-3
• O’Neil, Collin, 2012, “Lying, Trust, and Gratitude: Lying, Trust, and Gratitude”, Philosophy & Public Affairs , 40(4): 301–333. doi:10.1111/papa.12003
• O’Neill, Onora, 2002, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511606250
• Oreskes, Naomi, 2019, Why Trust Science? Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Oshana, Marina, 2014, “Trust and Autonomous Agency”, Res Philosophica , 91(3): 431–447. doi:10.11612/resphil.2014.91.3.10
• Pellegrino, Edmund D. and David C. Thomasma, 1993, The Virtues in Medical Practice , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Pettit, Philip, 1995, “The Cunning of Trust”, Philosophy & Public Affairs , 24(3): 202–225. doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.1995.tb00029.x
• Potter, Nancy Nyquist, 2002, How Can I be Trusted? A Virtue Theory of Trustworthiness , Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
• –––, 2013, “Narrative Selves, Relations of Trust, and Bipolar Disorder”, Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology , 20(1): 57–65.
• –––, 2020, “Interpersonal Trust”, in Simon 2020: 243–255.
• Rorty, Amélia Oksenberg, 1980, “Explaining Emotions”, in Explaining Emotions , Amélia Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 103–126.
• Scheman, Nancy, 2020, “Trust and Trustworthiness”, in Simon 2020: 28–40.
• Simon, Judith (ed.), 2020, The Routledge Handbook of Trust and Philosophy , New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315542294
• Simpson, Thomas W., 2012, “What Is Trust?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 93(4): 550–569. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01438.x
• Skyrms, Brian, 2008, “Trust, Risk, and the Social Contract”, Synthese , 160(1): 21–25. doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9075-3
• Smith, Matthew Noah, 2008, “Terrorism, Shared Rules and Trust”, Journal of Political Philosophy , 16(2): 201–219. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2006.00273.x
• Strawson, P. F., 1962 [1974], “Freedom and Resentment”, Proceedings of the British Academy , 48: 1–25. Reprinted in his Freedom and Resentment , London: Methuen, 1974, pp. 1–25.
• Sullins, John P., 2020, “Trust in Robots”, in Simon 2020: 313–325.
• Tallant, Jonathan, 2017, “Commitment in Cases of Trust and Distrust”, Thought: A Journal of Philosophy , 6(4): 261–267. doi:10.1002/tht3.259
• Townley, Cynthia and Jay L. Garfield, 2013, “Public Trust”, in Trust: Analytic and Applied Perspectives , Pekka Makela and Cynthia Townley (eds), Amsterdam: Rodopi Press, pp. 95–107.
• Ullmann-Margalit, Edna, 2004 [2017], “Trust, Distrust, and In Between”, in Distrust (Russell Sage Foundation series on trust), Russell Hardin (ed.), New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 60–82. Reprinted in her Normal Rationality: Decisions and Social Order , Avishai Margalit and Cass R. Sunstein (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 184–202.
• Uslaner, Eric M., 1999, “Democracy and Social Capital”, in Warren 1999: 121–150. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511659959.005
• Walker, Margaret Urban, 2006, Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations After Wrongdoing , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Wanderer, Jeremy and Leo Townsend, 2013, “Is it Rational to Trust?” Philosophy Compass , 8(1): 1–14. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00533.x
• Warren, Mark E. (ed.), 1999, Democracy and Trust , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511659959
• Webb, Mark Owen, 1992, “The Epistemology of Trust and the Politics of Suspicion”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 73(4): 390–400. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1992.tb00346.x
• –––, 1993, “Why I Know About As Much As You: A Reply to Hardwig”:, The Journal of Philosophy , 90(5): 260–270. doi:10.2307/2940913
• Welch, Shay, 2013, “Transparent Trust and Oppression”, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy , 16(1): 45–64. doi:10.1080/13698230.2011.597582
• Wonderly, Monique Lisa, 2016, “On Being Attached”, Philosophical Studies , 173(1): 223–242. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0487-0
• Zaner, Richard M., 1991, “The Phenomenon of Trust in the Patient-Physician Relationship”, in Ethics, Trust, and the Professions: Philosophical and Cultural Aspects , Edmund D. Pellegrino, Robert M. Veatch, and John P. Langan (eds.), Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, pp. 45–67.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• “ A Question of Trust ”, 2002 BBC Reith Lecture by Onora O’Neill.
• Russell Sage Foundation Program on Trust .
• “ Building Trust ”, by Donald J. Johnston, OECD Observer , December 2003, 240/241.
• “ Trust and Mistrust ”, with Jorah Dannenberg, Philosophy Talk , 29 December 2013.
• “ On Trust and Philosophy ”, OpenLearn, The Open University.
• “ The Philosophy of Trust: Key Findings ”, The Trust Project at Northwestern University.

Aristotle, General Topics: ethics | autonomy: in moral and political philosophy | autonomy: personal | emotion | epistemology: social | faith | feminist philosophy, interventions: social epistemology | feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on autonomy | feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on the self | friendship | justification, epistemic: internalist vs. externalist conceptions of | reliabilist epistemology | rights: of children | scientific knowledge: social dimensions of | testimony: epistemological problems of

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Julie Ponesse, Ken Chung, and Hale Doguoglu for their research assistance, to Andrew Botterell for his helpful comments, and to the Lupina Foundation and Western University for funding.

Copyright © 2020 by Carolyn McLeod

• Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

• Info about mirror sites

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2023 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Department of Philosophy, Stanford University

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

• SUGGESTED TOPICS
• The Magazine
• Newsletters
• Managing Yourself
• Managing Teams
• Work-life Balance
• The Big Idea
• Data & Visuals
• Reading Lists
• Case Selections
• HBR Learning
• Topic Feeds
• Account Settings
• Email Preferences

Build Your Reputation as a Trustworthy Leader

• Ron Carucci

Lessons from a 15-year study of more than 3,200 leaders.

People’s expectations and definition of trustworthiness are broadening for leaders, and it takes a lot to gain that trust. The author offers four research-based practices for leaders to master to earn and keep the trust of others. First, make your values clear, then make sure you’re living up to them. Second, treat others and their work with dignity. Third, determine when to be vulnerable and open and when to protect confidences. Finally, cultivate a sense of unity across your organization. In times of unprecedented uncertainty, it’s critical to earn and keep the trust of others every day. If you hope to enjoy a career of great influence and impact, start by cultivating a trustworthy reputation.

I recently had to deliver feedback to an executive, let’s call him Gabe, based on data I’d collected. He found this painfully difficult to hear: “People struggle to trust you.” His defensiveness was intense. He insisted he had kept his commitments, delivered positive results, and hadn’t ever acted deceitfully or unscrupulously. And all of those things were true.

• Ron Carucci is co-founder and managing partner at  Navalent , working with CEOs and executives pursuing transformational change. He is the bestselling author of eight books, including To Be Honest and Rising to Power . Connect with him on Linked In at  RonCarucci , and download his free “How Honest is My Team?” assessment.

Partner Center

Home — Essay Samples — Life — Trust — The Importance Of Trust In Society

The Importance of Trust in Society

• Categories: Society Trust

About this sample

Words: 700 |

Published: Mar 18, 2021

Words: 700 | Pages: 2 | 4 min read

Cite this Essay

To export a reference to this article please select a referencing style below:

Let us write you an essay from scratch

• 450+ experts on 30 subjects ready to help
• Custom essay delivered in as few as 3 hours

Get high-quality help

Dr Jacklynne

Verified writer

• Expert in: Sociology Life

+ 120 experts online

By clicking “Check Writers’ Offers”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy policy . We’ll occasionally send you promo and account related email

No need to pay just yet!

Related Essays

1 pages / 316 words

1 pages / 649 words

2 pages / 956 words

2 pages / 1131 words

Remember! This is just a sample.

You can get your custom paper by one of our expert writers.

121 writers online

Still can’t find what you need?

Browse our vast selection of original essay samples, each expertly formatted and styled

Related Essays on Trust

Trust and mistrust form the foundational dynamics of human relationships and societal interactions. As core psychological constructs, they shape one's social experiences, influencing behavior, emotional health, and even the [...]

In the realm of conflict resolution and negotiation, the TIPO Negotiation Model has emerged as a valuable framework for understanding and navigating the complexities of negotiation processes. Developed by Jeswald W. Salacuse, [...]

Trust and mistrust are fundamental concepts that shape human interactions and relationships. Trust is the belief in the reliability, truth, or ability of someone or something, while mistrust is the lack of trust or confidence in [...]

In conclusion, honesty is indeed the best policy in most situations. It is a moral value that promotes trust, transparency, and ethical behavior. Honesty has practical benefits, such as building strong relationships and creating [...]

Tartuffe is a French play written by the French writer Molière. Moliere was an actor and playwright in France during the 17th century. He was born in Paris in 1622 and got his first perform for theatre when he studied at the [...]

Raksana Charitable Trust Established by Mrs.Kavita Subakar in 2011, Raksana Charitable Trust is a Registered Nonprofit Social Organization working for take advancement crosswise over India. Since its origin it has been moving in [...]

Related Topics

By clicking “Send”, you agree to our Terms of service and Privacy statement . We will occasionally send you account related emails.

Where do you want us to send this sample?

By clicking “Continue”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy policy.

Be careful. This essay is not unique

This essay was donated by a student and is likely to have been used and submitted before

Download this Sample

Free samples may contain mistakes and not unique parts

Sorry, we could not paraphrase this essay. Our professional writers can rewrite it and get you a unique paper.

Please check your inbox.

We can write you a custom essay that will follow your exact instructions and meet the deadlines. Let's fix your grades together!

Get Your Personalized Essay in 3 Hours or Less!

We use cookies to personalyze your web-site experience. By continuing we’ll assume you board with our cookie policy .

• Instructions Followed To The Letter
• Deadlines Met At Every Stage
• Unique And Plagiarism Free

• Bipolar Disorder
• Therapy Center
• When To See a Therapist
• Types of Therapy
• Best Online Therapy
• Best Couples Therapy
• Managing Stress
• Sleep and Dreaming
• Understanding Emotions
• Self-Improvement
• Healthy Relationships
• Student Resources
• Personality Types
• Sweepstakes
• Guided Meditations
• Verywell Mind Insights
• 2024 Verywell Mind 25
• Mental Health in the Classroom
• Editorial Process
• Meet Our Review Board
• Crisis Support
• Trust vs. Mistrust
• Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt
• Initiative vs. Guilt
• Industry vs. Inferiority
• Identity vs. Confusion
• Intimacy vs. Isolation
• Generativity vs. Stagnation
• Integrity vs. Despair

Trust vs. Mistrust: Psychosocial Stage 1

The Most Crucial Stage of Childhood

• Why Trust Matters
• Building Trust
• Impact of Mistrust

Learning to Trust

• Next in Psychosocial Development Guide Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt in Psychosocial Stage 2

The trust vs. mistrust stage is the first stage of psychologist  Erik Erikson ’s theory of psychosocial development. It begins at birth and lasts until a child is around 18 months to two years old.

According to Erikson, this is the most important period of a child's life, as it shapes their view of the world as well as their overall personality.

Erikson's psychosocial development theory has seven other stages that span throughout a person's lifetime. At each stage, people face conflicts that either result in psychological strengthening or weakening.

This first stage of psychosocial development consists of:

• Psychosocial Conflict : Trust vs. mistrust
• Major Question : "Can I trust the people around me?"
• Basic Virtue : Hope
• Important Event : Feeding

The Importance of Trust

Babies are almost entirely dependent on their caregivers. So, the ways that parents interact with their babies have a profound effect on a child's health.

Erikson believed that early patterns of trust influence a child's social and emotional development. If a child successfully develops trust, they will feel safe and secure in the world. According to his theory, a parent essentially shapes their child's perception and future relationships.

However, it's important to remember that trust and mistrust exist on a spectrum. People aren't either completely trusting or completely mistrusting.

For example, there will be times when a baby's needs go unmet. A healthy amount of mistrust of our environment as infants prepares us as adults to be cautious and self-protective when necessary.

The key is that an infant's trustworthy relationships and interactions outweigh, for the most part, their untrustworthy ones. According to Erikson, this will give them a better sense of how to trust themselves and the world around them.

Erikson's Trust vs. Mistrust Stage

Children who learn to trust caregivers in infancy will be more likely to form trusting relationships with others throughout the course of their lives.

Believing in caregivers

Trusting that the world is safe

Knowing that needs will be met

Distrusting caregivers

Fearing the world

Unsure that needs will be met

Trust vs. Mistrust Examples

The following are examples of what builds trust between an infant and caregiver:

• An infant's caregivers create a safe environment in which the infant feels protected.
• A mother or father is attentive to their baby's needs (the baby is fed regularly, given affection consistently, etc.).
• A parent reassures their infant when the infant is scared and comforts them when they are in distress.

An infant learns to depend on their caregivers, and in turn, learns that the world is safe and will take care of their needs.

The following are examples of what builds mistrust between an infant and caregiver:

• When an infant cries out, their caregiver isn't available to meet their needs.
• A mother or father is inconsistent in feeding their infant.
• A caregiver doesn't comfort the infant when they are scared or uncomfortable.
• The caregiver allows the infant's environment to become unsafe, and as a result, the infant feels insecure and unsafe.

How To Build Trust

The primary way you can build trust with your baby is to respond when they try to communicate with you. Because babies can't use words to express themselves, they use nonverbal strategies to communicate what they're thinking and feeling at all times.

Crying is one of the most common strategies babies use to communicate with their caregivers, and it carries different meanings. Usually, babies cry to let you know that they need one of the following:

• Affection : Erikson believed that an infant's cries communicated an important message to caregivers. Such cries indicate an unmet need, and it is up to caregivers to determine how to fulfill that need.
• Comfort : It is important for caregivers to provide comfort to an infant by holding them closely and securely. This provides both warmth and physical contact. Feeding, bathing, and comforting your child helps them learn to trust that their needs will be met.
• Food : Erikson also believed that feeding played a pivotal role in the development of trust. By feeding an infant when the child is hungry, they learn that they can trust their need for nourishment will be met.

Every baby communicates differently, so becoming familiar with your baby's communication style is the key to success at this stage. Noticing and responding to these signals, whether they are cries, body movements, coos, or even words, helps them learn to trust you and the world around them.

Learning to trust the world and those around us is the key focus of this psychosocial stage of development. By responding quickly and appropriately to your infant's cries, you're building a foundation of trust.

Consequences of Mistrust

One study done with female twins, both identical and fraternal, concluded that a trusting personality seems to be at least in part genetic , while a mistrustful or distrusting personality seems to be learned from family and other social influences.

Children raised by consistently unreliable, unpredictable parents who fail to meet their basic needs eventually develop an overall sense of mistrust .

Children and adults with low levels of trust may be more likely to:

• Be depressed
• Be socially disengaged
• Be suspicious of others
• Experience loneliness
• Face peer rejection
• Make short-sighted decisions

Mistrust can cause children to become fearful, confused, and anxious , making it difficult to form healthy relationships .

Research shows that being raised in an untrustworthy environment may actually make a child more trusting of untrustworthy people. Researchers believe this is due to an adaptive mechanism that makes it possible for a child to form an attachment bond to an untrustworthy caregiver.

For instance, studies have found that children who were previously in foster care homes where they were mistreated were more likely to display behavior such as sitting in a stranger's lap or walking off with a stranger, whereas children who weren't in foster care homes did not display this behavior.

Consequences of Over-Trusting

Interestingly, being overly-trusting is linked with the same negative consequences as being under-trusting.

One study of school-aged children found that those with very high and very low trust levels tended to internalize problems and perceive a lack of acceptance among their peers.

Ultimately, children must experience trust, along with some degree of mistrust, in order to learn to trust in themselves and their relationships as adults.

If you experienced an unsafe environment or untrustworthy relationships as an infant, you may face difficulties with trust as an adult. But your childhood experiences don't have to define you.

It is possible to overcome childhood experiences and learn to trust.

Research has found, for instance, that children who were neglected while in institutional care experienced significant improvements in their social and behavioral functioning once adopted into nurturing families.

The following are ways that may help you on your journey of shifting your mindset into a more trusting one:

• Show compassion : Showing yourself and others compassion and understanding may be helpful in improving trust. Compassion is a tool that serves to remind us that we are all human and we all struggle at times.
• Try mindfulness : Mindfulness practices such as meditation can teach you how to feel your emotions without judging them.
• Process feelings : Journaling , confiding in a trusted loved one, and letting yourself cry are just a few ways of emotional processing. You may find that a counselor or therapist is a valuable resource. For instance, cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) focuses on helping people reframe old, limiting beliefs into new, proactive ones.
• Consider your environment : When healing from trauma, try to make your environment as safe as possible and interact with people who support you.

Final Thoughts

The trust versus mistrust stage serves as a foundation of development. The outcomes of this stage can influence the rest of childhood and adulthood in profound ways.

Of course, while it is essential for parents to provide responsive, dependable care, there's no need to despair if you experienced mistrust as an infant. Human beings are adaptable, and it is possible to rebuild your sense of trust in yourself and in others.

Sege RD, Harper Browne C. Responding to ACEs with HOPE: Health outcomes from positive experiences . Acad Pediatr . 2017;17(7S):S79-S85. doi:10.1016/j.acap.2017.03.007

Reimann M, Schilke O, Cook KS. Trust is heritable, whereas distrust is not . PNAS . 2017;114(27):7007-7012. doi:10.1073/pnas.1617132114

Murphy G, Peters K, Wilkes L, Jackson D. Childhood parental mental illness: Living with fear and mistrust . Issues Ment Health Nurs . 2015;36(4):294-299. doi:10.3109/01612840.2014.971385

Pitula CE, Wenner JA, Gunnar MR, Thomas KM. To trust or not to trust: Social decision-making in post-institutionalized, internationally adopted youth .  Dev Sci . 2017;20(3). doi:10.1111/desc.12375

American Psychological Association. Basic trust versus mistrust .

Neff KD. Self-compassion: Theory, method, research, and intervention . Annu Rev Psychol . 2022;74(1). doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-032420-031047

Erikson EH. Childhood and Society . W. W. Norton & Company; 1950.

By Kendra Cherry, MSEd Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

Essay on Environment for Students and Children

500+ words essay on environment.

Essay on Environment – All living things that live on this earth comes under the environment. Whether they live on land or water they are part of the environment. The environment also includes air, water, sunlight, plants, animals, etc.

Moreover, the earth is considered the only planet in the universe that supports life. The environment can be understood as a blanket that keeps life on the planet sage and sound.

Importance of Environment

We truly cannot understand the real worth of the environment. But we can estimate some of its importance that can help us understand its importance. It plays a vital role in keeping living things healthy in the environment.

Likewise, it maintains the ecological balance that will keep check of life on earth. It provides food, shelter, air, and fulfills all the human needs whether big or small.

Moreover, the entire life support of humans depends wholly on the environmental factors. In addition, it also helps in maintaining various life cycles on earth.

Most importantly, our environment is the source of natural beauty and is necessary for maintaining physical and mental health.

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

Benefits of the Environment

The environment gives us countless benefits that we can’t repay our entire life. As they are connected with the forest, trees, animals, water, and air. The forest and trees filter the air and absorb harmful gases. Plants purify water, reduce the chances of flood maintain natural balance and many others.

Moreover, the environment keeps a close check on the environment and its functioning, It regulates the vital systems that are essential for the ecosystem. Besides, it maintains the culture and quality of life on earth.

The environment regulates various natural cycles that happen daily. These cycles help in maintaining the natural balance between living things and the environment. Disturbance of these things can ultimately affect the life cycle of humans and other living beings.

The environment has helped us and other living beings to flourish and grow from thousands of years. The environment provides us fertile land, water, air, livestock and many essential things for survival.

Cause of Environmental Degradation

Human activities are the major cause of environmental degradation because most of the activities humans do harm the environment in some way. The activities of humans that causes environmental degradation is pollution, defective environmental policies, chemicals, greenhouse gases, global warming, ozone depletion, etc.

All these affect the environment badly. Besides, these the overuse of natural resources will create a situation in the future there will be no resources for consumption. And the most basic necessity of living air will get so polluted that humans have to use bottled oxygen for breathing.

Above all, increasing human activity is exerting more pressure on the surface of the earth which is causing many disasters in an unnatural form. Also, we are using the natural resources at a pace that within a few years they will vanish from the earth. To conclude, we can say that it is the environment that is keeping us alive. Without the blanket of environment, we won’t be able to survive.

Moreover, the environment’s contribution to life cannot be repaid. Besides, still what the environment has done for us, in return we only have damaged and degraded it.

FAQs about Essay on Environment

Q.1 What is the true meaning of the environment?

A.1 The ecosystem that includes all the plants, animals, birds, reptiles, insects, water bodies, fishes, human beings, trees, microorganisms and many more are part of the environment. Besides, all these constitute the environment.

Q.2 What is the three types of the environment?

A.2 The three types of environment includes the physical, social, and cultural environment. Besides, various scientists have defined different types and numbers of environment.

Customize your course in 30 seconds

Which class are you in.

• Travelling Essay
• Picnic Essay
• Our Country Essay
• My Parents Essay
• Essay on Favourite Personality
• Essay on Memorable Day of My Life
• Essay on Knowledge is Power
• Essay on Gurpurab
• Essay on My Favourite Season
• Essay on Types of Sports

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Download the App